JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This is a tenants' petition directed against the order dated 1. 12. 1982 passed by the learned IV Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur allowing an appeal filed by the landlady of the disputed premises against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting an application filed by the landlady under section 21 (i) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (the Act for short) which was filed for the eviction of the petitioners. 2. Premises no. 68/90 Lokman Mohal Kanpur is owned by Smt. Shyamdei, the respondent no. 2 in the petition. The ground and second floor portions of this building are in the occupation of the said respondent while the first floor portion was in the tenancy of the petitioners. The landlady filed an application in the year 1974 under section 21 (i)(a) of the Act for an order of eviction against the petitioners on the ground that she required the building under tenancy for the use and occupation of herself and members of her family which then consisted of 11 members. The accommodation in her occupation was grossly inadequate for her growing need The hardship which she would suffer in the event of her application being dismissed would be far better than that likely to be suffered by the tenants in case the application was allowed inasmuch as in the first place the family of the tenant was small and in the second place premises no. 68/84 of the same locality belonging to their aunt was also available for their residence as she was not residing at Kanpur. The tenant could shift and occupy the entire ground floor portion of that house. The landlady also relied on Explanation in to section 21(1) of the Act which provided that if the tenant was in occupation of a portion of a building in the remaining part of which the landlord himself was residing, the need of the latter for the building under tenancy would be deemed to be bonafide within the meaning of section 21 (1)(a). 3. The above application was contested by the petitioners. Their case was that the need of the landlady was not bonafide at all. The accommodation already in her possession in the aforesaid building was more than ample for her requirements. 3. The above application was contested by the petitioners. Their case was that the need of the landlady was not bonafide at all. The accommodation already in her possession in the aforesaid building was more than ample for her requirements. In any case, the hardship which the tenant would suffer on the landlady's application being allowed would be far better than that likely to be suffered by the landlady. Further, it was wrong to say that the petitioners' aunt was not residing at Kanpur. The application filed by the landlady was also defective as the two petitioners were in occupation of distinct portion of the accommodation under separate tenancy. A single petition was hence not competent. 4. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application of the landlady inter alia on the ground that the application was defective for the aforesaid reason. 5. Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority, the landlady filed an appeal which has been allowed by the learned Addl. District Judge by an order which is the subject of challenge in this petition. 6. For the petitioners, the first contention raised was that the appellate court committed an error in taking into consideration the need of Devi Charan, the elder brother of the landlady's husband, inasmuch as husband's brother could not be regarded as a member of the landlady's family in view of the definition of the term "family" as given in section 3 (g) of the Act, 1 find no merit in this contention. The appellate court has rightly observed that in the facts and circumstances of the case the landlady was entitled to rely on the circumstances that Devi Charan and his wife have been residing with the landlady from the lifetime of her husband as members of a joint Hindu family. The appellate court has adverted to the fact that Devi Charan was looking after the family after the death of the landlady's husband. There was the old and aged father-in-law of the landlady to be looked after. After her husband's death, she had to rely on the support if Devi Charan to enable her to manage her affairs. Devi Charan was already residing along with his wife in the same house as a member of a joint Hindu Family. There was the old and aged father-in-law of the landlady to be looked after. After her husband's death, she had to rely on the support if Devi Charan to enable her to manage her affairs. Devi Charan was already residing along with his wife in the same house as a member of a joint Hindu Family. Under these circumstances, it was really the requirement of the landlady rather than that of Devi Charan which the appellate court was considering when it counted Devi Charan and his wife as inmates residing with landlady for whom the accommodation was needed. 7. The learned counsel next made an attempt to assail the finding of fact recorded by the appellate court that the accommodation in possession of the landlady was inadequate for her growing needs. The learned counsel was, however, unable to satisfy me that the conclusion reached by the appellate court suffers from any error, much less a manifest error of law or jurisdiction. The issue whether the need of the landlady was bonafide or not was undeniably one of fact which having been reached by the appellate court on relevant and proper consideration cannot be disturbed in these proceedings. It has examined the extent of accommodation presently in occupation of the landlady and the large number of family members who have to be provided for. The appellate court has stressed that the need of the landlady has grown considerably since the filing of the application in 1974. Two of her sons Ramesh Chandra and Jagdish Chandra have since got married. The latter has also two children horn from that marriage. On the contrary, the need of the tenants has since the filing of the application been reduced. Madhuri, a daughter of the petitioner Hari Prasad had been married and was living away with her husband. Suman, the daughter of Ganda Narain has also been married since the application was filed. Further, Ram Prasad, the elder brother of petitioners, who was residing with them has shifted to House no. 8 Block 260, Babupurwa, labour coloney, at Kanpur. On a consideration of the entire evidence the appellate court has held that there was no manner of doubt that the accommodation available with the landlady was insufficient and her need for additional,accommodation was bonafide and pressing. 8. 8 Block 260, Babupurwa, labour coloney, at Kanpur. On a consideration of the entire evidence the appellate court has held that there was no manner of doubt that the accommodation available with the landlady was insufficient and her need for additional,accommodation was bonafide and pressing. 