This revision petition arises from the order dated 15.3.1985 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, West Tripura District, Agartala, in G.R. Case No. 689 of 1981. 2. On 11.12.1981, upon receiving a police report, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of an offence punishable under sec­tion 5 of the Tripura Gambling Act. The offence under section 5 of the Act is a summons-case as the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 (one) month of fine not exceeding one hundred rupees. Chapter XX of the Code provides for 'Trial of Summons-cases by Magistrates'. Before the particulars of the offences were explained to the persons accused of and the accused persons were asked whether they would plead guilty or have any defence to make, and before recording evi­dence, the accused persons filed an application on 15.2.85 for dropping the proceedings on the ground, inter alia, that the report of the police does not disclose any offence. On 15.3 85, the learned Magistrate considered the application and passed the impugned order acquitting the accused persons on the ground that the case is not maintainable; hence this revision petition to this Court. 3. The learned counsel for the accused respondents has submitted that the revision petition is not maintainable as the impugned order is of acquittal an appeal shall lie. Mr. S. Deb, learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the impugned order of acquittal is not an order of acquittal as such an order an only be passed after trial. The submission of the learned Public Pro­secutor has some force. Under Chapter XX the order of acquittal can only be passed after trial, that is, after hearing the pro­secution and taking all the evidence except as provided under section 258, Cr.P.C. In the present case, it is not the case of acqui­ttal under Chapter XX as no evidence of any witness has been recorded. The impugned order also cannot be said to be an or­der of discharging the accused as the word 'acquittal' has been used in the order. As already stated, the impugned order of acquittal is not an order of acquittal contemplated under Chap­ter XX of the Code. Therefore, it was not a valid acquittal. The impugned order also is not an order of discharge. In any vent, it is an order of termination or stopping the proceedings. 4. As already stated, the impugned order of acquittal is not an order of acquittal contemplated under Chap­ter XX of the Code. Therefore, it was not a valid acquittal. The impugned order also is not an order of discharge. In any vent, it is an order of termination or stopping the proceedings. 4. Therefore the contention of the respondent must fail. Now turning to section 258 Cr.P.C. Section 258, Cr.P.C. pro­vides that in any summons-case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class or, with the previ­ous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceeding at any stage without pronouncing any Judgment and where such stoppage of proceeding is made after the evidence of principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, and such release, shall have the effect of discharge. 5. Under section 258, Cr.P.C. the Magistrate has jurisdic­tion to stop or terminate a criminal proceeding in a summons-case instituted otherwise than upon complaint at any stage either discharging or acquitting the persons accused of. The discretion under section 258, Cr.P.C. is to be exercised only in the excep­tional circumstances or compelling and special circumstances, for example, no case is made out against the accused, or no prima facie case is made out against the accused. Therefore, the lear­ned Magistrate could consider the application for dropping the proceeding. The only question for consideration is whether the order is illegal. 6. The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused persons on the ground that the place of gambling is not a 'Common gambling house' as defined under the Tripura Gambling Act there­fore no offence is made out against the persons accused of. I am not expressing any opinion on the findings of the learned Magistrate as 1 am not inclined to interfere with the findings of the learned Magistrate at this stage for the reasons given above. However, when a suitable occasion arises in future, I will of-course deal with the similar matter. 7. Even if I do not agree with the findings of the learned Magistrate, I have to send back the case for trial. In 5. However, when a suitable occasion arises in future, I will of-course deal with the similar matter. 7. Even if I do not agree with the findings of the learned Magistrate, I have to send back the case for trial. In 5. Guin vs. Grindlays Bank Ltd., AIR 19S6 SC 289, the Supreme Court has observed : "We are of the view that having regard to the nature of the acts alleged to have been committed by the appe­llants and other attendant circumstances, this was a case in which the High Court should have directed the droppings of the proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code even if for some rea­son it came the conclusion that the acquittal was wrong." The offence relates to an occurrence which took place on 3.4.1981. The order of acquittal has been in force for about a hear. The offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or fine not exceeding one hundred rupees as already stated above. A fresh trial after about four years after the alleged" incident is bound to result in abuse of the judicial proceedings. The termination of the proceeding will meet the ends of justice. 8. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed.