Wasi Haider v. M. Menzed — 1986 DIGILAW 365 (ALL)

Judgment K. Nath, J. 1. THIS is an application under the Contempt of Courts Act. The prayer is to punish the opposite parties, who are officers of the Northern Railway, on the ground that they have disobeyed the judgment dated 12-3-79 of a Division Bench of this Court. 2. THE circumstances in which the application has been filed may be stated briefly. Writ petitions No. 626 of 1971, 443 of 1970 and 1046 of 1970 were filed by Sardar Husain (since dead and now represented by his heirs), Bhagwati Prasad Pandey and Ram Kumar Dubey respectively. They were decided by a common judgment on 7-11-74 by an Hon'ble Single Judge, Hon'ble Mr. Justice O. P. Trivedi. Sardar Husain, Bhagwati Prasad Pandey and Ram Kumar Dubey were employees of the Railway in the Running Cadre and were transferred to the Stationary Cadre respectively on 17-3-56, 25-3-55 and 11-7-59. Their grievance concerned the fixation of their salary in the Stationary Cadre and consequently benefits thereof. At pages 5 and 6 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge the substance of the dispute was described as follows :- "On these facts and allegations, the 3 petitioners prayed for a mandamus to direct the railway authorities to re-fix their officiating pay in Stationary Cadre according to Rules applicable to them and to pay such arrears of salary as may upon such re-fixation be found due. They further prayed that the opposite parties may be directed to grant benefit consequently to the re-fixation of their salary according to the Rules in the matter of provident fund, gratuity, leave and average pay and pension etc." 3. THE substance of the decision of the Hon'ble Single Judge appearing at pages 62, 63 and 65 of the judgment is that officiating pay of the petitioner in officiating appointments to Stationary posts was not fixed according to correct Rule, that consequent to the re-fixation of their pay for the period of their officiating appointments in Stationary posts and substantive appointment on confirmation, they were entitled to arrears of pay, if found due, and that their pension and gratuity ought to be calculated in that light. One of the finding as recorded was that running allowance which the petitioners used to draw on their running posts was not part of pay for the fixation of their salary in the stationary post. One of the finding as recorded was that running allowance which the petitioners used to draw on their running posts was not part of pay for the fixation of their salary in the stationary post. It was held (at page 63) that the claims of arrears of salary would ordinarily be barred by law of limitation except for the period of 3 years next before filing of those writ petitions. A hope in the matter of time barred arrears was, however, expressed at page 65 in the following words :- "In these circumstances the weight of equities appears to tilt the balance heavily in favour of these petitioners and I can only express the hope that Union of India on the balance of equities of these cases shall be able to see its way to payment of arrears of salary to the petitioners for such period as it may consider to be just inspite of the bar of the law of the limitation." 4. THE matter figured before a Division Bench of the Court consisting of Hon'ble U.C. Srivastava and Hon'ble K.N. Goyal, JJ. in the form of 3 special appeals filed by the Union of India in the 3 petitions and 2 special appeals filed by Bhagwati Prasad Pandey and Ram Kumar Dubey. In addition thereto, the writ petitions filed in the year 1975 by the applicants, other than the three petitioners referred to above, also came up for hearing before that Division Bench. Judgment of the Division Bench was rendered on 12-3-79. THE matter in all the appeals and writ petitions under consideration of the Division Bench was stated at page 9 of the copy of judgment as follows :- "THE main point which arises for consideration in the special appeals and writ petitions is whether pay includes the running allowance in the case of running staff and to what extent they are entitled to the same in the case they are transferred or (sic) to a stationary post." At page 11 the Division Bench held that running allowance is computed towards average pay and that it could not be denied that it is a part of the same. At page 12 the following view was expressed :- "THE pay of such employees of running cadre is thus to be calculated in accordance with the relevant rules, a reference to which will be made hereinafter, and is not mere allowance payable only while holding a running post, as has been held by the learned Single Judge." Dealing with the question of the extent to which running allowance may be treated as pay for fixation of pay in the stationary posts, the Court referred to Rules 2017, 2018-B and 2027 (2) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code Volume-II para 11 page 9 of Indian Railway Establishment Mannual, letters dated 1-7-49, 1-4-58, 16-8-61 and 17-12-63 of the Railway Board and a decision of the President of India published in Gazette dated 16-8-81 and held at page 21 that the "running staff entitled to 50 percent of the running allowance towards the pay which is to be calculated in accordance with the Rules." 