ORDER R.M. Sahai, J. - Removal from service and forfeiture of salary during suspension period had been assailed primarily because the order of removal was passed by the Regional Manager of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred as Corporation), who was neither appointing authority of petitioner nor was authorised by Board to exercise such powers. Finding of guilt was, also, challenged as bad since inquiry was contrary to principle of natural justice and it was based on no evidence. Alternative submission was on quantum of punishment. 2. Taking up the issue if Regional Manager could remove petitioner from service, it may be stated that petitioner was an employee of Government Roadways and he became permanent in 1974. His services were transferred when Government Roadways was taken over by Uttar Pradesh Road Transport Corporation. He, therefore, became an employee of the Corporation from that date. In 1981, Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (other than Officers) Service Regulations, 1981 were framed. Clause (ii) of R. 9 defines appointing authority to mean Board or officer authorised by the Board to make appointment and Cl. (iii) of the same rule the Board has been defined to mean Board of Directors of the Corporation. Therefore, according to the rules a person or an employee could be appointed by the Board or an officer authorised by the Board. And it is only such authority which could remove a person from service in view of the constitutional safeguard provided in Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Since order of punishment has been passed by Regional Manager it can be upheld, only, if it can he established that the Board has delegated its power to him. For this time was granted to learned counsel for Corporation but he could not produce any document to establish it. In absence of delegation under rules of 1981 what can save the order is if delegation of power can be inferred as matter of law or the delegation made prior to enforcement of these rules can be held to be good even now. In 1950 the Road Transport Corporation Act was enacted. It empowered States to establish Corporation consisting of a Chairman and such other members as the State Government thought fit. Under S. 12 the Corporation could authorise General Manager or any other officer of Corporation to exercise power and perform such duties as was necessary for efficient administration. In 1950 the Road Transport Corporation Act was enacted. It empowered States to establish Corporation consisting of a Chairman and such other members as the State Government thought fit. Under S. 12 the Corporation could authorise General Manager or any other officer of Corporation to exercise power and perform such duties as was necessary for efficient administration. It was under this section that the Corporation after its establishment in the State delegated its powers of appointment etc. to General Manager. Section 45(2)(c) of the Act empowered the Corporation to make rules for conditions of appointment and service and scale of pay of its officers and servants. In exercise of this power service regulations were framed. It superseded all existing regulations or orders on the subject. That is from the do to the regulations came into force an employee could be appointed and removed in the manner provided by the regulations, only. It is further clear from Cl. (ii) of R. 4 that conditions of service of employees governed by service regulations of 1981 shall after its enforcement be governed by these regulations. It cannot be disputed that appointment or removal are conditions of service. Therefore, petitioner could be removed from service in accordance with these regulations only. Argument of learned counsel for Corporation that this supersession did not affect earlier delegations does not appear to be convincing in absence of any specific provision continuing, delegation made earlier. Unlike the Corporation Act these rules establish a Board consisting of Board of Directors and a Chairman and it is the Board which has become appointing authority. It is not the same authority as Corporation itself. Therefore, the earlier delegation made by the Corporation could not either as a matter of law or fact be deemed to be delegation by the Board. Reliance was placed on U.P. State Electricity Board v. Abdul Sakoor Hashmi, (1980) 3 SCC 278 : ( AIR 1981 SC 1708 ). which does not appear to be appropriate. The Hon'ble Court upheld the delegation of power by the Board on construction of S. 79(c) of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It did not agree that in absence of any specific provisions the power could not be delegated. In this case, however, it is just the otherwise. Power to delegate is there but no delegation has been made. The Hon'ble Court upheld the delegation of power by the Board on construction of S. 79(c) of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It did not agree that in absence of any specific provisions the power could not be delegated. In this case, however, it is just the otherwise. Power to delegate is there but no delegation has been made. In absence of delegation the order passed by authority, who is not the appointing authority, the order cannot be upheld. Principle of viable construction is also not available. No interpretation or construction of any section is involved. The order is rendered bad because the Board did not delegate its power. The argument that it shall lead to injustice cannot be entertained since it would be in teeth of constitutional guarantee. Feeble attempt was made to justify absence of delegation of power by taking recourse to S. 24 of General Clauses Act. Suffice it to mention that its operation is restricted by use of expression `unless it is otherwise specifically provided'. Therefore, no assistance could be derived from the earlier delegation it having been specifically superseded. Nor is the decision in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. State of U.P., 1981 All WC 481 (FB) of any help. 3. Even assuming that General Manager was appointing authority it appears the order cannot be sustained. Initial charge sheet dated 2nd Dec., 1983 related to charging of excess fare