JUDGMENT - M.M. QAZI, J.:---The appellant (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) filed the suit against the respondent) for recovery of arrears of rent for the month of September 1977. The defendant contested the claim on the ground that the plaintiff had lost title and interest in the suit property and hence the suit for recovery of rent at his behest was not tenable. According to the defendant, he paid rent to the plaintiff till August 1972 but he stopped paying the same thereafter since he learned that the suit house was purchased by one Parasmal in November 1975 in auction held by the Municipal Council for recovery of taxes. 2. In view of the pleadings the point that fell for consideration was whether the plaintiff lost his title to the suit house on 10-11-1975? Both the courts concurrently found that the plaintiff lost his title to the suit house on 10-11-1975. The suit was accordingly dismissed, hence this revision. 3. Mr. Gaikwad, learned Counsel for the plaintiff vehemently contended that defendant was admittedly inducted as a tenant by the plaintiff and, therefore, he could not deny the title of the plaintiff. He invited my attention to section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, which reads thus:- "No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who come upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such license was given." (Emphasis supplied). He also heavily relied on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1974 Patna 364 (Jaikaran Singh v. Sita Ram Agarwalla others)1. The ratio of this decision seems to be that section 115 and section 116 of the Evidence Act are not exhaustive and there may be rules of estoppel applicable in India other than what is contained in those statutory provisions. According to section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord during the continuance of the tenancy and at the beginning of the tenancy. According to section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord during the continuance of the tenancy and at the beginning of the tenancy. This does not mean that if the tenancy comes to an end subsequently either by operation of law or for that matter for any other reason, the tenant would not be entitled to deny the title of the landlord. The two courts have concurrently recorded a finding of fact on the basis of the material before them that the plaintiff has lost his title to the suit house. While sitting in a revision I cannot reappreciate the evidence on that point. There can be no doubt that in the instant case the defendant is not denying title of the plaintiff as landlord at the beginning of the tenancy. On the contrary, he has categorically admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant at the initial stage. According to him it is only subsequent event which resulted in the loss of title of the plaintiff in the suit property, the property having been sanctioned for non-payment of taxes. In my view, section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act can usefully be cited here. It reads thus :- "111: A lease of immovable property determines--- (c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any vent by the happening of such event." In view of the facts found to have been proved, there can be no doubt that the lease between the plaintiff and defendant stood determined by operation of law as soon as the title and interest of the plaintiff in the property came to an end. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the tenant is denying the title of his landlord during the continuance of the tenancy as argued by Mr. Gaikwad. 4. Mr. Ghate, learned Counsel for the defendant has rightly relied on these two decisions namely :- (i) A.I.R. 1957, Rajasthan, 357 (Omkarmal v. Manak Chand another)2, Paragraph 4 of this judgement reads thus:- "One of the modes of determination of tenancy is a cesser of the interest of the landlord. Gaikwad. 4. Mr. Ghate, learned Counsel for the defendant has rightly relied on these two decisions namely :- (i) A.I.R. 1957, Rajasthan, 357 (Omkarmal v. Manak Chand another)2, Paragraph 4 of this judgement reads thus:- "One of the modes of determination of tenancy is a cesser of the interest of the landlord. It is conceded that the alleged mortgage in favour of the petitioner being by an unregistered document, the rights of the mortgage could not be enforced by a suit; but is contended that the tenants could not deny the landlord's title and in any case were bound under section 108(m) of the Transfer of Property Act to redeliver the property at the end of the tenancy. The principle of estoppel is mentioned in section 116 of the Evidence Act, and is only applicable so long as the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. The plea of cesser of the landlord's title is not denial of the landlord's title, and there is no estoppel against the tenants in the circumstances mentioned in this case. It has been laid down a large number of cases that it is open to a tenant to prove a cesser of the landlord's title by ouster by the holder of a paramount title, and to attorn to the latter without actually going out of possession. The eviction of the tenant by the true owner need not be actual dispossession of the tenant. If the true owner is armed with a legal process for eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted, even though the tenant is not put out of possession, the threat to put him out of possession amounts in law of eviction. In the present case, it was conceded that Roop Narain was the owner of the property, and his interest and title were purchased by Khajan Singh, and Khajan Singh got into possession of the property under warrant of delivery of possession of the Court. In the circumstance, it was open to the defendant to take up the plea that the plaintiff's title had ceased. In the circumstance, it was open to the defendant to take up the plea that the plaintiff's title had ceased. There is no evidence to show how his title continued even after auction sale is execution of the decree against Roop Narain." (ii) A.I.R. 1977 Patna 247 (Rajeshwar Prasad another v. Sita Ram Marwari others)3, Paragraph 7 of this judgment reads thus :- "The law may be briefly stated thus; section 116 of the Act prohibits a tenant from challenging the validity of the title of the landlord at the beginning of the tenant. In other words the estoppel in section 116 of the Act refers to the title at the beginning of the tenancy. It does not debar a tenant from challenging the validity of the title of the landlord on the basis of the previous events which occurred before the tenant was inducted in the premises. Section 116 of the Act also does not debar a tenant from proving the subsequent events in relation to the title of the landlord. The bar imposed under section 116 of the Act is that the tenant cannot challenge the defective title of the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy. In other words, the tenant is estopped from challenging the fact that the plaintiff obtained title to the suit property on the basis of mis-representation, fraud etc. Section 116 of the Act refers to the estoppel in respect of a defective title at the beginning of the tenancy. Section 116 does not estop the tenant from raising the plea that the landlord had no title to the suit property before he was inducted as tenant. In other words the defendant-tenant cannot challenge the defective title of the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy. Such a plea is estopped by section 116 of the Act." In my opinion these decisions fully support the view which I have taken. 6. Mr. Gaikwad invited my attention to section 156(2) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act which reads thus :- "After sale of the property by auction as aforesaid, the Chief Officer shall put the person declared to be the purchases in possession of the same and shall grant him a certificate to the effect that he has purchased the property to which the certificate refers." 7. As I have already observed that the two courts below have already recorded finding of fact that the plaintiffs has lost his interest and title in the property, I cannot examine this aspect of the case in revision particularly when I see that is overwhelming evidence on which that finding is based. 8. In short there is no substance in the revision. It is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed. -----