5. AT pages 21 and 22, the Division Bench observed that the President's decision published in Gazette dated 16-8-61 also had not been taken into consideration by the railway administration and it was observed that running allowance was to be treated as part of pay and the salary of the petitioner was to be re-fixed in accordance with Rule 2027 alongwith Railway Board's letters of 1961 and 1963 referred to above. The penultimate directions of the Division Bench at page 22 of the judgment are as follows : - "All the above five special appeals are thus partly allowed. The Railway Administration is directed to refix the pay of Sardar Husain deceased, Bhagwati Prasad Pandey and Ram Kumar Dubey for the period during which they held their officiating appointment in the stationary posts according to the relevant rules; to refix the pay of Sardar Husain, Bhagwati Prasad Pandey and Ram Kumar Dubey in accordance with Rules 2017, 2018 and 2027 read with the relevent circulars and Presidents' decisions respectively applicable to them, as has been indicated by us earlier after taking into consideration that running allowance is part of pay, during the period they held officiating appointment in the stationary posts and to take prompt steps for determination of their pensionary benefits during the period they officiated in the stationary post and the period they worked on that post in a substantive capacity according to the relevant rules. The order passed by the learned Single Judge in other respects is being maintained. The re-fixation shall be made within three months from today. No order as to costs. So far as other writ petitions are concerned they are hereby allowed. Let a Mandamus to the opposite parties to refix the pay of petitioners in accordance with our observations above, be issued. No order as to costs." 6. THE following position appears to have emerged in view of the above decision :- 1. 50 per cent of the running allowance was to be treated towards pay for the purposes of fixing the pay of the applicants in stationary posts. 2. THE pay was to be fixed in accordance with Rules 2017, 2018-B and 2027 read with circulars of 1961 and 1963 and the President's decision published in Gazette dated 16-8-61. 3. In consequence of such re-fixation of pay the pensionary benefits of the petitioners were to be determined. 4. THE order passed by the learned Single Judge in other respects was maintained which included the decision that the petitioners were entitled to the arrears only for the period of 3 years before the institution of the respective writ petitions. 5. THE re-fixation was to be made within 3 months from 12-3-79. Since the opposite parties did not comply with the decision of the Court within the stipulated 3 months' period, the applicants individually as well as collectively made representations to the opposite parties to do the needful the last representation being dated 16-2-80 Annexure-1 to this application. This application was filed on 11-3-80 and it was said in para 7 of the application that the opposite parties had deliberately and intentionally flouted the judgment and order passed by this court dated 13-3-79 and had disobeyed the mandamus. It was prayed that the opposite parties be punished for contempt of court. 7. IN reply to the show cause notice, opposite party no. 5 Sri K. K, Gupta, the Senior Divisional Personnel Officer, Northern Railway, Lucknow filed an affidavit on 10-11-80. It was said that after obtaining the certified copies of the judgment, the Railway Board took a decision on 24-7-79 not to agitate the matter any further in the Supreme Court and to implement this Court's order dated 12-3-79. Thereafter action for implementation of the judgment was initiated by the office of Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway Lucknow. It was said that after obtaining the certified copies of the judgment, the Railway Board took a decision on 24-7-79 not to agitate the matter any further in the Supreme Court and to implement this Court's order dated 12-3-79. Thereafter action for implementation of the judgment was initiated by the office of Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway Lucknow. It was said that since re-fixation was to be done with retrospective effect, old record had to be searched out and circulars of the Railway Board were to be gathered. It was further added that the implementation of the judgment required correct interpretation of the relevant paragraphs of the Railway Establishment Code, Volume-II, circulars issued by the Railway Board from time to time and the President's order already referred to in the judgment and for this purpose the matter was referred to the Headquarter's Office in