JUDGMENT 1. THE two Mandamundar have been preferred one by Shri Somen Maity being No. F. M. A. T. No. 1696 of 1986 and the other being No. F. M. A. T. 1619 of 1986 by Vivekananda Travels against the 3udgment and Order dated 22nd may, 1986 of Mr. Justice Suhas Chandra Sen. The aforesaid Judgment disposed of both the Writ petitions by a common order. Sri Somen maity (for short the writ petitioner hereafter) filed a writ petition, challenging the grant of inter-State route permits for Calcutta-Puri (for short Calcutta Puri hereafter in favour of (i) Tirupati Transport company and (ii) pran Ranjan Maity and for 3amshedpur-Digha route in favour of Sri Sajal Kumar Maity, Sri Atanu Das and Sri Santanu das. The Vivekananda Travels (for short the petitioner firm hereafter)similarly challenged against the grant of Inter-State route permit for Jamshedpur to Digha route for short Jamshedpurdigha route hereafter) in favour of Sri Sajal Maity, Sri Atanu Das and Sri Santanu das. The challenge of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm is against the resolution adopted in the meeting of the State Transport authority (for short "the STA" hereafter) on 14th March, 1986. 2. BY consent of the parties, both the appeals were taken for hereing for disposal thereof by a common judgment. The factual matrix of the challenge against the grant of Inter State route permit in respect of Calcutta-Puri route in favour of (i) Tripati Transport Company and Pran Ranjan Maity and Jamshed-pur-Dighe route in favour of Saja Maity, Atanu Das and Santanu das, by the writ petitioner and it he petitioner firm in respect of the Jamshedpur-Digha route, as cast in the writ petitions, presents the most disturbing state' of affairs now haunting the rooms and condors of power of the executive which is vested with the res possibility of carrying on the administration of the STA. 3. THE challenge against the resolution dated the 14th March, 1986 of the STA unfolds an unfortunate and shabby chapter of administrative leghargy and conscious violation of the statute by a quasi judicial authority. 4. A notice dated 8th April, 1985 was issued by the STA, West bengal, inviting applications for the grant of Stage Carriage permit in P. S. T. P. or P. S. T. S. Homes in one round-trip daily in order to fill up the vacancy on Calcutta- Puri route. 4. A notice dated 8th April, 1985 was issued by the STA, West bengal, inviting applications for the grant of Stage Carriage permit in P. S. T. P. or P. S. T. S. Homes in one round-trip daily in order to fill up the vacancy on Calcutta- Puri route. Of the vacancies, Cal cutta -Puri route appeared in the Daily Basumati on 9th April 1985 whereby the STA invited applications for the grant of Stage Carriage permits jamshedpur- Digha route appeared against serial No. 5 of the said notice. In response to the said notice, the writ petitioner made applications for both the routes in the prescribed from together with requisite fees and the said applications were duly received by the STA. Shri Bijan Kumar Maity and Shi Aswani Kumar Shaw formed a partnership firm in the year 1985 under the name and style of "vivekananda Travels". The petitioner firm, one of the applicants, made an application for the grant of Inter-State route permit for jamshedpur- Digha route in the prescribed form along with requisite fees, as required by the said notice. During the pendency of the application, Shri Aswini Kumar Shaw one of the partners of the said Partnership firm retired from the said Partnership firm with effect from 15th June, 1985 and Shri Shyamal Mitra was admitted as a Partner of the said Partnership firm in accordance with Clause. 9 (d) of the Deed of Partnership, which was executed and registered on 22nd May, 1985. The fact of induction of a new partner, Sri Shyamal kumar Mitra was duly intimated to the STA. 5. THE Writ petitioner i. e. the applicant for both the routes Cal cutta-Puri and Jamshedpur-Digha asserted that he was the most eligible candidate for being selected for the grant for permits for the routes in question. In support of his contentions the writ petitioner claimed that he has been owning and possessing 3 vehicles bearing no. WBG 5616, WBG 4746 and a spare bus being no. WBG 3568. After submission of the said applications for the Calcutta-Puri route and Jamshedpur-Digha route, the Writ petitioner sold away the vehicle no. WBG 4246 and purchased vehicles No. WBG 5665 of 1985 Model after spending huge sum of money, which was duly noted down by the STA at the time of verification of the particulars. The writ petitioner further claimed and asserted that the vehicle no. WBG. WBG 4246 and purchased vehicles No. WBG 5665 of 1985 Model after spending huge sum of money, which was duly noted down by the STA at the time of verification of the particulars. The writ petitioner further claimed and asserted that the vehicle no. WBG. 5616, 5665 And 3568 we're purchased by him after taking loan from the Bank and towards the repayment of Joan by way of installment he is required to pay a sum of Rs. 19,000/- per month regularly inclusive of interest, For the purpose of liquidating the Bank loan the writ petitioner had to place the vehicle No. WBG 5616 and 5665 on temporary hire basis but the other vehicle No. 3568 was kept idle; In support of his claim the writ petitioner produced relevant documents before the STA. The aforesaid 2 items namely; the grant of permit in respect of Calcutta-Puri route and Jamshedpur-Digha route were included in the agenda of the meeting to be held on 5th March, 1986. The aforesaid two items could not be taken up for consideration on 5th March, 1986 but the same was placed for consideration on 14th March, 1986. The writ petitioner made an application for certified copy of the resolution dated 5th March, 1986 and 14th March, 1986 and further asked for certain information by letter dated 17th March, 1986. The information as sought for by the writ petitioner by letter dated 17th March, 1986 read thus :- 6. THE petitioner firm was one of the applicants for grant of permit in Inter-State route "jamshedpur-Digha" also asserted that it owns and possesses vehicle Nos. WBG 5976 and WBG 5636; in support thereof he produced the income tax clearance certificate copies of idle certificate of bus No. WBG 4976 and wbg 5636, the original letter of the Regional Transport Authority for additional employment scheme sanction, one xerox copy of partnership deed, two copies of registration certificates of two buses, original office letter of Contai-Co-Operative Bank, copy of the conductor's licence held by Sri Bijan Kumar Maity, copy of conductor's licence held by Sri Shyamal Mitra, Bank account of the petitioner firm along with the statement of balance amount together with a copy of the affidavit by Bijan Kumar Maity and Shyamal Kumar Mitra. The petitioner firm claimed that it satisfied the conditions of the advertisement as "it is owning and possessing two ready vehicles of 1985" model. The petitioner firm claimed that it satisfied the conditions of the advertisement as "it is owning and possessing two ready vehicles of 1985" model. The petitioner firm also duly appeared before the ST A both on 5th March, 1986 and 14th March, 1986. On 21st March, 1986 the petitioner firm came to know on enquiry from the office of the ST A. that the petitioner firm has not been selected for the grant of permit for Jamshedpur- Digha route and some other persons were selected for the grant of permit in respect thereof. The petitioner firm further claimed that no reason has been furnished to the petitioner firm for refusal of the petitioner's case for grant of permit in respect of Jamshedpur-Digha route and two persons were selected for the grant of permit for the Jamshedpur-Digha route although none of them was holding two buses which was one of the foundational conditions for the grant of permit and the respondents not only selected two persons but also split up the permit to two different persons who were holding one each and were separate applicants. The petitioner firm asked for the certified copy to the following effect:-Certified copy required 1. Certified copy of the resolution of the meeting of the STA dated 5. 3. 86 and 14. 3. 86 relating to the grant of permit for the route of Jamshedpur-Diglha. 2. Certified copy of continuing names and particular of all the applicants for the said route along with the reasons for rejection. Aforesaid certified copies are urgently required for taking proper course of law. Sequel to the non-supply of the certified copy, the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm could not challenge the resolution adopted in the meeting held on 14th March, 1986. It is the case of the writ petitioner as well as the petitioner firm that despite the requests made by both the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm for making available the certified copies of the resolution dated 5th March, 1986 and 14th March, 1986 the STA did not supply the certified copies nor the STA did make available the information as sought for by the writ petitioner. 7. 7. PURSUANT to the direction of the Hon'ble Court, copy of the said resolution of the STA adopted in the meeting held on 14th march, 1986 was made over to Sri Dilip Kumar Samanta, the learned advocate for the writ petitioner on 9th April, 1986. 8. AN extract of the resolution dated 14th March, 1986 being annexure 'm' to the supplementary affidavit reads thus:- " (c) Digha- Jamshedpur in response to the Notification for this route 30 persons applied for permit. There was only one permit sanctioned for the route. It was evident that on this route two buses would be required for making a round trip. In order to make a wider distribution of the permit and also to ensure that at no point of time the service got disrupted causing inconvenience to the traveling public, it was decided to split up the permit between the two buses and distribute them amongst the applicants enabling them to ply one bus each with one trip daily. [detailed particulars of the applicants were placed before the members. After careful consideration of those particulars the following candidates were selected for issue of the permits: 1. Shri Sajal Kumar Maity, Applicant No. 12. 2. Shri Atanu Das and Shri Santanu Das, Applicant No. 20. (h) Calcutta-Puri 50 applications were received in response to the Notification issued for the purpose. Considering the distance to be covered it was decided, the permit would be issued in favour of two persons for a single trip daily to be operated by each of them, as also in 6 (c) above. The following applicants were selected for the permit for plying one bus each with one single trip daily with a bus:-1. M/s. Tirupati Transport Co.- Applicant No. 12. 2. Shri Pran Ranjan Maity, Applicant No. 33. " The resolution was allowed to be challenged in a supplementary affidavit and accordingly both the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm in support of the aforesaid writ petitions challenged the impugned resolution on several counts. 9. THE resolution was assailed as being arbitrary, illegal and in violation of section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short the said Act hereinafter) and the Bengal-Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 (for short the Rules hereinafter. 