ORDER R.A. Misra, J. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. This petition under S. 12, Contempt of Courts Act, was moved on 3-12-1985 with the prayer that the opposite parties have committed civil contempt and proceedings for punishing them be initiated under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. Instead of initiating the proceedings and requiring the respondents to show cause why they not be punished for having committed civil contempt this court directed notices to be issued to the opposite parties 1 to 5 for the time being to show cause why the petition be not admitted and why action for contempt of court be not taken against them fixing 10-1-1986. The order reads as below : "Issue notice to opposite parties 1 to 5 for the present to show cause why the petition be not admitted and why action for contempt of the court be not taken against them fixing 10-1-1986." It is therefore clear that this court has not yet arrived at the conclusion that a prima facie case is made out and that it is a fit case to initiate proceedings for civil contempt. 2. The period during which proceedings for civil contempt could be initiated has expired on 5-12-1985. As provided under S. 20, Contempt of Courts Act, it is not possible to initiate proceedings for civil contempt thereafter. I do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that by issuing notices to the opposite parties 1 to 5 this court has actually initiated proceedings. In "Baradakanta Misra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna, Misra, C.J. of the Orissa High Court", AIR 1974 SC 2255 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the language of S. 20 declared as follows :- "It is only when the court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in S. 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court." In "Gulab Singh v. Ramji Das", 1975 All LJ 481 : AIR 1975 All 366 , the Division Bench of this court has observed in para 3 of the judgment that it is only when the court decides to proceed against the contemner on a prima facie case having been made out that it initiates the proceedings by issuing notices and process. In the instant case it is abundantly clear from the order dated 3-12-1985 that to find out whether a prima facie case is made out, this Court wanted respondents 1 to 5 to make their submissions and for that purpose in clearest possible words notices have been directed to be issued to opposite parties 1 to 5 to show cause for the present why the petition not be admitted and why action for contempt of court be not taken against them. There is no manner of doubt that on 3-12-1985 the Court did not initiate proceeding for civil contempt and did not call upon the respondents to show cause why they not be punished for having committed civil contempt of Court. It is very clear that the proceedings for contempt have not been initiated so far and the period during which the proceedings could be initiated has admittedly expired on 5-12-1985. It is not possible to initiate proceedings after the expiry of such period. I, therefore, refuse to initiate proceedings for civil contempt after expiry of the period as provided under S. 20, Contempt of the Courts Act. 3. The prayer for the same is consequently rejected.