January 1980. Before the matters could be finalised, this application was filed. However, subsequently payments of certain amounts were offered to the applicants by Cheques prepared in July and August 1980 whose detail is given in para 22 of the affidavit of opposite party No. 5. It was said in para 24 that re-fixation statements had been prepared by the office of the D.R.M. Lucknow in accordance with the judgment dated 12-3-79 of this Court. It was then said that the officers and the staff concerned had no intention at any time to flout the judgment of the Court and that the deponent expressed apology for the delay in making the payment of the petitioners appellants which was caused on account of indicated reasons and administrative difficulties. 8. A rejoinder affidavit was filed by the applicant No. 2 Bhagwati Prasad Pandey and it was said that despite the decision of the Railway Board on 24-7-79 not to agitate the matter any further in the Supreme Court, yet the matter was kept pending without any attempt to implement the judgment. It was said that implementation was deliberately avoided on account of callous and indifferent attitude of opposite parties and even after expiry of the stipulated period of 3 months no further time was sought from the Court. The Cheques for payment to the applicants were stated to have been hurriedly prepared in disregard of the judgment of this Court in order to sidetrack the issue and avoid contempt, and not in accordance with the judgment. The Cheques for payment to the applicants were stated to have been hurriedly prepared in disregard of the judgment of this Court in order to sidetrack the issue and avoid contempt, and not in accordance with the judgment. This Court directed the applicants to submit a chart showing the mode of calculations of the arrears of the salary which accrued to them. Thereafter Bhagwati Prasad Pandey, Lakshman Prasad Agnihotri, Jagdish Prasad, S. L. Srivastava, Ram Chandra Ahuja, Kalika Prasad, S.P. Srivastava filed charts of calculation of their salary etc. individually with their separate affidavits on different dates upto 20-1-81. Denying those calculations, Charts of calculation prepared by the opposite parties were filed alongwith the affidavit of Ejaz Ahmad, the Chief Law Assistant in the office of D.R.M., Northern Railway, Lucknow on 26th November, 1982. The accuracy of these charts was challenged on behalf of the applicants by affidavit of Bhagwati Prasad Pandey filed on 16-12-82. 9. THE magnitude of controversy between the parties will appear from their respective charts. 10. ACCORDING to para 22 of the counter affidavit dated 15-9-82 of opposite party No. 5, the amounts payable and tendered by cheques to the various applicants are as follows :- 1. B. P. Pandey Rs. 5499 = 11 2. Ram Chandra Ahuja Rs. 7555 = 87 3. S. P.Srivastava Rs. 4931 = 05 4. K. Pandey Rs. 7404 = 30 5. R. K.Dubey Rs. 7048 = 62 6. Wasi Haider Rs. 1128 = 40 7. Smt.Vidyawati Rs. 504 = 00 8. Jagdish Prasad Rs. 5229 = 55 The charts submitted by the applicants do not state the aggregate of the amounts payable to any of them. Only monthly difference between the amount allegedly payable and actually paid has been set out. Two important features are that the monthly difference so worked out includes several periods prior to 3 years-period preceding the date of presentation of the respective writ petitions, and the amount which could be calculated from the monthly difference is several times more than the amounts of cheques tendered by the opposite parties and referred to above. Three of the writ petitions were filed in 1970 ; the rest of them were filed in 1975. The monthly differences relate back differently in the individual Charts of the petitioners to the years 1951, 1955, 1958, 1959 so on and so forth. 11. Three of the writ petitions were filed in 1970 ; the rest of them were filed in 1975. The monthly differences relate back differently in the individual Charts of the petitioners to the years 1951, 1955, 1958, 1959 so on and so forth. 11. THE charts submitted by the opposite parties on 26-11-82 also do not contain the aggregate of the amounts either initially due or ultimately payable in view of the admissible period as held by the Court. THE charts only contain determination of monthly rate of pay and that too is described as "subject to verification from accounts." A note appended at the bottom of most of the charts says that the difference of dearness allownce, city allowance, House allowance, if any, would be payable as per rules from time to time. An important point set out in each chart is that the monthly rate of pay on fixation/re-fixation cannot exceed the maximum of the grade in which the pay is fixed. 