JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, A.C.J. 1. Being of opinion that the view expressed by this Court in the case ot V.K. Tandon v. Smt. G. Devi Rathor, 1976 ARC 752 and subsequently followed in the cases of Hira Lal Jasrapuri v. VIII Addl. District Judge, iy 82 (1) ARC 117 and Gangu Narain v. IX Addl. District Judge, Kanpur 1984 (1) ARC 342 requires reconsideration in the light of observations made by the Supreme Court in the cases of Sri Ram Pasricha Vs. Jagannath and Others, AIR 1976 SC 2335 Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathak and Others, AIR 1977 SC 1599 and Subhendu Prosad Roy Choudhury and Others Vs. Kamala Bala Roy Choudhury and Others, AIR 1978 SC 835 a learned single Judge has referred this petition for decision by a larger Bench and this is how the matter has come up before us. 2. Shri Thakurji Madan Mohan Lal Ji Maharaj and Gopal Lal Ji Birajman Mandir (hereinafter referred to as Thakurji) filed a suit in the court of Judge Small Causes for ejectment of Mool Chand Sharma (Petitioner) from the premises in suit and for recovery of Ks. 1970.68 as arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation calculated at the rate of Rs. 125/- per month, through its Muta-walli Prakash Chand. 3. The Plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the premises in dispute and alleged that Defendant Mool Chand was a tenant thereof on payment of Rs. 125/- per month as rent. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant was in arrears of rent and despite service of notices upon him, he neither paid the rent nor vacated the premises in suit. 4. Defendant Mool Chand contested the suit and denied the right of Prakash Chand to maintain the same on behalf of Thakurji. He pleaded that Bankey Lal, father of Prakash Chand, used to realise the rent of the premises in question @ Rs. 45/- per month through his son Prahlad Das (brother of Prakash Chand) and he continued to pay the same to Prahlad Das even after the death of Bankey Lal. According to him the entire rent stands paid up and the suit for his ejectment deserved to be dismissed. 5. 45/- per month through his son Prahlad Das (brother of Prakash Chand) and he continued to pay the same to Prahlad Das even after the death of Bankey Lal. According to him the entire rent stands paid up and the suit for his ejectment deserved to be dismissed. 5. After considering the evidence produced in the case, the trial court found that at one stage Bankey Lal, father of Prakash Chand became the Mutawalli of Plaintiff Thakurji and that it was he who had let out the premises in question to Defendant Mool Chand on payment of Rs. 125/- per month as rent. Bankey Lal died leaving behind six sons out of whom two viz. Prahlad Chand and-Prahlad Das were major and remaining four sons were minor. Before the trial court, the Defendant claimed that after Bankey Lal's death his right as Mutawalli of Thakurji devolved on his six sons and Prakash Chand became merely a co-mutually along with his brothers. He relied on the principle that one co-owner is not competent to maintain a suit for ejectment of a tenant and urged that the suit filed through Prakash Chand, one of the co-mutualism, was not maintainable. However, the trial court held that in view of the fact that at the time of Bankey Lal's death, four of his sons were minor and Prahlad Das was blind, the case set up by Prakash Chand that, he had been, after his father's death, appointed as the Mutawalli appeared to be believable. It, therefore, found that Prakash Chand was the sole Mutawalli and the suit filed by Shri Thakurji Maharaj through him was not defective. He also found that the Defendant has been in arrears of rent ever since the month of May 1978. In the result, the trial court decreed the suit for Mool Chand's eviction and for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,970/- as arrears of rent and damages calculated at the rate of Rs. 125/-per month. 6. Aggrieved, Defendant Mool Chand went up in revision before the District Judge, Azamgarh and the said revision application was heard by the IV Addl. District Judge. He reiterated the submission that Prahlad Candy being merely a co-mutually was not entitled to maintain the present suit on behalf of Thakurji and that the rent payable by him was Rs. 45/- per month only. District Judge. He reiterated the submission that Prahlad Candy being merely a co-mutually was not entitled to maintain the present suit on behalf of Thakurji and that the rent payable by him was Rs. 45/- per month only. The revisional court observed that from the statement of DW 2 Prahlad Das, who appeared to be in collusion with the Defendant, it appeared that practice in the family was to appoint one person as a Mutawalli. It believed the statement made by Prakash Chand that he had been made Mutawalli by all the members of his family, and held that Prakash Chand being the sole Mutawalli was entitled to maintain the suit. On the question of rent payable by the Defendant, it affirmed the finding of the trial court that the same was payable at the rate of Rs. 125/- per month and not at the rate of Rs. 45/- per month as claimed by the Defendant and dismissed the revision application. 