JUDGMENT S.S. Sandhawalia C.J. Whether each and every provision of the Bihar and Orissa Jail Manual, 1927, is stricto sensu a justice able statutory rule and with particular reference to rules 981 and 982 thereof is the primal common question in this set of four cases necessitating this reference to the Full Bench. Assuming so, the subsidiary issues is whether the said rule 982 is mandatory or purely recommendatory. Equally at issue is the correctness of the Division Bench’s decision in Chandeshwar Prasad Singh and other vs. The State of Bihar and other. 2. The representative matrix of facts may be briefly noticed from criminal writ jurisdiction case no. 257 of 1985 (Birendra Kumar Singh and another vs. The State of Bihar). The two petitioners were convicted on the charge of pre-meditated murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and at present are lodged in the Central Jail, Patna. By virtue of Chapter XXXIV of the Bihar and Orissa Jail Manual (hereinafter called the Manual”), and in particular, Rules 981 and 982 thereof, convicted prisoners are classified in three divisions namely, Division I, Division II and all these prisoners who do not come within the purview of the same, as Division III. The convicted prisoners classified in Division I and II enjoy various privileges in their treatment within the Jails prescribed inter alia by Rules 1014 and 1015 of the Manual, which are not available to the rest. The petitioner filed a petition before the District Magistrate, Patna purporting to be under the Rules of the Manual, seeking a higher classification of prisoners there under, Vide order dated the 1st, of September, 1980 the District Magistrate, on the basis of some report cryptically allowed the petition for uppers class in the Jail and directed the Jail Superintendent to Act, accordingly (vide Annexure ‘3’ to the petition). It is averred that in pursuance of that order, the petitioners were granted the statues of upper division prisoners and are enjoying the privileges and benefits every since. However, by the impugned order dated the 8th October, 1985 (Annexure-4) the respondents issued directions to the Superintendents of all jails in Bihar that no prisoner in any case will get the benefit of upper division prisoner till the confirmation of the recommendation by the classifying authority, which, admittedly, is the Government. However, by the impugned order dated the 8th October, 1985 (Annexure-4) the respondents issued directions to the Superintendents of all jails in Bihar that no prisoner in any case will get the benefit of upper division prisoner till the confirmation of the recommendation by the classifying authority, which, admittedly, is the Government. It has been averred that the said impugned order has directly affected nearly 600 of 800 upper division prisoners all over the State, including the petitioners. Aggrieved thereby the present criminal writ petitions have been preferred. 3. In the counter-affidavit field on behalf of the Respondents State, the board factual position is not controverted. The stand taken is that under Rule 982, the State Government alone has the power to confirm any recommendation of a classifying authority, and necessarily has got the power to suspend or to confirm any such recommendation. It is the stand that the recommendation for the higher classification is purely provisional till approved and confirmed by the State Government and vests no legal right in the petitioners nor does it amount to any deprivation of an accrued vested privilege. It is then averred that under Rule 982 the District Magistrates are not empowered to pass orders of a permanent natural and they are purely recommending authorities to the Government and cannot grant or confer a vested of higher classification. The firm stand taken is that the orders of higher classification have been secured through maneuvering and without first furnishing the copies of the judgment of conviction and without obtaining the confirmatory order of the Government, and therefore, they cannot be allowed to continue ad infinitum and the writ petitions are thus neither maintainable nor meritorious. 4. At the threshold stage of admission, reliance on behalf of the petitioners was sought to be placed on Chandeshwar Prasad Singh and another’s vs. The State of Bihar and another (Supra) the correctness of which had been frontally assailed on behalf of the respondents and the firm stand taken that the mere classification of prisoners suggested by Rule 981 and 982 of the Manual was not justice able, as these were not statutory rules at all. In view of the importance of the matter and the challenge to an earlier precedent, the writ petitions were directed to be heard by a Full Bench. 5. In the first flush of argument Mr. In view of the importance of the matter and the challenge to an earlier precedent, the writ petitions were directed to be heard by a Full Bench. 