Judgment :- 1. Accused 1 and 2 who have been convicted by the IInd Addl. Sessions Judge, Quilon, under S.302, 449, and 323 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life under S.302 I.P.C., are the appellants. No separate sentence was imposed under other counts. The 3rd accused who was tried along with Accused 1 and 2 was found not guilty of any of the charges and he was acquitted by the Sessions Court. 2. According to the prosecution, the deceased Ammini was married by Ninan John, the 3rd accused in the case. Ammini was residing in Karikunnil Veedu, the house of the 3rd accused, at Karinthottuva Muri, Sasthankotta Village. She delivered a second child by name Kochumol. It is the prosecution case that the child was conceived at a time when the 3rd accused was in Bombay. When the 3rd accused returned from Bombay he quarrelled with Ammini regarding the second child. There was a mediation about the matter which was attended by P. W. 3 Mathew Kunjukutty, the brother of Ammini and P.W. 5 Yohannan Kunjukutty a paternal uncle of Ammini. As a result of this mediation, Ammini continued to stay in the house and the 3rd accused went back to Bombay. Some time in 1982 he returned from Bombay. They again started quarrelling with each other about the second child. Another mediation followed and a suggestion emerged that Ammini should entrust the second child to an orphanage and she must reside with her parents for some time. This was not agreeable to Ammini who said that she did not want to go away from her husband's house. On the afternoon of 26-8-1982, the 3rd accused told Ammini that he would teach her a lesson and went out in an angry mood. Thereafter at about 5 p. m. on that day, accused 1 and 2 who are brother and brother-in-law respectively of the 3rd accused came to Karikunnil Veedu. Ammini was feeding the second child at that time. The 2nd accused fisted Ammini on her face and head three or four times and kicked on her abdomen. When she tried to run away, she was dragged to the room by the 2nd accused. He forced her to lie down on a cot and pressed her neck. At that time the 1st accused poured "paramar" into her mouth and made her consume it. When she tried to run away, she was dragged to the room by the 2nd accused. He forced her to lie down on a cot and pressed her neck. At that time the 1st accused poured "paramar" into her mouth and made her consume it. One Yohannan, a neighbour and relative of the 3rd accused came to the house and found the deceased in a state of unconsciousness. He and some others removed Ammini to the Government Hospital, Adoor. She was attended on by P. W. 4, the doctor. It appears that Yohannan told P. W. 4 that the deceased had consumed poison. Yohannan had sent a messenger to P. W. 3 and P. W. 5 and on knowing that Ammini was not well, P.W. 3 and P.W. 5 rushed to the house of Yohannan and came to know that Ammini was taken to the Government Hospital, Adoor. Thereupon P.Ws. 3 and 5 proceeded to the Government Hospital, Adoor, in a taxi car. 3. They found Ammini was lying in a state of unconsciousness. After some time she regained consciousness. On their questioning Ammini told them that the 3rd accused left the house in the afternoon saying that he would teach her a lesson and after some time the accused 1 and 2 came to their house. Making some comments on the paternity of the second child and the disgrace that she brought to the family, the second accused fisted on her face and forehead three or four times and when she made an attempt to run away the second accused dragged her to the room, made her lie on a cot and caught bold of her neck and thereupon the first accused forcibly poured poison in her mouth. When P.W. 4, the Doctor came after she became conscious she told him that she was forcibly fed poison by her husband's brother and brother-in-law. P.w. 4 gave intimation to P.W. 11 the Sub Inspector of Police, Adoor, that a lady named Ammini was admitted in the Hospital with alleged forcible poisoning. Thereupon P.W. 11 went to the Hospital and took a statement from her in which she narrated how the incident had taken place: Ext. P10 is the dying declaration recorded by him in the form of First Information Statement and on its basis, Ext. Thereupon P.W. 11 went to the Hospital and took a statement from her in which she narrated how the incident had taken place: Ext. P10 is the dying declaration recorded by him in the form of First Information Statement and on its basis, Ext. P12 F. I. R. was prepared and Crime No.229/1982 on the file of the Adoor Police Station was registered by him for offence under S.109, 450, 323,107 and 34 I. P. C. He also prepared Ext. P11 body-note. He also took into custody the clothes worn by Ammini which was produced by P.W. 11, as per Ext. P1. Since the incident took place within the jurisdiction of Sooranad Police Station the case was transferred to that Station on 27-8-1982. Upon receipt of the C.D. File P.W. 12, the Head Constable of Sooranad Police Station prepared Ext. P13 F. I. R. and registered Crime No. 118/1982. Ammini died on 27-8-1982 at about 11.50 P.M. P.W. 7 the Doctor of Adoor Government Hospital, gave Ext. P6 intimation to the Sub Inspector of Police, Adoor, about her death. On receipt of this information, P.W. 13 the Head Constable, Sooranad Police Station prepared Ext. P15, report deleting S.307 I.P.C. and including S.302 I. P. C. in Crime No. 118/1982. 4. Subsequently investigation was taken over by P. W.15 the Circle Inspector of Police, Crime Detachment, Quilon. He prepared Ext. P16 inquest report. He proceeded to the scene of occurrence and prepared scene mahazar Ext. P17. He also took into custody M. O. III aluminium bottle and also M.O. IV the lid of the bottle. He questioned the witnesses and sent M. Os.1 to IV for chemical examination. Ext. P7, the certificate of Chemical Analyst shows that Methyle Parathion, a highly poisonous organo¬phospherus compound was detected in M. Os. I to VI and that Methyle Parathion is toxic ingredient of the insecticide sold under the trade name "Paramar". He arrested accused 1 and 2 on 13-9-1982 at 8 P. M. at Bharanikkavu and questioned them and completed investigation and laid the charge before the judicial Magistrate of the 1st Class, Adoor, who committed the case to the Sessions Court by order dated 30-11-1982. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges against the accused under S.449, 323, 302 read with S.34 and 109 I. P. C. The accused pleaded not guilty. 5. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges against the accused under S.449, 323, 302 read with S.34 and 109 I. P. C. The accused pleaded not guilty. 5. The prosecution examined P. Ws.1 to 15 and produced and marked Exts. P1 to P17 and M. Os. I to IV. 6. On the defence side Exts. D1 to D6 and Exts. X-I to X-VII were produced and marked and D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined. D1 to D4 are portions of the statements of P.Ws. 3 and 5 under S.161 of the Cr. P. C, and Ext. X-I to X-VII are documents which contained alleged signatures of Ammini. 7. The learned Sessions Judge after considering the evidence adduced in the case found the first accused guilty of murder of Ammini and the second accused also guilty of the same offence read with S.34 I. P. C. He also held them guilty of the offence punishable under S.449 I. P. C. for having entered the house in which Ammini resided with the intention of committing the offence. The learned Sessions Judge further held that the 2nd accused was guilty of causing hurt to Ammini, an offence punishable under S.323 I P. C. and the first accused guilty of offence punishable under S.323 read with S.34 I.P.C. They were sentenced for imprisonment for life under S.302 I. P. C. as stated above, but no separate sentence was awarded for other offences. The third accused was acquitted of all the charges as stated above. 8. It is not disputed that Ammini died. The evidences of P.Ws. 3 and 5, Ext. P4 post-mortem certificate and Ext. P16 inquest report prove beyond doubt that aspect of the prosecution case. That she died of organo-phospherus poison also admits of no doubt. Chemical Analyst's report Exts. P14 and Ext. P5 certificate issued by P.W. 8, the Doctor conclusively prove that her death was due to organo-phospherus poisoning. PW. 8 deposed that this poison, if administered will cause death in the ordinary course. The question that falls for consideration is as to whether accused 1 and 2 can be fastened with liability for poisoning Ammini, in other words whether this is a case of homicide or suicide?. 9. PW. 8 deposed that this poison, if administered will cause death in the ordinary course. The question that falls for consideration is as to whether accused 1 and 2 can be fastened with liability for poisoning Ammini, in other words whether this is a case of homicide or suicide?. 9. Shri Janardhana Kurup, the learned counsel for the appellants strenuously contended that the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellants trespassed into the residence of Ammini and committed murder of Ammini by forcibly administering poison with the intention of causing death to her. He argued that facts emerging from the evidence will indicate that in all probability she committed suicide. 10. The prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of PWs.1 to 5, 8,11 and 15. Ext. P2 wound certificate issued by PW. 4 and the dying declaration Ext.P10 recorded by PW. 11, Ext. P8 the postmortem certificate issued by PW. 8, Ext. P14 the report of Chemical Analyst and Ext. P5 final certificate issued by PW. 8 on the basis of Ext. P14, in proving the case against the appellants. 11. PW.1 Kannan Vasu deposed that in the evening of 26-8-1982, while he was proceeding through a road near the Orthodox Church he found the accused engaged in discussion. He also heard the 3rd accused saying to the other two accused that she need not be allowed to live. Thereafter, he saw A1 and A2 proceeding to the house of the deceased. PW. 2 stated that at about 4.30 p. m. on 26-8-1982 be was proceeding from his house to the house of Raian Masthri situated about one kilometre from the bouse in connection with the construction of his house. While be was passing through the pathway on the north-western side of the house of the 3rd accused he found accused 1 and 2 proceeding towards the door of the kitchen of the house of the 3rd accused. When he proceeded some distance be heard the cry of a woman. 12. PW.1 appears to be a chance witness whose presence at the relevant time was not satisfactorily explained and the lower court was justified in not relying upon his evidence. However we do not find any reason to reject the evidence of P.W. 2. When he proceeded some distance be heard the cry of a woman. 12. PW.1 appears to be a chance witness whose presence at the relevant time was not satisfactorily explained and the lower court was justified in not relying upon his evidence. However we do not find any reason to reject the evidence of P.W. 2. The learned Counsel for the appellants criticised his evidence contending that there was a main route from his house to the house of Mastry, which is shorter in distance and it could not be believed that he chose a longer route and passed through the byelane near the house of the 3rd accused. On a careful reading of his evidence, we are unable to find any justification for this criticism. No where is there any indication in his evidence that the pathway used by him is a longer route. We could also not notice any other infirmity in his evidence. His evidence clearly establishes that at about 4.30 p.m. on 26-8-1982 accused 1 and 2 proceeded to the kitchen of the house of the 3rd accused and on proceeding some distance he heard the cry of a woman. These are important and significant circumstances against the accused. 13. P.W. 3 is the brother and P.W. 5 is the paternal uncle of deceased Ammini. They deposed that all the accused were entertaining hatred towards the deceased Ammini as they believed that the second child of the deceased was born as a result of her illegitimate relationship with one Rajan. There were quarrels on account of this between Ammini and 3rd accused. According to them, there was a mediation talk in which Panchayat member Cherian Muthalali and others also participated. They were also present. The suggestion which emerged from the mediation was that Ammini should take the second child to an orphanage and leave the house of the 3rd accused and live with P.W. 5. This was not acceptable to the deceased and she continued to live in the same house. On the evening of 26-8-1982 after 7 p. m. Yohannan, a neighbour of the 3rd accused sent a messenger by name Kunjumon to them and be said that Ammini was not doing well. Thereupon they went to the house of Yohannan from where they came to know that Ammini was taken to hospital. On the evening of 26-8-1982 after 7 p. m. Yohannan, a neighbour of the 3rd accused sent a messenger by name Kunjumon to them and be said that Ammini was not doing well. Thereupon they went to the house of Yohannan from where they came to know that Ammini was taken to hospital. They hired a taxi car and went to the hospital and found Ammini in a state of unconsciousness. After seme time Ammini regained consciousness, and when they enquired as to how the incident had taken place the deceased stated that on the 26th afternoon her husband went out saying that he would teach a lesson to her and after some time accused 1 and 2 came to the kitchen side of the bouse and questioned her about the paternity of the child and fisted on her forehead and neck three or four times and when she attempted to escape the 2nd accused dragged her to the room and forced her to lie on a cot and caught hold of her neck and pressed and the Ist accused poured poison into her mouth. They also said that P.W. 11 the Sub Inspector of Police, Adoor, took a statement from the deceased. 