7. Being aggrieved, the Defendant has approached this Court for relief Under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. The learned single Judge, before whom the petition came up for hearing observed that as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Ratan v. Bajrang Lai AIR 1978 SC 1353 the office of The bait is hereditary unless provision to the contrary is made in the deed creating the endowment or that there is special usage or course of dealing which points to a different mode of devolution. He held that Prakash Chand's own statement went to show that there was neither any custom nor any usage nor any document according to which he could, after the death of his father Bankey Lal became the sole She bait. In the result he held that alter Bankey Lal's death Prakash Chand became a co-Mutawalli along with his brothers. However, as already indicated, he felt that the view expressed by this Court in the cases of V. K. Tandon v. Smt. G. Devi Rathor 1976 ARC 752, Ganga Narain v. IX Addl. District Judge 1984 ARC 342 and Hira Lal Jasrapuri v. VIII Addl. However, as already indicated, he felt that the view expressed by this Court in the cases of V. K. Tandon v. Smt. G. Devi Rathor 1976 ARC 752, Ganga Narain v. IX Addl. District Judge 1984 ARC 342 and Hira Lal Jasrapuri v. VIII Addl. , District Judge, 1982 (1) ARC 117 wherein he held that one of the co-landlord cannot maintain a suit for ejectment of a tenant, requires to be reconsidered in the light of the certain observations made in the case of Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath AlR 1976 SC 2335 , Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathak and Others, AIR 1977 SC 1599 and Subhendu Prosad Roy Choudhury and Others Vs. Kamala Bala Roy Choudhury and Others, AIR 1978 SC 835 and has referred the case for decision by a larger Bench. He also left the controversy regarding the rate of rent payable by the Defendant, open for being decided by the larger Bench. Two questions, therefore, that arise for reconsideration, in this case are: (1) whether in the circumstances of the case the suit for Petitioner's ejectment filed by one of the co-she bait is maintainable and (2) whether the rent payable by the Petitioner was Rs. 125/- per month as claimed by the Plaintiff or it was Rs. 45/- per month as claimed by the Petitioner. 9. So far as the first question is concerned it appears that arguments in the two courts below and before the learned Single Judge proceeded on the assumption that She bait or owners of the property dedicated to Thakurji and as such the co-She bait is in a position merely of a co-owner thereof. It was on this assumption that the question whether one of the co-landlords can maintain the suit for ejectment of a tenant arose for consideration. We are afraid that this assumption is not well founded and the cases which deal with the question as to whether or not one of the co-owners of the property can maintain the suit for enjoinment of a tenant would not be material. 10. We are afraid that this assumption is not well founded and the cases which deal with the question as to whether or not one of the co-owners of the property can maintain the suit for enjoinment of a tenant would not be material. 10. Mukharjee, in his Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, has summed up the position regarding the real ownership of the property delegated to a deity thus i- As you shall see later on the decisions of the Courts of India as well as of the Privy Council have held uniformly that the Hindu idol is a juristic person in whom the dedicated property vests. 'A Hindu idol ', the Judicial Committee observed in one of its recent pronouncements, " is according to long established authority founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus and the recognition thereof by courts of law, a juristic entity. It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. 11. In the case of H.R. Board v. Veeraragava, 1937 Madras 750 it was recognized that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person and in this juristic pennon the dedicated property vests. In the case of Pramatha Nath v. Pradyumna, (1925) 52 Ind App 245 the Privy Council ruled that an idol is a juridical person with the power of suing and being sued. However, idol not being a person it is only in the ideal sense that the property belongs to it. The possession and management of such a property, in the very nature of things, has to be entrusted to some person like a She bait. A She bait by virtue of his office gets the right to administer the property belonging to the deity, although he is Dot a trustee in the strict sense namely that the property does not vest in him yet his possession is somehow akin to that of a trustee. A She bait by virtue of his office gets the right to administer the property belonging to the deity, although he is Dot a trustee in the strict sense namely that the property does not vest in him yet his possession is somehow akin to that of a trustee. It is because of