JUDGMENT S. S. Sandhawalia, J. The primary question raised in this writ petition is whether section 36C of the Wakf Act, 1954, as inserted by the Wakf (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1976, infracts the equality clause of Article 14 of the Constitution. 2. The matrix of facts giving rise to the question lies in a narrow compass. The petitioner, Messers Das & Co., is a partnership firm carrying on its business since 1934 as a month to month tenant in the disputed property at mohalla Muradpur, Ashok Raj Path, Patna, owned by the Wakf known as Bibi Zohra Wakf Estate. It is averred that the trouble started after appointment of respondent no. 4, Md. Fariduddin, as the Mutwalli of the Bibi Zohra Wakf Estate in June, 1980. Respondent no. 4 is also averred to an influential member of the Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board (hereinafter to be called the 'Board'). He later instituted Title Suit no. 270 of 1981 for the eviction of the petitioner from the premises under the Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, which is pending in the court of the Subordinate Judge I, at Patna. However, short-circuiting the procedure for eviction under the Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, the petitioner received the impugned notice dated the 27th of November, 1982 issued by respondent no. 2, the Board directing the petitioner to vacate the premises aforesaid within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice on the ground that the said Board is in the need of the same premises for its own office. It is further averred that respondent no. 3, the Collector, Patna, on the requisition of respondent no. 2 is trying to evict the petitioner from the premises and in the evening of the 18th January, 1983 an Executive Magistrate, on the direction of the Collector, Patna, had come to execute the eviction but could not do so. Aggrieved by the notice and the consequential action of the respondents, the present petition has been preferred challenging the said notice and action on a wide variety of grounds. 3. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Board it is categorically averred that the premises are Wakf property and are expressly required for the purposes of the Board, namely, for accommodating its offices. 3. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Board it is categorically averred that the premises are Wakf property and are expressly required for the purposes of the Board, namely, for accommodating its offices. It is stated that the present office of the Board is in a rented house and the landlady of the same has been trying to evict the Board from the said premises, and a copy of the notice issued to the Board is annexure A to the counter affidavit. Further, the Chairman of the Board had even taken up the matter with the Government for allotment of adequate space for the purpose a of the Board but without any success. Consequently, the Board was on the look out of a suitable accommodation and has come to the conclusion that the building in possession of the writ petitioner is suitable for the office of the Board. It is then pointed out that the Chairman of the Board has been duly authorised by a unanimous resolution dated the 4th November, 1978 to exercise the power under section 36C of the Wakf Act, 1954 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act') and further the respondent Board in its meeting dated the 20th of February. 1983 has duly approved of the action taken - under section 3GC by the Chairman of the Board. A true copy of the said resolution is annexure D to the counter affidavit. It is averred that the petitioner has not availed of the statutory remedy of appeal provided under section 360 of the Act and consequent the writ petition is not maintainable. The allegations made in the supplementary affidavit and the insinuation of malafides therein have been stoutly controverted in the additional counter affidavit. The challenge to the vires of section 36C and the action taken is also sought to be repelled. 4. It may also be noticed that S. M. Noor and Saira Bano, respondents, have been impleaded in the writ petition under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that they were the beneficiaries in the major part of the income from the Wakf Estate known as Most. Bibi Zohra Wakf Estate. The stand taken on their behalf is primarily in support of the petitioner. 5. The controversy herein necessarily revolves around section 36C of the Act. Bibi Zohra Wakf Estate. The stand taken on their behalf is primarily in support of the petitioner. 5. The controversy herein necessarily revolves around section 36C of the Act. It is first apt to note its legis1ative background and contents. The said section was first inserted in the parent Act by the Wakf (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1976. thereafter it was amended by Bihar Ordinance 27 of 1982, which provisions were later incorporated in the Act by the Wakf (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1982• (Bihar Act 66 of 1982). The provision now reads as under;- "36C. (1) If at any time it appears to The Board that any Wakf land or building let' out to any tenant is required for the purposes of the Board itself or for the development of the said land or building, the Board may by an order in writing require the tenant to vacate such land or building within fifteen days of the date of receipt of such order: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect any lease made in writing for specified period or any right, title or interest in any such land or building of any person. (2) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Board under sub-section (1) may within the said period of fifteen days file an appeal before the State Government whose decision thereon shal1 be final. (3) After the expiry of the period specified in sub-section (1) or, where an appeal has been filed under sub-section (2), after the disposal of the appeal, the State Government may, at the request of the Board, direct the Collector of the district to evict the tenant or any other person in occupation of such Wakf