JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri B.K. Srivastava, who has urged that since the High Court at Allahabad is not functioning since long due to continued strike of the lawyers, and, as such, the petitioner cannot present this writ petition at Allahabad. An affidavit has also been filed by the petitioner wherein it has been averred that he had gone to Allahabad on 251986 along with his counsel and neither the petitioner nor his counsel were allowed to enter the High Court premises nor the residence of Hon'ble Judges of the High Court at Allahabad. It has further been averred that the petitioner being a poor man cannot afford to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence he is presenting this writ petition here at Lucknow Bench as the High Court at Allahabad is still not functioning on account of continued lawyers' strike. It has thus been urged that this writ petition deserves to he entertained by this Bench of Allahabad High Court. 2. Learned counsel also referred to various orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Writ Petitions and Special Leave Petitions wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has directed petitioners to approach the Lucknow Bench of the High Court for presenting their petitions seeking appropriate reliefs. Learned counsel referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.668 of 1986 (Jitendra, Singh v. The Vice Chancellor & Others) wherein it has been observed: "This, is a writ petition which should have been appropriately filed in the High Court instead of being filed in this Court. But since the lawyers in Allahabad are on strike and it is not possible for the petitioner to approach the High Court in Allahabad, we would direct that if the petitioner so desires he may file a Writ Petition before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court and if he files such writ petition within 10 days from today, Lucknow Bench of the High Court will entertain the writ petition. Meanwhile in order to enable the petitioner to approach the Lucknow Bench of the High Court, we would direct that the interim order made by this Court on 1541986 shall continue for a, period of 10 days from today. Writ Petition is disposed of acccordingly. Sd/. (Jagan Nath Sharma) 3. Meanwhile in order to enable the petitioner to approach the Lucknow Bench of the High Court, we would direct that the interim order made by this Court on 1541986 shall continue for a, period of 10 days from today. Writ Petition is disposed of acccordingly. Sd/. (Jagan Nath Sharma) 3. In another Writ Petition (Civil) No.774 of 1986 (Smt. Sarju Devi v. District Judge & Others), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to pass the following order: "Writ Petition is allowed to be withdrawn to enable the petitioner to file appropriate proceeding in the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court which is not functioning. On being filed, this case may be entertained by the Lucknow Bench." 1586 Sd/. (J.S. Bahri) Court Master' 4. In a petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.5437 of 1986, (K.K. Varma v. 4. D.M. (R), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following orders: "The Special Leave Petition is rejected since the appropriate remedy for the petitioner is to approach the High Court, but since the Allahabad High Court is not functioning at present we would direct that the petitioner may move for appropriate remedy before the Lucknow Bench within ten days from today. The Lucknow Bench will entertain it. Sd/ 2941986 (Jagannath Sharma) Court Master 5. In another Civil Writ Petition No.2501 of 1986 (Sri Satendrd Kumar Agarwal v. The State of U.P. of Others') the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to make the following orders: "Writ Petition is dismissed since the appropriate remedy for the petitioner is to approach the High Court of Allahabad, But in view of the lawyers' strike of Allahabad and in view of the litigants' difficulties who, we are told are not permitted even to approach the High Court Judges for the purpose of obtaining relief we would direct the Lucknow Bench of the High Court to entertain the Writ Petition which may be filed by the petitioner against the impugned order 5 challenging the order of the V Addl. District & Sessions Judge dated 5486 provided the writ petition is filed within 10 days from today. Mean while there will be exparte stay of operation of the order of the Distt. and Sessions Judge." Sd/ 5486 J.S Bahri Court Master. 6. District & Sessions Judge dated 5486 provided the writ petition is filed within 10 days from today. Mean while there will be exparte stay of operation of the order of the Distt. and Sessions Judge." Sd/ 5486 J.S Bahri Court Master. 6. In yet another Petition for Special leave to Appeal (Civil) No.5513 of 1986 (Ram Saran v. Ram Singh) it has been ordered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court: "This Special Leave Petition is rejected with liberty to the petitioner to file the same within one week from today in the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court since the Allahabad High Court is not functioning. (emphasis supplied). Sd/ 2841986 J.P. Shahri, Court Master. 7. In another Petition for Special Leave to appeal (Civil) No.5611 of 1986 (Aligarh District Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Bimala Devi Sharma, Aligarh), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to order: "Having regard to the circumstances presently prevailing in the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad, the petitioner is permitted to file the petition before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The petitioner will not be ejected from the accommodation in dispute for a fortnight. The Special Leave petition is disposed of accordingly." Sd/ 3041986 (C. Jha) Court Master. 