5. In the first flush of argument Mr. S.B.N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, virtually attempted to start on the assumption that the Manual was statutory and in terms framed under clause (18) of section 59 (2) of the Prisons Act, 1894. However, when asked to substantiate such a presumption the learned counsel appeared to be on a wholly slippery ground. Despite repeated pinpointing it could not even remotely be established that each and every provision of the Manual was expressly framed under section 59, and in particular, Chapter XXXIV of the Manual pertaining to classification of convicted prisoners for the purpose of treatment, in which rules 981 and 982 fall, which are the subject matter of specific consideration. In the ultimate analysis, the learned counsel for the petitioners had to fairly concede that there was no section of any Act, or any other legal provisions to which either expressly or by clearest implication the provisions of Chapter XXXIV of the Manual could be traced as Stricto sensu statutory rules in the legal sense of having been the mandate of a rule making power conferred by a legislative enactment. 6. That the manual does not derive any legal source from Section 59 of the Prison Act, of 1894 is manifest from the fact that it did not see the light of the day till as late as the year 1927. It would appear that the Manual derived its genealogy from the earlier Bengal Jail Code of 1910. Learned Counsel for the petitioners did not even remotely attempt to show, far from establishing, that the predecessor Bengal Jail Code of 1910 was itself stricto sensu statutory or was framed under the Act, aforesaid. Indeed, the same was not even cited before us. There is thus a gap of 33 years betwixt the enactment of the Prisons Act, of 1894, and the printing and publishing of the first edition of the Manual in 1927. Not the least explanation has been offered as to why in this yawing period no rules were framed earlier or the cause that necessitated of there being so framed by the Manual under Section 59 of the said Act. Not the least explanation has been offered as to why in this yawing period no rules were framed earlier or the cause that necessitated of there being so framed by the Manual under Section 59 of the said Act. Therein, there is not the least indication that the provisions of the Manual are being framed under sub section (2) of section 59 of the Prisons Act, of 1894. Indeed, the opening Chapter I of the Manual refers not merely to the Prisons Act, of 1894, but generically to 12 of more other statues and regulations, which cover the rambling filed of prison management and the establishment of Jails, the confinement and treatment of prisoners therein and the maintenance of discipline amongst them. These statues and regulations are separately printed and the second volume of the Manual. Indeed, as the Preface to this Manual by A.E. Scrooge, the then Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, Judicial Department, would indicate the provisions of the Manual are mere instructions or guidelines which were originally drafted by Rai Sahib Pokhar Das Verma and revised by Mr. J.A. Hubback, I.C.S., in the light of the Indian Jails Committee’s report, modifying the earlier Bengal Jail Code, as adapted to the Province of Bihar and Orissa. There is thus not the least indication of the provisions of the Manual being statutory rules framed by the well know procedures under the rule making power of the legislative enactment. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners in a vain attempt to reach out to some statutory source, made a reference to the opening part of Chapter II for suggesting that the Manual was framed under section 60 (a) of a Prisons Act, of 1894 (subsequently repealed and substituted by section 59(2). To my mind reference to Rule 2 in Chapter II does not even remotely advance that stand of the petitioners. As would be elaborated hereinafter in the matter of statutory rules, one cannot lunch on the high seas of speculation or a voyage of discovery to locate the legal sanction, where the provisions themselves do not remotely disclose such a source by actual reference or by necessary and unambiguous implication. As would be elaborated hereinafter in the matter of statutory rules, one cannot lunch on the high seas of speculation or a voyage of discovery to locate the legal sanction, where the provisions themselves do not remotely disclose such a source by actual reference or by necessary and unambiguous implication. It is significant to recall, and if necessary to repeat, that the opening part of Chapter I of the Manual makes reference not to the Prisons Act, of 1894 in singularity, but in a consolidated group of 12 or more prisons statues or regulations. Against, it neither in the heading nor in the Preamble nor in the preface of the opening part of the Manual gives any remote indication even as to the particular section or the legal source under which the Manual is said to be framed. Indeed, Mr. Scroope’s preface, to which a reference has already been made, gives the lie direct to any such source in the following terms :- “The Jail Manual now issued in an up-to-date reprint of the Bengal Jail Code of 1910 as adapted to the Province of Bihar and Orissa. A number of changes have been introduced in prisons administration in the province as a result of the Indian Jail Committee’s report and numerous correction slips have rendered the 1910 edition out-of date. It is also desirable that the Province should have a complete set of rules of its own. The original draft was prepared with care and ability by Jailor Rai Sahib Pokhar Das Verma. Mr. J.A. Hubback, I.C.S. was placed special on duty to revise and complete the work, These volume should be cited as the Bihar and Orissa Jail Manual, 1928. A.E. Scroope, Secretary to the Govt. of Bihar and Orissa “Judicial Department”. 