land or Building as the case may he, and the Collector shall there upon evict the tenant or such person and deliver possession of the Wakf Land or Building, direct to the Board, and may, for that purpose use such force as may be necessary: Provided that when crops are standing on the land the Collector shall not evict a tenant until the crops are harvested. (4) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, no order passed by the Board or the State Government under this section shall be called in question in any court or tribunal." To give a sharper edge to his challenge to the constitutionality of section 36C aforesaid, Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh learned Counsel for the petitioner, first drew our attention to certain observations in the case of Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mnjib Sehravardi and others (AIR 1981 Supreme Court 487) and relying thereon he contended that Article 14 of the Constitution, on which he primarily rested his attack, is a provision of activist magnitude and one should not countenance any attempt to constrict or truncate its all embracing scope and meaning. Therefore, in any and every violation of the equality rule the vice of arbitrariness was well within the purview of the said Article. With equal fairness the learned Counsel also referred to the case of R. K. Dalmia vs. Mr. Justice Mudholkar aad others (A.I. R. 1959 Supreme Court 279), wherein, in the concept of classification, even one man was held as a class by himself, so as to sustain the validity of the law or action against him alone. There is no quarrel with these settled propositions and the parameters and the anvil on which the equality rule is to be tested. 7. Now the main thrust of Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh's .contention herein was that the respondent Board was an instrumentality of the State and consequently obliged to act with a degree of reasonableness and an absence of arbitrariness. On that premise, it was contended that sub-section (I) of Section 36C gives no guideline or limitation as to which of the vast variety of tenants of any Wakf land or building the Board may chose to evict arbitrarily. According to the learned Counsel, the impugned section provides no protection against a whimsical action of the Board to evict the tenant of any Wakf land or Wakf building let out to any tenant. Therefore, it was sought to be contended that the provision must be struck down on the ground of arbitrariness. According to the learned Counsel, the impugned section provides no protection against a whimsical action of the Board to evict the tenant of any Wakf land or Wakf building let out to any tenant. Therefore, it was sought to be contended that the provision must be struck down on the ground of arbitrariness. Basic reliance was placed on the State of Punjab vs. Khanchand (1974) 2 Supreme Court Reports) (768 at 775), holding that if there is an element of pick and choose and the selection and acquisition by the Government is made without any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion provided by the statute, then either the provision or the action may be deemed to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. It appears to me that the contention aforesaid somewhat persistently advanced by the learned Counsel suffers from two basic infirmities. It proceeds on the assumption that the respondent, Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board, is either the Slate or an instrumentality thereof, and, therefore, a variety of obligations arise to act as such. This seems to be inherently unwarranted. There is nothing in the Wakf Act to which our attention was drawn even remotely for establishing that the respondent Board is either the State or an instrumentality thereof. It is significant to note that the Wakf Boards under the Act are not created by the Act it self, but only under the same, by virtue of Section 9 thereof. This visuallse the establishment of the Wakf Boards under such name as may be specified in the notification issuing for the same. The provision, witbin certain pre-conditions, envisages the creation of the Boards for the Shia Wakf or the Sunni Wakfs as the case may be. By sub-sections (2) of Section 9 such Board are a body corporate, having perpetual succession with power to acquire and hold property and to transfer any such property with such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed and also by the said name may sue or be sued. 9. By sub-sections (2) of Section 9 such Board are a body corporate, having perpetual succession with power to acquire and hold property and to transfer any such property with such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed and also by the said name may sue or be sued. 9. Apart from the fact that nothing could be brought to our notice in the Wakf Act itself or any statutory rules or regulations framed thereunder, there is equally no averment or factual material in the writ petition to sustain the claim that the respondent Board is, in any way, an instrumentality of the State over which an .ill pervasive control of the Government exists. Indeed, not even one of the six authoritative tests spelt out in paragraph 9 of the Ajay Hasia's case (supra) was even attempted to be established. It is thus patent that the respondent Board can neither be labelled either as a State or an instrumentality thereof or other authority within the meaning of Article 12. Equally, under the said Article, the only prohibition is with regard to the infraction of the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution, and, here there is not even a hint of any violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. 10. Now, once it is held that the respondent, Board is not a State or an in trumentality thereof or any authority, within the meaning of Article 12, the very bottom falls out of the Counsel's submission that the Boald's action must be tested on the anvil of Article 14. It is only the State or its instrumentality to whom the rule of equality clause applies and that is not to be laid on either individual citizens or legal persons who are outside the bounds of Article-12. Arbitrariness, is a vice of State action and not of personal or private action. 11. Even assuming everything in favour of the petitioner, it seems plain that sub-section (1) of Section 36C plainly provides the guidelines and the policy for the exercise of the power conferred on the Board. It is not that the Board can evict any and every tenant for any or every purpose, and, for that matter, for no purpose at all, arbitrarily. The statutory power herein is clearly hedged in and fettered by two basic prerequisites. It is not that the Board can evict any and every tenant for any or every purpose, and, for that matter, for no purpose at all, arbitrarily. The statutory power herein is clearly hedged in and fettered by two basic prerequisites. It is only, if such Wakf land or building is required for the Purpose of the Board itself that this power can be exercised, or, in the alternative, for the development of the said land or building. It is only within these confined parameters that this power bas to be exercised. To my mind, therefore, it extends over a limited and reasonable field. It cannot at all be assailed as either arbitrary or unguided or unfettered. 12. It seems plain that the attack of arbitrariness on the purpose of the Board itself cannot be sustained particularly in the context of the eviction of tenants from the premises. The need of the landlord himself of the premises owned by him is well established and a well recognised legal need. In the field of individual ownership, it is the hallowed concept of personal necessity. Its equivalent in the context of a statutory body here is the purpose of the Board itself. Neither can possibily be assailed as arbitrary, irrational of unreasonable. In the context of State action, it is well settled that when requisitioning or acquisitioning properties, it may do so for the requirement of a public purpose. The analogy is most apt, because, public purpose is a legally recognised ambiguity of the widest amplitude which is incapable of a precise definition. This is so axiomatic that it is unnecessary to elaborate or labour the point The State is entitled to requisition or acquire on the some what broad based objective test of public purpose. Therefore, if public purpose can be a good guide and policy in the law, the purpose of the Board itself would be of equal validity. 13. What has been said above, would apply mutatis mutandis to the alternative limitation of development of the said land or building. This phrase is also well understood even within the four corners of the rent laws, landlord may seek possession for rebuilding or reconstruction of the premises. The concept of the development of the building or of land cannot be doctrinairely laballed as either arbitrary or unguided. This phrase is also well understood even within the four corners of the rent laws, landlord may seek possession for rebuilding or reconstruction of the premises. The concept of the development of the building or of land cannot be doctrinairely laballed as either arbitrary or unguided. It thus seems plain that the two pre-conditions of sub-section (1) of section 36C provides guidelines, guidance and the principle or policy on the basis of which the power is conferred and within the parameters or' which it has to be exercised. l3A. Now, apart from the principle, policy and the guidelines expressly provided in subsection (I) of section 36C, reference must be made to sub-section 2) thereof. This provide for an expeditious statutory appeal for any person aggrieved by the order of the Board under sub-section (1). Such an appeal lie to the State Government and may be preferred within a period of fifteen days. This again provides a further check and balance to the exercise of the power under section 36C (1). No particular crippling limitations are laid on the scope of this appeal which obviously may be both on facts and law. It is well-settled that the provision of an appeal itself may sometimes cure a defect with regard to the validity of a statute when tested on the anvil of Article 14. It is unnecessary to elaborate this aspect because it is covered by the authoritative decision of the constitutional bench in Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of "Where a statute providing for a more drastice procedure different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the ordinary procedure, as in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case, 1952 SCR 284 : ( AIR 1952 SC 75 ) and Suraj Mali Mohta's case (1955) 1 SCR 448 : ( AIR 1954 SC 545 ) without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the statute will be hit by Article 14. Even there as mentioned in Suraj Mall Mohta's case, a provision for appeal may cure the defect. Even there as mentioned in Suraj Mall Mohta's case, a provision for appeal may cure the defect. Further, in such cases if from the preamble and surrounding circumstances, as well as the provisions of the statute themselves explained and amplified by affidavits, necessary guidelines could be inferred as in Saurashtra case, 1952 SCR 435: ( AIR 1952 SC 123 ) and Jyoti Pershad's case, (1962) 2 SCR 125 : ( AIR 1961 SC 1602 ) the statute will not be hit by Article 14." 14. The other basic premise on which the challenge under Article 14 was sought to be rested is that within the urban areas all tenants are entitled to be equally treated and are indeed so treated by the Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Building Control Act'). The submission was that the tenants of Wakf lands or buildings were being unequally or hostilely discriminated against by virtue of the provisions of section 36C of the Wakf Act. A reference was made to the earlier Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act of 1947, which excluded only the tenants of the State from its ambit. 