V. K. MEHROTRA, J. ( 1 ) ABDUL Aziz, the first respondent in this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, owns a shop in Bazar Kalluganj, Qasba Najiababad in district Bijnor. Petitioner Rafiq Ahmad is his tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/ -. ( 2 ) ABDUL Aziz got a notice under S. 106 T. P. Act, sent to Rafiq Ahmad purporting to terminate his tenancy combining with it a demand for some amount which, he claimed, was due as arrears of rent and water tax. This notice was followed by Suit No. 156 of 1978 in the Court of Small Causes for recovery of the amount in arrears and for a decree for ejectment of Rafiq Ahmad from the shop. ( 3 ) THE suit was filed on May 9, 1978. It was fixed for July 20, 1979 but that date was adjourned to 17-8-1979. The Court was closed on 17-8-1979 as it was declared to be a holiday, being the last Friday of Ramzan. The suit was, however, taken up on 18-8-1979, that is, the next working day and decreed ex parte against Rafiq Ahmad. ( 4 ) ON 22-8-1979 an application for setting aside the ex parte decree was made by Rafiq Ahmad under O. IX, R. 13, C. P. C. read with S. 17 (1) Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. This application was dismissed on 17-10-1979 and a revision against it was dismissed by the Ist Additional District Judge, Bijnor, on April 17, 1980. It is then that Rafiq Ahmad came to this Court for redress through the present petition. ( 5 ) THE basic question which has been raised by Sri Rishi Ram on behalf of Rafiq Ahmad is that the ex parte disposal of the suit on 18-8-1979 was without jurisdiction. Consequently, the decree and the order refusing to set it aside as affirmed by the revisional Court were all liable to fall. The other submission is that, in any case, there being no finding by any of the courts below that the cause shown for non-appearance by defendant Rafiq Ahmad or his counsel on 18-8-1979 before the trial Court was not sufficient it was a fit case where the ex parte decree should not be sustained. The other submission is that, in any case, there being no finding by any of the courts below that the cause shown for non-appearance by defendant Rafiq Ahmad or his counsel on 18-8-1979 before the trial Court was not sufficient it was a fit case where the ex parte decree should not be sustained. Sri R. H. Zaidi, appearing for the landlord Abdul Aziz, has, however, urged that 17-8-1979, which was the date fixed in the case, having been declared a holiday it was incumbent upon Rafiq Ahmad and his counsel to be present before the Court on the next working day and that the trial Court was fully justified in proceeding to dispose of the case ex parte on 18-8-1979, when they did not appear. He has further urged that, in any case, the proviso to S. 17 (1), Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, having not been complied with by Rafiq Ahmad when he sought the setting aside of the ex parte decree, the application made by him for setting it aside was not maintainable. The Courts below were not in error in refusing to set aside the ex parte decree. ( 6 ) THE basic question is whether the trial Judge was entitled to take up the case and dispose it of ex parte on 18-8-1979, in the absence of the defendant and his counsel, when the previous date fixed for the disposal of the case, namely, 17-8-1979 had been declared a holiday. Before examining this question it may be mentioned that this Court had directed the parties to file affidavits bringing on record the practice prevailing in the Courts at Bijnor in respect of cases which happened to be fixed for a date which was subsequently declared to be a holiday. Petitioner Rafiq Ahmad has filed an affidavit to the effect that the practice is that if a particular date is declared to be a public holiday, cases fixed on that date are not taken up for hearing on the following day except with the consent of parties and that no case is decided ex parte or dismissed in default on the following day but a future date is fixed for hearing. He has filed a letter from Sri Qamran Nabi, Advocate in support of this assertion as an annexure to his affidavit sworn on 22-1-1985. He has filed a letter from Sri Qamran Nabi, Advocate in support of this assertion as an annexure to his affidavit sworn on 22-1-1985. Landlord Abdul Aziz has, on the contrary, asserted in his affidavit filed in reply to the affidavit of Rafiq Ahmad that in the event of any particular working day being declared a holiday, the cases fixed for such date are taken up the next day and are dealt with and decided in accordance with law and further that the parties and counsel concerned are supposed to remain present before the court whenever they are called out. In the event of the failure of a party to appear before the court when the case is called out the Court is at liberty to pass ex parte order in accordance with law. He had filed a letter from Sri Purushottam Lal Gupta, an Advocate, with his affidavit to this effect. Practise apart, what should be the legal consequence of the date on which a case is fixed being declared a holiday upon its further progress ? This may be examined keeping in view the practical working of the courts. ( 7 ) AUGUST 17, 1979 was fixed both for the filing of the written statement as also for the final disposal of the suit which was a suit being tried by the Court of Small Causes. This was in keeping with R. 1 and R. 5 of O. V, C. P. C. The process in such cases is issued in form No. 1 of appendix b of the Code. ( 8 ) THIS Court has framed General Rules (Civil), 1957 for the civil courts in the State. Rule 16 of Chap. I of the Rules provides for weekly list of cases fixed for hearing being prepared and posted on the last working day of the previous week at some conspicuous