Judgment :- 1. Same questions arise in these two Original Petitions. So, they are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The petitioners in these Original petitions are partnership firms and persons, doing business within the limits of Ponnanl Municipality. They had taken licence for carrying on the business, since under S.284 of the Kerala Municipalities Act the Municipality published notification that no place within the municipal limits should be used for any of the purposes specified in Schedule.3 without a licence issued by the Commissioner and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein. For the year 1981-82, the petitioners had taken licence on payment of the licence fee prescribed by the Municipality. In the meeting of the Permanent Committee of the Municipality held on 25-2-1982 the rates of licence fee were revised. The revision was in some cases upto three fold, Coming to know of the unreasonable and exorbitant upward revision of the fee, the Merchants Association of which the petitioners are members submitted a representation to the Municipal Chairman. The Municipal Council discussed the matter and overruled the objection. The upward revision of fee suggested by the Committee was accepted and the petitioners were directed to pay the same. The Municipality did not follow the procedure prescribed for levying a tax. The imposition can therefore be justified only as a levy of fees. For sustaining the levy as a fee, there must be special benefit to the payer of the fee in addition to what is enjoyed by the members of the general public. The special benefit should be a service rendered specially to the payer of the fee or to the class of people who pay the same. It cannot be as a service rendered to the members of the public in general, in discharge of the statutory obligations cast on the Municipality under the Kerala Municipalities Act. The first respondent is not doing anything whatsoever for supervising or controlling the oil mills and the business establishments operating within the municipal limits. Apart from providing the ordinary municipal services such as roads, street lights etc. no special service whatsoever is rendered by the Municipality either to the petitioners individually or to the mill owners as a class or to the operators of electric motors within the municipal limits. Apart from providing the ordinary municipal services such as roads, street lights etc. no special service whatsoever is rendered by the Municipality either to the petitioners individually or to the mill owners as a class or to the operators of electric motors within the municipal limits. The levy is not supported by any quid-pro-quo whatsoever and therefore the levy is totally without jurisdiction and void in law. As per the decisions of the Supreme Court at least a substantial portion of the amount of fees realised must be spent for the special benefits of the payers of the fee for sustaining the levy of fees. No portion of the fee collected by the Municipality from the petitioners is spent for the benefit of the petitioners or for the benefit of other mill owners or users of motors or for the benefit of any of the classes of the licencee from whom such fee is levied. The licence fee levied by the Municipality is therefore without jurisdiction, without the authority of law and therefore null and void. The only reason for enhancing the licence fee is the desire of the Municipality to raise additional funds since the Municipality is stated to be financially in a tight corner. The necessity of raising general funds for the Municipality is not a good justification for increasing the licence fee payable by the petitioners and by persons similarly situated. The increase evidenced by the decision Ext. P2 is motivated solely by the need to find additional finance for the general activities of the Municipality. The increase of fees is not correlated to any special service done or proposed to be done by the Municipality. Therefore, the petitioners pray for quashing Exts. P2 and P5 decisions taken by the 1st respondent Municipality. 3. The averments made by the petitioners in these original petitions stand uncontroverted. The assertion of the petitioners that the fee has been increased only for raising the general funds of the Municipality to better the financial stability of the Municipality and not for rendering any additional service to the petitioners or the licensees is not disputed. The contention that the Municipality did not resort to any procedure for levying a tax and that the imposition of the additional fee can be sustained only if there are special benefit to the payers of the fee is also not in dispute. 4. The contention that the Municipality did not resort to any procedure for levying a tax and that the imposition of the additional fee can be sustained only if there are special benefit to the payers of the fee is also not in dispute. 