15. Now, a conclusive answer to the aforesaid contention, to my mind, is provided by section 52 of the Building Control Act. This is in the terms following :- "Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the local authority, or the State Government or the Bihar State Shwetamber Jain Trust Board, or Bihar State Digamber Jain Trust Board or the Wakf, which may be under the Bihar State Wakf Board:' It is obvious from the above that even the Building Control Act does not provide mathematical equality in this regard and in terms excludes the tenants of the local authorities. States and Central Government or those of the Bihar State Shwetamber Jain Trust Board and the Digamber Jain Trust Board, and, in particular, the tenants of Wakfs under the Bihar State Wakfs Boards. When the Building Control Act itself entirely excludes the tenants of the Wakfs lands or buildings, it seeme futile to contaend that section 36C (1) of the Wakf Act which operates in a somewhat limited field of eviction on two basic requirements, is in any way, discriminatory. 16. In fairness to Mr. When the Building Control Act itself entirely excludes the tenants of the Wakfs lands or buildings, it seeme futile to contaend that section 36C (1) of the Wakf Act which operates in a somewhat limited field of eviction on two basic requirements, is in any way, discriminatory. 16. In fairness to Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, one must" notice a some what involved contention raised in this context. It was argued that the legislature has not used the words "under the control and superintendence of the Bihar State Wakf Boards" in section 32 of the Building Control Act. The bare word used is the 'Wakf' under the Bihar State Wakf Boards. On this somewhat tenuous premise and after reference to the other provisions of the Wakfs Act, it was contended that the provisions of section 36C may be read down to authorise the Board while acting under section 43 or section 43A of the Wakfs Act to evict a tenant of the building of the Wakf which has come under it for the purposes of the Board, i.e., for discharging its functions in relation to its direct management. I an unable to find any merit in this submission which seems to stem merely from a quibble on the language employed by the statute. It is not for the interpreter to dictate as to what particular phraseology the legislature would use or to read down the plain meaning of the words employed unless they frontally lead to unconstitutionality or absurdity. Herein we find neither of the two conditions remotely satisfied. The contention must, therefore, be rejected. 17. Almost as an argument of desperation, it was then contended on behalf of the petitioner that the exemption by section 32 of the Building Control Act of the tenants of the Wakf Boards is itself unconstitutional. There is not a hint of any challenge to the constitutionality of section 32 in the writ petition, and, at the belated stage of the end of the arguments, we could not possibly permit the learned counsel to assail its validity for reasons which are not even remotedly hinted at in the petition. However, 'Very fairly Mr. Balabhadra Prasad Singh did not attempt to lay any challenge to the exclusion of the tenants or' the State or the Central Government. However, 'Very fairly Mr. Balabhadra Prasad Singh did not attempt to lay any challenge to the exclusion of the tenants or' the State or the Central Government. If such exclusion is valid, one fails to see how the identical exclusion of other categories would suffer from the vice of invalidity. 18. Much store was then set on the submission that even in the generic clause of the Mohammadan wakf a particular wakf alal-oulad was nothing but a personal aggrandisement of the Wakf in favour of his own decendants and it had neither the character of a public nor that of a charitable trust. It was contended that in such a Wakf by merely providing that the property would ultimately be dedicated to God on the failure of all the numerous heirs of the Wokf the dedication to God is so far fetched and remote that it would be wrong to label it either as a public or charitable trust. Therefore, to exclude the tan ants of a private and personal trust, 1estified by the wakf-oralaulad alaloulad from the ambit of the tenants under the Building Control Act was alleged to be a hostile discrimination. Reference was made to sections 42 and 43 of the Wakfs Act pertaining to the power to appoint Mutawallis in certain cases and their removal and reliance was placed on Muhammad Shafia Ahmad v. Muhammad Mujtaba and another (A.I.R. 1928 Allahabad 660), Irfan Ali and others v. Bhagwat Kishore and others (A.I.R. 1929 Allahabad 180), and Asma Jafar Imam v. The State of Bihar and others (A.I.R 1975 Patria 48). 19. It is not at all easy to subscribe to the specious and ingenious distinction sought to be made with regard to a Wakf-alal-oulad. Equally necessary it is to recall that within this jurisdiction in Bihar, after the aforesaid decision in Asma Jafar Imam v. The State of Bihar and others certain State amendments were introduced in the Wakfs Act of 1954; The words to the extent "pious, religious or charitable" after the words "Wakf-alal-aulad" were deleted, thus removing any descriptive limitation to the application of the Wakfs Act, and as, such, the Wakfs Act, as amended in Bihar, is applicable to all types of Wakfs, including Wokfs alal-aulad. It has then to be borne in mind that the Wakfs Act now does not draw any I distinction between public and private Wakfs. It has then to be borne in mind that the Wakfs Act now does not draw any I distinction between public and private Wakfs. Indeed, Section 3 (1) defines 'Wokf' as under :- "(1) 'Wakf' means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam of any moveable or Immoveable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim Law as pious, religious or charitable and includes- (i) a wakf by user; (ii) grants (including Mashrm-al-Khidmat), for any purpose recognised by the Muslim Law as pious religious, charitable; and, (iii) a wakf-alal-au lad, to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim Law, as pious, religious or charitable; and 'Wakf' means any person making such dedication. In the light of the above, one has to pointedly remind oneself that under the particular provisions of the Wakfs Act, no line whatsoever is being diawn between Wakfs-alal-aulad and of any other category