8. Referring to the above orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court learned counsel urged that having regard to the circumstances presently prevailing in the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to direct that the petitions be presented before the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court even in respect of cases which have come up beyond the 12 Districts attached to the Lucknow Bench of the High Court. It was urged by the learned counsel that since lawyers at Allahabad are on strike and it is not possible for the petitioner to approach the High Court at Allahabad, the petitioner is presenting this petition at this Bench of Allahabad High Court. Learned counsel has urged that the petitioner being a poor man cannot afford the costs of litigation in approaching the Hon'ble Supreme Court for obtaining an order for presenting this petition at Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. Learned counsel has urged that the petitioner being a poor man cannot afford the costs of litigation in approaching the Hon'ble Supreme Court for obtaining an order for presenting this petition at Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. Learned counsel further contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has permitted the petitioners to approach Lucknow Bench of the High Court on account of the fact that the High Court at Allahabad is not presently functioning and, as such, this petition be entertained on the same ground. 9. Learned counsel Sri Shafiq Mirza and Sri Syed Ikhlaq Husain, who filed second appeals of the District Bareilly and a first appeal of District Agra respectively, also made their submissions urging that the Lucknow Bencfi of the Allahabad High Court in the present circumstances has got jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions and other civil and criminal matters relating to places outside Avadh area because the High Court of Allahabad is presently not functioning on account of prolonged strike by the Allahabad lawyers in opposition to the proposed creation of a Bench in the western Districts. Affidavits have been filed by the appellants in said appeals stating therein that they were prevented from entering the courtpremises and also the residences of the Hon'ble Judges by the Allahabad lawyers who are on strike for over a month. It has also been averred by the appellants that they cannot afford to bear the extra cost of litigation in approaching the Hon'ble Supreme Court which has permitted cases of the area outside Avadh to be presented at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court. It was used that the appellants should not be denied justice on account of their poverty and utter helplessness in which they are placed in such an extraordinary situation prevailing due to prolonged lawyers' strike resulting in nonfunctioning of Allahabad High Court. 10. Arguments were also addressed by Sri H.N. Tilhari and some other lawyers supporting the contention of the petitioners. Sri Tilhari urged that Article 214 of the Constitution of India provides that there should be a high court for each State. Article 216 relates to the Constitution of High Courts and it provides that every High Court consist of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. Sri Tilhari urged that Article 214 of the Constitution of India provides that there should be a high court for each State. Article 216 relates to the Constitution of High Courts and it provides that every High Court consist of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. He thus urged that the judges sitting at Lucknow Bench of the High Court exercise jurisdiction as a Judge of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which is the High Court for the entire State of Uttar Pradesh. His further contention was that the Amalgamation Order, 1948, does not create another High Court for the State of Uttar Pradesh for the two Commissioners' Division of Lucknow and Faizabad, for short, known as 'Avadh Area'. According to him no such construction can be put to the Amalgamation Order as it would be quite against the Constitution which provides that there should be only one High Court in each State. Thus, according to him, it cannot be urged nor it can be accepted that the judges sitting at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions and appeals of the places outside Avadh area, especially in such an extraordinary situation created by continued indefinite strike by the Allahabad lawyers thereby causing constitutional breakdown for the reason that presently in respect of major part of the State of Uttar Pradesh no High Court is functioning resulting in denial of justice to the litigants of that area. Learned counsel, however, hastened to say that one would be reluctant to easily accept that there has occurred a complete constitutional breakdown in the Higher judiciary of the State as the judges of the High Court sitting at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh are functioning unaffected by the continued indefinite strike of the lawyers of Allahabad High Court. The unhampered smooth working at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court in effect operates to save complete constitutional breakdown in the higher judiciary of the State. The unhampered smooth working at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court in effect operates to save complete constitutional breakdown in the higher judiciary of the State. It was thus urged that the Lucknow Bench of the High Court which at present is functioning as life and soul of the High Court of the State, would be competent to exercise jurisdiction also over the area lying beyond Avadh region in order to provide justice to the people of that area till such time the present State of affairs continues and the High Court at Allahabad does not resume functioning. It would serve the constitutional breakdown in the higher judiciary of the State in that major part of the Province where the High Court is presently not functioning. It was thus urged by the learned counsel that in the present emergent circumstances it can neither be contended nor accepted that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions and appeals of the area outside Avadh. 