8. Now the aforesaid is plainly indicative of the fact that apparently on the separation of the Province of Bihar and Orissa from Bengal, the earlier Bengal Jail Code 1910, continued to serve as a Management Manual for the Jails and it was not till 1927 that in a way it was redrafted and revised in the shape of the present Manual as a convenient set of administrative instructions. The different Chapters of the Manual (barring Chapter XXI pertaining to remissions) do not at all indicate or suggest that these were framed under the legal source of any particular section of the 12 or more prison statues governing the filed. Equally, it is a mistake nation that Chapter II of the Manual has been framed under Section (2) or the earlier repealed Sec. 60 (a) of the Prisons Act, 1894. It does not even remotely pretend to say so. Indeed the correct interpretation of Chapter II of the Manual plainly is that it refers to the fact that section 60 (a) of the Prisons Act, 1894 (which now stands repealed had earlier classified Jails into Central Jails, District Jails, Subsidiary Jails and Sub-Jails, On the lines thereof, the then existing jails of Buxar, Bhagalpur, Gaya and Hazaribagh were declared to be Central jails, Similarly, 11 others were declared as District Jails and a numbers of others as subsidiary Jails, and, a reference was made to Monghyr, which was termed as special jail for the confinement of juvenile prisoners and know as the Juvenile Jail. Thus, the reference to the relevant section of the Prisons Act, 1894, is not any declaration of statutory source, but merely a reference for the factual division of the existing jails in the State for the purposes of classification into four categories. Therefore, the suggestion that Chapter II, or, for that matter, the rest of the provisions of the Manual, has been declared to be framed under section 59 (2) of the Indian Prisons Act. 1894, must be rejected, Even otherwise, it seems wholly incongruous that if the Manual derived its authority from the specific section 59 or 60, it should not have been mentioned either in the heading or in the preamble or in the preface or even in the opening part of Chapter I thereof. 9. Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad ingenuously delved into history whilst attempting to argue that at the material time in year 1927, when the Manual was punished, section 59(1) of the Indian Prisons Act, 1894 authorized the Governor Central in Council to frame rules under the said Act. It was submitted that the Manual refers to the same having been prescribed by the Governor in Council and, therefore, indicative of the fact that these rules were framed under the said section at that time. It was submitted that the Manual refers to the same having been prescribed by the Governor in Council and, therefore, indicative of the fact that these rules were framed under the said section at that time. This contention is only to be noticed and rejected. At the material time, Section 59 read as under :- “59. POWER TO MAKE RULES-The Governor-General in Council may for any part to British India, and each Local Government, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, may for the territories under its administration, make rules consistent with this Act…….” It would be plain from the above that the primal rule making authority was the Governor-General in Council. On the other hand, the reference in the heading of the Manual is not to the Governor-General in Council at all. It only refers to the prescription by the Governor of Bihar and Orissa and Council. Even if the earlier provision is read as authorizing the Governor in Council to do so, the same would only be by the express permission and the delegated authority of the Governor General in Council. There is nothing whatsoever to show that any such permission was ever sought or any such delegation was ever made. That being so, the argument of Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad indeed must boomerang upon him and cast a further shadow of doubt, because the Manual admittedly is not framed either by the Governor-General in Council, or by his permission or delegation. 10. Apparently clutching on a last straw, Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad had then sought to place reliance on Ranbir Singh Sehgal Vs. the State of Punjab wherein their Lordship observed that Paragraph 571 and 572 of the Punjab Jail Manual were presumably drafted under the Prisons Act, of 1894. This submission at once reminds one of the warning in Quinn Vs. Leathem pointedly highlighting the pit falls of reading every line or observation in a judgment as its ratio. Admittedly, the issue was not even remotely raised before their Lordship in the case aforesaid. The provisions there were of the Punjab Jail Manual and paragraphs 5 and 7 (5) there of, which have not the least analogy or relevance to what we are herein called upon to construe. In the said case the challenge was raised to the validity of the aforesaid paragraphs, which was upheld. The provisions there were of the Punjab Jail Manual and paragraphs 5 and 7 (5) there of, which have not the least analogy or relevance to what we are herein called upon to construe. In the said case the challenge was raised to the validity of the aforesaid paragraphs, which was upheld. Herein in the reserves, the claim is that the provisions of the manual are statutory and a mandamus it sought for to enforce the same on that premise. The employment of the word ‘Presumably’ by their Lordship is plainly a studied reminder or a pointer that they were not at all adjudicating on the issue. There cannot possibly be any presumability when a pointed issue as to whether the provision is statutorily binding or not is expressly raised. Little or no aid can therefore be derived by the petitioners from the observation in the aforesaid judgment. 