Judgment :- NAINER SUNDARAM, J. 1. This Writ Appeal is directed against the order of Varadarajan, J. as he then was, in W.P. No. 121 of 1977. The respondents in the Writ Petition are the appellants herein and the petitioner in the Writ Petition is the respondent herein. We propose to refer to the parties as per their array in the Writ Petition. 2. The Petitioner wanted a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from collecting the sum of Rs. 6,325 referred to in the Distraint Order, dated 5th January, 1977 of the second respondent. The grievance of the petitioner and the basis for his approach to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India are set out in particular in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition and the same stands extracted as hereunder: “2. I state that for the tree and other taxes alleged to be due from me to the Nattapakkam Commune Pondicherry State for the years 1970, 1971. and 1972, the first respondent herein has directed the 2nd respondent to initiate recovery proceedings under the Pondicherry Revenue Recovery Act (Act XIV of 1970) Accordingly, the 2nd respondent has issued an order under S. 8 of the said Act on 5th January 1977 directing distraint of my properties in the village of Tavalkuppam for recovery of Rs. 6,325. 3. Aggrieved by the same, having no other adequate and effective alternative remedy, I am invoking the extraordinary original jurisdiction of this Honble Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a Writ, Direction or Order for the following amongst other grounds. (a) Even assuming without admitting that the petitioner is liable to pay the alleged taxes, the claim is clearly barred by limitation. (b) Section 219 of the Pondicherry Village and Commune Panchayats Act, 1973 (Act No. 10 of 1973) clearly prohibits making of any distraint in respect of any tax or other sum due to village Panchayat or Commune Panchayat Council under that Act after the expiration of a period of three years from the date on which distraint might first have been made in respect of such tax or sum. (c) The claim in the instant case being in respect of alleged tax due to a Panchayat for the years 1970, 1971 and 1972 ought to have been made within three years from the respective years and the same not having been made it is clearly barred by limitation. (d) The time limit for taking action having expired, the first respondent has no jurisdiction to resurrect a dead cause and require the second respondent to issue an order of distraint and deal with the subject matter as if it was a live cause of action.” The answer of the respondents to the contentions of the petitioner is contained in paragraphs 3 and 5 of their counter-affidavit in the following terms: “3. I state that the petitioner herein is a defaulter of the tax arrears due to the 1st respondent Commune pertaining to the years 1970, 1971 and 1972. As the petitioner failed to pay the tax arrears the Revenue Department was requested to proceed with the recovery action under the Revenue Recovery Act, 1970. Subsequently the Revenue Officials have initiated distraint action for the recovery of the tax arrears. In these circumstances the petitioner has filed the above Writ Petition. 5. I state that the contentions raised by the petitioner in paras 3(a) to 3(d) are not correct. I submit the claim for the tax arrears for the years 1970 and 1972 is not barred by limitation. The claim for tax arrears pertaining to the years 1970 onwards is well within time in view of the Notification of the Local Administration Department, Pondicherry issued in G.O.Ms. No. 14, dated 25th January 1974. I submit the said notification provides that in respect of all Commune Panchayat dues pertaining to the period prior to 26th January, 1974 the limitation period of three years as specified under S. 219 shall be reckoned from the appointed day, viz., 26th January, 1974. In the circumstances I state the claim is not barred by limitation and the respondents are entitled to proceed under the Revenue Recovery Act.” As could be seen from the averments set out in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, the petitioner sought to avoid the claim of arrears of tax due and recovery thereof by pointing out the bar under S. 219 of the Pondicherry Village and Commune Panchayats Act, 1973 (Act. 10 of 1973), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The respondents conceded that S. 219 of the Act would apparently apply to the dues but only relied on a particular Government Order as extending the period of limitation. The learned Judge considered the question raised on the pleadings and came to the conclusion that the provisions of the Government order are inconsistent with S. 219 of the Act, which prescribed a period of three years for the issue of distraint proceedings in respect of arrears from the date on which distraint might first have been made. The learned Judge took note of the fact that his attention was not drawn to any authority conferred on the Subordinate rule making authority to pass an order extending the period of limitation with retrospective effect. As a result, the learned Judge allowed the Writ Petition. 