12. IN the face of this gross disparity between claims and denials and involvement of extensive calculations, the learned counsel for both the parties agreed to the appointment of M/s. Bbargava and Co., Chartered Accountants, to function as Accounts Commissioner in the proceedings dated 6-5-85 whereupon the necessary order was passed whose relevant extract is as follows :- "......Preparation of these accounts is a technical matter which should in the first instance be better handled by an appropriate Chartered Accountant. As agreed by the learned counsel for the parties, M/s. Bhargava and Co. Chartered Accountants of Lucknow, are appointed as Commissioner of Accounts by this Court for the purpose indicated above. They will go through the relevant orders of this Court, examine the two sets of accounts submitted by the contending parties and work out the amount which may be payable to the three applicants named above. The parties shall make available the necessary records and material to the said Chartered Accountants as required by them. The Chartered Accountants will submit report to this court within two months. The amount that may be ordered to be paid to the Chartered Accountants as their fees, shall be paid by the opposite parties." The amounts worked out by the Chartered Accountants are as follows :- Rs. Period 1. Wasi Haider 2,15,354=00 From 17-3-56 to 4-6-74 2. Bhagwati Prasad Panday 3,50,088=00 From 25-3-55 to 30-6-74 3. The amount that may be ordered to be paid to the Chartered Accountants as their fees, shall be paid by the opposite parties." The amounts worked out by the Chartered Accountants are as follows :- Rs. Period 1. Wasi Haider 2,15,354=00 From 17-3-56 to 4-6-74 2. Bhagwati Prasad Panday 3,50,088=00 From 25-3-55 to 30-6-74 3. R.K. Dubey 4,12,669=00 From 11-7-59 to 30-4-82 4. Kalika Prasad 2,61,398=00 From 12-4-59 to 31-12-77 5. Sanktha Prasad Srivastava 3,48,297=00 From 18-7-69 to 31-7-81 6. Ram Chandra Anuja 3,89,662=00 From 4-6-55 to 16-10-85 7. S.L. Srivastava 1,78,728=00 From 10-2-58 to 23-8-78 8. Smt. Vidyawati 2,60,530=00 From 9-2-56 to 15-10-75 9. Lakshman Prasad Agnohotri 80,192=00 From 31-1-62 to 29-5-69 10. Jgdish Prasad 3,75,112=00 From 30-9-57 to 30-11-77 13. THESE amounts were worked out by the Chartered Accountants after both parties had appeared before them and had placed material of their choice The applicants rely upon the report while the opposite parties have filed objections with affidavit. 14. SRI Lalji Sinha Advocate for the opposite party and SRI P.K. Khare Advocate for the applicants have pressed for their respective points. SRI Lalji Srivastava raised the following points :- (1) The amounts worked out by Chartered Accountants include a substantial period beyond that fixed by the Court in its judgment. (2) The fixation of pay in various posts is at amounts in excess of the maximum of the scale of pay of the post held. Pay could not be fixed at an amount which is more than that maximum of the scale. (3) The amounts actually paid by the opposite parties to the applicants from time to time has not been set off in the calculation. (4) These proceedings are for contempt of court and all that has to be seen is whether the alleged non-implementation of the Court's order is wilful and deliberate or bonafide. There is a bonafide controversy over the interpretation of this Court's judgment and over that of various Rules and letters of the Railway Board and the decision of the President on the basis of which the fixation of pay was directed to be made. The opposite parties have made bonafide efforts to carry out the mandate of the Court by fixing the pay and determining the amount. Reliance is placed upon a judgment dated 24-11-85 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. The opposite parties have made bonafide efforts to carry out the mandate of the Court by fixing the pay and determining the amount. Reliance is placed upon a judgment dated 24-11-85 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 45 of 1982, S. K. Tewari v. Union of India, copy Annexure I to the opposite party's objection to the report of the Chartered Accountant. There the judgment of this Court under implementation came up for consideration and interpretation was placed on various Rules, which according to the opposite parties is the correct interpretation. (5) This Court while dealing the matter of Contempt of Court would be reluctant to make an interpretation of the material mentioned in (4), because that would be the function of a Division Bench of this Court as the judgment under implementation was rendered by a Division Bench. If the amount fixed by the opposite parties is incorrect, the remedy of the applicants is to file another writ petition. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicants in reply pointwise is :- (1) There is no question of running of any period of limitation so long as correct fixation of pay is not made. The claim for correct pay would accrue only when it is actually fixed which is yet to be done. Reliance is placed on the case of Maimoona Khatoon v. State of U.P., 1980 SC 1773. (2) The judgment of this Court does not say that pay must not be fixed in excess of the maximum of the scale of the concerned post. The pay, in accordance with the judgment, must be fixed at an amount which may be arrived at by complying with the direction of the Court, and if necessary the opposite parties must create posts for the purpose. (3) It was the duty of the opposite parties to indicate to the Chartered Accountants the amounts already paid by them to the applicants from time to time. (4) The proceedings for contempt of court are for enforcement of the Court's judgment, and since the opposite parties agreed to the appointment of Chartered Accountants vide orders dated 6-5-85 and further participated in the deliberation before the Chartered Accountants, it is not open to them to say that the amounts payable cannot be determined in these proceedings. (4) The proceedings for contempt of court are for enforcement of the Court's judgment, and since the opposite parties agreed to the appointment of Chartered Accountants vide orders dated 6-5-85 and further participated in the deliberation before the Chartered Accountants, it is not open to them to say that the amounts payable cannot be determined in these proceedings. The opposite parties did not implement the mandate of this Court within the time fixed, nor sought extension of time. Instead they want to re-open the whole case which cannot be done now. There is deliberate non-compliance of the Court's order. (5) This Court is competent to interpret the judgment and the material referred to therein to do justice to the applicants who have already suffered over a very long period of time. 15. LEARNED counsel for the opposite parties emphasises that in the face of specific decision of this Court inter partes that arrears would be recoverable only for the period of 3 years immediately preceding the date of presentation of the writ petition, there is no question of accrual of any right, on re-fixation of pay, in respect of the period beyond the said time, that there is no question of creating posts and that the mere agreement to appoint the Chartered Accountants as Accounts Commissioner does not oblige the opposite parties to accept the report. It is urged that there is bonafide dispute over interpretation of this Court's judgment and the various Rules and letters, hence no case of contempt of court is made out. He has relied upon the cases of Manohar Lal v. Prem Shanker Tandon, 1960 Alld. 231 (DB) and V. K. Kar v. Chief Justice of Orissa, 1961 SC 1367. 16. ON a consideration of all the matters it must be held that there has been a delay on the part of the opposite parties in implementation of this Court's judgment because the only explanation given for non-implementation within 3 months is that the opposite parties were examining whether an appeal should be filed before the Supreme Court. It was ultimately decided by the Railway Board on 24-7-79 that appeal need not be filed and the judgment be implemented. This certainly constitutes a breach of the Court's mandate, but, the breach seems to be technical rather than real. It was ultimately decided by the Railway Board on 24-7-79 that appeal need not be filed and the judgment be implemented. This certainly constitutes a breach of the Court's mandate, but, the breach seems to be technical rather than real. It is noticeable that the applicants themselves did not work out the amount ultimately payable to them although they set out the monthly difference. There is a bonafide controversy over the various Rules and letters of the Railway Board and President, as also the applicability of some of them to the case of individual applicants. The Division Bench having said that running allowance is to be taken into consideration for the purposes of fixing pay in stationary post, only indicated the material on which fixation/refixation of pay and determination of arrears of salary has to be done ; the Court did not set out an interpretation of all the applicable material. It cannot be said that the material must be interpreted only in the manner urged by the applicants and not in the manner contended for by the opposite parties; the interpretation is open, since the Division Bench did not find it necessary to interpret them at that stage. But it would be too much to contend that in order to obtain the true interpretation of the material, the 'applicants must file fresh writ petition. The cycle may go on indefinitely, if that was to be done. The decisions arise out of the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution, and although the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure may not apply in view of Sec. 141 CPC, the powers of this Court to pass any order for any purpose under Article 226 is unlimited. Principles of fairness and justice which inform the provisions of the CPC may be adopted except in so far as they may be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or Rules of Court. One of the principles is that a Decree or Order may be executed by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is transferred for the purpose. Since the judgment sought to be implemented was passed by a Division Bench of this Court, motion for its implementation must be made to a Division Bench. 