11. Though the specific submissions stand rejected after consideration, the larger question that nonetheless looms is whether statutory rules must on their face disclose the fountainhead of the power had authority under which they have been framed, or, in any case, an unequivocal and unambiguous link establishing the toe. Learned Counsel for the parties before us stand that there was no direct decision of the Final court or of this court, or, for the matter, of any other court, holding one way or the other. The issue has, therefore, to be somewhat refreshingly examined on principle. 12. In this context learned counsel for the petitioners, attempted to contend that even though admittedly Chapter XXXIV of the Manual and most other Chapter (barring Chapter XXI with regard to remission) do not even remotely declare or disclose any section of a parent statutory provision under which these are purportedly framed, yet it would be permissible by a process of remote ration/creation to infer or connect them with any one of the 12 or more prisons statutes referred to in Chapter I By way of analogy, reliance was placed on Afzal Ullah vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (paragraph 13 and 14) P. Radhakrishna Naidu & other vrs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmadabad vs. Ban Hirabed. 13. The aforesaid argument, though it may bring credit to the ingenuity of the counsel, is nevertheless fallacious and has to be rejected for reasons that follow. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmadabad vs. Ban Hirabed. 13. The aforesaid argument, though it may bring credit to the ingenuity of the counsel, is nevertheless fallacious and has to be rejected for reasons that follow. However, since it is sought to be buttressed by binding precedent, it is apt to first distinguish the same. Now it is well settled that with regard to any order simpliciter or any action purported to be taken under any law, it is not necessary or mandatory to indicate therein the statutory provisions under which it is taken, though if it is so done, it would be desirable enough, Equally well settled it is that even where it is purported to be done, but a wrong provisions of law is mentioned, the same would not invalidate the order or the action, if their exists an otherwise valid statutory source under which such action or order can be sustained. In other words, if the statutory sanction exists, the non-mentioning thereof or even a wrong labeling of the same in an order does not vitiate the same or the action taken there under. Consequently, it is not only permissible but always possible to trace the statutory source of power an order or an action, the validity of which is challenged, even though it is not specific or has been wrongly specified. All the three aforementioned authorities are a warrant for this proposition with which there can possibly be no quarrel on principle, and, indeed none in view of the binding precedent. 14. What, however, is true with regard to an order or action cannot possibly be true or be extended to legislation strico sensu. In Babu Ram Upadhya’s case their Lordships rightly held that once statutory rules have been validly framed under an Act, then they become part and parcel of the same. Assuming that such rules are within the parameters of the rule making power of the parent statue, they in a way merge with the same with an identical authority and as if they were in a way merge in the very section of the Act, itself. Consequently, in order to subsist, such rules must expressly be framed under the parent provisions and within the limits spelt out in the section conferring a rule making power therefore. Consequently, in order to subsist, such rules must expressly be framed under the parent provisions and within the limits spelt out in the section conferring a rule making power therefore. The larger principles governing the framing of subordinate legislation or delegated legislation are at once at traced in this context. One has to remind oneself of the cardinal rule that herein the legislature cannot possibly abdicate this duty and has to prescribe the parameter within which the rule has to be framed and confer the power in express terms. Therefore, subordinate legislation like the rule making power or delegated legislation by its very nature has to be within the area carved out therefore by the parent Act, and has to be framed with a keen eye to the said limitations. The principle of the rules being ultra vires of the Act, if they transgress the