11. Arguments were also addressed by Sri S.C. Budhwar, Advocate practicing at Allahabad in support of the contentions of the petitioners who urged that in the present prevailing situation arising due to prolonged indefinite strike of Allahabad lawyers, the doctrine of necessity would operate to remove the jurisdictional disability of the Lucknow Bench of the High Court in entertaining these petitions. Learned counsel pointed out that although it has been laid down in Nasiruddin's case ( AIR 1976 SC 331 ), that the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench is confied to twelve districts of Avadh area and that the Hon'ble Chief Justice having once exercised the power under the Amalgamation Order allocating districts to the Lucknow Bench, cannot enlarge or reduce the territorial jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench, yet that can in no manner be construed to mean that the Amalgamation order and the orders passed thereunder has created another High Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh. According to him there is only one High Court in the State and Lucknow Bench is part and parcel of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The judges sitting at Lucknow Bench are the Judges of the High Court. They exercise jurisdiction within the! territorial limits of twelve districts of Avadh when they sit at Lucknow and over remaining other part of the State when they sit at Allahabad. The judges sitting at Lucknow Bench are the Judges of the High Court. They exercise jurisdiction within the! territorial limits of twelve districts of Avadh when they sit at Lucknow and over remaining other part of the State when they sit at Allahabad. But this would not mean that they cease to be judges of the Hon'ble High Court of judicature at Allahabad when they sit at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court. The territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench, however, operates to create a disability in their entertaining the writ petitions and other matters relating to areas outside twelve Districts of Avadh. This disability, according to learned counsel Sri Budhwar, would not operate as a bar in view of doctrine of necessity fully applicable in such emergency and extraordinary situation cropping up due to indefinite strike by Allahabad Lawyers on account of which High Court at Allahabad is not functioning. The poor litigants, who cannot afford to approach Hon'ble Supremje Court, cannot be denied justice and their petitions cannot be refused to be entertained at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court, when some petitions have been entertained of those wealthy litigants who could afford to Approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court and obtained orders from the Hon'ble 'Supreme Court permitting them to present their petitions at the Lucknow Bench. Learned counsel had put a question to himself whether such a jurisdiction could be created or conferred by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the Lucknow Bench of High Court without an amendment being made in the Amalgamation Order. The reply was that it could not be done except under the doctrine of necessity according to which the disability to entertain and decide a case would stand removed in the extraordinary circumstances arising due to prolonged indefinite strike on account of which High Court at Allahabad is not functioning. He, thus, urged that in the present situation even without requiring the petitioners to approach the Hon'ble supreme Court for orders in that behalf, the petitions can be entertained! at the Lucknow Bench. 12. Learned Additional Advocate General Sri R.N. Trivedi was asked to assist court and address his arguments on the aforesaid vital question raised by the learned counsel, referred to above. at the Lucknow Bench. 12. Learned Additional Advocate General Sri R.N. Trivedi was asked to assist court and address his arguments on the aforesaid vital question raised by the learned counsel, referred to above. Referring to Amalgamation order and citing Nasiruddin's case (supra) learned counsel urged that the judges sitting at Allahabad alone can entertain the writ petitions and other matters arising outside Avadh area and that the judges sitting at Lucknow Bench can exercise territorial jurisdiction confined only to twelve districts of Avadh and no petition can be entertained at the Lucknow Bench of outside Avadh area unless directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that behalf. Learned counsel, however, could not point out any such provision under the Amalgamation Order, enabling the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory jurisdiction or otherwise to make such order creating jurisdiction in the Lucknow Bench of the High Court to entertain such writ petitions and other matters relating to districts outside Avadh Area. But according to him such orders could be appropriately passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and also in certain matters under Article 32/139 in a writ petition filed before it. His contention has been that under Article 136 Special Leave Petitions could be presented against any judgment or order in any court or tribunal passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. But whether while not entertaining Special Leave Petitions and rejecting them on the ground that the petitioner has got remedy to approach High Court could those writ petitions and appeals, which were entertainable by the High Court at Allahabad, be directed to be presented at the Lucknow Bench which has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain such petitions Further, whether the abovereferred orders would be construed to create, confer or extend the territorial jurisdiction on the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court to entertain such petitions when it is not possessed of such jurisdiction? 