17. CERTAIN legal angles, as they appear to me, may be indicated. Since the judgment sought to be implemented was passed by a Division Bench of this Court, motion for its implementation must be made to a Division Bench. 17. CERTAIN legal angles, as they appear to me, may be indicated. Under Rule 2 (v) (c) of Chapter V of the Rules of Court, a Judge sitting singly may not decide an application other than one for interim relief to which Chapter XXII applied, viz., an application for a direction or an order under Article 226 (other than of a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus). In the matter of an order of costs, the Court may transmit the order to the District Court for execution under Rule 11 of Chapter XXII, but there is no corresponding provision for transfer of cases for enforcement of other relief awarded by this Court. Hence, a motion for enforcement of an order, passed in a writ petition under Article 226, may be made to the court itself in view of the wide scope of Art. 226. 18. ACCORDING to Rule 13 of Chapter V of the Rules of Court, an application to the same effect or with the same object as a previous application on which a Bench had passed any order, shall ordinarily be heard by the same Bench. Coupled with this, the general principle that a court which had passed a decree, may execute the same, would show that so far as enforcement of a judgment of this court, passed by a Division Bench, is concerned, the motion must be made to the Division Bench. Coupled with this, the general principle that a court which had passed a decree, may execute the same, would show that so far as enforcement of a judgment of this court, passed by a Division Bench, is concerned, the motion must be made to the Division Bench. The English Law on the method of enforcement of an uncomplied Mandamus is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Second Edition, Volume 9, Para 1359 (at page 798) as follows :- "If a mandamus be not complied with, the court or a Judge, besides or instead of proceedings against the disobedient party for contempt, may direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the party by whom the mandamus has been obtained, or some other person appointed by the court or judge, at the cost of the disobedient party, and, upon the act being done, the expense incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the court or judge may direct, and execution may issue for the amount so ascertained and costs." In the Fourth Edition of Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 11 the law is stated in para 1568 (at page 822) as follows :- "Disobedience to an order of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition is a contempt of court and is punishable by committal for contempt. In case of disobedience to an order of mandamus, a court may also direct that the act required to be done may be done, so far as practicable, by the party by whom the order was obtained or some other persons appointed by the court, and the costs recovered from the disobedient party." It is clear, therefore, that the court can direct an Accounts Commissioner to perform the function of fixation/refixation of the pay of the petitioner and determine the arrears payable to them on the basis of the mandamus granted by this court. Further, the expense incurred in this regard may also be required, to be paid by the disobedient party. I consider this to be a reasonable and fair course to be adopted in cases like this. 19. Further, the expense incurred in this regard may also be required, to be paid by the disobedient party. I consider this to be a reasonable and fair course to be adopted in cases like this. 19. THE proceeding to punish for contempt of court, under the Contempt of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution, strictly speaking, is not a proceeding in execution of judgment, decree or order, it is only a proceeding to impose punishment within specified limits, in the hope that under sanction of punishment the delinquent party would carry out the mandate. So far as the actual performance of the mandate is concerned the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act or Article 215 of the Constitution are of no assistance. THE High Court's powers in this regard must ultimately be exercised under Article 226 in a proper forum ; and in exercise of these powers, this Court may pass such orders as it may find necessary, fair, just and effective; the hands of the court are not tied down by the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. 