arena earmarked therefore, is at once called into play. If the very source of the power were under the rules are purported to be framed is not disclosed or is uncertain, the validity of such rules cannot possibly be tested on the anvil of the legislative sanction given for the framing thereof. If such a power has to be looked around and to be gathered and reached in more than II or 12 statues, it cannot but lead to utter confusion and uncertainly. The settled cannot of construction is that the law must be uniform and certain and not confusing or conjectural. If the parent provision, from which the statutory rules are alleged to spring is unnamed or uncertain or has to be searched for, then such rules lose their legitimacy and cannot possibly have the force of law. Therefore, it must be held that a roving search for the legislative source for the framing of rules is not permissible. To be strico sensu statutory and have the sanction and mandate of a legal provisions, such subordinate or delegated legislation must necessarily indicate the delegator or the source from which they take bright. One cannot make a roving search for the legal authority, like the framed search for the successor to the Dalai lama in the spiritual filed of the Tibetan mythology of yore. This is so, because the subordinate legislation has to necessarily remain within the parameters of the arena delegated and prescribed to it by the parent statue. One cannot make a roving search for the legal authority, like the framed search for the successor to the Dalai lama in the spiritual filed of the Tibetan mythology of yore. This is so, because the subordinate legislation has to necessarily remain within the parameters of the arena delegated and prescribed to it by the parent statue. It must, therefore, be held that the parent section or the legislative source for the framing of the rules or the subordinate legislation must be clearly disclosed either in the rules themselves or by an inflexible and unequivocal provision. 15. Now, apart from other things, even a bare look at the voluminous provisions of volume I of the Manual itself (not to speak of the remaining Volumes II & III), is a clear pointer to the fact that it is indeed a detailed and meticulous management Manual laying out the administrative methodology of running jails efficiently, Volume I is itself in two parts, wherein the first part contains the Bihar and Orissa Jail Manual and the second part, the Bihar and Orissa Subsidiary Jail Manual. The 1296 exhaustive rules laid out in Part I, in as many as 42 chapters, and 273 rules spelt out in the Subsidiary Jail Manual span over the minutest and ministerial details of jails and their management. Whilst its draftsmen are to be complimented for the painstaking care for detail by its numerous authors and devisors, it is equally plain that each and every one of these provisions are not mandates of law stemming from a sovereign sanction therefore. These rules range over a wide filed of activities, including religious and moral instructions in prisons the modes of preparation of food procurement and storing of food supplies, including the running of a dairy therefore. Equally they govern the jail gardens and agriculture, clothing, ending and jail equipments and even sanitary regulations pertaining to barracks, buildings conservancy and water supplies. Reference in this connection may be made at random to Rules 1037, 1050, 1058 and 1120 to 1130. Indeed a bare reading to these rules can leave no manner of doubt that these could not possibly be imagined as statutory enforceable provisions. As a representative provision, Rule 1058 (at page 407 of the Manual) may be quoted:- “Every jail shall have a dairy Well-roofed and ventilated sheds shall be provided. Indeed a bare reading to these rules can leave no manner of doubt that these could not possibly be imagined as statutory enforceable provisions. As a representative provision, Rule 1058 (at page 407 of the Manual) may be quoted:- “Every jail shall have a dairy Well-roofed and ventilated sheds shall be provided. The floor should be or well burnt brick-on-edge or other good material pointed with cement To prevent slipping, the slope of the floor should be slight, only sufficient to carry off the urine and washings to a masonry drain emptying through a spout into iron receptacles removable by hand, and not into the surface drains of the jail. The vital necessity of cleanliness must always be borne in mind. The floor of the cowshed must be scrubbed and washed and washed daily and afterwards thoroughly dried. Sand and straw should be throw on the floor to prevent the cows slipping. The presence of files in the cow-house is a sure sign of neglect. A separate shed or separate division of a shed should be provided for weaned calves”. 