S. C. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THE facts giving rise to this civil revision are as follows :- on 14-5-1966, Sadhavani Patrani obtained a decree for recovery of possession of a double storied building in Jeypore town. She executed the decree in Execution Proceeding No. 35 of 1966. During its pendency, she expired on 20-11-1968. The petitioner filed an application on 7-1-1969 to be substituted in place of the deceased decree-holder as her legal representative alleging that Sadhavani executed a Will in his favour and registered it on 23-12-1959 and a Codicil on 25-9-1967 apart from adopting him as a son. The judgement debtors objected to the said application. Enquiry was conducted on the application of the petitioner and one witness was examined on commission. At the stage the objection of the judgement-debtors that they are real successors was directed by order dated 16-1-1970 to be registered as a Misc. Case under S. 47, C. P. C. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows :-". . . . . BE that as it may, as rightly contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner, there appears to be mixed question of law and fact and since the effect of any order regarding the objection being fairly contended by the learned advocate for the J. Dr. to have the force and effect of order under S. 47, C. P. C. it is proper to register as a Misc. Case under S. 47 as prayed by the petitioner and to treat the evidence already recorded to be the evidence for all purposes of the Misc. Case. Hence that the petition of the J. Dr. be registered as a Misc. Case and that the evidence recorded be treated as the evidence for all purposes of this Misc. Case. . . . . . . "the objection was accordingly, registered as M. J. C. No. 2 of 1970. It was dismissed for default on 29-7-1972. The Execution Proceeding was, therefore, required to proceed from the stage where it was left, i. e. , enquiry on the question of legal representative of the deceased decree-holder. After various dates, by order dated 7-1-1976 the Executing Court directed enquiry into the application of the petitioner dated 7-1-1969. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows :-"now as the facts stand the counter which was filed by the J. Dr. After various dates, by order dated 7-1-1976 the Executing Court directed enquiry into the application of the petitioner dated 7-1-1969. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows :-"now as the facts stand the counter which was filed by the J. Dr. to the petition of Sarat Chandra Patra for adding him as L. R. has been dismissed for default, and therefore, the petition dated 7-1-1969 filed by Sarat Chandra Patra is still open for consideration. . . . . . "the application was posted for enquiry being an application in the Execution Case. On 30-4-1979, the case was posted for hearing to 21-6-1979. However, the order-sheet reveals that M. J. C. No. 2 of 1970 was so posted. On 26-10-1979, the applications of both the parties for adjournment were rejected and M. J. C. No. 2 of 1970 was dismissed for default of the Petitioner. Thereafter, on 4-2-1980, the petitioner filed an application to recall the order dated 26-10-1979 and to permit him to continue and proceed with the execution proceeding. By order dated 16-3-1981, the petition having been dismissed, petitioner preferred an appeal which has also been dismissed giving rise to this civil revision. ( 2 ) IN both the forums it was not disputed that the application of the petitioner dated 7-1-1969 was registered as M. J. C. No. 2 of 1970 which is a wrong admission on the face of it. The Executing Court held that the petition dated 7-1-1969 was wrongly directed to be registered as a Misc. Case. This inference is contrary to the fact borne out from the record. On merits the Executing Court held that since the said Misc. Case was dismissed for default and no steps have been taken by the petitioner for restoration of the same, according to law the order of dismissal passed cannot be recalled on the basis of application dated 4-2-1980. The further ground of dismissal was that the Will having been registered at Jeypore in respect of the property in Jeypore which was at one time within the jurisdiction of Madras High Court, the petitioner cannot establish his right as a legatee unless the Will and Codicil are probated. The further ground of dismissal was that the Will having been registered at Jeypore in respect of the property in Jeypore which was at one time within the jurisdiction of Madras High Court, the petitioner cannot establish his right as a legatee unless the Will and Codicil are probated. The third ground of dismissal was that the interest of the decree-holder not having been transferred by assignment in favour of the petitioner, he cannot be allowed to continue and proceed with the Execution Case after death of the deceased on the language of O. 21, R. 16, C. P. C. The appellate Court found that the application of the petitioner in 1969 for being substituted as legal representative of the deceased decree-holder on the strength of a will of the deceased was registered as M. J. C. No. 2 of 1970 as per order No. 63 dated 16-1-1970 as one under S. 47, C. P. C. and it was dismissed for default on 26-10-1979. It held the appeal not to be maintainable. The relevant portions of the appellate order are extracted below :"the appellant had not gone against that order of dismissal passed in M. J. C. 2/70 on 26-10-1979. 