revealed in surprise checking from passengers on 18th May and 12th Oct., 1983. While inquiry was going on another charge sheet dated 26th March, 1984 was submitted for tearing allotment chart and misbehaviour with allotment clerk. In the first charge sheet it was mentioned that evidence against petitioner comprised of the report of Transport Inspector and statements of passengers. Materials for the second charge sheet were report of Sri W. A. Faridi signed by Ali Ahmad, Ghanshyam and Sheo Pujan Singh, allotment chart of 13th Mar., 1984 and report of Junior Regional Officer. On 22nd Aug., 1984 petitioner moved an application before the inquiry officer for producing the passengers whose statements had been recorded on 18th May 1983. Request was also made for producing K. H. Misra the bus-conductor who had signed the statements of passengers. Demand was made for way bill of the bus checked on 12th Oct., 1983 which was stated to have been signed by Akbar Ahmad, bus-conductor. Request was also made for producing K. H. Misra the bus-conductor who had signed the statements of passengers. Demand was made for way bill of the bus checked on 12th Oct., 1983 which was stated to have been signed by Akbar Ahmad, bus-conductor. It was not acceded to 'Entire evidence of the checking which took place in May and October 1983 comprised of certain officers of the checking squad. They have been examined and they have stated that during checking of the bus it was stated by passengers that excess fare had been charged from them. No details of checking procedure or rules had been stated by any of the officers. It is not known whether during checking of bus the checking officer is required only to check if some passengers were incorrect (sic) or he could further inquire from the passengers about something which had happened earlier namely at the time of issue of tickets. Even assuming that such inquiry could be made it has not been stated by any of the officers that they had prior information or any suspicion that petitioner had charged excess fare. Apart from that the conductor who normally is with the checking squad did not support official version that passengers had disclosed that excess fare was charged. None of the passengers were produced. Even the way bill was not produced. The petitioner at the very out-set had made a request for producing passengers and the way-bill since he had made allegations against the checking staff. Report of May incident was made in June. Even on the day when bus was checked namely 18th May, surprise checking was done of petitioner in the office. But no excess was found. Whether it was coincidence or on some information is again not known. But cash was short. Evidence of passengers in the circumstances was relevant. The Inquiry Officer did not make any effort even by sending them intimation for appearance etc. It is doubtful if in the circumstances inquiry can be said to have been done after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of defending himself. 4. Even on merits the finding on first charge stands vitiated as reliance was placed on statement of passengers without producing them and affording any opportunity to petitioner, to cross-examine them. But what is more serious is that finding is based on assumptions and inferences. 4. Even on merits the finding on first charge stands vitiated as reliance was placed on statement of passengers without producing them and affording any opportunity to petitioner, to cross-examine them. But what is more serious is that finding is based on assumptions and inferences. It was found that there was no complaint of excess charging of fare. But inference was drawn that it might have been because no officer might have been available or the passengers might have felt that it was futile to make any complaint. Further inference of guilt has been drawn against petitioner from the shortage found in cash on surprise inspection made of his counter on 18th May, 1983. It was neither subject of charge nor it was mentioned as material on which reliance was reported to be placed. And yet it was held that it established that petitioner could indulge in irregularity of giving and taking of cash. In drawing this inference on material which was now intended to be relied without intimating petitioner the opposite party not only acted illegally but drew upon imagination and conjectures. Since this has been taken as evidence to corroborate oral testimony of checking squad. the finding cannot be maintained. 5. Second charge. has been found to be established on material on record. It was attempted to be assailed. But it cannot be interfered with as even if on the evidence different finding could be recorded it does not either vitiate the finding nor clothe this Court with jurisdiction to quash it. Claim of petitioner that he was sick and not present having been repelled for good reasons the opposite party did not commit any error of law in recording the finding against petitioner on report of Sri Faridi. 6. Learned counsel for Corporation urged that even if finding on first charge was vitiated the order was liable to be upheld on the second finding. The argument does not appear to have any substance. As a matter of law it is no doubt well established, that if order of removal can be upheld even on one charge then the order should not be quashed. But it is apparent that if finding on first charge, which related to integrity and misconduct cannot be upheld then order of removal cannot be upheld on second charge which related to minor scuffle with another assistant in the office. 7. But it is apparent that if finding on first charge, which related to integrity and misconduct cannot be upheld then order of removal cannot be upheld on second charge which related to minor scuffle with another assistant in the office. 7. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. Order of removal passed by opposite party is quashed. He shall be entitled to re-instatement with all benefits available to him. Since second charge has been found to be established it shall remain open to opposite party to take fresh proceedings in accordance with law in respect of this charge only. The petitioner shall be entitled to his cost.