16. Now it would be plain from the above that such details about the materials for the roofs, ventilation of the sheds, and the washing and scrubbing thereof, cannot possibly be binding provisions for the justice ability of courts. This may, perhaps, be even more manifest from a perusal of Rules 1120 to 1130 pertaining to conservancy and the maintenance of drains, latrines, urinals, etc. Indeed, faced with these provisions, the learned Counsel for the petitioners had no choice, but to concede that the aforesaid provisions cannot possibly be either held to be statutory or binding or justice able. Plainly enough these are purely administrative guidelines in a somewhat exhaustive management manual. Now once that is so, in law it is impossible to held and go on a voyage of discovery over a wide spectrum of more than 1500 rules in Volume I (not to mention others in Volumes II and III), in order to determine their justice-ability. We were invited of this futile and vain task and canvassed to hold that rules 981 and 982 and Some others relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, were statutory in character, whilst unreservedly conceding that most others in the Manual were not so. No cannon of reason or logic, however, dictates us to hold to such a course. No cannon of reason or logic, however, dictates us to hold to such a course. Indeed, it deserves highlighting that Chapter XXXIV containing rules 981 and 982 does not in its heading or in the body refer to any Act, or under section which the said Chapter or the Rules contained therein in are purported to be framed. In sharp contrast thereto are the Provisions of Chapter XXI pertaining to remissions. The very heading thereof declares that the Rules in the said Chapter are being framed by the Governor General in Council in exercise of the powers conferred by section 59 (5) of the Prisons Act, 1894. In terms, it is specified that the Rules in the said Chapter apply to the whole of British India inclusive of British Baluchistan and the Sental Parganas. The inevitable inference is that neither Chapter XXXIV nor the Rules contained therein are in any way statutory and the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this context, therefore, must be rejected. 17. It is true that the Manual labels the provisions therein as rules. It is, however, equally well settled that merely labeling or saying that a provision is a rule does not thereby render it either statutory or having the force of law. The word ‘rule’ in the Manual is used in its generic sense of a direction or order proceeding from authority, but, not as a terms of Art. of a statutory rule, stemming from the sanction of an Act, of Legislature authorizing the delegation or framing of rule for the objects and purposes of such an Act. The real issue herein is whether assuming that the provisions are authoritative, they are statutory stricto sensu. I am inclined to the view (which was not seriously contested on behalf of the petitioners) that the issue is not merely of labels, and the heading of the Manual, mentioning its provisions as Rules, is indeed very far from, in any way, being conclusive on the point. 18. Reliance on behalf of the petitioners had been sought to be placed on a series of Judgments in the case of Charles Sobhraj and Sunil Batra. Primal reference was made to Charles Sobraj-vs-Superintendent, Central Jail. Tihar, New Delhi (supra) and in Sunil Batra-evs-Delhi Administration for elaborating the same principle. 18. Reliance on behalf of the petitioners had been sought to be placed on a series of Judgments in the case of Charles Sobhraj and Sunil Batra. Primal reference was made to Charles Sobraj-vs-Superintendent, Central Jail. Tihar, New Delhi (supra) and in Sunil Batra-evs-Delhi Administration for elaborating the same principle. In this set of cases, Krishna lyer, J. in his usual picturesque language has elaborated the concept that prison laws do not shut out the constitutional mandate of fundamental rights. There is, and possibly cannot be, any quarrel with this basic proposition. Undoubtedly, where fundamental rights or even humans rights of a prisoner, subject of course to the limitations imposed by lawful imprisonment are impaired or flouted the Courts may and indeed are duty bound to enforce them. All the cases relied upon are of brutal mal-treatment, solitary confinement denial of basic human rights which would come well squarely within the ambit of part III of the Constitution. These cases are themselves plainly distinguishable, because, even putting the cases of the present petitioners at the very highest, there is no involvement or question of any fundamental right. This indeed had to be fairly conceded by their learned Counsel. On the other hand, the position is somewhat in the reverse, whilst the State Government is wishing to treat all prisoners equally in a single class till adequate ground for confirming the recommendation for an upper division is shown, it is the petitioners who are seeking a privilege and special favourable treatment on alleged ground of higher social status, despite the fact they stand convicted of the heinous crime of murder. We are not at this stage inclined to adjudicate whether the archaic rules of better treatment on the basis of higher social status would today stand the searching scrutiny of equality before the law on any such consideration. Without pronouncing about the validity or otherwise of the relevant rules, it suffices to mention that not the least infringement of fundamental rights herein is involved, and, in sum, the claim of the petitioners is to special privileges and benefits other then the common class of prisoners, despite the fact of the petitioners themselves being life convicts. 