JUDGMENT : D.P. Mohapatra, J. - The petitioner, an Adibasi woman, belonging to G. Udayagiri Subdivision in the district of Phulbani, one of the most undeveloped areas in the State has approached this Court with the application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the appellate authority under Annexure-5 to the writ application and also the order of the competent authority under the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (By Scheduled Tribes) Regulations, 1956 (Orissa Regulation 2 of 1956)(hereinafter referred to as the "Regulation") under Annexurp-2 to the writ application. Since the controversy in the present proceeding lies within a narrow compass, it is not necessary to deal with the respective cases of the parties in detail. It is sufficient for the present purpose to state that the proceeding under the Regulation was initiated on the application filed by the petitioner against opp. party No 2. The said petition was registered as R. M. C. No 1 of 1979 (13/60). 2. The gist of the case of the petitioner was that the disputed land appearing to plot No. 2377 under Khata No. 727 in village C. Udayagiri belonged to her father. On a portion of the said plot stood a house in which the petitioner's family lived The vacant portion with a cow-shed thereon was leased out to opp. party. No. 2 about 9 years prior to me proceeding on condition that the latter would pay rent to the petitioner's father for the land, Opp party No. 2 paid rent for a few years, but after the death of her father, taking advantage of petitioner's helplessness, stopped paying rent. On demand he refused to vacate the land and continued in unauthorised occupation thereof The petitioner therefore sought the help of the competent authority under the Regulation for restoration of possession of the property to her. Admittedly, the petitioner belongs to a scheduled tribe being 'Kandha' by caste while opp. party No. 2 belongs to a non-scheduled tribe being Brahmin by caste. 3. The opp. party No 2 while refuting the claim of the petitioner, took the plea that the disputed land was Anabadi land prior to his occupation. He has been in possession of the said land by constructing a house thereon since about 30 to 35 years. ' 4. 3. The opp. party No 2 while refuting the claim of the petitioner, took the plea that the disputed land was Anabadi land prior to his occupation. He has been in possession of the said land by constructing a house thereon since about 30 to 35 years. ' 4. The hearing of the case was taken up by the Revenue Officer, Balliguda Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in suoport of their case. It appears from the records that the Revenue Officer also held a local inspection of the disputed property. The hearing of the case was taken up on several dates, ail at C. Udayagiri. The case was posted to several dates, for delivery of orders and finally the order was pronounced on 18th of April, 1981 by the Revenue Officer at Balliguda. The authority dropped the proceeding and directed the petitioner to seek redress in the proper Court of law to establish her right, title and interest over the disputed land Against the aforesaid order the petitioner filed an appeal, R. M. A. No. 4 of 1981 (Regulation) which was disposed of by the Addl. Dist. Magistrate, Boudh-Khandmal, Phulbani, by order dated 31-12-.1981 (Annexure-5). The appellate authority dismissed the appeal at the stage of adnission solely on the ground that it was barred by limitation. It is pertinent to note hare that though the appellant-petitioner contended that the appeal was within time, by way of abundant caution, she filed an application for condonation of delay. 5. The main question that arises for consideration is whether the appellate authority was justified, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in rejecting the appeal as time-barred. It may be stated here that the said authority also refused to condone the delay as is apparent from the impugned order under Annexure-5. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Regulation, it Is provided that an appeal may be preferred within thirty days from the date of the orders under Sub-section (2) and such an appeal would lie to the Collector or any other officer specially empowered by the State Government if the order is passed by any other competent authority and to the Board of Revenue if the order is of the Collector. In this case the order of the Revenue Officer was passed on 18-4-1981. The appeal by the petitioner was presented on 17-7-1981. In this case the order of the Revenue Officer was passed on 18-4-1981. The appeal by the petitioner was presented on 17-7-1981. Thus it was fifed beyond 30 days from the date of the order. It was the submission of the petitioner, before the appellate authority that the order dated 18-4-1981 was passed without any notice to her. Such notice, according to the petitioner, was necessary particularly when the case was all along being tried at G. Udayagiri and in normal course it was expected that the order will be pronounced at that place. Without any notice to the petitioner, the Revenue Officer pronounced the order on 18-4-1981 at Balliguda in absence of the petitioner and her counsel. The petitioner alleged that she came to know about the order from opp. party No 2 on 25-6-1981 and thereafter on obtaining certified copy of the order, filed the appeal on 17-7-1981. In these circumstances, it was the contention of the petitioner that the appeal having been filed within thirty days from the date of her knowledge about the order, it was not barred by limitation. As a measure of abundant caution the petitioner filed an application for condonation of delay reiterating the aforesaid averments therein, in case the authority took the view that the appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation. 6. Opp. party No 2, as expected, contended that the appeal was liable to be rejected in limine being barred by limitation. 7. The appellate authority, as it appears from the order, took the view that the petitioner was supposed to be aware of the position that the case was posted to 18-4-1981 for delivery of orders. Therefore, it was expected of her to make enquiry on that day or shortly thereafter about the order passed in the case. Since she failed to make any such enquiry about the fate of the case, her plea that she was not aware of the order till she came to know about it from opp. party No. 2 on 25-6-1981, cannot be entertained. The contention of the parties indicated in the foregoing paragraphs were reiterated by the learned counsel appearing for them in this case. party No. 2 on 25-6-1981, cannot be entertained. The contention of the parties indicated in the foregoing paragraphs were reiterated by the learned counsel appearing for them in this case. No dispute was raised before us about the fact that the case was being tried by the Revenue Officer at C. Udayagiri where the petitioner resides and she was being represented by an advocate of the local Bar. It was also not disputed before us that the order disposing of the case was pronounced on 18-4-1981 at Balliguda, without prior intimation to the petitioner or her counsel and in their absence. Our attention was not drawn to any material to show that the petitioner had knowledge about the order of the Revenue Officer prior to 25-6-1981. In these circumstances, the question that arises for consideration is whether the appeal filed on 17-7-1981 can be said to be barred by limitation. If this question is answered in the negative the appeal must be heard on merit. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then further question for consideration would be whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the delay in filing of the appeal should have been condoned by the opposite authority. It would not be necessary to go to the second question as, in our view, it has to be held that the appeal was not barred by limitation. From the facts narrated in the foregoing paragraphs, it is clear that the petitioner had no knowledge, direct or constructive, of disposal of the proceedings by the Revenue Officer on 18-4-1981. 8. From a perusal of the different provisions of the Regulation, it is sufficiently indicative that the intention of the legislature in framing the Regulation is to come to aid and assistance of the scheduled tribe people to recover their properties from members of the other castes. 8. From a perusal of the different provisions of the Regulation, it is sufficiently indicative that the intention of the legislature in framing the Regulation is to come to aid and assistance of the scheduled tribe people to recover their properties from members of the other castes. These provisions have been made on the well-recognised position that members of the scheduled tribe are usually exploited by the members of other castes and communities due to their poverty, ignorance and undeveloped State The legislature has even gone to the extent of providing in Section 7-C of the Regulation that not withstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, if in any proceeding under the Regulation the validity of the transfer or relinquishment of any immovable property is called in question or if such proceedings are for the recovery of possession of immovable property, the burden of proving that the transfer or relinquishment was valid shall lie on the transferee and further that the Court shall, in any suit or proceeding relating to the transfer of immovable property of a member of the scheduled trible, have power to reqire any fact expressly or impliedly admitted by such member to be proved otherwise then by mere admission by the schedule tribe. Similarly Section 3-A (a) of the Regulation vests sou motu power in the competent authority to initiate proceeding if he is satisfied that the property belonging to a scheduled tribe is in unauthorised occupation of any person other than a scheduled tribe. From these provisions it is clear that the law recognises the incapacity of the members of the scheduled tribe to cope with the formalities and intricacies of developed society and to act with promptness and intelligence. The appellate authority was of the view that the petitioner a poor and' ignorant scheduled tribe woman, was expected to act with alertness in keeping track of the case and should have taken proper steps within the time prescribed by law. If this was so, then the very purpose for which the Regulation was framed would be frustrated. Accepting the view taken by the appellate authority would mean that the exploiter and the exploited shall remain in their respective positions despite the efforts intended to be made under the provisions of the Regulation. If this was so, then the very purpose for which the Regulation was framed would be frustrated. Accepting the view taken by the appellate authority would mean that the exploiter and the exploited shall remain in their respective positions despite the efforts intended to be made under the provisions of the Regulation. In taking this view we have drawn guidance from the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another, AIR 1961 S. C I500 wherein dealing with the question of limitation the Court observed : "...The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words from 'the date of the Collector's award' used in the proviso to 5.18 in a literal or mechanical way." On the aforesaid discussions, we are of the view that the appeal filed by the petitioner was not barred by time and the order of the appellate authority rejecting the appeal on the ground of limitation is clearly erroneous and it is liable to be quashed. 9. In the result the writ application is allowed and the order of the appellate authority under Annexure-5 is quashed. The appellate authority is directed to dispose of the appeal R. M. A. No. 4 of 1981 (Regulation) on merit in accordance with law after giving due opportunity, to the parties to place their case before him. A writ shall be issued accordingly. Both parties shall bear their respective costs of this proceeding. R.C. Patnaik, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Allowed