ORDER K.T. Thomas, J. 1. The only point urged in this Criminal Revision is that the sentence of rigorous imprisonment, for a period of three months imposed on the petitioner for the offence under S.304A I.P.C. has no justification. Alternatively it was contended that a more lenient view may be taken in the matter of sentence because, the facts of the case would reveal that the motor accident described in this case was only on account of an error of judgment on the part of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged to have a new look at the sentencing policy while dealing with offences involving S.304A I.P.C. 2. The case against the petitioner, in short, is that he drove a jeep so rashly and negligently as to endanger human life, .through Muvattupuzha - Thodupuzha public road, from West to East, during the afternoon of 26-2-1981 and the jeep went off the road towards right at the place of occurrence and dashed against a cart which was parked on the extreme south of the road and then the vehicle moved further towards south and ranover one Moideen who was sitting in the Veranda of a house on the road-side. Moideen later succumbed to his injuries. The petitioner did not dispute that he drove the vehicle at the time of accident, nor did he dispute that the jeep dashed against the cart and hit the deceased down. His version was that while he was driving his jeep behind a car, he had to overtake the car which was abruptly stopped in front of him and while overtaking the car, he noticed a bus rushing from the opposite direction; and in order to avoid a head-on-collision with the bus, he had to swerve his vehicle further to his right and then the consequences followed. 3. The trial Magistrate as well as the appellate court (Sessions Court) found that the prosecution story has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and they rejected the defence theory as improbable. Accordingly, the petitioner was found, guilty of the offence and was therefore, convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. The concurrent findings based on evidence need no disturbance in this revision and the learned counsel has no contention that the findings are vitiated by any error of that degree or unreasonableness of such a dimension as would warrant interference from revisional' court. Accordingly, the petitioner was found, guilty of the offence and was therefore, convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. The concurrent findings based on evidence need no disturbance in this revision and the learned counsel has no contention that the findings are vitiated by any error of that degree or unreasonableness of such a dimension as would warrant interference from revisional' court. Hence, the learned counsel made focus on the sentence alone during the time of arguments in this revision. 4. The Learned counsel contended that when an offence is made punishable with imprisonment or fine, and when discretion is given to the trial court to make the choice and to determine the extent of the sentence, the normal sentence should not be a term of imprisonment. The counsel expressed concern saying that the recent trend, unfortunately, is to pass sentence of imprisonment in such cases, forgetting that no criminal intention can be attributed to the accused for such offences. In the above context, a reference was made to the observation of Beaumont, C.J. in one of the early decisions of the Bombay High Court reported in Emperor v. Khanmahomed (AIR 1937 Bom. 96). The learned Chief Justice in that case observed thus: "It is not part of the duty of the courts to punish with savage sentences every motorist who has the misfortune to have an accident, which results in a loss of life, even though the accident be due to an error of judgment on the part of the driver. 'The circumstances of each case must be considered in imposing sentence. Moreover, one has to remember that driving motorcars has become an essential part of human activities and it is impossible to avoid certain number of accidents." The Last part of the above observation does not appear to have gained preponderant approval from other High Courts. Even if there had been any justification in making the said observation in the decision in that case, it is not consistent with the present line of thinking and it must be remembered that a period of half a century has elapsed between then and now. The highways and other public roads, in the urban and suburban areas as well as village pans have become crammed with fleeing automobiles. The highways and other public roads, in the urban and suburban areas as well as village pans have become crammed with fleeing automobiles. Road traffic hazards have reached such a monstrous proportion now in the megalopolises that the incredible difference between the potential for fatal accidents and the actual number of such accidents often appears to explain how faith prevails over reason. The volume and melange of vehicular traffic have grown. Commonest users of the roads in India continue to be the pedestrians which include women and school-going children. Krishna Iyer, J., in his own style, has described the scene as this, "the callous yet tragic traffic chaos and treacherous unsafely of public transportation-the besetting sin of our highways which arc more like fatal facilities than means of mobility. More people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so, the Indian highways arc among the top killers of the country." If drivers of vehicles heavy vehicles or light vehicles get the impression that the worst consequence which visits them on account of rash driving is only that they will have to pay some amount of fine, that impression would considerably dilute the element of deference in them. In the present situation, when vehicular traffic is registering galloping growth, the weakening of deterant element will make the class of drivers inalert to the imperative need to take proper care and circumspection. This is an aspect to be seriously borne in mind by the Magistrates while deciding the quantum of sentence for the offence under S.304A IPC. 5. It is true that the sentence awardable for the said offence is either a term of imprisonment which may go upto two years or fine or both, leaving the extent of sentence to be determined by the court inits discretion. The judicial discretion, as is often said, is a "discretion which is informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system". While exercising the discretion in fixing the extent of the sentence, the severity of rashness, the degree of callousness as well as the seriousness of the consequences which followed arc matters to be taken into account by courts. The judicial discretion, as is often said, is a "discretion which is informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system". While exercising the discretion in fixing the extent of the sentence, the severity of rashness, the degree of callousness as well as the seriousness of the consequences which followed arc matters to be taken into account by courts. The Supreme Court refused to reduce a sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment for this offence in the case in which Krishna Iyer, J. has made the observations quoted above, despite the argument that the driver had a large family to be maintained. In 1973 the Indian Parliament imposed a mild but definite limitation on the discretion of the courts in awarding sentence. By the addition of sub-s.