20. THE position which emerged from the judgment, under implementation, has been set out in earlier part of this judgment. It is clear enough that the applicants were held to be entitled to arrears of salary etc. only for a period of three years prior to the date of presentation of the writ petition. It is also clear that although the court directed that the pay was to be fixed in accordance with Rules 2017, 2018-B and 2027, read with circulars of 1961 and 1963, and the President's decisions published in Gazette dated 16-8-61, the court did not set out its interpretation of those provisions to provide the guidelines or fixation/refixation of pay and computation of arrears. THE court did not say that the pay fixed/refixed of the applicants could exceed the maximum of the scale of pay for the particular stationary post held by the applicants. THE court indicated, inter alia, that fixation and refixation was to be done in accordance with Rules. It would be inherent that no fixation could be made beyond the Rules and perhaps there is no Rule that fixation of pay can be made at an amount in excess of the maximum of the pay scale of the post held. THE court indicated, inter alia, that fixation and refixation was to be done in accordance with Rules. It would be inherent that no fixation could be made beyond the Rules and perhaps there is no Rule that fixation of pay can be made at an amount in excess of the maximum of the pay scale of the post held. The Chartered Accountants have clearly gone wrong at least in these two respects, and if they entertained any doubt about the true position in this regard, they would have been better advised to seen, the guidance of this court rather than ignore the directions contained in the judgment for which they were appointed as Commissioner of Accounts. I would not like to say anything more on the merits of the amount payable to each of the applicant, because for reasons already recorded, that has got to be done by a Division Bench of the Court before which applicants may file applications in the nature of execution petitions for enforcement and implementation of this Court's order. As and when such application is filed, the interpretation of the Rules, the letters and the President's orders, as also the calculations made by the applicants, by the opposite parties, and by the Chartered Accountants, would come up for scrutiny. Within the limited scope of proceedings contempt of court in the present application no further action is called for, and it does not appear just to impose a punishment merely for the delay with which the opposite parties proceeded to work out the amount payable to the applicants. It is rather unfortunate that despite passage of several years, it has not yet been possible to fix the exact amount and the consequential pensionary benefits admissible to the applicants. 21. I considered the question whether I myself may refer the matter to a Larger Bench, but I notice that would not serve any useful purpose because so far as the present application is concerned, even a Bench can only consider the question of the opposite parties committing a concempt of court and no more The motion for realisation of the amount in the nature of execution of this court's order is of a different class and would have to be raised before and considered by a different forum in the light of altogether different principles of law. I may still hope that if a proper petition in the nature of an application for execution for implementation of the court's order is made before a Bench, it may be possible to settle the entire controversy at a very early date. 22. BEFORE I part with this case, the bills of Charteied Accountants must be settled. They have claimed the following fees :- In the case of Wasi Haider - Rs 5,778/-. B.P. Pandey - Rs 8.752/-. R.K. Dubey - Rs. 10,317/-. S.L. Srivastava - Rs. 4,468/-Smt. Vidyawati - Rs. 6,513/-. In the case of L.P. Agnihotri - Rs. 2,005/-. K.P. Pandey - Rs. 6,534/-. Jagdish Prasad - Rs. 9,377/-. R.C. Ahuja - Rs. 9,741/-. S.P. Srivastava - Rs. 8,706/-. The claims are made on the basis of 2 1/2 per cent of the amount determined by them. As already stated, the amounts calculated by the Chartered Accountants have been challenged by the opposite parties to be greatly exaggerated and excessive. The contention of learned counsel for the opposite parties is that the amount really admissible as payable would be much less and consequently the fees claimed are too high and deserve to be reduced. The contention of learned counsel for opposite parties in this regard cannot be said to be without substance for reasons already recorded. Having regard to the nature of the work, I direct the Union of India, through opposite parties nos.1 and 2, to pay the sums of Rs. 1,000/-, 1,500/-, 2,000/-, 750/-, 1,000/-, 500/-, 1,000/-, 2,000/-, 2,000/- and 1,500/- respectively in the cases of Sarvsri Wasi Haider, B.P. Pandey, R.K. Dubey, S.L. Srivastava, Smt. Vidyawati, L.P. Agnihotri, K.P. Pandey, Jagdish Prasad, R.C. Ahuja and S.P. Srivastava. With the above observations, this petition is dismissed. Parties shall bear their costs. The Union of India, through the opposite parties nos.1 and 2, shall pay the fees of the Chartered Accountants as held above within two months from today. Petition dismissed.