of Wakfs. Equally specious to me is the argument that though under the very Mohammedan Law, which is the source of the foundation of the concept of a Wakfs-alal-aulad, the same is considered to be for a charitable, pious or religious purpose, yet, one must proceed to label the same as wholly private and personal. If under the Wakf. Act a Wakfs-alal-aulad, is a recognised institution and one of the ffi0des of creating a wakf, it must be recognised in the same vein and light as other charitable and public trusts under the Mohammedan Law. No hair splitting or invidious insinuation in this context would seem permissible, nor can one easily and logically hold that section 36C (1) of the Wakfs Act is good with regard to all other categories of wakfs, but would be unconstitutional as regards the tenants of the lands or buildings belonging to a Wakfs-alal-aulad, 20. Though I have noticed in some detail the individual submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and repelled them on principle, it appears to me equally that the matter is substantlal1y concluded against him by I the recent judgment of their Lordships in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and another ( AIR 1985 SC 257 ). Though I have noticed in some detail the individual submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and repelled them on principle, it appears to me equally that the matter is substantlal1y concluded against him by I the recent judgment of their Lordships in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and another ( AIR 1985 SC 257 ). Equally well it is to recall that earlier in P.J. Irani v. State of Madras 'and another ( AIR 1961 SC 1731 ) the Constitution Bench held in categoric terms that the power vested in the Government to exempt a particular building or buildings from the operation of rent legislation was not open to attack as a denial of equal protection of laws. It is significant that section 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1949 did not itself exempt any class of' buildings from the operation 'of the Act but even empowered the Stale Government by notification to exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the said Act. The challenge to the constitutionality of section 13 on the basis of Article 14 was squarely repelled. It is plain that the pre- sent case is on a much stronger footing because in a way the exemption and the pre-conditions for the exercise thereof are laid out in the relevant statutes themselves and not left to the discretion of a delegated authority. In S. Kandaswmy chettiar’s case again the Government exercising the powers vested in it by section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1960 had exempted all the buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public trusts and public char- table trusts from all the provisions of the' aforesaid Act. It is significant to note that this total exemption from provisions of the Rent Act was given without any pre-conditions. It is significant to note that this total exemption from provisions of the Rent Act was given without any pre-conditions. Upholding the notification and the exercise of power, their Lordships observed as under :- "In our view, the aforesaid• material clearly shows that buildings belonging to such public religious and charitable endowments or trusts clearly fell into a class where undue hardship and injustice resulting to them from the uniform application of the beneficial provisions of the Act needed to be relieved and the exemption granted will have to be regarded as being germane to the policy and purp'0ses of the Act. In other words the classification made has a clear nexus with the object with which the power to grant "exemption has been conferred upon the State Government under S. 29 of the Act. "exemption has been conferred upon the State Government under S.29 of the Act. "15. Apart from this aspect of the matter it is conceivable that trustees of buildings belonging to such public religious institutions or public charities may desire eviction of their tenants for the purpose of carrying out major or substantial repairs or for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the State Government may have felt that the trustees of such buildings should be able to effect evictions without being required to fulfil other onerous conditions which must be complied with by private landlords, when they seek evictions for such purposes. In our view, therefore, the total exemption granted to such buildings under the impugned notification is perfectly justified." In the light of the aforesaid authoritative enunciations, it seems somewhat plain that the issues herein is concluded against the petitioner. 21. To conclude on this aspect, it must be held on principle, on the language of the statute .and on binding precedent that section 36C of the Wakfs Act, 1954 as inserted by the Wakf (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1976 does not in any way infract the equality clause of Article 14 of the Constitution. . 22. It now remains to notice the ancillary submissions sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioner. It was contended that section 36C cannot affect any pending action and is only prospective in' nature. It was pointed out that a title suit was already pending in a court of law and, therefore, action under section 36C could not affect that suit. It was contended that section 36C cannot affect any pending action and is only prospective in' nature. It was pointed out that a title suit was already pending in a court of law and, therefore, action under section 36C could not affect that suit. To my mind, there is no question of any prospectivity in this context. Section 36C independently gives another right or remedy to the Board generally in wokf land or building is required for its own purposes. The issue is now wholly well settled by the decision of Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others (AIR 1974 Supreme Court 2009) wherein their Lordships overruling the decision in Northern India Caterers (P) Ltd. v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1967 SC 1581 ) have held that even if two remedies are available to one authority, it may resort to either one of them or both and the same does not involve invalidity. 