Judgment :- 1. In this second appeal filed by the plaintiff the substantial question of law to be considered is whether a decree which has become final and conclusive between the parties could be reopened on the basis of a decision rendered subsequently interpreting the legal position in a different manner. 2. In the suit for redemption a preliminary decree was passed on 30-3-1967. Final decree application filed subsequently by the plaintiff was dismissed on 25-8-1971 accepting the contention of the defendants that they are entitled to fixity of tenure under the Kerala Land Reforms Act as amended by Act 35 of 1969. That decision was rendered on the basis of the relevant legal provisions interpreted in the decisions in Jagthamma v. Raghavan Pillai (1970 KLT 469) and Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (1971 KLT 216 (FB). The decision was not appealed against and hence it has become final and conclusive between the parties. The above decisions were subsequently overruled by the decision in Velayudhan Vivekanandan v. Ayyappan Sadasivan (1975 KLT 1 (FB). On the basis of that decision plaintiff moved a fresh application for passing final decree on the ground that defendants are not entitled to tenancy right as per the law subsequently interpreted. That application was dismissed on the ground of res judicata on account of the previous decision which has become final between the parties. Appeal was also dismissed and hence the plaintiff has come up in second appeal. 3. According to the counsel the earlier decision was erroneous on the relevant point of law and hence it cannot be deemed to have finally determined the question and the decision cannot operate as res judicata. I do not think I could accept that argument. S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure embodies the doctrine of res judicata or the rule of collusiveness of decisions, as to the points decided, in every subsequent suit between the same parties. It corresponds to what is known as estoppel by judgment in English Law. It is intended to avoid superfluous suits. Though it is one of convenience and rest and not of absolute justice, it concerns the State that there should be finality to law suits and no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause. It corresponds to what is known as estoppel by judgment in English Law. It is intended to avoid superfluous suits. Though it is one of convenience and rest and not of absolute justice, it concerns the State that there should be finality to law suits and no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause. The rule is intended not only to prevent a new decision but also to prevent a new investigation so that the same person cannot be harassed again and again in various proceedings upon the same question. By the amendment Act of 1976 the provisions were extended to proceedings for execution of decrees as well as decisions by courts of limited jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that such court was not competent to try the subsequent suit. The section does not create any right or interest in property but only operates as a personal bar. The Section does not compel the court trying the later case to hold that the previous decision is correct. A court having jurisdiction is entitled to decide rightly or wrongly. An erroneous decision by a competent court having jurisdiction will be as much res judicata as a correct decision. Remedy lies only by way of appeal, revision, review or any other process allowed by law. When none of these remedies are resorted to and an erroneous decision is allowed to become final and conclusive it will definitely operate as res judicata in subsequent suits. A decision will not cease to be res judicata merely because the view of the law on which it is based ceased to represent the correct law owing to a later judicial pronouncement. The general principles of res judicata are based firstly on public policy and secondly on private justice. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant cited three decisions before me to upport his argument that the earlier dismissal of the final decree application will not be res judicata in view of the fact that the decisions relied on by the court to rest its order were superseded by a subsequent decision which interpreted the law otherwise. In Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and others v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy (AIR 1971 SC 2355) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court said: A question relating to jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of that Court. In Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and others v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy (AIR 1971 SC 2355) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court said: A question relating to jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of that Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise, because if those decisions are considered as conclusive, it will assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the legislature." 5. Pandurang v. M.R.T. Nagpur (AIR 1974 Bombay 20) laid down the law as under: "Whenever the law is changed or an error in its interpretation has been declared by Court in the same or subsequent proceedings the prior erroneous decision unrelated to facts of the case but depedient only on interpretation of law cannot constitute res judicata at subsequent stage even in the same proceeding. An interpretation of S.38(7) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1958 which was made in the earlier High Court decision (AIR 1966 Bom 194) was merely alluded to and the case was remanded by the High Court. When the matter came up before it again by way of writ petition, the said decision was already overruled by Full Bench decision in AIR 1970 Bom 232 (FB). The earlier remand order could not be treated as res judicata for the purpose of the present writ petition because the order of remand was unrelated to facts of the case and was only made because of the erroneous view of tenability of application by virtue of S.38(7) as expressed in the overruled decision. Therefore since the tenant was covered under S.38 (7) application to evict him was not maintainable as declared by the Full Bench case referred to above " 6. Therefore since the tenant was covered under S.38 (7) application to evict him was not maintainable as declared by the Full Bench case referred to above " 6. Palaniappa Chettiar v. Parvathi Bai (AIR 1972 Madras 52) discussed the law thus: "where in view of a decision by the High Court that eviction of tenant of a vacant site comes within the provisions of a Rent Control Act, the proceedings for eviction of tenant are initiated before a Rent Controller but the decision is overruled by subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, the tenant can raise a plea in those proceedings that in view of the subsequent contrary decision by the Supreme Court the decision of the High Court is erroneous and hence the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to evict him. The High Court decision does not operate as a bar on principles of res judicata". 7. I do not think that any of these decisions will help the position canvassed by the appellant. Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and others v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy (AIR 1971 SC 2355) is a case in which an application for fixation of standard rent was first dismissed by the civil judge holding that the Act did not apply to such land. That decision was confirmed by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. But the view expressed in that decision was overruled by a later decision on the basis of which a fresh petition was filed by the party for determining standard rent. The decision was rendered in that case. It was in such a case that the Supreme Court held that: "But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure, it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby." What was claimed to be res judicata in that case was an erroneous decision inter parties regarding jurisdiction of a court to entertain an application for determination of standard rent. Such a decision regarding jurisdiction has not decided any question of fact or mixed question of fact and law and relating to the right in dispute between the parties Such a decision on a question of jurisdiction alone was subsequently held to be wrong and overruled in a later decision which was not inter parties. That later decision laid down the law regarding jurisdiction correctly. Therefore the same party again moved for the same relief in the same court and what was decided was only that the earlier decision unconnected with any question of law or fact relating to the right in dispute between the parties and relating to jurisdiction alone cannot operate as res judicata. If that decision is held to be res judicata between the parties the position will be that as between chose parties the court will not have jurisdiction whereas in all other identical cases the court will have jurisdiction. That will be an anomalous position and a wrong decision on jurisdiction alone cannot oust jurisdiction. Here in this case what we are concerned with is a decision disposing of the suit finally holding that applying the provisions of law as then stood the particular transaction involved in the case creates a tenancy. That is a decision on a mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties. A decision of a competent court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties: the "matter in issue" may be an issue of fact or an issue of mixed fact and law or an issue of law alone. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata; the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A matter in issue is a right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. A matter in issue is a right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. It was so held in the same decision and that is the difference between that case and the present one. 8. When we say that a previous decision is res judicata what is meant is that the right claimed has already been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the parties. A decision on an issue of law will be res judicata in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties if the cause of action in the subsequent proceedings is the same as in the previous one, but not when the cause of action is different. So also in such a case the position will be different if the law has since the earlier decision been changed by a competent authority. When the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties in a subsequent suit. In such a case the matter in issue in the subsequent proceedings is not the same because the law interpreted is different. Anyhow a question of jurisdiction of the court or of a procedure or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of parties cannot be res judicata. The object of this doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten special principles of law upon parties as applicable to them inter se, but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which those rights depend; and to prevent such ascertainment from becoming nugatory. This is all what AIR 1971 SC 2355 (supra) decided. In the case in hand the suit was finally disposed of by the impugned order dismissing the final decree application. The fact in issue in deciding the final decree application was whether the plaintiff was entitled to redeem and recover possession or not. This fact in issue arose on the contention of the defendants that they are entitled to fixity of tenure on the basis of the transaction which was the subject matter of that suit. The fact in issue in deciding the final decree application was whether the plaintiff was entitled to redeem and recover possession or not. This fact in issue arose on the contention of the defendants that they are entitled to fixity of tenure on the basis of the transaction which was the subject matter of that suit. Applying the provisions of law to the facts in dispute covered by the pleadings and the materials on record the court found that the transaction evidences a tenancy by which the defendants are entitled to fixity of tenure and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to redeem and recover possession. That decision finally determined the question in issue between the parties and disposed of the suit and the decision has become final and conclusive in the sense that it cannot be challenged by any method allowed by law. Under such a situation even if the law as interpreted in Velayudhan v. Vivekanandan's case (1975 KLT 1) is capable of deciding the question of tenancy in favour of the plaintiff that is no reason to reopen the decree which has become final and conclusive between the parties. If such an interpretation is given the position will be really anomalous. The very purpose of S.11 will ' thereby be frustrated. The result will be that there will be no finality to law suits and each and every change of law by judicial interpretation or otherwise will have the effect of reopening decisions which have otherwise become final. That is not the position of law. The other two decisions, Pandurang's case (AIR 1974 Bombay 20) and Palaniappa Chettiar's case (AIR 1972 Madras 52), also did not lay down the law in any way to suit the contention of the appellant. 9. An incorrect decision cannot be equated with a decision rendered without jurisdiction. A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review, which the law provides. The fact that the decision was on the merits erroneous as seen from a later decision of a superior court or a Bench does not render it any less final and binding between the parties before court (State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar (AIR 1966 SC 1061). The fact that the decision was on the merits erroneous as seen from a later decision of a superior court or a Bench does not render it any less final and binding between the parties before court (State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar (AIR 1966 SC 1061). The same view was held by the Madras High Court in the decision in Nagoor Rowther v. Abdul Rahim (AIR 1973 Madras 360). It is not necessary to add authorities and hence I am not referring to the other decisions cited before me. The suit was finally disposed of by an order binding on the parties and settling their rights. That has become final. The second application for final decree has no legs to stand. Trial court and the appellate court rightly dismissed the application as barred by res judicata. Second Appeal is dismissed with costs.