9. THE resolution was assailed as being arbitrary, illegal and in violation of section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short the said Act hereinafter) and the Bengal-Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 (for short the Rules hereinafter. The writ petitioner claimed and contended to the following effect that the STA acted illegally and arbitrarily in splitting up two permits into four permits in respect of Calcutta-Puri route and Jamshedpur-Digha route on the alleged ground to make a wider distribution of Permit and/or considering the distance to be covered' in violation of the determination made under the provisions of the section 47 (3) of the said Act. The STA did not consider and dispose of the applications for the routes in question in terms of the advertisement published by them. The writ petitioner is the best candidate for the grant of permits in respect of Calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur-Digha routes inasmuch as the writ petitioner specified three vehicles; for the route Digha to Jamshedpur whereas the STA did not at all specify the required vehicles in their respective advertisements. The number of vehicles and specification thereof was the condition precedent for obtaining such permis in question. The writ-petitioner duly satisfied all the conditions mentioned in the said applications including the specification of vehicles for the route permits, in question and therefore the writ petitioner is entitled to get preferential treatment over the other applicants including the respondents who did not satisfy the requisite qualification mentioned in the advertisement including the specification of vehicles. The impugned resolutions of the STA do not contain any reason either with regard to the selection of the grantees by the sta or the rejection of the rest of the applicants including the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. The STA being quasi judicial authority is bound to assign reasons in the resolution itself with regard to the selection of the successful candidates and rejection of the rest the other applications and more so when sub-section (7) of section 57 (hereafter referred to as the said provisions) of the said Act warrants such compliance. The STA acted illegally, arbitrarily and unfairly in splitting the route permits in question with pre- determined mind for selecting the grantees and to disfavor the others. The STA acted illegally, arbitrarily and unfairly in splitting the route permits in question with pre- determined mind for selecting the grantees and to disfavor the others. The sta acted illegally, and arbitrarily in splitting up the route permits in question in violation of the provisions as laid down in section-63 of the said Act. The grants, are bad as they are devoid of any reason whatsoever and the grant is contrary to the advertisement and consequently in violation of section 63 of the said Act. Since the grantees did not own and possess the requisite vehicles for the said route permits, on the date of alleged consideration of the applications they are not, in any way, entitled to be considered for the said oute permits. 10. MR. Arun Prokash Chatterjee, the Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the added respondents (for short "the grantee') in respect of Calcutta-Puri route and Jamshedpur-Digha route claimed' that the writ petition is premature and the STA acted legally and within the bounds of the said Act. There is no provision in the said act requiring the STA to give written judgment and decision with complete reasons in support thereof The said Act does not prescribe any time limit for such communication in writing of the reasons for the decision of the STA. Unsuccessful candidates has right to appeal within 30 days from the receipt of the said order. It is not obligatory on the part of the STA within the meaning of the said provision to communicate the (reasons nor it is obligatory on the part of the STA to state reasons in the resolution itself. Mr. Chatterjee further supported the action of the STA by contending that the STA did not act illegally and arbitrarily in splitting up the two permits into four as aforesaid, in violation of the provisions as contained in sub-section (3) of section 47 of the said Act and the grounds challenging the resolution relating to split up the permits, are wholly frivolous. It is further contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the STA acted within its jurisdiction by splitting up the permits in the interest of the traveling public on the grounds mentioned in the resolution. It is further contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the STA acted within its jurisdiction by splitting up the permits in the interest of the traveling public on the grounds mentioned in the resolution. The respondents further denied that the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm owned and possessed requisite vehicles and acquired qualifications respectively for the grant of permit or that the vehicle had been kept idle or that the writ petitioner was in possession of the vehicles to place the vehicles on the Calcutta-Puri route and jamshedpur-Digha route at any time. The mere fact that the writ petitioner claiming himself to be: an unemployed person did not merit any special consideration inasmuch as "he has stage carriage permit in Kharagpur- Digha route". The offer of the writ petitioner that he would place three vehicles being Nos. WGB 5616, WGB 4246 and wgb 3568 for the Calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur-Digha routes is not bona-fide. It is claimed that the vehicle No. WGB 5616 of 1984 model has, in fact, been plying on the Howrah-Digha route against the permit issued in favour of Sri Samiran Mukherjee. The other vehicle bearing Police Registration No. WGB 5665 of 1985 model has been plying on Digha-Howrah route against the route permit issued in favour of the writ petitioner and Sri Dipak Maity. As other vehicle No. WGB 3668 was too old to be fit for the relevant long distance route and as such, the STA according to Mr. Chatterjee did not consider him to be fit and qualified for the said permit. Further, Mr. Chatterjee seriously denied that the respondents did not own and possess three ready vehicles in respect of Calcutta-Puri route and hence they were not 'entitled to claim such permit or that the vehicle No. WGB 5648 of Sri Biswanath Prosad Agarwal was covered by a temporary permit, for the Digha-Howrah route or that the said permit was granted by the Regional Transport Authrity, midnapore in favour of Sri Biswanath Prosad Agarwal under the consideration of the possession of the vehicle or that the vehicle no. WGB 4692 belonged to the said Grantee or that grantee Tirupati transport Company did not own and possess three ready vehicles or that ' they were not qualified or entitled to claim the permit in question. He further asserted that the successful applicants required the financial solvency, which the writ petitioner did not have. WGB 4692 belonged to the said Grantee or that grantee Tirupati transport Company did not own and possess three ready vehicles or that ' they were not qualified or entitled to claim the permit in question. He further asserted that the successful applicants required the financial solvency, which the writ petitioner did not have. It is also contended that Sri Sajal Kumar Maity, Sri Atanu Das arid sri Santanu Das also are the eligible and fit candidates for being selected in respect of Jamshedpur-Digha route by reason of their financial capacity, ready vehicles which are long idle as would appear from the Certificate being Annexure 'f' to the application for vacating and/or variation and/or modification. Mr. Chatterjee also pointed out that the interest of the traveling public being the paramount condition, the STA was within its bounds to split up the permit and no illegality was committed by the STA. 11. THE procedure, according to Mr. Chatterjee, adopted in the present case, can at best be said to be irregular and mere irregularity would not render the resolution as also the grant of permit illegal. Mr. Chatterjee also submitted that the selection of the respondents by the STA constituted reasons for refusing to grant permits to the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. 12. THE STA and the Secretary of the STA duly entered appearance and contested the matter by filing affidavit- in- opposition to the writ petition on behalf of the respondents nos. 2 and 3 and the said affidavit was sworn and affirmed, on 21st April, 1986 by Sri Nalini ranjan Aich, the Deputy Secretary of the STA. Another affidavit was filed on behalf of the said respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to the supplementary affidavit of the writ petitioner. In the said affidavits, the said respondents Nos. 2 and 3 justified the action in granting permits in favour of Sarbasree Sajal Maity, Atanu Das and Santanu Das in respect of Jamshedpur-Digha as also the grant of permits in favour of Tirupati Transport Company and Sri Pranranjan Maity in respect of Calcutta-Puri Shri Manick Das, the learned Advocate appearing for the STA i. e. the said respondents Nos. 2 and 3 justified the action in granting permits in favour of Sarbasree Sajal Maity, Atanu Das and Santanu Das in respect of Jamshedpur-Digha as also the grant of permits in favour of Tirupati Transport Company and Sri Pranranjan Maity in respect of Calcutta-Puri Shri Manick Das, the learned Advocate appearing for the STA i. e. the said respondents Nos. 2 and 3 claimed and con tended, inter alia, as follows :- The actual meaning of the previous provisions of the said act is that the STA is required to communicate the reasons in writing for refusal of the grant of permit to the applicant upon an application, but not automatically or that the purpose and object of the said provisions of the said Act is to apprise the applicant as to why the application for grant of permit has been rejected and where from the said unsuccessful applicant may determine their action against such refusal or that communication of reasons for the refusal of grant of permit is not a condition precedent for the grant of permit and as such, no statutory time limit has been fixed in the said provisions of the said Act to communicate reasons to the applicant aggrieved by refusal. The writ petitioner" and the petitioner firm applied (or the certified copies of the resolution dated 5. 3. 1986 and J 4. 3. 1986 on 17. 3. 1986. Without giving any reasonable time to the STA to supply those certified copies, the writ petitioner moved the writ petition on 19. 3. 1986. The writ petitioner ought to have waited for reasonable time to obtain the certified copies of impugned resolution asked for. A serious grievance is raised that the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm without exhaustion of the alternative remedies as provided for under section 64 of the said Act read with Rule 84 (b) of the Rules within 30 days from the date of receipt of the resolution, moved this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of india and the said filing of the writ petition, according to Mr. Das ought not to have been made without exhaustion of the alternative remedies. Das ought not to have been made without exhaustion of the alternative remedies. It is also claimed that mere preferring of an appeal under Section 64 of the said Act and the Rules framed there under does not ipso facto mean that preferring of an appeal will automatically stay the operation of the resolution and/or decision appealed against inasmuch as it cannot be said that the appeal would be infructuous and nugatory, if any permit is issued in the meantime by the STA. Mr. Das further claimed and contended that STA was not provided with sufficient time by the Writ petitioner to supply the copies of the resolutions as asked for nor there has been any delay in supply of the certified copies of the resolution, the writ petitioner has no cause of grievance to move the writ petition before this Hon'ble court. It is further asserted by Mr. Das that the members of the sta selected the candidate and resolved to grant permit in favour of the successful candidates after proper application of mind and consideration of various aspects of the applications of the grantees and hence, the resolution was reasonable, legal, justified and valid and the STA had properly discharged its duties as quasi judicial authority. It is also claimed and contended that the selection was made on the basis of the available documents furnished by the individual applicants in support of their respective claims for grant of permit as required by the STA. Resolution manifests only the names of the selected candidates whereas the names of several applicants for different route may be found at a glance over the comparative statements. With a view to justifying the action of the STA in. splitting the permits, it is claimed and contended that the STA did not depart from its Notification for inviting application for grant of Inter-State Permit (Express) and Agreement with the concerned State and nothing wrong has been done by the STA by splitting up the permit one round trip daily covering the two separate vehicles of separate owners and that Act does not violate the pro visions of Section 47 (3) of the said Act and the same has been done with the concurrence of the concerned State Transport. 