19. Without pronouncing about the validity or otherwise of the relevant rules, it suffices to mention that not the least infringement of fundamental rights herein is involved, and, in sum, the claim of the petitioners is to special privileges and benefits other then the common class of prisoners, despite the fact of the petitioners themselves being life convicts. 19. To conclude on this aspect, in the light of the aforesaid discussions, the answers to the first question posed at the very outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that chapter XXXIV of the Manual containing Rules 981 and 982 is not statutory in nature and the said Rules are consequently not justice-able. 20. Though the aforesaid findings conclude the matter, yet, in becomes necessary, and in any case, apt to dispose of the subsidiary argument, which was strenuously pressed before us. Assuming entirely for the sake of argument (without in the least holding that it is so), that Rules 981 and 982 of the Manual have the force of law, the question was raised whether the same are mandatory or directory. The main plank of the learned Counsel for the petitioners for this hyper-technical assumption was that Rule 982 was indeed binding and mandatory in nature. Herein learned Counsel for the petitioners seem on a weakest wicket. It is well to recall that when originally framed, Rules 981 and 982 pertained to European prisoners and their classification and treatment as such. These rules have been later on repealed and substituted by the present Rules 981 and 982, which are inter-related, and, therefore, deserve, notice in extensor; “981. There shall be three divisions of convicted prisoner viz Division I-Prisoners sentenced to rigorous or simple imprisonment may be classed in this division if- (1) they are non-habitual prisoners of good character; (2) They by social status, education and habit of life have been accustomed to a superior mode of living; provided that- (3) They have not been convicted of- (a) Offences involving elements of cruelty moral degradation or Personal greed; (b) serious or Premeditated violence; (c) serious offences against Property; (d) offences relating to the possession of explosives, fire arms and other dangerous weapons with the object of committing an offence or of enabling an offence to be committed; (e) abetment or incitement of offences falling within these sub-clauses. Division II-Prisoners who, by social status; education or habit of life have been accustomed to a superior mode of living shall be classed in this division. Hibitual Prisoner will not be excluded automatically from this class. Division III-Will include all prisoners not classed in the first two divisions, They will not receive any social treatment and will be treated as ordinary prisoner under the rules of this Manual. 982. Classifying Authority:-The High Court, Sessions Judges, District Magistrate. Sub-divisional Magistrate and Magistrate of the first Class (the two latter through the District Magistrate) is cases tried by originally or in any other case the District Magistrate, should make the initial recommendation for classification in Division or II to the State Government, by whom these recommendations should be confirmed or reviewed. Pending confirmation of the classification by the State Government. Prisoners shall receive the treatment of the Division for which they are recommended by the classification authority”. 21. Even a Plain reading of Rule 982 is indicative of the fact that far from being mandatory it is on the face of it merely recommendatory. Its language leaves no manner of doubt that the ultimate repository of power for determining a division or class of prisoners is the State Government itself. In this context even the judicial authorities like the High Court, Session Judge and the District Magistrate etc. in the context of cases tried by them originally are merely recommendatory bodies, which in the interregnum may suggest the class or division in which the prisoners may be treated till the State Government finally decided the matter, Indeed the language employed is specific and talks of an initial recommendation for classification. It is expressly open to conformation or review by the State Government. Any such recommendation under Rule 982, even by the trial or the appellate criminal court is purely transitory in nature subject to approval and conformation by the State Government. It is somewhat elementary that the power to confirm or review would inevitably include the power to pass interim orders, which would include the power to suspend or extend the recommendatory order. No hyper-technicality in this context is either envisaged or desirable. On the board scheme, Rule 982 suggest, as a matter of practicability, that the convicting courts generically and the District Magistrate in any other case, may propose an upper division or classification of a prisoner. No hyper-technicality in this context is either envisaged or desirable. On the board scheme, Rule 982 suggest, as a matter of practicability, that the convicting courts generically and the District Magistrate in any other case, may propose an upper division or classification of a prisoner. However, the same is entirely in the nature of an initial recommendation which may not be accepted or conformed. The broad construction of Rule 982, read as a whole, would thus clearly manifest that the provision is recommendatory in nature, reposing the final decision in the State Government. To any mind, reading such a provision either as mandatory or inflexibly binding, on the basis of a mere recommendation at that stage appears as unwarranted. 