14. P. W. 4 the Assistant Surgeon, Govt. Hospital, Adoor deposed that on 26-8-1982 at about 8.30 p.m. he examined the deceased and issued Ext.P2 wound certificate, that when the deceased was taken to the hospital she was unconscious but when she regained consciousness later, she told him that she was forcibly fed poison by her husband's brother and brother-in-law. 15. P.W. 11 was then the S. I. of Police, Adoor. He deposed that on 27-8-1982 at 1.45 a. m. be got the intimation from the Government Hospital, Adoor, that a woman by name Ammini was admitted in the hospital and pursuant to this be went to the hospital at about 2 a. m. and took Ext. P10 statement from Ammini. P.W. 11 was then the S. I. of Police, Adoor. He deposed that on 27-8-1982 at 1.45 a. m. be got the intimation from the Government Hospital, Adoor, that a woman by name Ammini was admitted in the hospital and pursuant to this be went to the hospital at about 2 a. m. and took Ext. P10 statement from Ammini. He further deposed that she stated to him that Ammini and her husband were living along with their daughters Sobhamol aged 5 years and Kochumol aged 1 year, that her husband was working in a company in Bombay, that while he was leaving for Bombay on the expiry of the leave he entrusted, one Rajan to look after her affairs which ultimately resulted in her pregnancy through him and she delivered a female child, that when the husband came on leave he picked a quarrel with her on account of this, that the Panchayat members and others mediated as a result of which she was permitted to continue to reside in the house of her husband, that thereafter he left for Bombay and again came home on 15-8-1982 on leave and started quarrelling with her on the above issue. P.W. 11 also stated that she told him that on the afternoon of 26-8-1982 the 3rd accused picked quarrel with her and threatened that he would teach a lesson to her and left the house and that when she and her second daughter were taking food in the kitchen accused 1 and 2 came to the kitchen and questioned her regarding the paternity of the child and abused her for bringing disgrace to the family and fisted on her forehead three or four times and kicked on her abdomen. He also deposed that she also told him that when she attempted to escape, the 2nd accused forcibly dragged her to the room and pressed on her neck and the 1st accused forcibly poured poison into her mouth as a result of which she became unconscious and when she regained consciousness she found herself in the hospital. He further stated that Ammini was in a fit condition to give the statement. 16. There are three separate statements of deceased Ammini coming within the purview of S.32(1) of the Evidence Act, namely, (1) the statement made by the deceased to PW. 3 and PW. He further stated that Ammini was in a fit condition to give the statement. 16. There are three separate statements of deceased Ammini coming within the purview of S.32(1) of the Evidence Act, namely, (1) the statement made by the deceased to PW. 3 and PW. 5; (2) the statement made by the deceased to PW. 4 Doctor, which was recorded in Ext. P2 wound certificate; and (3) the statement Ext. P10 recorded by PW. 11 the S. I. of Police, all relating to circumstances which ultimately resulted in her death. 17. The learned Counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that these statements treated as dying declarations and relied on by the prosecution are not truthful and cannot be acted upon. It was also contended that they are not made under expectation of death and therefore will not fall under S.32 (1) of the Evidence Act. 18. S.32 (1) of the Evidence Act reads thus: "32. Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: (1) When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. xx xx xx xx" 18. Before adverting to the circumstances of this case, it will be convenient to examine the decisions on this point. One of the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court on the point is the ruling in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (A.I.R.1958 S.C. 22). In that decision the Supreme Court held: "16. xx xx xx xx" 18. Before adverting to the circumstances of this case, it will be convenient to examine the decisions on this point. One of the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court on the point is the ruling in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (A.I.R.1958 S.C. 22). In that decision the Supreme Court held: "16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and. as far as practicable in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. 17. Hence, in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once, the Court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration." 