23. It was then argued that the Board could not delegate the exercise of its power under section 36C to its Chairman. The conc1usive answer to this is provided by the explicit statutory provisions of section 22 of the Wakfs Act which is in the following terms :- “The Board may, by a general or special order in writing, delegate to the Chairman of any other member or to the Secretary or any other officer or servant of the Board or any committee thereof, subject to such conditions and limitations (if any) as may be specified in the order, such of its powers and duties under this Act as it may deem necessary." One cannot see how the aforesaid express statutory power of delegation is to be cut down by any general dictum. A specious attempt was then sought to be made for contending that the power under section 36C was a quasi-judicial power and, therefore could not be delegated despite the provisions of section 22 of the Act. One is unable to find any adjudicatory or quasi judicial character in the exercise of the power under section 36C which, as noticed, pertains to either the requirement of the land or building for the purposes of the Board itself or its development. One is unable to find any adjudicatory or quasi judicial character in the exercise of the power under section 36C which, as noticed, pertains to either the requirement of the land or building for the purposes of the Board itself or its development. In such a situation, there is no lis, there are no parties and there is no arbitration or adjudication necessary to label this as either a judicial or a quasi-judicial power. On facts, it is necessary to recall that not only was the power duly delegated to its Chairman but his action was equally ratified later by the Board by a unanimous resolution. 24. Lastly, perhaps, as an argument of desperation, it was sought to be contended that the principles of natural justice have been violated in the exercise of the power. Once it is held as above that the power under section 36C is neither judicial nor quasi judicial, no such question can possibly arise. Equally, if it is held, as already, that the respondent Board is neither the State nor an instrumentality thereof nor other authority then also no question of invoking the principles of natural justice comes in Mr. Balabhadra Prasad Singh was fair enough to concede that the concept of natural justice arises only qua State action and not qua private action. 25. Before parting with this judgment, it may be noticed that the intervening respondent S.M. Noor and Saira Bano had attempted to intercede and support the stand of the petitioner. It is, however, noticeable that no pleading or counter affidavit on their behalf has been admitted on the record. Thus, there is no material or basis on which any other submission could be made apart from the legal ones which have already been elaborately noticed and repelled. Indeed, it is an admitted position that the intervenor respondents had earlier filed a Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case which was withdrawn unconditionally. In view of the decision in the case of Kishori Singh v. The State of Bihar and others ( 1985 PLJR 605 ) no second writ petition even would have been competent on their behalf and they cannot possibly claim the identical relief in the garb of intervenor respondents. 26. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is without merit and is hereby dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to cost. 26. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is without merit and is hereby dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to cost. S. Shamsul Hasan, J.-Juridical symphony created by Hon'ble the Chief Justice with deep erudition cannot justifiably countenance a discordant note. I am, however, feeling tempted with utmost respect to him to add a harmonious note appropriate to the main forray on the wakf Board's action by Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh. His attempt to create a cleavage between a public wakf and 'wakf alal-aulad' described as private wakf for the purpose of the supervision and exercise of power under section 36C of the Wakfs Act by the Wakfs Board does not stand the test of either the interpretational or historical justification. 27. The true concept of the dedication of property, which is described as 'wakf" was attributed to the words of the Holy Prophet, as stated in Chaitlal-Bayan and followed in other juridical exposition right up to Jam' an ut Tirmizi in the following terms. It is stated - "tie up the property (asl or corpus) and devote the us fruct to human beings, and it is not to be sold or made the subject of gift or inheritance devote its produce to your children, your kindred, and the, poor in the way of God." These sublime words were stated when Caliph Umar wanted to know how to utilise some landed property for pious purpose. As stated by Syed Ameer Ali in Mohmmadan Law, Vol. I Chapter VII, page 193, relating to 'Origin of Wakf', on the authority of Sunni law, the origin of wokf can be traced to the Prophet himself and he cites the following instances. As stated by Syed Ameer Ali in Mohmmadan Law, Vol. I Chapter VII, page 193, relating to 'Origin of Wakf', on the authority of Sunni law, the origin of wokf can be traced to the Prophet himself and he cites the following instances. "the wakf by the Prophet him self of piece of land which he bad acquired in the canton of Khaibar for the support of travelers the wakf of Omar of the land called' Sammagh in the same canton for his children, kindred, and the poor; of Zubair the Awwam for his daughters; or Arkam in favour of his son; of Abu Bakr in favour of his children; of S'aad ibn Abi Wakkas of his lands in Medina and Egypt for his children "which still exists" and of Osman of his lands called Baruah, 'which still continues.' "Wakafa literally means" I have bound up or detained' and is applied to the tying up of animals, such as a horse or camel. Technically or as the Arabian jurists put it, 'in the language of the law" it signifies the dedication or consecration of property, either in express terms or by implication, for any charitable or religious object, or to secure any benefit to human beings. To use the curt but expressive language of the Moslem lawyers a dedication to any good purpose wujuh-ulbirr- wa'l-ihsan of the Shiahs, or wujuh-ul-khair wa’l-birr of the Hanafis is a wakf. The terms birr and khair include all good and pious acts and objects. To make a provision for one's self is regarded by Hanafi lawyers as an act of khair, for the Prophet declared a man giving subsistence to himself as giving charity, and settlements upon one's family are approved of and regarded as lawful by all the schools. 