13. MR. 13. MR. Das further sought to justify the action of the STA in splitting the permits by making reference to Section 2 (20) of the said Act. Mr. Molay Basu, the Learned Advocate for the writ petitioner, in his reply strenuously argued that the contention of Mr. Chatterjee and Mr. Manick Das, the learned Advocates if accepted would render the said provision of the said Act meaningless, ineffective and illusory. He further argued that the action of the STA in splitting the permits into four cannot be justified by reason of the fact that there exists an incurable infirmity in the said action of the splitting up as the STA committed violence on the provision of section 63 of the said Act. He also argued that the entire procedure as adopted in the facts and circumstances of the instant case would render the proceedings as being wholly illegal and without jurisdiction and in reply he reiterated the submissions as advanced by him. During the course of hearing, Sri Manick Das the Learned Advocate appearing for the STA produced the records of the case and, the said records present very distressing state of affairs as regards the maintenance of the records vis- a- vis the manner in which the administration of the STA is being carried on. The facts as would appear from the records produced by Sri Das demonstrate startling features of the case. 14. ON 5th March, 1986, the STA could not take up the item regarding grant of permit for Calcutta-Puri route and 3amshedpur-Digha route for consideration. Again, the matter was adjourned till 14th march, 1986. The impugned resolution was adopted in the meeting of the STA held on 14th March, 1986. The said resolution does not contain reasons. On 15th March, 1986 the Secretary of the STA was verbally instructed by the Deputy Secretary, STA that the proceedings of the meeting of the STA held on 18th February, 1986, 5th March, 1986 and 14th March, 1986, may be sent to the members for approval. This was supposedly directed to be put up by a Memo being No. 013027 (3) STA dated 15th March, 1. 986. 15. ON 18th March, 1986 the Secretary made an endorsement to the effect that "o. R. may be issued to the above candidates. This was supposedly directed to be put up by a Memo being No. 013027 (3) STA dated 15th March, 1. 986. 15. ON 18th March, 1986 the Secretary made an endorsement to the effect that "o. R. may be issued to the above candidates. "it is an admitted position that the offer letters were directed to be issued to the candidates in terms of the endorsement by the Secretary on 18th March, 1986. The draft resolution written by dot pen in green ink was only signed on 20th March, 1986 by Shri Dipak Kumarrudra, the Chairman of the STA, whereas the Secretary by a letter under Memo. No. 01 3027 (3) STA dated 15th March, 1986 informed sarbashri Salil Kumar Ganguly, 50, Ramtanu Bose Lane, Calcutta, (2) Sri Nalini Guha, the West Bengal Land Development Bank Ltd, 25d, Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta and (3) Shri Nikhil Das of 279/2, netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Road, Calcutta, inter alia, to the effect that "i am directed to send herewith the proceedings of the meeting of the STA held on 14th March, 1986 (which was adjourned on 5th march 1986 and resumed on 14th March, 1986) for your approval and to request you to return the same to this office. " when the draft resolution was not ready, a memo dated 15th March, 1986 ought not to have been issued nor any orders should have been made on 18th March, 1986. 16. THE said proceedings could not be sent under the cover of memo No. 3027 (3) STA dated 15th March, 1986 when the draft resolution was not ready and signed by the members of the STA. Sri dipak Kumar Rudra, the Chairman, put his signature on the draft resolution only on 20th March, 1986. The Chairman and the Secretary, sta could not have signed the proceedings on 15th March, 1986. On 20th March, 1986 when the draft resolution was signed by the Chairman subject the approval of the members, the Secretary informed the grantees that the STA "has been pleased to sanction" the grant of such permit. The said Secretary consciously overlooked the fact that the resolution was without the approval of the members. On 5th May, 1986 the Secretary recorded the reasons in support of the decision of the STA refusing to grant the permit in favour of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. 17. The said Secretary consciously overlooked the fact that the resolution was without the approval of the members. On 5th May, 1986 the Secretary recorded the reasons in support of the decision of the STA refusing to grant the permit in favour of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. 17. NO record nor any documentary evidence in support of the service of the letter dated 15th March, 1986 was shown as to when and how the letter together with the copy of the draft resolution in question was, in fact, sent to the other members, viz. Sri Nikhil das and Sri Nalini Guha. The letter could not have been despatched on 15th March, 1986 inasmuch as the draft resolution stated above was only ready and signed on 20th March, 1986 it is evidently manifest that the concerned Officers do no maintain the Registers properly not the order or directions, as would appear from the records, are correct, true and proper. The claim of the authority, would appear from the letter dated 15th March, 1986. Such claim was wholly with out any basis and the same is untrue and contrary to the records of the case for the reasons setforth hereunder :- (a) The Secretary of the STA should not have made an order on 15th March, 1986 to the effect that the draft resolution dated 15th March, 1986 be sent to all the members of the STA. (b) The draft resolution was not at all made ready on 15th March, 1986. (c) The draft resolution having been signed on 20th march, 1986 by Sri D. K. Rudra, the Chairman, sta, no reliance could be placed on all the records, pertaining to the' transmission of the draft resolution to the concerned members. (d) On 5th May, 1986 the Secretary, STA was neither authorised nor competent to record reasons in support of the rejection of the case of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. The Secretary acted in such a manner as is required to be deprecated by the Court. The Court cannot shut its eyes to illegal, improper and irregular manner in which the recording of reasons was made by the Secretary with a view to regularising the same in support of the refusal, on 5th May, 1986 when the STA, as regards the resolutions dated 14th March, 1986 became functus officio. 18. The Court cannot shut its eyes to illegal, improper and irregular manner in which the recording of reasons was made by the Secretary with a view to regularising the same in support of the refusal, on 5th May, 1986 when the STA, as regards the resolutions dated 14th March, 1986 became functus officio. 18. THE Secretary of the STA recorded the reasons on 5th May, 1986 when the matter was pending before the learned Single Judge. The reasons thus, recorded by the Secretary could not be placed before the STA on 14th March, 1986. After 14th March, 1986 the sta became fuctus officio as regard the resolutions which were adopted in the meeting held on 14th March, 1986. The Secretary was not delegated to record the alleged reasons on the basis of the unpublished principles which read thus : state TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, WEST BENGAL. General principles followed for selecting candidates are discussed below : -Preference are given to the applicants procuring vehicles under the Additional Employment Scheme of the Government, the Ex-Service personnel and the applicants belonging to the Scheduled Caste and scheduled Tribes. From amongst other applicants efforts are made to select these applicants who have ready and idle vehicles of their own as that vehicles can be put on the road without delay after granting the permit. The STA also takes care to avoid concentration of the permits in the hands of few individual operators. The papers containing the impugned resolutions and also other resolutions adopted on diverse dates are found in loose, torn and mutilated condition. Some of the papers of the proceedings relating to the impugned resolutions adopted on 14th March, 1986 are found in haphazard manner in different files. The said files contain the resolution dated 14th March, 1986. A torn slip of paper was attached to the said resolution in the fallowing manner. On the top of the slip, the endorsement made reads thus :-A/d 29/4 transport DEPARTMENT extracts from the proceedings of the meeting held on 14. 3. 1986 (which was adjourned on 5. 3. 86 and resumed again on 14. 3. 1986)Agenda item no. 7 - Grant of permit. (P. T. O.) permits on inter-state routes. (c) Digha-Jamshedpur (h) Calcutta-Puri. On the top of the slip, the endorsement made reads thus :-A/d 29/4 transport DEPARTMENT extracts from the proceedings of the meeting held on 14. 3. 1986 (which was adjourned on 5. 3. 86 and resumed again on 14. 3. 1986)Agenda item no. 7 - Grant of permit. (P. T. O.) permits on inter-state routes. (c) Digha-Jamshedpur (h) Calcutta-Puri. It was also decided that the Secretary, STA be advised to issue offer letters to the selected candidates immediately and to ensure that the selected candidates Shri D. Rudra, Secretary, transport Department, Government of the West Bengal". 15/3/86. 19. THE subject of File No. 2c/1/86 is the meeting of the STA of West Bengal in the year, 1986. The said file contains the cyclostyle copy of the resolution dated 14th March, 1986. The two sheets containing recording of reasons by the Secretary together with general principles to be followed for selecting candidates. The said file contains miscellaneous papers relating to the proceedings of the year 1985. the draft resolution as regards the Calcutta-Puri and Jamshed pur-Digha routes along with other resolution signed by Sri D. K. Rudra, the Chairman of the STA on 20th March, 1986 is found in the file No. 2c/1/85 subject whereof is the meeting of the STA, west Bengal in the year, 1985. The draft resolutions were written in a foolscap paper whereas other resolution were not recorded in such papers. The copy of the draft resolution although served upon sri Nalini Guha, one of the members of the STA on 7th April, 1986 was not returned to the STA. The procedure by circulation is maintained only on paper but that was not followed in practice. The resolutions of the STA and the papers connected therewith are the most valuable and precious documents and the same are found and maintained in different files. It shows that the high officials or the concerned Officers now at the helm of the officers of the STA have no time to look into the papers or to see how the records are maintained and the relevant resolutions are duly recorded and dispatched to the concerned members of the STA. It shows that the high officials or the concerned Officers now at the helm of the officers of the STA have no time to look into the papers or to see how the records are maintained and the relevant resolutions are duly recorded and dispatched to the concerned members of the STA. The records, thus produced before the Court suggest that the adhoc system, followed by the STA as regards the maintenance of the records, recording of resolutions the filing thereof in the relevant files and the transmission, of the same to the respective members of the STA, demonstrate maladministration. 20. THE disclosure warrants a note of caution for the administration of the STA which is now carried on in languid fashion and cynical manner. We may quote with respect certain passages of the Hamlyn lectures on 'maladministration and its remedies by Mr. K. C. Where. Let us see where we get by quoting some examples. There is little doubt that we would all regard official action which transgressed the law as an example of maladministration. This could arise, say, from a failure to carry out a duty imposed by law, or from action which went beyond the powers conferred by law or used the power conferred by law for a purpose for which it was not intended. It would arise by statute or by the Courts in various decisions designed to prevent, so far as possible, the making of arbitrary, unreasonable decision in the application of legal powers" "after all, while 'incorruptibility and efficiency are two obvious requirements for public confidence in the administration of Government departments the citizen has a right to except not only that his affairs will be dealt with effectively and expeditiously but also that his personal feelings no less than his rights as an individual will be sympathetically and fairly considered". "bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on can be grouped under the heading "maladministration". Maladministration may be 'described as "administrative action (or inaction) based on or influenced by improper consideration or conduct, arbitrariness, malice or bias, including discrimination, are examples of improper considerations. "bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on can be grouped under the heading "maladministration". Maladministration may be 'described as "administrative action (or inaction) based on or influenced by improper consideration or conduct, arbitrariness, malice or bias, including discrimination, are examples of improper considerations. Neglect, unjustifiable delay, failure to observe relevant rules and procedure, failure to take relevant rules and procedure, failure to take relevant consideration into account, failure to establish or review procedures where there is a duty or obligation on one body to do so are examples of improper conduct. " 21. GOOD administration as helpfully and materially culled from administrative Law-cases and materials by 3. Bentson and M. H. Matthews (1983 page 533 and 534) is meant for promoting and securing welfare of the citizens. Administration is required to be efficient in the sense the objectives of policy and the mandates of the statute are squarely, fairly and scrupulously attained without delay. It should also satisfy the conscience of the general body of citizens that it is operating and proceeding with reasonable regard to the balance between the public interest which it promotes and the private interest which it affects. In our country the Government runs fundamentally and foundational upon the consent of the governed; Openness, fairness and Impartiality constitute the basis structure of good administration. If the maintenance of public records as far as it relates to determination of rights and claims of the citizens and procedure adopted in the maintaining such records are wholly secret, confidence of the citizens in the administration and acceptability thereof would stand severely shaken. So there should be openness, next is fairness. If the objector were not allowed to state case, there would be nothing to stop oppression. Thirdly, there is impartiality. How the citizen can be satisfied unless he feels that those who decided his case come to their decision with open minds? To assert that openness, fairness and impartiality the administration should be free from influence of calculated secrecy, unfairness and partiality. In the field of tribunals and/or quasi judicial authorities openness requires the publicity of proceedings and knowledge of the essential reasoning underlying the decision. 22. FAIRNESS requires that adoption of procedure which enables parties to know their rights to present their case and to know the case which they are otherwise to meet. In the field of tribunals and/or quasi judicial authorities openness requires the publicity of proceedings and knowledge of the essential reasoning underlying the decision. 22. FAIRNESS requires that adoption of procedure which enables parties to know their rights to present their case and to know the case which they are otherwise to meet. Impartiality demands the freedom of tribunal from influence, real or apparent of the departments concerned with the subject matter of the decision. The Tribunals are not ordinary Courts but neither are they appendages of the Government departments. The Tribunal should properly be regarded as the part of the machinery provided by Parliament for adjudication rather than as part of the machinery of administration. The rule of the civil servant in our country is required to be projected in such manner as to inculcate' impartiality and anonymity. Barely is the public given opportunity to see or get the details of handling of matter of a department of the Government. As HWR Wade puts it "but an enquiry of that kind involving the disclosure of the depart mental files and the findings of the responsibility upon particular officials must make every Government officials the more determined to avoid such an event again. " Regarding good administration, honest and bona-fide decision and impartiality Lord Parker, C. J. focused in course of his judgment in Re; H. K. (An Infant) 2 QB 618 "good administration and an honest or bona-fide decision must, as it seems to me require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem but acting fairly and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow, and within the legislative ' frame-work under which the administrator is working, only to that limited extent do the so-called rules of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly. " Reference may be made to the decision of R. v. Local Commissioner for Administration for the North and East Area of Nagaland, Exparte, Bradford City Council, (1979) Q. B. P. 287. 23. MR. Molay Basu, the Learned Advocate appearing along with mr. Dilip Samanta, submitted that they might be allowed to take inspection of the records which required the scrutiny of this Court and after inspection of the records Mr. Molay Kumar Basu assailed the impugned resolution by pointing out. 23. MR. Molay Basu, the Learned Advocate appearing along with mr. Dilip Samanta, submitted that they might be allowed to take inspection of the records which required the scrutiny of this Court and after inspection of the records Mr. Molay Kumar Basu assailed the impugned resolution by pointing out. the reach and sweep of the challenge on the following grounds: (a) That the entire proceedings including the grant of permit is vitiated by reason of the grievous violation of such provisions of the said Act; (b) The STA as a Quasi Judicial Authority is bound to assign the reasons in the resolution itself with regard to their refusal of the application for permit of any kind and it is incumbent upon the STA to give the reasons for the refusal. (c) That the grant of permit in respect of Inter-State route in favour of the respondents is contrary to and dehors the provisions of section 63 of the said Act and Rule 54 of the Rules. (d) That the STA failed to show any ground or reason in support of the refusal of the case of the Writ petitioner and the applicants vis-a-vis the "canned" reasons weighing with the STA in the matter of grant of permit are erroneous. (e) The writ petitioner being best candidate should have been preferred to the respondents who are favored with the grant of permits. (f) That the public interest could not absolve the quasi-judicial authority i. e. the STA from not performing and discharging the statutory duties, inasmuch as the quasi-judicial authority cannot act contrary to the mandate of the statute and they are required to discharge their function consonance with the said provisions of the said Act. (g) Procedure adopted as would appear from the records of the case shows that the entire proceedings suffer from non-application of mind, conscious violation of the said Act and arbitrariness. 24. IT is necessary to place on record that Mr. Murari Mohan Das, the learned Advocate for the petitioner form after placing the reliance on' the writ petition and the affidavit- in- opposition and the affidavit-, in- reply filed adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Molay Basu, the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner. Mr. Ashoke Dey learned advocate for the added respondents in the aforesaid appeal also similarly adopted the submissions of Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee, learned standing Counsel for the added respondents. Molay Basu, the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner. Mr. Ashoke Dey learned advocate for the added respondents in the aforesaid appeal also similarly adopted the submissions of Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee, learned standing Counsel for the added respondents. After hearing the learned advocates appearing for the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm, the STA and the added respondents we now deal with the grounds of challenge as stated above. Before embarking upon the main thrust of Mr. Molay Basu founded upon violation of the provisions of the said Act, it is necessary for us Ho state, certain important aspects of the matter in this regard. It appears from the unpublished principles mechanically resorted to by the STA for refusing the grant of permit to the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm that the STA has internal and unpublished arrangement which' were and are applied to settle matters of the nature now open for scrutiny by this court. The STA does not seem in the least to be disturbed in deciding the citizens' claims according to the set and fixed principles which they conceal from citizens. The conduct of the Secretary has lifted the vail of unpublished principles vis-a-vis internal and Secret arrangement. In the present case, ultra vires recording of reasons by the Secretary was founded upon secret arrangement within the hierarchy of the STA for handling cases, as it is evident from the facts and circumstances of the present co. se, by taking arbitrary recourse to the secret arrangement and unpublished principles. The unfortunate and uninformed citizens like the writ petitioner and the partners of the petitioner firm were told nothing of the principles. This militates against openness inasmuch as it is wholly unfair to the citizens who cannot be expected to tract down the details of the principles and they are fobbed off by the tribunals or quasi judicial authority. This signals the dangers of the situation. 