19. The next decision on the point is Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab and another (A.I.R.1970 S.C. 1566). In this case the Supreme Court made reference to the decision in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (A.I.R.1958 SC. 22) and also to another decision by Five Judges of the Supreme Court in Harban Singh v. State of Punjab (A.I.R.1962 SC. 439), with approval and made the following observation: " If the dying declaration is acceptable as truthful then even in the absence of other corroborative evidence it would be open to the court to act upon the dying declaration and convict the appellant stated therein to be the offender.An accusation in a dying declaration conies from the victim himself and if it is worthy of acceptance then in view of its source the Court can safely act upon it." 20. Mannu Raja and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (A I. R.1976 S.C. 2199) is a case where there were more than one dying declarations. The Supreme Court stated; "4. We are thus left with the three dying declarations made by Bahadur Singh and since the Prosecutor has placed great reliance on them, we thought it necessary to hear the learned Counsel fully on the tacts and circumstances leading to the dying declarations. 5. In regard to these dying declarations the judgment of the Sessions Gouri suffers from a patent infirmity in that it wholly overlooks the earliest of these dying declarations, which was made by the deceased soon after the incident in the house of one Barior Singh. The second statement which has been treated by the High Court as a dying declaration is Ext. P14, being the first information report which was lodged by the deceased at the police station. The learned Sessions Judge probably assumed that since the statement was recorded as a first information report, it could not be treated as a dying declaration. In this assumption, he was clearly in error. After making the statement before the police, Bahadur Singh succumbed to his injuries and therefore the statement can be treated as a dying declaration and is admissible under S.32(1) of the Evidence Act. The maker of the statement is dead and the statement relates to the cause of his death. 6. xx xx xx 7. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the oral statement which Bahadur Singh made cannot, in (he eye of law constitute a dying declaration became he did not give a full account of the incident or of the transaction which resulted in his death. There is no substance in this contention because in order that the Court may be in a position to assess the evidentiary value of a dying declaration, what is necessary is that the whole of the statement made by the deceased must be laid before the Court, without tampering with its terms or its tenor. Law does not require that the maker of the dying declaration must cover the whole incident or narrate the case history. Indeed, quite often, all that the victim may be able to say is that he was beaten by a certain person or persons. Law does not require that the maker of the dying declaration must cover the whole incident or narrate the case history. Indeed, quite often, all that the victim may be able to say is that he was beaten by a certain person or persons. That may either be due to the suddenness of the attack or the conditions of visibility or because the victim is not in a physical condition to recapitulate the entire incident or to narrate it at length. In fact, many a time, dying declarations which are copiously worded or neatly structured excite suspicion for the reason that they bear traces of tutoring. 8. It was urged by the learned counsel that after the attack, the deceased was all along accompanied by a large number of persons and one cannot therefore exclude the possibility that he was tutored into involving the appellants falsely. We see no basis for this submission because not even a suggestion was made to any of the witnesses that the deceased was tutored into making the statement. The deceased on his own. did not bear any enmity or hostility to the appellants and bad therefore no reason to implicate them falsely. Indeed, none of the persons, who were in company of the deceased after he was assaulted is shown to have any particular animus for implicating the appellants falsely. 9. In regard to the second dying declaration, Ext.P14. the main objection of the learned Counsel is that it was made to the investigating officer himself and ought therefore be treated as suspect. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in Balak Ram v. State of U.P. A. I R.1974 SC. 2165 at page 2175. The error of this argument consists is the assumption that the dying declaration was made to an Investigating Officer. The statement Ext. P14, was made by Bahadur Singh at the police station by way of a first information report. It is after the information was recorded, and indeed because of it, that the investigation commenced and therefore it is wrong to say that the statement was made to an Investigating Officer. The Station House Officer who recorded the statement did not possess the capacity of an Investigating Officer at the time when he recorded the statement. The judgment on which the counsel relies has therefore no application. 10. The Station House Officer who recorded the statement did not possess the capacity of an Investigating Officer at the time when he recorded the statement. The judgment on which the counsel relies has therefore no application. 