8. The above findings not having been demonstrated to be vitiated by any error of jurisdiction or breach of the principles of natural Justice or manifact error cannot be disturbed under Article 226 of the Constitution. (See Harbans Lal v. Jagmohan Saran, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 302. His Lordship R.S. Pathak, J. speaking for the court had occasion to consider the extent and nature of powers exercisable under Article 226 and observed: "The limitation on the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are well settled. The writ petition before the High Court prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari, and it is well known that a writ in the nature of certiorari may be issued only if the order of the inferior tribunal or subordinate Court suffers from an error of jurisdiction, or from a breach of the principles of natural justice or is vitiated by a manifest or apparent error of law. There is no sanction enabling the High Court to reappraise the evidence without sufficient reason in law and reach findings of fact contrary to those rendered by an inferior court or subordinate Court. When High Court proceeds to do so, it acts plainly in excess of its powers." 9. Applying the dictum laid down by their Lordships, it is apparent that no case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has been made out. The impugned order does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction or law which may entitle this court to issue a writ of certiorari. 10. The conclusion reached by the appellate court that the need of the landlady is bonafide can also be sustained on the ground that this is a case which was beyond doubt squarely covered by Explanation IV to section 21 which, though deleted in 1976 by U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act 1976, would still be attracted to the present case inasmuch as the amendment was not retrospective as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Bimla Devi v. 1st Addl. District Judge & others, AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1376. Their Lordships held that the Explanation confers on the landlord a substantive right and there was nothing in the Amending Act to indicate that the amendments were intended to be retrospective in their operation. That being so, the deletion of Explanation IV in 1976 would have no effect on the pending proceedings. In the present case as mentioned above the application was filed in 1974 whereas the Explanation was deleted in 1976, that is, while the case was still pending before the Prescribed Authority. 11. This aspect of the case was considered by the Prescribed Authority but the plea of the landlady was negatived on the short ground that the Explanation had been deleted in 1976 and consequently the same could not be relied on by the landlady. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it is apparent that the view taken by the Prescribed Authority was clearly erroneous. 12. In the present case, the accommodation in question is undoubtedly a part of the building, the remaining part of which is in occupation of the landlady and is being used for residential purposes. That being so, Explanation IV was plainly attracted to the case. Consequently, it must be presumed that the landlady bonafide requires the building. 13. Learned counsel next contended relying on rule 16(i)(d) of the rules framed under the aforesaid Act, that even though the petitioners had not specifically raised the plea before the courts below that the need of the landlady would be served by releasing only a part of the building under tenancy while leaving the rest with the petitioners, the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate court were obliged to consider this aspect of the case. 14. I am unable to agree. In the first place, I find that on the conclusions reached by the appellate court as to the largeness of the landlady as family and the inadequacy of the accommodation presently available wish her it is apparent that her needs cannot be reasonably expected to be satisfied by release of a part only of the accommodation. I am hence not persuaded to interfere on this ground and send back the case to the courts below after a lapse of 12 years. 15. I am hence not persuaded to interfere on this ground and send back the case to the courts below after a lapse of 12 years. 15. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that this is a case covered by the IVth Explanation to Section 21(i) which, in my view, excludes release of part only of the tenanted accommodation. IVth Explanation, which was deleted in 1976, provided that in a case where the landlord resides in a portion of a building the remaining part of which is in occupation of tenant, the landlord's requirement for the tenanted portion shall be presumed to be bonafide in all circumstances. This presumption. I do venture to think, applied to the whole of the tenanted accommodation and not to any portion thereof. In such cases, therefore, the whole of the accommodation had to be released. The legislative intent was that the landlord should not be forced to share a building used by him for residential purposes with others. That was the nature of right which the Legislature intended to preserve. Such a claim hence did not postulate the sort of enquiry which is envisaged by Rule 16(i)(d). 16. This conclusion is further fortified by the fourth proviso to Section 21(i) which says that hardship likely to be caused to the landlord and the tenant by the result of the application under Section 21(i) has not to be compared in cases covered by Explanations to Section 21(i). 17. Lastly, learned counsel made an attempt to question the correctness of the finding recorded by the appellate court on the issue of relative hardships. In my opinion, this finding is based on relevant and proper considerations. The appellate court has assessed the evidence existing on the record correctly and has rightly arrived at the conclusion that as between the landlady and the tenants, it is the former who would suffer greater hardship than the latter. This finding has not been demonstrated to be vitiated by any such error as may justify interference by this Court. Further, the case being covered by the IVth Explanation, there is no occasion for comparing relative hardship (See fourth proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. 18. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs to the landlady. Further, the case being covered by the IVth Explanation, there is no occasion for comparing relative hardship (See fourth proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. 18. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs to the landlady. The eviction of the petitioners shall, however, remain stayed for a period of three months at the end of which this direction shall stand automatically vacated.