25. RECORDING of reasons is the condition precedent for the exercise of powers by the STA for the refusal of the applicants' applications for the grant of permit. The contentions of Mr. Chatterjee, the learned standing Counsel and Mr. Manick Das, the learned Advocate, cannot be accepted inasmuch as the contentions if accepted on this point, would render the provisions of the said Act meaningless and illusory. The contentions of Mr. Chatterjee, the learned standing Counsel and Mr. Manick Das, the learned Advocate, cannot be accepted inasmuch as the contentions if accepted on this point, would render the provisions of the said Act meaningless and illusory. It is incumbent upon the STA to state reason in terms of and in consonance with the said provisions of the said Act. 26. IF the statute requires recording of reasons, then it is the statutory requirement and therefore, there is no scope for further inquiry. But even when the statute does not impose such an obligation it is necessary for the quasi-judicial authority to record reasons, as the' hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. M. L. Kapoor, A. I. R. 1974 s. C. 87 held that it is the 'only visible safeguard against possible injustices and arbitrariness' and affords protection to the person adversely affected. Reasons are links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision, whether it is purely considered administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a national nexus between the facts and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown manifestly just and reasonable. The courts insist upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on three grounds (1) the party aggrieved has the opportunity to demonstrate before the appellate or revisions court that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous. (2) the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by executive authority invested with judicial power;3) it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made. The power to refuse to disclose reasons in support of the order is an exceptional in nature and it ought to be exercised fairly, sparingly and only when fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation. The resolution as contained in Annexure 'm' does not contain any reasons nor does it show as to how case of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm were considered and conclusion reached, it is an admitted fact that the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm applied for the certified copies of the resolution of the meeting of the STA held on 14th March, 1986. The plea taken by the respondents that the certified copy could not be supplied by reason of the fifing of the application under Article 226 of live Constitution of India, is wholly untenable by reason of the fact that the STA did not record any reason in support of the rejection of the case of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm, at least till 5th May, 1986 when the Secretary of the STA, without any authority, recorded reasons., according to his own opinion. This case reveals the distressing state of affairs. The STA have disclosed by their conduct reckless disregard of the provisions of the said Act. Grant of permit us aforesaid on mere consideration of the application of the successful candidates necessarily implies that the STA had no reasons for refusal of the grant of permits in favour of the writ petitioner and the petit loner firm. The and Act provides for appeal against an order of the STA and the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm must have opportunity to convince the STA Tribunal the reasons as recorded by the STA being totally irrelevant and erroneous to the core, the exercise of power under the said provisions of the said Act is bad and the resolution can not be sustained in jaw. The reasons were not furnished to the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm and as a result whereof the right of appeal stands whittled down. The STA as a quasi-judicial authority is bound to assign the reasons in the resolution itself with regard to their refusal of the application for the permit of any kind and it is also obligatory upon the STA to make available certified copy of the resolution. The STA failed to show any ground or reason in support the refusal of the case of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. 27. THAT the STA exceeded its jurisdiction and transgressed the powers by importing the concept of wider distribution of permits. Such concept of wider distribution is unknown to the provisions of the said Act. The STA failed to show any ground or reason in support the refusal of the case of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. 27. THAT the STA exceeded its jurisdiction and transgressed the powers by importing the concept of wider distribution of permits. Such concept of wider distribution is unknown to the provisions of the said Act. The extract of the proceedings as contained in Annexure 'v' does not disclose any ground as To how the cases of the applicants for the grant of permit for Calcutta-Puri route and for Jamshedpur-Digha route were considered nor does it disclose the ground which weighed with the STA for the grant of permit in favour of Sri Sajal kumar Maity, Atanu Das and Santanu Das in respect of Jamshedpur to Digha and Tirupati Transport Company and Pran Ranjan Maity in respect of Calcutta-Pun route. 28. THE said reasons were sought to be recorded by the Secretary of the STA on 5th May, 19s6 when the writ petitions were pending before this Hon'ble Court. The Secretary with a view to justifying the decision of the STA as contained in the Resolution adopted in the meeting of the STA on 14th March, 1986 fried to fill up the gaps by recording reasons together with unpublished principles as would appear just above the recording of the reasons. The said reasons as recorded by the Secretary we re sought to be superadded to the resolution dated 14th March, 1986. When the' ST A has become functus officio as regards the said resolution and the Secretary had no power, competence, jurisdiction to record the said reasons in his personal capacity. The reasons can at best be called the personal opinion of the Secretary. In the words of Bernard Sehawartz Administrative Law - Second Edition Page 432 "the personalised opinion not only fails to achieve the purpose for which it was instituted but it involves art element of deception that cannot help but be uncomfortable to the participants in the pro cess. " The recording of reasons by the Secretary is wholly ultra vires the said provisions of the said Act. " The recording of reasons by the Secretary is wholly ultra vires the said provisions of the said Act. it is well settled that when stature requires something to be done in a certain manner, it must be done in that manner alone, any other mode of performance other than those specified in the statute is wholly forbidden and the same also amounts to violation of natural justice. Reference may be made to the following decisions Tailor v. Tailor. (1875)1 Ch. D. 426 at page 431 King Emperor v. Nazir ahmed. 63 Indian Appeals 372, Hukum Chand Shyamlal v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 789. Refusal of the cases of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm remains unsupported by any reason. The resolution apart from being vitiated by absence of reason is adopted without consideration of the merits of the applicants for Calcutta-Prorate and Jamshedpur digha Route, Where the said provisions of the said Act require recording of reasons in support of the Order. it imposes ass obligation on the adjudicating authority and the reasons must be recorded by the authority. Reference may be made to the cases of Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prosad Goenka, A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1694 (1700); Union of India v. M. L. Capoor (Supra), Ajantha Ind. v. Central Board, A. I. R. 1976 s. C. 437 (439-41. Even when the stature does not lay down expressly the requirement of recording of reasons, the same can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. Reference may be made to the case of Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1606 (1610) State of Gujarat v. Krishna Cinema, (1970) 2 S. C. C. 744: A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1650, Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjan (1972) 2's. C. C. 170 (178-79)A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1571 0677-78), quasi-judicial functions in terms of the said provisions of the said Act to be exercised by the sta have not been delegated to the Secretary of the STA and it is therefore, patent that the Secretary cannot record reasons. The said recording of reasons is wholly extra-vires the said provision of the said Act. The said recording of reasons is wholly extra-vires the said provision of the said Act. If it is contended for the sake of argument, the STA instead of the Secretary, recorded the reasons on 5th May, 1986, itself even then such recording of reasons would amount to illegality, invalidity and impropriety, inasmuch as after the adoption of resolution as regards Calcutta-Puri route and Jamshedpur-Digha route on 14th March, 1986, the STA become functus officio. The STA ceased to have control over the matter as soon as it adopts the resolution and thereafter cannot review' its decision unless the said power is conferred on it by the Statute. Reference may be made to the case of Patel, Narshi v. Thakursi Pradumansinghji, A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1273, Mehar Singh v. N. T. Das, (1973) 3 S. C. C 731:a. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2533. From reference to the sequence of events and trail of incidents, it is manifest that the high officials who are at the helm of the administration in the sta consciously committed violence on the provisions of the said act and the Rules. Mere fact that the proceedings were treated as confidential does not dispense with the requirement of recording of reasons. 29. REFERENCE may be made to the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder, A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1669 (1678, 1683. The resolution impugned in the writ petition is subject to appeal or revision. That being the position, the necessity of recording of reasons is greater as without reasons the appellate or revisional authority cannot exercise its power effectively inasmuch as it has no material on which it may determine whether the facts were correctly ascertained, law was properly applied and the decision was just and based on legal, relevant and existent grounds. Failure to disclose reasons amounts to depriving the party of the right of appeal or revision. Reference may be made to the cases of M. P. Industries (Supra) Bhagat Raj's case (Supra)Mahabir Prosad v. State of U. P. (1970) 1 S. C. C. 764 A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1302, Travancore Rayons v. Union of India (1969) 3 S. C. C. 868:a. I. R. 1971 S. C, 8. 62: Harinagar Sugar Milis case (Supra); Sardar Govindrao v. State, AIR 1956 5c 1222. 