13. In reply to said crucial questions, learned counsel urged, that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to pass the aforesaid orders considering the extraordinary situation created due to lawyers' indefinite strike on account of which High Court at Allahabad is not functioning. 13. In reply to said crucial questions, learned counsel urged, that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to pass the aforesaid orders considering the extraordinary situation created due to lawyers' indefinite strike on account of which High Court at Allahabad is not functioning. The orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, though may not amount to create or confer jurisdiction on the Lucknow Bench to entertain petitions and other matters of the places outside Avadh area, but the same would be binding on parties to the case and cannot be questioned and challenged on the ground that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to pass such order directing the Lucknow Bench to entertain such petitions, which otherwise could not be entertained by it. Learned counsel thus urged that the present petitioner and the appellants may be required to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court to obtain similar order, like the one passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in other petitions in case they cannot wait, awaiting the lawyers' strike be called off. Similar arguments were addressed by the learned counsel Sri Umesh Chandra Srivastava. 14. Having carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel, I find much substance in the arguments addressed op behalf pf the petitioners. It is quite evident from the affidavits on record that the present petitioners and the appellant could not present their writ petitions and appeals in the High Court at Allahabad on account of picketting by the Allahabad lawyers at the High Court premises and at the residences of the Hon'ble Judges. These petitioners have also averred that being poor persons they cannot arrange money to bear the extra expenses of litigation in opproaching Hon'ble Supreme Court for obtaining an order for presenting the petition and appeals in this Court. There appears no ground to disbelieve their statement on the point. The Hon'ble Supreme Court repeatedly observed in the above quoted various orders passed in the writ petitions and Special Leave petitions that the High Court at Allahabad is not functioning and for that reason Hon'ble Supreme Court appears to have been pleased to direct the petitioners to approach Lucknow Bench of the High Court for presenting their petitions and appeals. 15. 15. It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and in my opinion, quite correctly, that the aforesaid orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be said to have been passed under any statutory provision of any enactment or under any supervisory jurisdiction over the working of the High Court or in exercise of any such power for transferring an uninstituted case cognizable by the High Court at Allahabad to the Lucknow Bench, for which, in my opinion, there exists no provision in the Constitution or Statute. Such orders can also be not taken to have been passed under the Amalgamation Order as there is no provision authorising Hon'ble Supreme Court to pass orders conferring jurisdiction on the Lucknow Bench of the High Court to entertain writ petition and other civil and criminal matters which are exclusively entertainable by the High Court at Allahabad. Such a present emergent situation had never arisen nor it could then be visualized to occur in future so that it might have been taken care of by incorporating appropriate provision in Amalgamation Order to meet such contingency as and when arises. The aforesaid orders can therefore, be taken to have been passed keeping in view the convenience of the litigants under the doctrine of necessity which would operate to remove the disability pertaining to territorial limits of jurisdiction enabling the petitioners to approach Lucknow Bench of the High Court seeking appropriate reliefs as the High Court at Allahabad is presently not functioning. 16. It cannot be disputed that Article 214 of the Constitution of India provides for the establishment of only one High Court in each State. The creation of the Lucknow Bench under the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, for short 'the Amalgamation Order', cannot amount to creation of another High Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench created by an order passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice allocating 12 districts to the Lucknow Bench, cannot amount to territorial bifurcation of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad (for short 'the High Court'). The territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench created by an order passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice allocating 12 districts to the Lucknow Bench, cannot amount to territorial bifurcation of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad (for short 'the High Court'). In Bhuwal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh ( AIR 1977 All 488 ), the Full Bench endorsed the majority view expressed in Nirmal Das Khaturia v. State Transport (Appellate) Tribunal AIR 1972, All 200 (FB) wherein it was held: We are unable to subscribe to the view that if cases arising in the Oudh areas are to be heard at Lucknow alone it would in effect result in splitting up the High Court into two Courts. From the provisions of the Amalgamation order already set out, it is clear that there is only one High Court with one seal, one Chief Justice and a single body of judges, and a single code of rules and orders relating to practice and procedure which except for a few transitional provisions operates in respect of the entire court. The jurisdiction defined by Article 7 vests in the entire body of judges. It is a jurisdiction enjoyed by every judge of the High Court and extends to all cases throughout the territories of the State. Where that jurisdiction will be exercised is a matter determined under Article 14. It may be exercised at Allahabad or it may be exercised at Lucknow or at any other place appointed by the Chief Justice under Article 14. But wherever exercised it is exercised by a Judge, who equally with all the other judges represents the High Court. 