22. To conclude on this aspect, it must be held that assuming entirely as a matter of argument (without holding so that Rule 981 and 982 have the force of law, the latter Rule 982 is not) mandatory, but is indeed purely recommendatory. 23. It remains to advert to the case of Chandeshwar Prasad Singh and others vs. The State of Bihar and others, which indeed has necessitated his reference to the Full Bench. A mere reading of the High Courts short order passed at the threshold stage of admission would indicate that the issue was hardly canvassed at all. The questions which have been herein examined in great detail seem to have been bagged in the first instance itself. It appears to have been assumed that the rules in the Manual are statutory and or that the power exercised there under was quasi judicial in nature, requiring the exercise of a reasoned and speaking order. Neither of the assumption seems to be true in the life of the detailed discussions above. It would appears that the learned Counsel for the Respondent State was somewhat remiss in not highlighting the meaningful issue which arise in this context and have been notice and adjudicated as above. Neither principle nor precedent has been referred to in arriving at the conclusions. The order indeed indicates the pitfalls of adjudicating meaningful and complicated issue at the threshold stage of admission itself, with the deepest deference, the case does not lay down the law correctly and his hereby overruled, 24. Lastly, on merits also it would appear that the State’s stand is more than amply justified. The order indeed indicates the pitfalls of adjudicating meaningful and complicated issue at the threshold stage of admission itself, with the deepest deference, the case does not lay down the law correctly and his hereby overruled, 24. Lastly, on merits also it would appear that the State’s stand is more than amply justified. Learned Counsel for the State rightly highlighted the infirmities in the order of the District Magistrate (Annexure ‘3’), which is the sheet anchor of the petitioners, It purports to be a final order, when under Rule 982, at best a recommendation could have been, made by him. It directs as a flat that the prisoners be give a higher class on the basis of some reports, forgetting that the conditions prescribed in the proceeding Rule 981 must first be satisfied. There under it has been laid down that the prisoners held guilty of murder or heinous offences are not entitled to a higher class. It would be doubtful whether a person convicted for a premeditated or designed murder would not come under the category and it is a direct bar against higher classification. It is such like orders which the State Government has suspended vide Annexure ‘4’ and in our view, rightly. The onus would lie heavily on the petitioners to sustain the validity and even the propriety of such an order, which, on the face of it, runs contrary even to Rule 981 and 982. 25. It was firmly the stand of the Respondent State at the Bar that because of the misuse or abuse of the provisions of Rule 981 and 982 by District Magistrates or other authorities in making haphazard directions for classification of the petitioners, unwarranted by these provisions, that the impugned order (Annexure ‘4’) had come to be passed. In the counter affidavit, it had been averred that the privileges of higher classification were being enjoyed through man-oeuvre without obtaining the confirmatory orders of the State Government. Even copies of the judgments were not being furnished, wherein the trial or the appellate court alone were entitled to make the initial recommendations. In the counter affidavit, it had been averred that the privileges of higher classification were being enjoyed through man-oeuvre without obtaining the confirmatory orders of the State Government. Even copies of the judgments were not being furnished, wherein the trial or the appellate court alone were entitled to make the initial recommendations. To correct this abuse or misuse of these provisions, rooted allegedly in corruption and man-oeuvres, the State Government, vide Annexure ‘4’ had taken a uniform decision that all such orders be put in suspension and the prisoners be treated equally of one class, till the State Government decides and confirms the necessity of higher classification in individual cases. Far form any fundamental right being involved, not even a legal right or a plausible claim to higher classification herein is disclosed. The mere fact that the petitioner may have enjoyed this privilege surreptitiously and in an unwarranted manner, does not create either an easement in their favour or something in the nature of a claim of adverse possession. No infirmity worth the name in the impugned order (Annexure ‘4’) is thus disclosed. Which must consequently, be upheld. 26. In the light of the above, all these writ petitions are without merit and are hereby dismissed. S. Shamsul Hasan, J; I agree K.B, Sinha, J; I agree. Applications dismissed.