(4) in S.354 of the Code, the law now provides that when a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment for a term less than three months for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of one year or more, the court shall record its reasons for awarding such sentence. The said new provision indicates the concern of the Parliament in noticing too much of leniency shown by courts while awarding sentences an exercise of their discretion. Now it is made clear that sentence of imprisonment shall be the rule and sentence of fine would only the exception for such offences. When the Parliament inserted the said sub-section, certainly the Parliament would have borne in mind that the sentence prescribed for the offence under S.304A IPC is imprisonment which may go upto two years or fine or both. 6. A quarter of a century ago, this Court emphasised the need for a realistic sentencing policy while dealing with the offence under S.304A I.P.C. That was expressed in the decision reported in State of Kerala v. Ramaswami ( 1961 KLT 769 ). In that case the court found that there was utter callousness on the part of the driver in having gone to the wrong side of the road losing control of the vehicle and rolled over a person who was sitting on the extreme end of the road. The trial Magistrate, in that case, awarded imprisonment for six months as the sentence, but the Sessions Judge reduced the sentence to one of fine only. Govinda Menon, J. criticised the reduction of the sentence and termed it as grossly inadequate. The trial Magistrate, in that case, awarded imprisonment for six months as the sentence, but the Sessions Judge reduced the sentence to one of fine only. Govinda Menon, J. criticised the reduction of the sentence and termed it as grossly inadequate. K.S. Hegde, J. (as he then was) observed in Suite of Mysore v. Banira Kunjanna (AIR 1960 Mys. 177) that, "in recent times several cases have come to the notice of the court where the sentence imposed had no proportion to the offence committed by the accused." That was a case where the Magistrate imposed a sentence of fine for the offence under S.304A I.P.C. without pointing out any extenuating circumstance for preferring a lenient sentence. Even the counsel who appeared for the accused in that case did not dispute that the sentence imposed was ridiculously lenient, but tried to justify it saying that the accused was .assured of a lenient sentence and hence, he was persuaded to plead guilty. Inspite of the above circumstance, the learned Judge expressed his anguish over the disproportionate leniency shown in awarding sentence for .the offence under S.304A I.P.C. The Bombay. High Court in the decision reported in State v. Balachandra ( AIR 1966 Bom. 122 ), after saying that for an offence under S.304A I.P.C., the sentence is a matter of discretion of the trial Magistrate, has further staled that, "having regard to the circumstances of the case, and the fact that sentence must be such as to serve as a deterant to others, the High Court may, if necessary impose a substantive sentence of imprison mentor addition to the sentence of fine imposed by the trial court." The Orissa High Court in the decision reported in Pitabash Panda v. State ( AIR 1961 Ori. 45 ) had to decide the question of adequacy of the sentence in a case where the defence theory was error of judgment. That theory was rejected. The then learned Chief Justice of that High Court who delivered the judgment in the said case observed that: "....the conduct, of the petitioner was callous throughout and his inability to control the . vehicle was due to his recklessness and therefore a mere sentence of fine was inappropriate. That theory was rejected. The then learned Chief Justice of that High Court who delivered the judgment in the said case observed that: "....the conduct, of the petitioner was callous throughout and his inability to control the . vehicle was due to his recklessness and therefore a mere sentence of fine was inappropriate. 'The undue prolongation of the trial may be a ground for not imposing a long term sentence of imprisonment, but it will not be a ground for letting off the petitioner with a sentence of fine only". In 1969 the Madras High Court had to consider the argument that a sentence of six months' imprisonment for such an offence is excessive, in the decision reported in Sundaram Pillai, In re ((1969) 2 M.L.C. 464). The learned Judge adopted the standard that, "the severity of the sentence must depend,' to a great extent, on the degree of callousness", and he refused to reduce the sentence. The latest in" the case law is the decision of this Court reported in Mohana Sreekuinartin Nair v. Stale of Kerala ( 1986 KLT 504 ). Sreedharan, J. in the said decision has depricated the tendency "exhibited by the trial Magistrate in avoiding substantive imprisonment to offenders who are found guilty of live said offence, if persons driving vehicles inculcate a feeling that they can get away by paying some money as fine-ex-en in eases where reckless driving results in the deaths of innocent victims, the deterrent effect of sentencing policy disappears and it would tend those drivers to continue their reckless driving." I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations made by the learned Judge. 7. I made the above survey in order to outline the judicial thinking as well as the Parliament's concern as to the modalities to be followed in determining the extent of sentence for the offence under S.304A I.P.C. while exercising discretion of the court. Bearing in mind the above guidelines, I find little scope to interfere with the sentence in this case. The criminal revision petition is accordingly dismissed.