Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the tenant of the building, the subject matter of the petition for eviction filed by the respondent under S.11(3) and 11(4)(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, (for short The Rent Control Act). 2. The Rent Controller and the appellate authority found that the respondent has been successful in establishing the grounds under S.11(3) of the Rent Control Act, and accordingly directed surrender of possession of the building. The revisional authority under S.20 of the Rent Control Act has dismissed the revision, some of the petitioners had filed, in limine and it is the said order that is under challenge in this revision petition. 3. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the revisional court is justified in dismissing the revision invoking the provisions contained in O.41 R.11 CPC, in limine. The answer depends upon the construction of S.20 of the Rent Control Act, clothing the District Court with the revisional power. 4. S.20 of the Rent Control Act reads thus: "Revision:- (1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered under S.18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call, for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. (2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-s.(1) shall be In its discretion." 5. The section provides that on the application of an aggrieved party the revisional authority may call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act by the authority below for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto, as it thinks fit. The revisional authority therefore has to call for and examine the records of the authority below before it forms the opinion as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order which is under attack before it. 6. The revisional authority therefore has to call for and examine the records of the authority below before it forms the opinion as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order which is under attack before it. 6. What then is the nature of the enquiry the revisional authority should conduct before it forms its opinion as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order? The wordings of the section would suggest that the revisional authority can dismiss the petition in limine provided the revisional authority after examining the records, which he is bound to call for, holds the view that the order under challenge is legal, regular or proper. However, there cannot be any doubt that even in rejecting the application summarily the revisional authority has to consider the points raised in the application with reference to the records called for and form its opinion whether it was a case fit for being dismissed summarily/in limine. That does not mean that the revisional authority need not hear the aggrieved person. The very fact that the revision is filed by a person who is aggrieved by the order, is enough to opine that the said person should be given an opportunity of being heard, enabling him to substantiate the points, he has raised, before the revisional authority forms the opinion as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order. The scrutiny of the records should take place in the presence of the petitioner or in the presence of his representative. It should be remembered that the jurisdiction conferred upon the revisional authorities i.e. the District Court and the High Court, by S.20 is a special jurisdiction and the limits of that jurisdiction are clearly laid down in the section itself. This jurisdiction does not form part of the District Court's or High Court's original or appellate jurisdiction. If the aggrieved person however, fails to appear and participate in the hearing notwithstanding notice, the revisional authority is well within its right to past appropriate orders dismissing the application in limine or entertaining the tame after examining the records, which he had called for. 7. After examining the records and after hearing the arguments of the aggrieved person if the revisional authority is satisfied that the order is legal, regular and proper, there is no need to order notice to the opposite party. The petition can be dismissed in limine. 7. After examining the records and after hearing the arguments of the aggrieved person if the revisional authority is satisfied that the order is legal, regular and proper, there is no need to order notice to the opposite party. The petition can be dismissed in limine. Notice should however, be given to the opposite party where the revisional authority while dismissing the revision application summarily under this section, makes an order which would prejudicially affect the interest of the respondent, because such an order though not legally binding on the respondent, will be operative till it is set aside. In other words such exparte older against the respondent is not ipso facto void but it is liable to be set aside at his instance. 