place in the court house. The principles on which it is to be prepared are also given in the same rule. Chapter I also provides in R. 13 that : "except with the consent of parties, no suit, case or appeal shall be heard on a gazetted holiday; provided that on a gazetted holiday a court shall not refuse to do any act or make any order urgently required or which may with propriety be done or made out of court. Chapter I also provides in R. 13 that : "except with the consent of parties, no suit, case or appeal shall be heard on a gazetted holiday; provided that on a gazetted holiday a court shall not refuse to do any act or make any order urgently required or which may with propriety be done or made out of court. " ( 9 ) THE suit fixed for disposal on 17-8-1979 could thus, normally, not be disposed of on August 17, itself, which was declared a gazetted holiday, except with the consent of the parties. Could then it be disposed of without such consent on the next following day, namely 18-8-1979 ? The answer, to me, appears to be in the negative. The reason seems to be embedded largely in equity. After all, the trial of a suit, albeit tried by a Court of Small Causes, is to be held with a view to determine the controversy between the parties after opportunity of hearing to them. The procedure envisaged by the Civil P. C. is to ensure that this is done. This object cannot be overlooked while interpreting the various rules forming part of the Code. ( 10 ) UNDER R. 1, O. IX, C. P. C. , on the date fixed in the summons for the defendant to appear and answer, the parties are to be in attendance at the court-house in person or by their respective pleaders when the suit is to be heard unless the hearing is adjourned to a future date by the court. This is to be ensured through the summons for disposal of the suit issued in form No. 1 of Appendix b of the Code. A hearing of the suit may be adjourned by a court at any stage for sufficient cause as contemplated by O. XVII, R. 1, C. P. C. and when the suit is so adjourned, the court can proceed to dispose it of in one of the modes mentioned in O. IX where, on any date to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, parties or any of them fail to appear. The court can, instead, make such other order as it thinks fit. This is what R. 2 of O. XVII envisages. The court can, instead, make such other order as it thinks fit. This is what R. 2 of O. XVII envisages. R. 6 of O. IX, C. P. C. visualises that where the plaintiff appears but the defendant does not, when the suit is called on for hearing; the court may make an order that the suit be heard ex parte if it is proved that the summonses were duly served. Where such adjournment of the hearing of the suit ex parte is made, the defendant may, at or before such hearing, appear and assign good cause for his previous non-appearance and the court may, on accepting the explanation, permit the defendant to be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the date fixed for his appearance. It may put the defendant to terms before passing such order. This is what R. 7 of O. IX provides for. These provisions unmistakably suggest that even where the case is called on for hearing on the date fixed, a defendant may satisfy the court that his non-appearance was not intentional nor was it calculated to impede the proper progress of the suit and may secure an opportunity of contesting the claim of the plaintiff on merits. ( 11 ) A defendant is expected to act as a prudent person. If the date on which a suit was fixed for final disposal comes to be declared to be a holiday, he or his authorised representative like his counsel is expected to find out as to what happened to the case. To that extent, the obligation would be upon him, as it were, to chase the case. But would that obligation carry with it the risk that on the working day next following the date declared a holiday, the case would be disposed of on merits in his absence. Extending the obligation of a party to this extent would impinge upon the rule of audi alteram partem. Parties can be said to have no notice that the case would be taken up and disposed of on merits even in their absence on a date other than the one fixed for the disposal of the suit. Extending the obligation of a party to this extent would impinge upon the rule of audi alteram partem. Parties can be said to have no notice that the case would be taken up and disposed of on merits even in their absence on a date other than the one fixed for the disposal of the suit. The court, in such cases, would have to post the case for disposal on another date unless, of course, both the parties are present and want it to be disposal of on that date itself. ( 12 ) ON behalf of Abdul Aziz, the plaintiff-respondent, it was strenuously canvassed that the provisions of S. 10, General Clauses Act, would be attracted in a situation like this. That section envisages that where by an Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the court or office is open. Several decisions were cited by the counsel for the parties about this provision. It is unnecessary to refer to them all in view of what the Supreme Court has said in two of its decisions. In (H. H. Raja) Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh AIR 1957 SC 271 it was observed that the object of the section was to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day, and that for S. 10 to apply all that was requisite was that there should be a period prescribed and that period should expire on a holiday. The question was whether S. 10 would apply to the presentation of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 when the period for presentation of election petition was provided in R. 119 (A) of the Rules framed thereunder. The