17. The judges at Lucknow are part of the same High Court as those at Allahabad. Whether the judge sits at Allahabad or at Lucknow, he remains a judge of the same High Court. A judge sitting at Lucknow may sit at Allahabad and vice versa. It is only the work entrusted to him at the two places which will differ. A judge of the High Court at Lucknow will hear cases arising in the specified areas of Oudh except cases transferred to Allahabad, while a Judge at Allahabad will exercise jurisdiction in respect of all remaining cases. It is only the work entrusted to him at the two places which will differ. A judge of the High Court at Lucknow will hear cases arising in the specified areas of Oudh except cases transferred to Allahabad, while a Judge at Allahabad will exercise jurisdiction in respect of all remaining cases. The writ of the High Court runs throughout the territories of the State and the law laid down whether by the Judges at Lucknow or the Judges at Allahabad is binding on all throughout the State the judges the lay public alike.................. 18. Similar question came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in relation to the Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharastra, v. Narayan Shamrao purenikao and others, ( AIR 1983 SC 46 ) after considering orders passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court in exercise of powers under subsection (3) of Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 observed: "The nonobstante clause contained in subsection (3) of Section 51, gives an overriding effect to the power of the Chief Justice. There is no territorial bifurcation of the High Court merely because the chief Justice directs under subsection (3) of Section 51 of the Act that the judges and Division Courts shall also sit at such other places as he with the approval of the Governor appoints. It must accordingly be held that there was no territorial bifurcation of the Bombay High merely because the Chief Justice by the impugned Notification may, Court issued under the clause (3) of Section 51 of the Act directed that the judges and Division Courts shall sit at Aurangabad. In Seth Mauji deva v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on July 22,1958, it was challenged that all income tax references presented at Nagpur should be heard at the principal seat of the; High Court at Bombay since Rule 254 of the Appellate side Rules excludes jurisdiction of High Court functioning at Nagpur, it was observed : "Legally the position is quite clear. Under Section 5 (3) of the States Reorganisation Act, the judges sitting at Nagpur constitute part of the High Court of Bombay. Under Section 5 (3) of the States Reorganisation Act, the judges sitting at Nagpur constitute part of the High Court of Bombay. They are as much par of the High Court of Bombay, and if we might say so distinguished part of the High Court of Bombay, as if they were sitting under the same roof under which judges function in Bombay. All that happens is that the Chief Justice under the powers given to him under the Letters Patent distributes the work to various judges and various Division Benches, and acting under that power he distributes certain work to the judges sitting at Nagpur." After considering Rule 254, it was expressed: After all, courts exist for the convenience of the litigants and not in order to maintain any particular system of administration. Whenever a court finds that a particular rule does not serve the convenience of litigants, the court should be always prepared to change the rule. 19. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Mauji Deva's case (Supra) was referred to in the above referred State of Maharastra's case ( AIR 1983 SC 46 ), and it was observed : "The ratio to be deduced from the decision of the Hon'ble Chief Justice is that the judges and Division Court!, sitting at Nagpur were functioning as if they were the judges and Divisions Courts of the High Court at Bombay (emphasis laid). 20. In view of the above I am of opinion that the Amalgamation Order, 1948, does not create another High Court for the State of Uttar Pradesh for the two Commissioners Division of Lucknow and Faizabad known as Avadh area, the judges at Lucknow are part of the same High Court as those of Allahabad. The territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench is, no doubt, defined by the orders issued by the Hon'ble Chief Justice in exercise of powers in the Amalgamation Order, 1948. But the First Proviso to Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order, cannot be construed in the splitting up the High Court into two High Courts having altogether separate entity unconcerned with each other. 21. But the First Proviso to Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order, cannot be construed in the splitting up the High Court into two High Courts having altogether separate entity unconcerned with each other. 