4. Even though the Municipality has not filed a counter affidavit justifying the imposition of the levy of additional fees on the basis of special benefits conferred on the payers, the learned counsel appearing for the Municipality tries to sustain the decision in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the City Corporation of Calicut v. Thachambalath Sadasivan & others (AIR 1985 SC 756). In the said decision Their Lordships observed: "It is thus well-settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee. Applying the ratio of these decisions it is incontrovertible that the appellant-Corporation is rendering numerous services to the persons within its areas of operation and that therefore the levy of the licence fee as fee is fully justified. Soaking coconut husk emit foul odour and contaminates environment. The Corporation by rendering scavenging services, carrying on operations for cleanliness of city, to make habitation tolerable is rendering general service of which amongst others appellants are beneficiaries. Levy as a fee is thus justified." On the basis of the above statement of the law the learned counsel submits that the additional fee is to be sustained if the court has reason to believe that the services rendered by the Municipality to the petitioners and the payers of the fee has got at least a casual relationship with the amount so levied. In other words, if the statutory services rendered by the Municipality enures to the benefit of the payers of this fee the court has to sustain the imposition of the fee. The learned counsel proceeds to argue that the statutory obligations cast on the Municipality to maintain roads, street lights, maintenance of hygene etc. are being discharged by the Municipality, that for carrying out those obligations they require funds and that the levy impugned in these original petitions go to the funds spent by the Municipality for the said purpose. The discharge of those statutory obligations by the Municipality will necessarily benefit the payers of this fee. That benefit should be taken as the special services rendered to the petitioners. Therefore, it is submitted that these petitions are only to be dismissed. 5. The difference between tax and fee was judicially recognised in the Commissioner. Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Sri. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282). A Bench consisting of seven judges observed in that case: The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege. Fees confer a capacity, although the special advantage, as for example in the case of registration fees for documents or marriage licences, is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Public interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it is some special benefit which the individual receives. It is the special benefit accruing to the individual which is the reason for payment in the case of fees; in the case of a tax. Public interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it is some special benefit which the individual receives. It is the special benefit accruing to the individual which is the reason for payment in the case of fees; in the case of a tax. the particular advantage if it exist at all is an incidental result of State action." Their Lordships further observed: "If as we hold, a fee is regarded as a sort of return or consideration for services rendered, it is absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should, on the face of the legislative provision, be correlated to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the services." It is further stated: 'If the money thus paid is set apart and appropriated specifically for the performance of such work and is not merged in the public revenues for the benefit of the general public it could be counted as fees and not a tax." 6. In Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi v. Durga Das Bhattacharya and others (AIR 1968 SC 1119) a Bench of three judges took the view that the Municipal Board cannot sustain levy of fee solely on the ground of the discharge of their statutory obligations. In that case Their Lordships were concerned with the nature of the levy of fees imposed on the owners of rickshaws. Licence fee was imposed for plying rickshaws for hire within the municipal limits of Varanasi. The imposition was sought to be sustained on the ground that the Municipal Board was providing facilities and amenities to the owners and drivers of rickshaws. That plea was negatived holding: "The expenditure under these two items was incurred by the Municipal Board in the discharge of its statutory duty and it is manifest that the licence fee cannot be imposed for reimbursing the cost of ordinary municipal services which the Municipal Board was bound under the statute to provide to the general public." This statement of the law was approved by a Constitution Bench consisting of five judges in Kewal Krishan Puri and another v. State of Punjab and another (AIR 1980 SC 1008). It was observed therein: "A good and substantial portion of it (referring to the fee levied) must be shown as being spent for the services rendered." 7. It was observed therein: "A good and substantial portion of it (referring to the fee levied) must be shown as being spent for the services rendered." 