28. From these it is clear that there was no distinction between a 'wokf created for public in general or for the aggrandisement of the family. The wakfs for all purposes came within the general description of pious, religious and charitable. There was no distinction between them. 28. From these it is clear that there was no distinction between a 'wokf created for public in general or for the aggrandisement of the family. The wakfs for all purposes came within the general description of pious, religious and charitable. There was no distinction between them. The author in the same book at the same page states that subsequent Arabian jurists, however, endowed each type of wakfs with the description and for the sake of convenience and divided it under three heads, viz., public, quasi public and private, and further grouped the wakfs or trusts under the following heads:- "(a) Trusts in favour of the affluent and indigent alike, (b) Trusts in favour of the affluent and then for the indigent, (C) Trusts in favour of the indigent alone. Trusts for public works of utility which are dedicated to the public at large, though classed under the first head, 1have -a distinctive name. They are called wakfs for masalih-ul-aamma; and differ in one feature from other wakfs. For example, a bridge constructed by a private individual and dedicated as a public highway for the people at large without any restriction, comes under the direct control or supervision of the Sovereign (Sultan) and his representative, the Kazi, whereas in the case of other trusts the Kazi can interfere- only at the instance of some of the beneficiaries. So is the case of a Masjidul. Jam'aa, the public mosque, whether erected by the Sovereign or a private individual, which is pecaliarly under the supervision of the Kazi. These masalih-ul-aama I designate as public wakfs. But there is a large body of trusts which without being public trusts, partake something of that character. I have thought it expedient to include them under the head of quasi public wakfs. By quasi public wakfs, therefore, I mean those trusts, the primary and initial object of which is, partly, to provide for a general pious purpose, and partly for the benefit of particular individuals or class of individuals which may be the settlor's family. By private wakfs, I mean those trusts, the primary object of which is to make a provision for private individuals, including the wakif's family or relations." Thus the concept of private and public wakfs was introduced. 30. From these it is apparent that the separation was merely descriptive and not in substance nor in the nature of its obligations. By private wakfs, I mean those trusts, the primary object of which is to make a provision for private individuals, including the wakif's family or relations." Thus the concept of private and public wakfs was introduced. 30. From these it is apparent that the separation was merely descriptive and not in substance nor in the nature of its obligations. Subsequently, with the advent of Kingship in Islam wakfs were under the control and supervision of Kazi, which, in course of time, with the advent of Anglo-Saxon laws, came within the supervision and control of the District Judge. With the independence of the country as far as Bihar is concerned, the Bihar Wakfs -Act, 19n, was brought into operation for the purpose of supervision and c0ntrol of wakfs of all types. In this Act various kinds of wakfs were characterised and 'wakf-alal-aulad' were mentioned as distinct from other forms of wakfs. In the Wakfs Act, 1954, introduced by the Parliament the definition of 'wakf-alal-aulad' was circumscribed by the use of the word to the extent that it is religious, charitable and .pious. Subsequently, original. definition, as contained in the Bihar Wakfs Act, 1947, was restored by deleting the words 'religious, charitable and pious'. It will be also interesting to set out how ancient Muslim law of charity suffered Anglo-Saxon. invasion by the precedential mandate of the Privy Council. The case relevant is the case of Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v. Rasamaya Dhar Chowdhri : I.LR. 23 Calcutta 619 at page 632, which iatroduced an alient concept that endowment to a member of the family is not charitable; and is to the following effect :- "Among the very elaborate arguments and Judgments reported in Bikani Mia's case (I.L.R. 20 Cal. 116), some doubts are expressed whether cases of this' kind are governed by Mahomedan law; and it is suggested that the decision in Ahsanulla Chowdhry's case (I.L.R. 27 Cal. 498); displaced the Mahomedan law in favour of English law. Clearly the Mahomedan law ought to govern a purely Mahomedan disposition of property. Their Lordships have endeavoured to the best of their ability to ascertain and apply the Mahomedan law as known and administered in India; but they cannot find that it is in accordance with the absolute, and as it seems to the extravagent, application of abstract precepts taken from the mouth of the Prophet. Their Lordships have endeavoured to the best of their ability to ascertain and apply the Mahomedan law as known and administered in India; but they cannot find that it is in accordance with the absolute, and as it seems to the extravagent, application of abstract precepts taken from the mouth of the Prophet. Those precepts may be excellent in their proper application. They may, for ought their Lordships know, have had their effect in moulding the law and practice of wakf, as the learned Judge says they have. But it would be doing wrong to the great law giver to suppose that he is thereby commending gifts for which the donor exercises no self denial; in which he takes back with one hand what be appears to put away with the other; which are to form the entre of attraction for accumulations of income and further accessions of family property; which carefully protect so-called managers from being called to account; which seek to give to the donors and their family the enjoyment of property free from all liability to creditors; and which do not seek the benefit of others beyond the use of empty words." 