62: Harinagar Sugar Milis case (Supra); Sardar Govindrao v. State, AIR 1956 5c 1222. If reasons recorded are totally irrelevant the exercise of power cannot but be called bad and consequently the resolution is liable to be struck down as being without jurisdiction. Reference is made to the cases of M. P. Industries' Case (Supra) Bhagat raja's case (Supra), Sri Rama Vilas Service P. Ltd. v. C. Chandra shekharan, AIR 1965 SC 107 Mohd. Yasin Ali v. Akbar Khan, AIR 1976 SC 1866 (1882) Validity of the resolution passed by the STA is required to be judged by reasons recorded therein and cannot be cons trued in the light of subsequent recording of the reasons as made in the instant case by the Secretary who is neither delegated nor authorised to record such reasons. "orders are not like "old wine" becoming better as they grow older". Reference is made to the case of F. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978)1 scc 405 (417): AIR 1978 SC ; 85i (858. The duty of the STA to record reasons is a responsibility and cannot be discharged by the use of vague general words. Reference may be made to the case of Elliot v. Southwork London Borough Council, (1976)1 WLR 499. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service AIR 1969 SC 329 cited at the bar is clearly distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The STA admittedly did not record any reasons in support of the refusal of the case off the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision had to consider the matter in different context and perspective. It is true that the STA need not write a detailed order containing the reasons nor it is' necessary for the STA to write a detailed judgment in an elaborate fashion. The STA in the instant case has not recorded any reasons in terms of the said provisions of the said Act. Reasons can be described as 'canned' reasons as helpfully collected at Page. 89 of Dr. Geoffrey A Flick's book 'natural 'justice' and Practical applications (1979) 'canned' reasons; that is standard statements in streotype form that expose little of the decision maker's true reasoning process which in its turn adversely affect public confidence in the administrative process. Reasons can be described as 'canned' reasons as helpfully collected at Page. 89 of Dr. Geoffrey A Flick's book 'natural 'justice' and Practical applications (1979) 'canned' reasons; that is standard statements in streotype form that expose little of the decision maker's true reasoning process which in its turn adversely affect public confidence in the administrative process. Reasons for refusal of the grant of application as it appears from the facts and circumstances of the present case are given without dealing with the individual cases separately and consequently the said provisions of the said Act have been contravened because the applicants namely; the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm were not in a position to ascertain as to which particular reasons were applied in their case for (refusal. 30. THE view that we have taken finds support from the following decision : -P. I. Scarla v. P. K. Krishna Nair, AIR 1957 TC 254 P. V. Sharma v. RTA AIR 1956 Cal 490 : 60 CWN 19: Mannaynat Union Motor Service limited v. RTA AIR 1953 Mad. 59 of Ram Vilas Service (P.) Ltd. v. C. Chandra Sekharan reported in AIR. 1965 SC 107. The absence of reasons renders the decision of the STA as contained in resolution being Annexure 'm' to the supplementary affidavit wholly arbitrary to the core. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of s. J. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1967 S. C 1427 held as follows in this context it is important, to emphasize that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of' law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey - "law of the Constitution" - Tenth Edn. Introduction cx) "law has reached its finest moments. ", stated douglas, J. in United States v. Wunderlich, (1951) 342 US 98. (See Dicey - "law of the Constitution" - Tenth Edn. Introduction cx) "law has reached its finest moments. ", stated douglas, J. in United States v. Wunderlich, (1951) 342 US 98. "when it has free from the unlimited discretion of some ruler. . . . . Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered". it is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion as Lord Mansfield stated it in class terms in the case of John Wilkes (1770)4, Burr 2528 at page 2539" means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful". Schwartz's Administrative Law, Second Edition page 423-425 dealing with the findings state "there must he a written decision by the Agency: in addition, the agency must do more than render a bare decision : "the discretion vested in an administrative agency is not the naked, unfettered power to turn thumbs down or thumbs' up". The decision must be accompanied by the findings upon which it is based. There are three principal reasons for the findings requirement. The most obvious today is the overriding policy against government operating in secret. Acts of agencies should be open, subject to comment and criticism. Unexplained decisions leave the public in the dark on the reasons that led to them. More important, permitting them is an open invitation to arbitrary action. The obligation to give a reasoned decision is a substantial check upon misuse of power A decision supported by specific findings is much less likely to be a product' of caprice on careless consideration. Requiring articulation of the reasoning process evokes care on the part of the decider : "no Judge who has ever sat on an appellate court for any length of time is without a story of a decision which he ardently wished to make in favour of one party, only to find that justice or' his own personal philosophy notwithstanding an opinion in support of that decision just could not be written". In the second place, a losing party has a right to know why he lost his case. The requirement of findings meets the elementary demand of those injured by an agency decision to be told "the reason why". In the second place, a losing party has a right to know why he lost his case. The requirement of findings meets the elementary demand of those injured by an agency decision to be told "the reason why". Findings serve as explanation to the parties as to the basis for the decision. Thirdly, and the reason most frequently emphasized, is the role of the findings requirement in facilitating judicial review. Findings provide a basis for judicial review; without them a court cannot adequately perform its reviewing function : "we must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong". If there are no findings, "in Lord Summer's famous phrase, the record "speaks" only with the "inscrutable face of a sphinx". In such circumstances, "the silence of the records renders it pragmatically impossible for the court to perform its function of review" findings supply the nexus between the agency decision and an often bulky record. The court can determine whether the findings support the decision and whether the findings themselves are supported by substantial evidence in the record. This enables the courts to engage in an. "orderly functioning of the process of review which requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained". Hence, as a recent case puts it, the findings requirement "is not a mere technicality but is an absolute necessity without which judicial review would be impossible". Professor Bernard schwarz further says that ''agency findings tend to be defective in two ways. Ali too often they mere parrot the language of the governing statute, without the statutory language to the facts of the- case. "whenever an agency may be permitted to state its findings of fact in bare statutory language, the decision may be rendered by a clerk or Secretary". Conclusory findings in language borrowed from the statute are not enlightening to a reviewing court. The most common defect in agency findings is their tendency to be couched in vague and obscure terms: abounding in bureaucratic legalisms, they obfuscate rather than clarify. Conclusory findings in language borrowed from the statute are not enlightening to a reviewing court. The most common defect in agency findings is their tendency to be couched in vague and obscure terms: abounding in bureaucratic legalisms, they obfuscate rather than clarify. Those whose professional carrer has condemned them to the dreary task of reading agency decisions cannot help but find a responsive chord in the animadversion of Justice Black with regard to an ICC Order : "i am compelled to say that the commissioner could have informed me just as well if it had written its so called findings on ancient Sanskrit. " At the same time, d the requirement of findings means. anything, it must compel administrative agencies adequately to articulate the basis of their action showing a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made". Even when the Rules of natural justice do not apply there is nevertheless an obligation on any who decides anything to reach his decision through a procedure that is, 'fair' and an attribute of 'fairness', the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm should have been told why their applications for the grant of permit were refused. The view as indicated above will find support from the decision in the case of osmond v. Public Service Board of New South Wales and Anr., reported in (1985) LRC (Const) Page 1041 at Page 1057-58 of the Supreme court of New South Wales observed "the Hon'ble Supreme Court of india" in a series of decision has elaborated a general requirement for administrative Tribunals to give reasons for the decision. Sometimes the requirement has been founded on the elementary requirements of the "quasi judicial process". Reference may be made - Vedachala mudaliar v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad. 276 , 280, Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Walchand and Co. AIR 1967 SC 1435 , govindrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1222 , 1226); Sometimes in the Indian Constitution Special Leave to appeal to the Supreme court (See e. g. Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttarpradesh, AIR 1970 sc 1302 , Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar, AIR 1961 SC 1669, Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1606 . The use of the principles of natural justice, derived from the common law in england, as a basis for the requirement to state reasons, has reached its most notable support in two important decisions of the Supreme court of India in which the leading judgments were written by Bhagwati janamely, Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. v. Union of india AIR 1976 SC 1785 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 . The role of "natural justice" in administrative law as an independent principle, intended to "invest law with fairness and to secure justice" was stressed by Bhagwati J. In Maneka Gandhi (supra)calling on the language of Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gust in Wiseman v. Bornman (1971) AC 297, 309, Bhagwati J. suggested that the soul of natural justice is 'fair play in action' and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world". In Osmond's case (Supra) the court further observed "and in Akbar Buses Ltd. v. Transport Control Board, Fiji Transport Company 1984, Fiji Court of Appeal (unreported No. 9 of 1984) Speight, V. P. speaking for the same court held that there were occasions when the absence of reasons in administrative decision-making "prima facie suggests a misuse of power". The case involved the refusal of a licence to a bus company without reasons given. The court held that "it is clear beyond argument that reasons of disapproval of the company should have been put before it on this occasion. If it had shortcomings in the past, it should have been given the opportunity to explain whether or not it had remedied those shortcomings". In the absence of stated reasons, the administrative decision appeared to the court to be "inexplicable". The failure to give reasons was held to lead "to a very justifiable complaint that there has been a breach of natural justice". The challenge that the sta failed to show any ground or reason in support of rejection of the case of the writ petitioner and the writ petitioner's firm vis- a- vis 'canned reason' of the STA for refusing the applications for the grant of permit does not lack in substance. The STA did not at all consider the case of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. The STA did not at all consider the case of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm. The basic documents together with other documents filed before the STA were completely overlooked, as a result whereof the resolution thus adopted by the STA is wholly vitiated on the ground of the failure of the STA to take into account the relevant: considerations as would appear from the comparative statements produced by the STA. The grant of permit in favour of the grantees is tainted with three grounds upon which the administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The views that we have taken finds support from the decision of the house of Lords in Council of Civil Services Union and Ors. v. Minister for the Civil Service reported in 01885) LRC (Const) 948 at Page 1026. Lord Diplock, according to Lord Roskill, has devised a new nomenclature for each of the three grounds calling them illegality, irrational laity and procedural impropriety. The relevant passages from the judgment of Lord Diplock as regards three grounds were set out below in extenso "by "illegality" as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justifiable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the 3udges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By "irrationality" I mean what can by now be succinctly reference to as "wednesbury unreasonableness" (Associated Provincial picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948)1 KB 223. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that Judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer. or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial] system. To justify the court's exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Vis count Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards v. Beirstow (1956) AC 14 of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by decision-maker. To justify the court's exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Vis count Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards v. Beirstow (1956) AC 14 of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by decision-maker. "irrationality" by now can. stand upon its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by judicial review. I nave described the third head as "procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision". 31. THE resolution is vitiated by 'illegality', irrationality and procedural impropriety. The contention of Mr. Bose is that the grant of permit in respect of the Inter-State routes namely, Calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur-Digha in favour of the grantees by the STA is contrary and dehors the provisions of Sections 63 and 47 (3) of the said Act and Rule 54 of the said Rules. Sub-section 3 of Section 47 of the said Act permits the number of stage carriage permit being fixed only in respect of routes within the State que sub-section 3 of Section 47 of the said Act is not applicable to Inter-State routes. This number is to be fixed by the Inter-State Commission constituted under section 63a of the said Act, but if such Commission has not been constituted then the number can be fixed only by Inter-State Argeements. Reference may be made to the decision in case of T. N. Regunath Reddy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1979 AP 92 . As stated above the provisions of sub-section 3 of section 47 of the said act are found in their operation in and within the region, they do not apply to Inter-State or Inter-Region permits. The number of services for Inter-State and Inter-Regional routes will have to be determined by agreement. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Md. Ibrahim v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal reported in AIR 1970 SC 1542 applies in the facts of the case. The number of services for Inter-State and Inter-Regional routes will have to be determined by agreement. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Md. Ibrahim v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal reported in AIR 1970 SC 1542 applies in the facts of the case. Proviso to sub-section 3 of section 63 of the said Act cannot be construed to imply that once there is an agreement between two States as regards number of Stage Carriage Permits on any particular route the main sub-section 3 of section 63 stands obliterated and wiped out. The STA can grant permit on Inter-State routes in excess of agreed number of permits between the two States after following the provisions of sub-section 3 of Section 57 of the said Act. The STA is not powerless to split up the permit in the manner as stated above but such splitting up can only be made after following the provisions of sub-section 3 of section 57 of the said Act. This has not admittedly been done and consequently the decision of the STA to split up the permits without following the procedures as laid down in sub-section 57 (3) cannot be sustained. In view of our decision that the action of the STA in splitting up the permits is not warranted by law, we hold that the STA having failed to conform to the requirements of sub-section 3 of Section 57 of the said Act acted improperly and without jurisdiction in splitting up the permits. 32. THE writ petitioner according to Mr. Bose, is the best candidate and should have been preferred to the: grantees who are favoured with the permits. The STA while selecting the candidates for the grant of permit did not consider all the relevant documents filed by the petitioner and there is no warrant either factual or legal for refusal of the application of the writ petitioner for the grant of permit. This court cannot substitute its opinion for the STA which is the only authority to consider the merits and demerits of the applicants. The sta while deciding the matter in terms of the said provisions of the said Act is required to consider the merits and demorits of the applicants for the grant of permit. The question that the writ petitioner is the best candidate or not can only be decided by the STA. The sta while deciding the matter in terms of the said provisions of the said Act is required to consider the merits and demorits of the applicants for the grant of permit. The question that the writ petitioner is the best candidate or not can only be decided by the STA. In absence of reasons in support of rejection of the case of the writ petitioner or the petitioner firm the said resolution is liable to be struck down. Mr. Bose strenuously focused on the ground that public interest cannot absovle the STA from not performing and/or discharging the statutory duties. The contention of Mr. Bose is sound. Mere mention of the public interest or interest of traveling in terms of the said act does not confer the unfettered and naked power on the STA to grant largess in the garb of grant of permit without following the procedures. The interest of the traveling public being the paramount consideration to be taken into account in the matter of grant of permit does not transcend the said provisions of the said Act and the said rules. The bogey of public interest cannot outweigh the mandate as engrafted in the said provisions and section 63 of the said Act. We cannot pursuade ourselves 10 accept the contention of the Learned standing Counsel and Mr. Manik Das, the Learned Advocate for the sta advanced on the question of the interest of traveling public. 33. THE last contention of Mr. Bose is that the procedures adopted in the present case as would appear from the facts and circumstances of the case show that the entire proceedings suffer from callous exercise of power, non-application of mind, absence of reasons and fairness and as a result, the grant of permit in favour of the grantee made by the STA is unauthorised and without any jurisdiction. 34. RULE 54 of the said Rules deals with the conduct of the business of the Transport Authority. Rule 64 relates to grant of permits for inter-Regional routes and/or Inter-State routes. From a reference to records produced by the STA, we do find that the records are not maintained, the resolutions are not recorded in the bound book the minutes of the proceeding of the sta and the registers are kept in utterly haphazard manner. The rules as aforesaid are deliberately and calculatedly bypassed by the STA. From a reference to records produced by the STA, we do find that the records are not maintained, the resolutions are not recorded in the bound book the minutes of the proceeding of the sta and the registers are kept in utterly haphazard manner. The rules as aforesaid are deliberately and calculatedly bypassed by the STA. The order of the Secretary in the facts and circumstances of the present case constitute grounds for the loss of confidence of the citizens dealing in transport business in the administration of the STA. Orders were prepared in tailor-made fashion, endorsements were made by the concerned authority including the Chairman and the Secretary of the STA without looking into the records. The Secretary acted irresponsibly, improperly and illegally by signing the Memo No. 3037- (3) STA dated 15. 3. 1986 when the draft resolution was not at all ready. The Secretary was very over-zealous in sending the letters dated 15. 3. 86, 18. 3. 86 and 20. 3. 