7. In I.T.C. Ltd. and others v. State of Karnataka and others (AIR 1985 (Supp) SCC 476) the question of quid pro quo in the case of levy of fees came up for consideration before a Bench of three Judges. Fazal Ali, J. observed: "The theory of nexus between the fee levied and the services rendered cannot be reduced to a ritualistic formula so as to close it in a strait jacket nor can it be weighed in golden scales. All that is necessary is that there should be a direct nexus between realisation of fees and the service rendered." After reviewing of the earlier decisions Mukharji, J observed; "Most of these decisions were reviewed by this Court in judging the validity of fees imposed in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri. Several principles deduced from the decision in Kewal Krishan Puri case have been noted hereinbefore. Prior thereto the question was considered in the case of Government of A P v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd which was noted in Kewal Krishan Puri case. Kewal Krishan Puri case specifically noted that the element of quid pro quo might not be possible or even necessary to be established with arithmetical exactitude even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authority which charged the fees that the amount was being spent for rendering services to those on whom fell the burden of the fee. At least a good and substantial amount collected on account of fees might be in the neighbourhood of two-third or three-fourth must be shown with reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services to those from whom the fees are realised. The Court, however, noted that while conferring special benefits to the licensees or payers of fees, it was permissible to render other services in the market which might be in the general interest of all concerned in respect of transactions that take place in the markets. Services rendered to the licensees must be in relation to the transactions of purchase or sale of produce in the market. Services rendered to the licensees must be in relation to the transactions of purchase or sale of produce in the market. It is not necessary, however, to confer the whole of the benefit on the licensees but some special benefits must be conferred on them which have a direct, close, and reasonable correlation between the licensees and transactions. But imposition of fees for general benefit like augmenting the agricultural produce, its facility of transport in villages and to provide other facilities meant mainly or exclusively for the benefit of agriculturists was not permissible on the ground that such service in the long run augmented the volume of transaction in the market ultimately benefiting the tenders. Such an indirect benefit could not be considered to be sufficient quid pro quo to justify imposition of market fee." Varadarajan J. in this case observed: "The principles of law laid down by the Bench of five learned judges of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri case so long as they have not been dissented from, varied or set aside by a larger Bench are binding, with respect, not only on smaller Benches of this Court but also undoubtedly on the High Courts and other subordinate courts and parties similarly placed " 8. In Om Parkash Agarwal and others v. Giri Raj Kishori and others (1986 (1) SCC 722) a Bench consisting of two judges observed: "In determining a levy as a fee the true test must be whether its primary and essential purpose is to render specific services to a specified area or class it being of no consequence that the State may ultimately and indirectly be benefited by it " After considering Sreenivasa General Traders' case and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mohammad Yasin and Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, Trichur, Their Lordships observed: "In none of these three cases it has been stated that a fee may be validily imposed when no services either directly or indirectly are rendered to the person from whom it is collected." 9. From these decisions it appears that for sustaining the imposition of a fee there must be special benefits to the payer. The benefit may not only be confined to the prayers but to others as well. The fact that the levy of fee enures not only to the payers but also some others will not in any way go to defeat the levy. The benefit may not only be confined to the prayers but to others as well. The fact that the levy of fee enures not only to the payers but also some others will not in any way go to defeat the levy. In any case, the levy of the fee must be for some special benefit to the payer. Even in the decision reported in AIR 1985 SC 756 (1985 KLT 549) Their Lordships observed: "Co-relationship between the levy and the services rendered or expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a reasonable co-relationship between the levy of the fee and the service rendered " In the instant case, the Municipality has no case that the levy was being imposed for rendering any special benefit to the payers. What the Municipality has stated in Ext. P5 is that the levy is being imposed only to augment the resources of the Municipality for getting over the financial difficulties. In other words, the Municipality wants to sustain the levy of fees on the ground that the financial position of the Municipality is not sound and that they want to raise the funds. No fee can be imposed for bettering the financial position of the Municipality, without rendering any special benefit to the payers. As stated earlier the Municipality bad not taken any action to impose tax for improving its financial position. Therefore, the decision evidenced by Ext. P2 to enhance the fee is illegal and beyond the powers of the Municipality. In view of what has been stated above the Original Petitions are allowed. Ext. P2 decision produced along with these Original Petitions taken by the first respondent Municipality is quashed. I make no order as to costs.