31. The aforesaid judgment resulted in the introduction of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913 (VI of 1913). The concept of charity as embodied in the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council in Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak's case was again affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan & Ors. v. State of West Bengal and others: AIR 1965 SC 1722 at page 1727. It will be of academic interest to quote paragraphs 11 and 12 of that decision. 11. Now it is a matter of legal history that wakfs in which the benefits to charity or religion were either illusory or postponed indefinitely, while the property so dedicated was being enjoyed from generation to generation by the family of the wakif, were regarded as opposed to the rule against perpetuities as contained in the Indian Succession and the Transfer of Property Acts. This was so declared in a succession of cases by the Judicial Committee and the opinion of Ameer Ali expressed in his Tagore Lectures as well as in Meer Mahomed lsrail Khan v. Shasti Churn Ghose, I.L.R. 19 Cal. 412 and Bikani Mia v. Suklal Poddar. I.L.R. 20 Cal. 116 (FB), was not accepted. This was so declared in a succession of cases by the Judicial Committee and the opinion of Ameer Ali expressed in his Tagore Lectures as well as in Meer Mahomed lsrail Khan v. Shasti Churn Ghose, I.L.R. 19 Cal. 412 and Bikani Mia v. Suklal Poddar. I.L.R. 20 Cal. 116 (FB), was not accepted. These cases are referred to in the three opinions in the High Court and most important of them is of Abul Fata Mohomed Ishak v. Rasamaya Dhur Chowdhry; 22 Ind. App. 76 (PC). In that case Lord Hobhouse, while emphasising that Mahomedan Law ought to govern a purely Mahomedan disposition, declined to hold that disposition in which the benefit was really intended to go to the wakif and his family could be described as charity even under that law. Speaking of the precept above quoted by us Lord Hobhouse observed: 'it would be doing wrong to the great lawgiver to suppose that he is thereby commending gifts for which the donor exercises no self-denial ; in which he takes back with one hand what he appears to put a way with the others; which are to form the centre of attraction for accumulations of income and further accessions of family property ; which carefully protected socalled managers from being called to account ; which seek to give to the donors and their family the enjoyment of property free from all liability to creditors; and which do not seek the benefit of others beyond the use of empty words. Similar observations were made by Lord Hobhouse in Mahomed Ahsanulla v. Amarchand Kundu, L.R. 27 Ind. App. 28 (PC) and by Lord Watson in Abdul Gafur v. Nizamudin, 19 Iud. App. 170 (PC), in earlier cases." 31. These cases led to agitation in India and the Musalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913 (VI of 1913) was passed. It declared the rights of Musalmans to make settlements of property by way of wakf in favour of their families, children and descendants. For the purposes of the Validating Act the term 'wakf' was defined to mean the permanent dedication by a person professing the Musalman faith of any property for any purpose recognied by the Musalman law as religious, pious or charitable. For the purposes of the Validating Act the term 'wakf' was defined to mean the permanent dedication by a person professing the Musalman faith of any property for any purpose recognied by the Musalman law as religious, pious or charitable. This gave a wider meaning to the word 'wakf' but only for the purpose of taking them out of the invalidity which would have otherwise existed and which was already authoritatively stated to have so existed. 32. The effect of these two decisions, by which wakf for the aggrandisement for the family was removed from classification of charitable endowments, was, however, as I have stated above, mitigated by the Wakf Validating Act, 1913, and, therefore, whatever may be the distinction left on the basis of the aforesaid decisions completely disappeared for the purpose of supervision and control by the introduction of the various wakfs laws in independent India and thus there was no difference between the various types of wakfs as far as they relate to the supervision and control by the Kazi and -the District Judge in the past and the Wakfs Board in Bihar, including the exercise of power under section 36C of the Act by it under the relevant Wakfs Act. It may be that while exercising supervision and control and power u/s 36C over a wakf burely for charitable purpose the interest of the public at large has to be kept in mind and in the case of 'wakf-alal-aulad' the interest of the beneficiaries present and these who come in future within that description have to be of prime consideration, yet the control is similar and the supervision, identical Needless to say that the Board while exercising the supervision and control u/s power 36C has to keep in mind that the wakfs are so administered as to sub-serve the interest of the public in general in charitable wakf and beneficiaries of 'wakf-alal-aulud' in existence and those who come in future. 33. Summing up, I am definitely of the view that the distinction made between the two types of wakfs for the application of section 36C of the Act is entirely untenable, with these words I am entirely in agreement with Hon'ble the Chief Justice.