3. In this Writ Appeal directed against the order of the learned Judge, Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, appellants herein, would submit that the tax arrears in the present case are not dues under the Act and hence the limitation under S. 219 of the Act should not be put against the distraint proceedings. According to the learned counsel, the dues arose by virtue of French decrees and in view of S. 332 of the Act, the remedy in respect of such French decrees can be enforced as if the Act had not been passed. This plea has got only a factual basis, namely, that the tax arrears became due under French decrees. The respondents proceeded that the dues were under the Act and they did not dispute the application of S. 219 of the Act to the dues and there was only a reliance on the Government order for extension of time. There was also no opportunity afforded to the petitioner to meet specifically the point that the dues sought to be recovered were only under the French decrees and the old law of limitation alone would apply. Even before us, no material has been placed as to the details of the French decrees and the implication of any old law governing the question of recovery of due under such decrees. Practically the learned counsel wants us in Writ Appeal to investigate this entirely new factual allegation and render a decision. Even before us, no material has been placed as to the details of the French decrees and the implication of any old law governing the question of recovery of due under such decrees. Practically the learned counsel wants us in Writ Appeal to investigate this entirely new factual allegation and render a decision. We are conscious that we are exercising Letters Patent Appeal powers and this is not a pure question of law that could be adjudicated on the facts already exposed. Hence, we are not inclined to go into this question, and this contention stands eschewed. 4. However, the learned counsel would further contend that even as per the language of S. 219 of the Act, a distraint under the Act alone will come within the mischief of prescription of the period of limitation under that provision; but the distraint in the present case is only under the Pondicherry Revenue Recovery Act (Act 14 of 1970) and hence would not be affected by that provision. The learned counsel would place reliance on a pronouncement of Srinivasan. J., in V.VR.NV.R. Nagappa Chettiar and another v. The Union of India represented by the Commissioner of Income-tax Madras 1, as well as a pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Raja Jagadish Pratap Sahi v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2. S. 219 of the Act reads as follows:— “219. Limitation for recovery of dues:— No distraint shall be made, no suit shall be instituted and no prosecution shall be commenced in respect of any tax or other sum due to village panchayat or commune panchayat council under this Act or any rule, bye-law, regulation or order made thereunder after the expiration of a period of three years from the date on which distraint might first have been made, a suit might first have been made, a suit might first have been instituted, or prosecution might first have been commenced, as the case may be, in respect of such tax or sum”. 5. 5. We need not strain over this contention because even assuming that language of S. 219 should be so construed as to say that the limitation set out therein is applicable only to distraints “under the Act”, yet we find that for recovery of the present dues, admittedly there could not be any independent resort to the provisions of the Pondicherry Revenue Recovery Act and the respondents are enabled to have resort to such process only by virtue of and under the authority of the provisions of the Act. The learned counsel admits this position and, in fact, to a question put by us, he drew our attention to Ss. 124 and 153 of the Act. If the process under the Pondicherry Revenue Recovery Act could be resorted to only pursuant to and under the authority of the Act, certainly the mischief of S. 219 of the Act will be attracted and the period of limitation set out therein has to be applied for recovery of the dues of the present nature. The expression “under the Act” occurring in S. 219 of the Act should be construed as to include distraints authorised by the Act. Once it is admitted that Pondicherry Revenue Recovery Act (Act 14 of 1970) cannot be independently invoked for recovery of the present dues and that the provisions of that Act could be invoked only under the authority of the Act, then certainly the distraint must be held to be one authorised under the Act and hence under the Act itself. The very nexus for recovery under the Pondicherry Revenue Recovery Act has got to be found only under the Act. No distraint under the Pondicherry Revenue Recovery Act would have any independent existence but for the authority under the Act. 6. Thirdly, the learned counsel would contend that the cause of action for the recovery did not accrue until the Act was enacted and came into force which alone enabled the respondents to set the process for recovery in motion. We are not able to spell out such a theory as the learned counsel would advance. The general principle is that when once limitation has commenced to run, it will continue to do so unless it is stopped by virtue of any statutory provision. We are not able to spell out such a theory as the learned counsel would advance. The general principle is that when once limitation has commenced to run, it will continue to do so unless it is stopped by virtue of any statutory provision. If the right to recover the dues had accrued then limitation would run and it cannot be claimed that a new body coming in succession to an erstwhile body will have a new cause of action and a new period of limitation. It is not demonstrated before us that the erstwhile body had a larger period of limitation for the present dues and that stood saved in any manner for the new body coming in succession. We find that only pursuant to clause (j) of S. 334 of the Act, the first respondent is enabled to resort to the recovery of the dues and it is not possible to state that the cause of action accrued to the first respondent only on its coming into existence because for the recovery of the tax arrears due to the erstwhile body, the new body only steps into its shops and it cannot have a fresh cause of action. Our attention has not been drawn to any authority which has countenanced a contrary proposition. Otherwise, no argument was advanced with regard to the reasons expressed by the learned Judge for repelling the other contentions put forth by the appellants herein. 7. For these reasons we do not feel obliged to interfere in Writ Appeal. Accordingly the Writ Appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.