Judgment 1. This second appeal by the defendant against the judgment of affirmance arises out of a suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession and for mesne profits. 2. The case of the plaintiffs, in short, is that the suit lands were recorded in two khatas in the name of three brothers, namely, Panchu, Buniyad and Mahabir as raiyats thereof in the cadastral survey Khatian, wherein Banwari and Chulhai who are ancestors of the defendant were shown as sikmidars. Sometime after the cadastral survey, Panchu and Buniyad died in jointness leaving behind their third brother Mahabir upon whom the lands of the aforesaid Khatas devolved and who came in possession exclusively thereof since that day. The sikmidars thereafter surrendered their sikmi right in the lands of the aforesaid khatas with Mahabir. Later on Mahabir died leaving behind his son Muso upon whom the lands of the aforesaid khatas devolved and who came in possession thereof exclusively. The plaintiffs father purchased the lands of the aforesaid khatas under a registered sale deed from the aforesaid Muso and came in possession thereof from the date of purchase. Later on, there was a proceeding under S.145, Criminal P.C. between the parties which was decided against the plaintiffs, but in spite of the final order passed in the said proceeding the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession of the subject of dispute. But the defendants after passing of the order under S.145, Criminal P.C., being emboldened thereby dispossessed the plaintiffs from the suit lands which necessitated filing of the present suit. 3. The case of the defendants, in short, is that Mahabir was not the brother of Panchu and Buniyad. According to them, Panchu, Buniyad and Chhakauri were the three brothers. So far as Mahabir is concerned, they say that he was son of Banwari. According to them, though Mahabir was not the brother of Panchu and Buniyad, but upon the death of Panchu and Buniyad interest in the disputed khatas in question devolved upon Mahabir and Chhakauri both and consequently Mahabir did not acquire the entire interest in the disputed khatas. They denied the case of the plaintiffs regarding surrender and pleaded that since there was no surrender, the sale in favour of the plaintiffs by defendants father Muso was invalid. They denied the case of the plaintiffs regarding surrender and pleaded that since there was no surrender, the sale in favour of the plaintiffs by defendants father Muso was invalid. It was also pleaded on behalf of the defendants that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary party and that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. Upon consideration of the evidence of the parties, the trial court decreed the suit after having found that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of party and it was not barred by limitation. The story of surrender was proved by the plaintiffs. 5. On appeal being taken by the defendant the lower appellate court has affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and approved all the findings recorded by the trial court. Thus, this second appeal to this Court. 6. Dr. Sada Nand Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in support of the appeal has placed 3 points. The first point is that the suit was barred by limitation which was one of the substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission of the appeal. According to Dr. Jha the proceeding under S.145, Criminal P.C. was initiated on 6-3-1961 and the final order therein was passed on 17-8-1963 and the suit was filed on 11-1-1975. According to him, the 12 years period of limitation under the Limitation Act would begin to run from the initiation of the proceeding under S.145, Criminal P.C., i.e., the date of passing of the preliminary order under S.145(1), Criminal P.C. learned counsel further contended that the period of limitation shall not begin to run from 17-8-1963, i.e., the date of passing of the final order passed in the proceeding under S.145, Criminal P.C. In support of this submission, learned counsel has cited three decisions. The first one is in the case of R.H. Bhutani V/s. Mani J. Desai (1969 Cr. L.J. 13). The first one is in the case of R.H. Bhutani V/s. Mani J. Desai (1969 Cr. L.J. 13). I find that in this decision the Supreme Court was considering the effect of second proviso to S.145, Criminal P. C. 1898 which lays down that if a party is able to prove that within two months next before the date of passing of the preliminary order under S.145(1) he has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, in that event the court shall treat the party so dispossessed to be in possession of the subject of the dispute. This was the only question for consideration before their Lordships and no question was raised in that case regarding the period of limitation for filing of a suit for declaration of title, the cause of action of which is the final order passed in a proceeding under S.145, Criminal P.C. The learned counsel also cited two other decisions in Ishwari Singh V/s. Kamleshwari Singh, 1976 BBCJ 558 and Jahandad V/s. Abdul Ghafur, AIR 1930 PC 281. I do not think these decisions have any bearing on the point raised in the present appeal on the question of limitation. 7. In my view, for the purpose of calculating 12 years period of limitation it can by no stretch of imagination be said that the same will be counted from the date of passing of the preliminary order under S.145(1), Criminal P.C. because the day when the preliminary order under S.145(1) was passed none of the parties had any cause of action to file the suit and the cause of action for filing the suit has accrued only when the final order has been passed. Thus, I find that the suit was filed well within time and there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant on this score. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the suit is bad for not impleading certain persons as party defendants in the suit. Learned counsel contended that all the heirs of Banwari who was one of the recorded sikmidars have not been impleaded in the suit. He further contended that though the property was purchased by the plaintiffs father who died leaving behind the sons and daughters, but the daughters have not been impleaded in the suit. Learned counsel contended that all the heirs of Banwari who was one of the recorded sikmidars have not been impleaded in the suit. He further contended that though the property was purchased by the plaintiffs father who died leaving behind the sons and daughters, but the daughters have not been impleaded in the suit. In my view, both the courts below have come to the conclusion that the suit is not bad for defect of party. Since none of these left out heirs were parties in S.145 Cr. P.C. order they were not necessary party to be impleaded in the present suit. Consequently, I find that the persons sought to be impleaded, according to the defendant, were some of the heirs of Banwari and the plaintiffs father. Since the other heirs of these two persons are parties in the suit who can represent their estate, on this score as well the suit cannot fail, even if it is assumed that they are necessary party. Thus, I find no merit in this contention as well of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. 9. Lastly the learned counsel contended that the court of appeal below has not recorded any finding on the question whether Mahabir was brother of Buniyad and Panchu and as such the judgment is fit to be set aside on this ground alone. I find that in para 14 of its judgment the lower appellate court has recorded a finding that the defendant has failed to establish the genealogical table alleged by him. Further, the lower appellate court while considering the case of non-joinder has observed that the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendant have failed to substantiate the genealogy set forth by him. Thus, I find that this point has also no force and the appeal is concluded by the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two courts below. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.