21. However, the main question which crops up for consideration in the present petition is as to whether in the present prevailing circumstances when the High Court at Allahabad is not functioning, can the writ petitions and other matters coming up from places outside 12 Districts of Avadh area be entertained at Lucknow Bench even without orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that behalf and can the disability relating to territorial jurisdiction can be taken to be removed by the application of doctrine of necessity as was urged by the learned counsel Sri S.C. Budhwar. 22. It was urged by the learned Advocate General that the petitioners cannot be said to be remedyless and incapacitated by the continued strike of the Allahabad lawyers on account of which the High Court at Allahabad is not functioning because they can approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and obtain order from that Court for presenting their petitions at Lucknow Bench of the High Court as other litigants have done. This argument at the first flash appears to be attractive but on careful consideration, I am unable to find much force in it. Firstly, because I find that every litigant of the vast area attached to the territorial jurisdiction of High Court at Allahabad, cannot be expected to conveniently approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court and secondly, it will be very difficult in these hard days for poor litigants to arrange funds for approaching Hon'ble Supreme Court to obtain orders for presenting their petitions at this Bench of the High Court. Further, there also appears much substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the territorial jurisdiction of this court cannot be enlarged nor the jurisdictional disability in entertaining writ petitions and other civil or criminal matters of places beyond Avadh area can be removed under any other enabling statutory provision except on the basis of doctrine of necessity being fully applicable in the present emergent circumstances, then why this court should require the litigants to first obtain orders from the Hon'ble Supreme Court before approaching this court, especially when for the applicability of the said universely recognized doctrine no orders of the higher court are required. Thus, the insistance upon it would, in my opinion, amount to callous denial of justice. 23. Sri R.N. Trivedi, learned Advocate General, had however urged that some orders for the removal of the territorial disability of the Lucknow Bench in entertaining writ petitions and other matters would be required to be passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which it can very well pass in exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution, and that such orders would be binding on the parties and the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be challenged. A serious challenge was made to this argument by the learned counsel for the petitioners and it was urged that the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot possibly create or confer jurisdiction in the Lucknow Bench for entertaining petitions of the area beyond twelve Districts of Avadh by an order passed under Article 136 of the Constitution, It was urged, and quite correctly, that while rejecting the writ petition or the Special Leave Petitions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court could only direct the petitioners to present their petitions before the competent court, which would be none else but the High Court, Allahabad because by an order under said Article the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench could not possibly be extended in respect of the cases not entertainable by the Lucknow Bench of the High Court. The aforesaid orders, however, appear to have been appropriately made on the basis of well recognized doctrine of necessity and also keeping in view the convenience of the litigants who are unable to get justice from the High Court at Allahabad which is presently not functioning. 24. The aforesaid orders, however, appear to have been appropriately made on the basis of well recognized doctrine of necessity and also keeping in view the convenience of the litigants who are unable to get justice from the High Court at Allahabad which is presently not functioning. 24. Next crucial question on which much stress was laid is whether a litigant before approaching this court would have first to approach, the Hon'ble Supreme Court to obtain order in that behalf. In my opinion, it would not be necessary because as already observed above, no order of the higher court would be required for the applicability of the said 'doctrine of necessity' according to which any jurisdictional disability would stand removed in such given emergent circumstances like in the present one. Thus, this court, in order to prevent the failure of justice and to provide justice to the rich and the poor alike, can entertain writ petitions and others civil and criminal matters on the basis of said doctrine even without an order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that behalf, but it can be done only so long as the High Court at Allahabad is not functioning and the present, prevailing circumstances persist. In de Smith' Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition, by J.N. Evans, it has been expressed while considering the question of exemption from disqualification regarding jurisdiction to a cause, it has been expressed at page 276 of the Book : "An adjudicator who is subject to disqualification at common law may be required to sit if there is no other competent tribunal or if a quorum cannot be formed without him. Here the doctrine of necessity is applied to prevent a failure of justice. So, if proceedings were brought against all the superior judges, they would have to sit as judges in their own cause. Similarly, a judge may be obliged to hear a case in which he has a pecuniary interest. 25. It is true that such a doctrine of necessity should be sparingly invoked and applied but its application cannot be denied in the present situation when the High Court at Allahabad is not at all functioning. 26. Similarly, a judge may be obliged to hear a case in which he has a pecuniary interest. 