8. Another aspect that should be borne in mind in this connection is this: The wordings of the section no doubt, do not warrant a detailed order if the revisional authority after examining the records and after hearing the arguments of the aggrieved party decides to dismiss the petition in limine. Nonetheless the said order should disclose the reasons as to why and how the revisional authority could form the opinion that the order under challenge is legal, regular and proper. For instance, where the revisional authority has not given any reason for rejecting the arguments of the aggrieved person, but merely stated that the judgment of the court below was a detailed one and there appeared nothing wrong in the judgment, the order cannot be said to have been validly passed under the section. To put it differently, the order dismissing the petition in limine should disclose that the revisional authority had applied its mind to the facts of the case. 9. It therefore follows that the Revisional Authority has the power under the section to dismiss the revision in limine without ordering notice to the opposite party if, after examining the records relating to the order under challenge, the revisional authority is satisfied that the order in question was not illegal, irregular or improper. The consideration of this question as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order could however, be made only after giving the aggrieved party who has filed the revision, an opportunity of being heard. 10. The consideration of this question as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order could however, be made only after giving the aggrieved party who has filed the revision, an opportunity of being heard. 10. In the instant case, the Revisional Authority dismissed the petition in limine by invoking 0.41 R.11 (1) C. P. C. A question immediately would arise; is the procedure prescribed under 0.41 R.11 (1) C. P. C., applicable to a proceeding initiated under S.20 of the Rent Control Act. The answer depends upon the construction of S.4(1) CPC read with sub-s.5 of S.18 of the Rent Control Act. S.4(1) CPC "In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force." Construing this provision this court has held in Sankaran Nair v. Krishna Pillai (AIR 1962 Ker. 233) thus: "S.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that nothing in the Code should be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure, by or under any other law for the time being in force." The provisions of the CPC can therefore be read only subject to the specific provisions contained in the Rent Control Act. It is clear from S.20 that the District Court can revise an order of the Appellate Authority under S.18 oily by following the procedure prescribed thereunder. A reference to sub-s. 3 of S.18 of the Rent Control Act is profitable in this connection. This sub-section provides that the decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final, and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, except as provided in S.20. The cumulative effect of S.18(5) and S.20 is that the District Court can correct the errors of the authorities below, only by adopting the procedure prescribed under S.20. That is the scheme of these sections. They by themselves constitute a code. The authorities therefore are obliged to function within the four wells of these sections. The cumulative effect of S.18(5) and S.20 is that the District Court can correct the errors of the authorities below, only by adopting the procedure prescribed under S.20. That is the scheme of these sections. They by themselves constitute a code. The authorities therefore are obliged to function within the four wells of these sections. The Rent Control Act by S.18(5) has conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the authorities constituted thereunder to decide finally jurisdictional facts thereby excluding the jurisdiction of a civil court in that regard. The procedure, the said authorities should follow, to decide the disputes also has been prescribed by the Act. The District Court and the High Court, though not creatures of the statute in question, are conferred with special power by S.20 to correct the errors of the Rent Control Court and the appellate authority. These authorities therefore were required to discharge the said function by following the procedure prescribed by S.20. As already noticed, the provisions of CPC can be read only subject to the provisions of the Rent Control Act. If that be so, 0.41 R.11(1) must be said to have wrongly been pressed into service by the District Court to dispose of the revision, the petitioner had filed before it under S.20 of the Rent Control Act. 11. Yet another reason which supports the above view is this: In Rent Control cases the District Court, as it is not a persona designata, can exercise all the powers of a civil court under the Civil Procedure Code; subject however, to the specific provisions contained in the Rent Control Act. Where therefore the Rent Control Act provides appeals and revisions in a particular manner, any order passed by the District Court under the Civil Procedure Code will not be subject to the provisions of the Rent Control Act, but will be in contravention of those provisions. This is not permissible in view of S.4(1) CPC. The Rent Control Act is a special law and in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary the Code of Civil Procedure cannot limit or otherwise affect the provisions of the Rent Control Act. I am therefore of opinion that the dismissal of the revision by invoking the provisions of 0.41 R.11(1) is bad in law. The Rent Control Act is a special law and in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary the Code of Civil Procedure cannot limit or otherwise affect the provisions of the Rent Control Act. I am therefore of opinion that the dismissal of the revision by invoking the provisions of 0.41 R.11(1) is bad in law. I am fortified in this view by a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Wall Mohammad v. Higan Lal (AIR 1936 Allahabad 80). The CRP, for the reasons stated above, is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the District Court for a de novo consideration, in the light of the principles highlighted in the order and in accordance with law. No costs. The order of stay passed on 10-7-1986 will be in force till 15-11-1986. Issue carbon copy on usual terms.