10. We are in full agreement with the High Court that both of these dying declarations are true". 22. Surat Singh and another v. State of Punjab (A. I. R.1977 S. C. 705) is yet another decision in which the Supreme Court had occasion to consider a situation where there were two dying declarations. In that case the deceased was first taken to Malout Hospital and Dr. Bamal attended on him recorded his statement, which was marked as Ext. P2. The injured was taken to Bhatuda Hospital and the Sub Inspector of Police recorded a detailed statement marked as Ext. P16 at that Hospital and first information report was drawn from that statement. Their Lordships felt that the details contained in Ext. P10 might not have been given by the injured himself. However the Supreme Court held that the version contained in Ext. P2 was truthful and acted upon it. 23. In Kusa and Others v. State of Orissa (1980 (2) S.C.C. 207) the Supreme Court after examining the earlier decisions on the point made the following observations in Para.12 of the judgment: "Suffice it to say that it is now well established by a long course of decisions of this Court that although a dying declaration should be carefully scrutinised but if after perusal of the same, the Court is satisfied that the dying declarations is true and is free from any effort to prompt the deceased to make a statement and is coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in founding the conviction on such a dying declaration even if there is no corroboration." 24. Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 S.C.C. 211) is another case where the scope of S.32 (1) of the Evidence Act came for consideration before the Supreme Court. Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 S.C.C. 211) is another case where the scope of S.32 (1) of the Evidence Act came for consideration before the Supreme Court. In Para.7 of the judgment Their Lordships laid down the law as follows: " A statement, written or oral, made by a person who is dead as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, becomes admissible under S.32 of the Evidence Act. Such statement made by the deceased is commonly termed as dying declaration There is no requirement of law that such a statement must necessarily be made to a Magistrate. What evidentiary value or weight has to be attached to such a statement, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In a proper case, it may be permissible to convict a person only on the basis of a dying declaration in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case". 25. That the dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction has been held by the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Mufizuddin Ahamed (A. I. R.1983 S.C. 274). 26. Tested in the light of the observations contained in the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, we have to examine whether conviction against accused 1 and 2 can be based on all or any of the above statements. 27. A contention has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants regarding admissibility of these statements. According to him none of the above statements are made under expectation of death and therefore S.32 (1) is not attracted. The learned Counsel would submit that the evidence of P.Ws. 3 to 5 shows that she regained consciousness and her condition improved and therefore expectation of death cannot be inferred in the present case. 28. This argument overlooks the very provision in S.32 (1) of the Evidence Act to the effect that such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death. 28. This argument overlooks the very provision in S.32 (1) of the Evidence Act to the effect that such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death. In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (A.I.R.1958 S.C. 22) the Supreme Court has made a passing reference to this aspect on the following terms: "Thus, a statement made by a dying person as to the cause of death, has been accorded by the Legislature, a special sanctity which should, on first principles, be respected unless there are clear circumstances brought out in the evidence to show that the person making the statement was not in expectation of death, not that that circumstance would affect the admissibility of the statement, but only its weight." Therefore it is clear that a statement made by a deceased person as to the cause of his death is admissible even if that person was not under expectation of death when the statement was made, though it might affect the evidentiary value of such statement. 