question was whether S. 10 would apply to the presentation of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 when the period for presentation of election petition was provided in R. 119 (A) of the Rules framed thereunder. ( 13 ) LIKEWISE, in Hukumdeo Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra AIR 1974 SC 480 , the Supreme Court, again in regard to the presentation of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, said that if the court is closed on the date when the limitation expired, S. 10 (1), General Clauses Act, enabled the filing of the election petition on the next working day of the court. On their interpretation of the Rules framed by the Patna High Court, however, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court took the view that the court was not closed on Saturday and the petition could have been presented to the Registrar on that day. ( 14 ) WHAT is, however, noticeable is that S. 10, General Clauses Act, can only be attracted where the prescription of the period or the date is by or under an Act. Also that the provision is a piece of beneficent legislation to avoid prejudice to the party who could not take the necessary action in time as the court or office was closed. The provision cannot, in terms, apply to quote the words of P. B. Mukharji, J. in Madan Gopal Daga v. Rallis India Ltd. AIR 1957 Cal 598 :". . . . . TO an order of the court. S. 10, General Clauses Act, is only applied where a statute allows an order or act to be done within a particular time. It cannot be extended to cover an order of court fixing a particular time within which an act is to be done. " ( 15 ) WHEN the court fixes a date for hearing of a suit, it cannot be said to be an act or proceeding which the party is directed or allowed to do or take in any court or office by an Act. S. 10, General Clauses Act, will not apply to it. " ( 15 ) WHEN the court fixes a date for hearing of a suit, it cannot be said to be an act or proceeding which the party is directed or allowed to do or take in any court or office by an Act. S. 10, General Clauses Act, will not apply to it. Besides, the object of S. 10 being to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday on the next working day, can it be said that the object is furthered by visiting him with the penalty of the disposal of suit on merits against him in case of his absence on the next working day following the day which has been declared to be a holiday on which date the case was fixed for disposal. Obviously not. ( 16 ) IF the court can pass an order for ex parte hearing of the suit, in the absence of the defendant, on the date fixed, in terms of R. 6 of O. IX, C. P. C. can it be said that the decree passed ex parte by it on the working day next following the date fixed for disposal of the suit, which was declared a holiday, would be a valid decree ? The answer should undoubtedly be in the negative. The suit disposed of finally on a date not fixed for its disposal by an ex parte decree would be a clear case of denial of justice to a party which happens to be absent that day. This has been accepted by this Court in Munnoo v. Smt. Champakali 1979 All LJ 534. In that case, the date of hearing of the suit fixed for February 15 was advanced to January 27 on an application moved by the plaintiff, on November 23, of the previous year, of which a copy was served upon the counsel for the defendant. It was found that actual intimation about the advanced date, namely, of January 27, was not given to the defendant or his counsel as directed by the court. The view that A. N. Verma, J. took was that, in as much as, the defendants counsel had not been informed of the date by the office, the mistake was of the court and the ex parte decree should have been set aside on that ground alone under the inherent powers of the court. The view that A. N. Verma, J. took was that, in as much as, the defendants counsel had not been informed of the date by the office, the mistake was of the court and the ex parte decree should have been set aside on that ground alone under the inherent powers of the court. ( 17 ) THE trial Judge has, in the present case, said firstly, that the defendant had not complied with the provisions of S. 17 (1), Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, so that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was not maintainable and, secondly that 17-8-1979, which was fixed both for filing the written statement and final disposal of the case, having been declared as a public holiday by the High Court, the parties were presumed to come to the court on the next day. There was no ground for the applicant not to appear in the court on Aug. 18, 1979. The I Addl. Civil Judge, in revision, only said that the application made by the defendant for setting aside the decree was not maintainable for non-compliance with the provisions of S. 17 (1), Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Counsel for both the parties have joined issue on the question whether there was compliance with S. 17 (1 ). It is not necessary to go into that question. The trial Judge, in proceeding to dispose of the suit finally on 18-8-1979 ex parte committed a manifest error of law. His order and decree of that date cannot be sustained being in violation of the principles of natural justice which renders them void. His later order of 13-10-1979 and that dt. April 17, 1980 of the Addl. District Judge, passed in revision consequently fall. They are quashed. The trial Judge shall proceed to dispose of the suit (No. 156 of 1978) afresh in accordance with law, after notice to the parties, expeditiously. ( 18 ) THE petition shall stand allowed as aforesaid but the parties shall bear their own costs of this court. Petition allowed. .