86. There was no warrant for the issue of the letters at the time when the draft resolution was not signed by Sri Nalini guha, one of the members of the STA nor the approval of the said number, in physical sense, was obtained. In any event the Secretary was oblivious of the statutory limits of his functions. The style of functioning of the Secretary establishes that he userped the basic and statutory-functions of the STA. The improper and unwarranted manner in which records are maintained, resolutions are adopted letters are issued, draft resolutions were signed and sent to the concerned members of the STA shows that deep-rooted malady has crippled the administration of the STA and thereby impaired the basic structure of the administration, that is, openness, fairness and impartiality. If the deplorable state of affairs, as detailed above, continues to exist the basic structure as aforesaid would very soon crumble down. There is no openness in the administration of the STA as the entire procedure as revealed in the present case demonstrates the unauthorised secrecy which is contrary to the concept of openness. In Breen v. Amalgamated engineering Union 1971 (1) AER 1154 - Lord Denning says "the giving of reason is one of the fundamentals of good administration". The condition to record reasons introduces, clarify and excludes arbitrariness and satisfy the party concerned against, whom the order is passed. In Breen v. Amalgamated engineering Union 1971 (1) AER 1154 - Lord Denning says "the giving of reason is one of the fundamentals of good administration". The condition to record reasons introduces, clarify and excludes arbitrariness and satisfy the party concerned against, whom the order is passed. The old Police State has become Welfare State. It provides deterrant safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of powers by the executive authorities, Tribunals and quasi-judicial authorities. What satisfaction and solace will the applicants for the grant of permit have when they will come to know the unfolded chapter of complete lack of openness, fairness and impartiality. In Metropolitan properties Limited v. Lannon reported in 1969 (1)KB 577 lord Denning says "the reason is plain enough, Justice must be rooted in confidence. " If the quasi-judicial authorities of the Tribunals can make orders without giving reasons the said power in the background of absolute discretion may turn out to be a lethal weapon for the abuse of power by incompetent, inefficient and irresponsible officers. In the Council of Civil Service Union and Others v. Minister of Civil Service (Supra), lord Roskill while considering the process now known as judicial process observed "today it is perhaps common place to observe that as a result of a series of judicial decisions since about 1950 both in this House and in the Court of Appeal there has been a dramatic and indeed a radical change in the scope of judicial review. That change has been described by no means critically as an upsurge of judicial activism". While dealing with the principle of natural justice Lord roskill observed, the use of this phrase "principles of natural justice" is not doubt hallowed by time and much judicial repetition, but it is a phrase often widely misunderstood and therefore as often misused. That phrase perhaps might now be allowed to find a permanent resting-place and be better replaced by speaking of a duty to act fairly". That phrase perhaps might now be allowed to find a permanent resting-place and be better replaced by speaking of a duty to act fairly". Lord Roskill further said "to speak today of the acts of the sovereign as "irresistible and absolute" when modern constitutional convention requires that all such acts are done by the sovereign on the advice of and will be carried out by the soverign's ministers currently in power is surely to hamper the continual development of our administrative law by harking back to what Lord Atkin once called, albeit in a different context, the clanking of mediaeval chains of the ghosts of the past : see United australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (1941) AC 1, 29. " The 'acting fairly' or 'fairness' doctrine is a challenging advance in the domain of judicial review. The terms 'fairness' or 'acting fairly' make their initial appearance in Lord Parker C. J. 's judgment in Re : H. K. (An Infant) (1967) 2 Q. B. 617. Lord Parker said "even if an immigration officer is not in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity, he must at any give the immigrant an opportunity of satisfying him of the matters in the sub-section, and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of being required to act fairly". 35. TO quote from P. P. Craig's Administrative Law 1983 at Page 261. 'how significant is the development of fairness, whether it be seen as synonymous with natural justice or in juxtaposition there ? one view sees the development of fairness as a co-relative of the expansion of procedural rights post Ridge v. Baldwin,1964 AC 40. The judgment of Megarry V. C. in Mc. Innes v. Onslow. . . Fans is illuminating in this respect". Megarry V. C. states in Mc. Innes v. Onslow. . . Fans (1978)3 ALL ER 211 at 219, (1978) WLR 1520 at 1530. . . if one accept that "natural justice" is a flexible term which imposes different requirements in different cases, it is capable of applying to the whole range of situation indicated by terms "judicial", "quasi-judicial" and "administrative". Nevertheless, the further the situation is away from anything that at resembles a judicial or quasi judicial situation. . . . . if one accept that "natural justice" is a flexible term which imposes different requirements in different cases, it is capable of applying to the whole range of situation indicated by terms "judicial", "quasi-judicial" and "administrative". Nevertheless, the further the situation is away from anything that at resembles a judicial or quasi judicial situation. . . the more appropriate it is to reject a expression, which includes the word "justice" and to use instead terms such as "fairness" or "the duty to act fairly". See in Re: K. (An Infant) (1967) (Supra) 630, per Lord Parker C. J. ; in Re: Pergamon Press Ltd. (1971) Ch. 388, 399, per Lord Denning M. R. Breen's case 1971) 2 Q. B. 175, 195, per edmund Davies, L. J. ('fairly exercised'); Pearlberg v. Varty (1972) 1 wlr 534, 545, per Viscount Dilhorne, and at p. 547, per Lord Pearson". To cite from D. Mullen's Article "fairness : The New Natural Justice" (1975) 25 UPLJ 281 at 300 "fairness appears to offer to the Courts greater measure of flexibility than that allowed by the Rules of Natural justice. The procedure thus resorted to by the STA and in particular the action of the Secretary is wholly unauthorised and contrary to the mandates of the said Act. It is well settled that the conferral of quasi judicial power upon a particular authority by a Statute must be exercised by that authority alone and cannot be delegated to anyone unless such delegate is authorised by the Statute expressly. Admittedly the Secretary, was not delegated to record the reasons in terms of the said provision of the said Act and the Rules framed there under. It is really a matter of shock and surprise. Reference may ' be made to the decision in Local Government board v. Alridge 1915 AC 120, Bombay Municipal Corporation v. Thunda, AIR 1965 SC 1486 - Gullipalli Nageswer Rao v. Andhra Pradesh road Transport Corporation AIR 1959sc303 and Runklev. US (1887)- 122/us 543. 36. THERE is no inherent power of review with any authority and the said power can be exercised only if it is conferred by the relevant statute. As a general rule, the quasi-judicial authority or Administrative tribunal becomes functus officio as soon as it makes the order and thereafter cannot review its decision unless the said power is expressly-conferred on it by the Statute. As a general rule, the quasi-judicial authority or Administrative tribunal becomes functus officio as soon as it makes the order and thereafter cannot review its decision unless the said power is expressly-conferred on it by the Statute. The view that' we have taken as regards the ultra vires recording of reasons vis- a- vis unauthorised functions of the Secretary finds its support from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in cases of patel Narshi v. Thakurji Ft pradumansinghji (Supra), Mehar Singh v. N. T. Das (Supra. We have already indicated that the contentions of mr. Chatterjee the learned Standing Counsel and Mr. Das appearing for the STA by reason of our findings against the main thrust of Mr. Molay Kumar Basu, the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner, cannot he accepted and accordingly we hold that the entire proceedings are vitiated and the grant of permits in favour of grantees who are added respondents is tainted with illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. 37. IN view of our findings we overrule the contentions of Mr. Chatterjee and Mr. Das that the writ petitioners are premature by reason of the failure of the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm to exhaust the alternative remedies it is well settled that exhaustion of alternative remedies is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition if the reasons were not furnished to the writ petitioner and the petitioner firm the challenge against the decision of the STA by preferring an appeal under section 54 of the said Act and Rule 84 (b) of the Rules would become on impossibility. 38. THE appeals which were heard for a number of days came up for hearing on 10. 9. 1986 when Mr. Manick Das the learned Advocate appearing for the STA submitted that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as. would appear from the records produced by Mr. Das before this Court, the resolution dated 14. 3. 1986 be not given effect to or set aside and Mr. Das further submitted that the STA may be directed to invite application afresh for the grant of Inter-State permit in respect of Calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur-Digha routes and the STA be allowed to commence, continue and conclude the proceedings for the grant of permits in respect of, Inter-State routes as indicated above by 31. 3. Das further submitted that the STA may be directed to invite application afresh for the grant of Inter-State permit in respect of Calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur-Digha routes and the STA be allowed to commence, continue and conclude the proceedings for the grant of permits in respect of, Inter-State routes as indicated above by 31. 3. 1987 and during this period of interregnum, the STA shall be at liberty to take such steps as are necessary for the grant of temporary Inter-State permits in respect of Calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur-Digha routes after observance of the relevant provisions of the said Act and the Rules. Apart from the findings reached by us, we, on the basis of submission and prayer of Mr. Das set aside the entire proceeding including the grant of Inter-State Permits issued in favour of the added respondents in respect of Inter-State routes namely, Calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur-Digha. The judgment of the Learned Judge dismissing the writ petition is set aside. Accordingly let a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued commanding the respondents to cancel, withdraw and rescind the notice inviting applications for the grant of permit in respect of Calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur-Digha routes, as also the permits granted in favour of the added respondents and a writ in the nature of certiorari be also issued by quashing the entire proceeding and the Resolution dated 14. 3. 1986 as contained in Annexure 'm' to the Supplementary Affidavit and the grant of permits made in pursuance of the Said resolution. On the prayer of Mr. Das as we further direct that the STA shall be at liberty to' grant temporary permits in the interest of the traveling public ' after complying with the provisions of the said Act and/or Rules, and while considering the grant of temporary permits in respect of calcutta-Puri Route and Jamshedpur-Digha the STA shall take into account the case of the writ 'petitioner and the petitioner firm as also the cases of grantees but it is made clear that the experience acquired by the grantees during this period, when they were allowed to ply their vehicles shall not weigh with the STA. It is once again made clear that the STA should take utmost expeditious steps in the interest of the traveling public for the grant of permanent permits in respect of Inter-State Route permits namely: calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur to Digha on or before 31. 3. 1987. It is once again made clear that the STA should take utmost expeditious steps in the interest of the traveling public for the grant of permanent permits in respect of Inter-State Route permits namely: calcutta-Puri and Jamshedpur to Digha on or before 31. 3. 1987. 39. BEFORE parting with the case we must record a note of appreciation that the startling facts would not have seen the light of the day but for the fairness of the Learned Advocate Mr. Manick Das who produced the records of the case. The appeals thus succeed and accordingly, they are allowed without any order as to the costs. Appeals allowed.