29. In. Tahal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab (1979 S.C.C. (Crl.) 722) a similar argument was met by the Supreme Court thus: "We also do not see any force in the suggestion of Dr. Chitale that statement of Harmal Singh was not made in expectation of death and was therefore not entitled to weight Apart from the fact that S.32 of the Evidence Act does not require that a statement should be made in expectation of death, it is clear from the evidence that the condition of Harmal Singh was serious at that time". Here also though Ammini regained consciousness her condition was very serious at the time when statements were made. The fact that Ammini regained consciousness would not lead to the inference that the deceased, at the time when statements were made, was under the belief that she was out of danger. It cannot be forgotten that she died a few hours after the statements were made. There was also no time for tutoring the deceased. We cannot also see any reason for the deceased to implicate falsely accused 1 and 2. In these circumstances we have no hesitation to reject the above contention as wholly untenable. 30. It cannot be forgotten that she died a few hours after the statements were made. There was also no time for tutoring the deceased. We cannot also see any reason for the deceased to implicate falsely accused 1 and 2. In these circumstances we have no hesitation to reject the above contention as wholly untenable. 30. Of the three statements which are sought to be made out as dying declarations, coming within the purview of S.32(1) of the Evidence Act by the prosecution, the earliest one was that which the deceased made before P Ws. 3 and 5. Commenting on their evidence, the learned Counsel for the appellants pointed out a few case diary contradictions marked as Exhibits D1 to D4 and contended on that basis that they are not truthful witnesses. On going through these alleged contradictions we feel that they are not serious ones and do net touch material aspects of the prosecution case. They are close relations of Ammini and rushed to the Hospital on knowing that Ammini was taken to the Hospital. We do not find any reason to doubt the veracity of these witnesses when they say Ammini regained consciousness and told them how the incident had taken place. The versions of P.Ws. 3 and 5 regarding the statement of the deceased are in substance identical. They have stated that the deceased was in a fit condition to give statement. This was broadly supported by the evidence of the Doctor PW. 4. We have no hesitation to hold that these witnesses are speaking the truth and the deceased had given statement as spoken to by them and this evidence would establish that accused 1 and 2 were responsible for causing hurt and forcibly administering poison to the accused. 31. The second dying declaration is (he statement given by the deceased to PW. 4 the Doctor. PW. 4 has no axe to grind against the accused and it was not suggested that he bad any reason to falsely implicate accused 1 and 2 in the case. He deposed that Ammini was in a fit state to give the statement to him. This statement has been incorporated in Ext.P2 wound certificate also. It was however contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the names of accused 1 and 2 were not specifically mentioned to PW. He deposed that Ammini was in a fit state to give the statement to him. This statement has been incorporated in Ext.P2 wound certificate also. It was however contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the names of accused 1 and 2 were not specifically mentioned to PW. 4 and it was only stated that the brother and brother-in-law of her husband forcibly fed poison and it might as well refer to any other brother or brother-in-law of the 3rd accused. There is no evidence that the third accused had any other brother or brother-in-law. The defence has not put any question to the witness suggesting the existence or involvement of any other brother or brother-in-law of the third accused. In such circumstances we are unable to hold that this piece of evidence suffers from any infirmity. His evidence is amply corroborated by the evidence of PWs. 2 and 5. 32. The third statement is the one Ammini made before PW. 11, which was marked as Ext P10. It was contended that a person in the condition of the declared would not have been able to give a lengthy statement like Ext.P10. Ammini became unconscious immediately after administering the - poison and she died on 27-8-1982 at 11.15 p. m. and according to the defence it is quite unbelievable that the deceased gave such a detailed statement. No doubt, the statement is a lengthy one covering two and a half pages, but for that reason alone, it cannot be held that she was not in a fit condition to make that statement or was not likely to narrate the incident in such details. The evidence of PW. 4, the Doctor shows that she became conscious and was in a fit state. No question was put to PW. 4 on the question of capacity of the deceased to give a statement like Ext.P10. For the above reasons we do not find sufficient justification to reject this piece of evidence as concocted. Apart from the suggestion about influence of people of Citizens Forum as the motive to create Ext.P10, no other interest Was attributed to PW. 11 in this respect, but when we bear in mind that Ext.P10 document reached the court on 27-8-1982 itself, no weight could be attached to such an argument. The alleged agitation if any, of the Citizens Forum could only be later development. 