this peculiar position that a She bait enjoys under the Hindu Law, that it is in a series of cases being accepted that in cases where a She bait is unwilling or is incapable of bringing a suit, in order to protect the interest of the idol or his property, such suit can be instituted by a prospective She bait, the heirs of the founder or any person interested and the deity itself can sue through a next friend. In the case of Bishwanath v. Kadha Ballabhji (67) SC 1044 it has been held that a person interested in the worship of the idol can certainly be clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to protect its interest. It thus appears that in cases where the She baitship of an idol vests in a number of persons, normally all of them should combine together for starting legal proceedings or protecting the propriety interest of an idol but then this rule is not absolute and in exceptional cases where the body of She bait is either unwilling or is for some reason incapable of protecting the interest of the idol, any person interested in the deity can bring a suit in the name of the deity for protecting its interest. Accordingly in a case where the property belongs to a deity is let out by a She bait, it is the deity and not the Shebait who becomes the landlord. A suit for ejectment of a tenant riled by a competent person on behalf of a deity would thus be a suit by the deity itself and no question of one of the co-landlords alone filing the suit of tenant's ejectment can arise. 12. In the instant case the suit has been filed by Prakash Chand one of the co-she bait in the name of deity itself. The question, therefore, that arises for consideration is as to whether in the circumstances of the present case Prakash Chand could appropriately bring the suit for Petitioner's ejectment in the name and for protecting the interest of the deity. The question, therefore, that arises for consideration is as to whether in the circumstances of the present case Prakash Chand could appropriately bring the suit for Petitioner's ejectment in the name and for protecting the interest of the deity. As already stated after the death of Bankey Lal the Shebaitsbip of the temple devolved on his six sons. Four of the aforementioned six sons were minors and were certainly incapable of protecting the interest of the deity. Prahlad Das was a blind man and as held by the revisional court he was colluding with the Petitioner and was certainly unwilling to file a suit for protecting the deity's interest. Prahlad Das infact appeared as witness for supporting the case of the Petitioner and the version given by him has not been found to be correct. In these circumstances there can be no manner of doubt that the entire body of She bait was incapable of bringing a suit or protecting the interest of the idol and anybody who had an interest in the deity could bring a suit on its behalf. A co-she bait is certainly such a person and there is no reason why he should be precluded from bringing an action or enforcing the rights of the deity. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion it is not necessary for us to consider the question as to whether the decisions given by this Court in the cases of V.K. Tandon v. Smt. G. Devi Rathor 1976 ARC 752, Ganga Narain v. IX Addl. District Judge 1984 ARC 342 and Has Lai Jasrapuri v. V11I Addl. District Judge 1982 (1) ARC 117 require reconsideration in the light of decision given by the Supreme Court in the cases of Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, 1976 SC 2335, Smt. Kanta Goel v. B.P. Patbak 1977 SC 1599 and Subhandu Prasad v. Kamala Bala Roy Chaudhary 1978 SC 835 require reconsideration. 14. Suffice it to say that in the case of Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath 1976 SC 2335 a number of cases were cited before the Supreme Court in support of the proposition that a suit by one of the co-shaiers for eviction of a tenant was incompetent. The Supreme Court did not rule that the proposition of law laid down in those cases was erroneous but held that those decisions did not apply to the facts of the case before them. The Supreme Court did not rule that the proposition of law laid down in those cases was erroneous but held that those decisions did not apply to the facts of the case before them. However, in the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to dwell on this controversy any further. 15. In the result we are of the opinion that the suit for Petitioner's ejectment filed in the name of the Plaintiff through its Mutawalli, Prakash Chand was maintainable and did not suffer from any defect. 16. Coming now to the second question, namely, the rent which was payable by the Petitioner in respect of the premises we find that the finding of the two courts below that the rent payable was Rs. 125/- per month is a finding of fact based on appraisement of evidence produced in the case and the same does not suffer from any error of law. 17. In the result both the points raised on behalf of the Petitioner in this writ petition lack merit, the petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.