25. It is true that such a doctrine of necessity should be sparingly invoked and applied but its application cannot be denied in the present situation when the High Court at Allahabad is not at all functioning. 26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly observed in the aforesaid orders that the High Court at Allahabad is not functioning as the lawyears in Allahabad are on strike and it is not possible for the petitioners to approach and present their writ petitions and appeals in the High Court at Allahabad. Thus, since the High Court at Allahabad is presently not functioning, and, as such, the above well recognized doctrine would merit its application to prevent failure of justice. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged, and in my opinion, quite correctly, that a poor litigant cannot be denied the right of approaching this court merely on the ground of his poverty and inability to raise funds for approaching the Hon'ble Supreme Court to obtain similar orders as has been passed in other cases, especially when for the applicability of the said 'doctrine of necessity' no such orders of the higher court would be needed and this court can itself entertain petition on that basis. Any litigant cannot be denied justice by reason of economic or other disability nor it would be reasonable to ask the poor litigant first to go to Supreme Court to obtain directions for getting his case entertained at lucknow Bench after mortgaging his property in order to raise funds for meeting expenses of litigation in approaching the Hon'ble Supreme Court, especially when this court on the same basis and parity of grounds entertains cases relating to areas beyond Avadh region so long as prevailing circumstances persist and the High Court at Allahabad does not start functioning. 28. 28. If the lawcourts are to fulfil the obligation to provide speedy and cheap justice to the litigants approaching law courts seeking justice, then they cannot be left uncared for in bewilderness in the grave situation of the kind in which at present the litigants find themselves landed and stranded gazing curiously towards the gates of the monument of temple of justice in utter helplessness and waiting anxiously for the doors of the highest court of justice in the State to flung open and the picketing personalities of the legal profession permit them to approach the Court seeking redress in their cause. The situation has worsened more because such a situation is persisting since long with no indication that the blockade will be removed in future. The litigants are wandering here and there with their briefs curiously waiting for the storm of agitation to fade out. Some litigants, who could afford to bear the extra costs of litigation approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court which on being apprised of the present prevailing situation, has been pleased to pass aforesaid orders in order to prevent failure of justice. The well recognized doctrine of necessity, which operates to remove the jurisdictional disability in such a given situation of emergency and dire necessity is inherently manifest in the orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court directing petitioners to approach Lucknow Bench of the High Court for presenting their petitions. 29. It cannot be denied that every litigant cannot afford to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court being unable to bear enormous extra cost of litigation, nor it can be urged that the doctrine of necessity would be confined in its application only to those cases where the litigant in the quest of getting justice in his cause in the present emergent situation should first approach the Highest court of the Country. Thus, in the absence of any legal requirement to that effect, there appears to be no rationality in requiring the litigants to first obtain orders from the Hon'ble Supreme Court before presenting their petitions in this court. 30. Thus, in the absence of any legal requirement to that effect, there appears to be no rationality in requiring the litigants to first obtain orders from the Hon'ble Supreme Court before presenting their petitions in this court. 30. Thus, in view of the above, I find that this court can entertain writ petitions and other civil and criminal matters relating to area falling beyond twelve Districts of Avadh only so long as the present prevailing circumstances persist and the High Court at Allahabad is not functioning, without requiring the litigants of said area to first approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court seeking orders to that effect. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before me an order of the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Mathur and Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.L. Loomba, admitting a writ petition presented by petitioner Kripal (Kripal v. Zila Panchayat Raj Adhikari, Saharanpur and Another), wherein the petitioners had challenged the order of his removal from the office of the Pradhan, Gaon Sabha Maukali Kala, District Saharanpur, by the impugned order. Although this writ petition related to the District of Saharanpur, but the petitioner without approaching Hon'ble Supreme Court presented his petition at Lucknow Bench which has been admitted. Similar is the case in the present petitions as well. 32. Thus having regard to the circumstances presently prevailing at Allahabad High Court at Allahabad and also having regard to the fact that the High Court at Allahabad is not functioning, I find that there is no bar in petitioner's presenting this writ petition at the Lucknow Bench. This writ petition is, therefore, entertained. 33. This order would also govern the above noted second appeal and First Appeal relating to Districts Bareilly and Agra. A copy of this order be placed on the records of the said appeals. (Petition entertained.)