33. 11 in this respect, but when we bear in mind that Ext.P10 document reached the court on 27-8-1982 itself, no weight could be attached to such an argument. The alleged agitation if any, of the Citizens Forum could only be later development. 33. The learned Counsel for the appellants has relied on Exts. X-1 to X-4 and also the evidence of DWs.1 and 2 to show that the signature in Ext. P10 is not that of Ammini. In Ext.P10 Ammini appears to have signed in Malayalam but in documents Exts.X-1 to X-7 which were proved by DWs.1 and 2 the deceased signed as Amminikutty in English. On the basis of this fact it was contended that the signature in Ext.P10 is a fabrication. 34. The learned Sessions Judge while considering this aspect has observed that from 1962 onwards one George the cousin of the third accused was the Secretary of the bank and the custodian of the documents of the Bank which Exts. X-3 to X-7 purports to be ana under such circumstances one cannot really raise a presumption of genuineness in regard to those documents. Exts. X-1 and X-2 were produced by the Headmaster and those documents would show that applications for admission to the school and also the application for care-food were signed by Ammini in English. We find slight variations in these signatures, but for that reason it is not possible for us to say that the signatures contained in those documents are not genuine signatures of Ammini. We would rather proceed on the basis that the signatures in Exts. X-1 to X-III are genuine signatures of Ammini. But however from that fact alone we are unable to infer that she would not have signed in Malayalam in Ext. P10, especially having regard to her state at that time when Ext. P10 was recorded. We are inclined to accept Ext. P10 as the true record of statement made by the deceased to P. W. 11, the Sub Inspector of Police. It is also corroborated by the evidence of P. Ws. 2,3 and 5 and Exts. P2, P4 and P5. 35. Ext. P2 wound certificate indicates that there were injuries on the neck. P. W. 4, the Doctor deposed that injuries 7 to 9 could be caused while forcibly administering poison. It it was a case of suicide by consuming poison, these injuries could not have been caused. 2,3 and 5 and Exts. P2, P4 and P5. 35. Ext. P2 wound certificate indicates that there were injuries on the neck. P. W. 4, the Doctor deposed that injuries 7 to 9 could be caused while forcibly administering poison. It it was a case of suicide by consuming poison, these injuries could not have been caused. Injuries on the cheek also suggest that there was fisting. These injuries found on the person of the deceased exclude the theory of suicide advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants. They are only consistent with the prosecution case that accused 1 and 2 caused hurt to the deceased and forcibly administered poison to her and caused her death. Considering the nature of the poison, the acts must have been committed with the intention of causing her death. The two accused went together to the place, and they acted in concert. The circumstances clearly establish their common intention to cause death of Ammini. The acts could have been committed only in furtherance of such a common intention. 36. In the circumstances the conviction against the appellants under S.302, 449 and 323 I. P. C read with S.34 I. P. C. and the sentence of imprisonment for life, awarded by the Sessions Court under S.302 I. P. C. are correct and are hereby confirmed and the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. 37. There is yet another point to be disposed of. The lower court has not awarded separate sentence for the offences under S.323 and 449 I. P. C. though it convicted both the accused under those sections. This is not in accordance with law. In the decision in Jayaram Vithoba and another v. The State of Bombay (A. I. R.1956 S. C. 146), the Supreme Court has observed in Para.6 of the judgment as follows: "When a person is tried for an offence and convicted, it is the duly of the Court to impose on him such sentence as is prescribed therefor. The law does not envisage a person being convicted for an offence without a sentence being imposed". However, we do not propose to rectify the irregularity since the State has not filed any appeal. Dismissed.