12 years had passed from the date of decree by 14-5-1978 and before the expiry of that time, the decree-holder had died. His petition dated 4-2-1980 for proceeding with the E. P. was an independent one on the ground that the E. P. had not been dismissed with the death of the decree-holder on 20-11-1978. The ground under the circumstances is not acceptable inasmuch as his said application had come more than 12 years after the period for execution of decree had lapsed. Further to his application the amended C. P. C. will apply since he had not connected it with the earlier case which he had instituted under S. 47, C. P. C. His said petition dated 4-2-1980 was one under O. 21, R. 16, read with S. 146, C. P. C. as he said. Any order passed thereunder in such a proceeding is not appealable under any of the provisions of O. 43, C. P. C. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the appeal is not maintainable in this Court against the impugned order. " ( 3 ) MR. Any order passed thereunder in such a proceeding is not appealable under any of the provisions of O. 43, C. P. C. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the appeal is not maintainable in this Court against the impugned order. " ( 3 ) MR. Y. S. N. Murty, the learned counsel for the opposite parties (judgement-debtors) submitted that the civil revision has been filed against the appellate order wherein it was held that the appeal was not maintainable. Hence, the correctness of that question is only available to be raised. Mr. B. B. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand, submitted that an appeal against the order of the Executing Court rejecting the application dated 4-2-1980 was maintainable. ( 4 ) APPEAL is a creature of the statute. Unless provided for, no party has a right of appeal. Therefore, I called upon Mr. Mohanty to support his submission that an appeal was maintainable. Initially he submitted that the application to recall the order was in effect an application under O. 9, R. 9, C. P. C. and order rejecting restoration would be appealable under O. 43, R. 1 (c), C. P. C. Since O. 9 has no application directly to execution proceedings, he took the help of S. 141, C. P. C. Mr. Murty relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1962 SC 1886 (Bhushayya D. v. Ramakrishnayya K.) and submitted that S. 141 has no application to an Execution Proceeding. Considering the said decision this Court in a decision reported in ILR (1964) Cut 958; (Ganga Devi v. Krushna Prasad Sharma) at p. 964 observed :". . There is, therefore, no dispute over the proposition that on the strength of S. 141, Civil Procedure Code, the Procedure provided in Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to execution proceeding. "therefore, the submission of Mr. B. B. Mohanty that the order being one under O. 9, R. 9, C. P. C. is appealable has no merit. O. 9, C. P. C. has no application to execution proceeding. ( 5 ) MR. "therefore, the submission of Mr. B. B. Mohanty that the order being one under O. 9, R. 9, C. P. C. is appealable has no merit. O. 9, C. P. C. has no application to execution proceeding. ( 5 ) MR. B. B. Mohanty thereafter submitted that the application dated 4-2-1980 can be treated to be one under O. 22, R. 10, C. P. C. and an order refusing to give leave is appealable under O. 43, R. 1 (1), C. P. C. He relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1955 SC 376 (Jugal Kishore Saraf v. M/s. Rao Cotton Co. Ltd. ). In the said decision it was held that O. 21, R. 16, C. P. C. would have no application to a transfer of the property since the language thereof clearly indicates that decree is envisaged to have been transferred. This decision has been relied upon in AIR 1958 SC 394 (Sm. Saila Bala Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi) and in AIR 1969 SC 73 (Loon Karan Sethia v. Ivan E. John ). Thus, O. 22, R. 10, C. P. C. is not applicable in terms though the application can be one under S. 146, C. P. C. There being no provision for appeal against an order under S. 146, C. P. C the appeal is not maintainable. Accordingly, this contention of Mr. B. B. Mohanty also fails. Failing in both the contentions, Mr. B. B. Mohanty filed an application to entertain the objection against, the original order of the Executing Court and to allow the petitioner to continue the Execution Case. Suo motu power of revision is provided for under S. 115, C. P. C. The entire proceeding was continued with confusion. The legislative intention is that a decree-holder ought to get the fruits of the decree early so that the judgement-debtor who has been vanquished in the right is not permitted to enjoy the fruit of the wrongful act for long. In case I do not entertain the revision to examine the correctness of the original order a wrongdoer will continue to enjoy the fruits of his wrong. On the other hand, law of limitation is provided to keep the litigants alert. Therefore, it may not be correct to assist a party who is not vigilant. Between the horns of a dilemma of the two evils a lesser evil is to be chosen. On the other hand, law of limitation is provided to keep the litigants alert. Therefore, it may not be correct to assist a party who is not vigilant. Between the horns of a dilemma of the two evils a lesser evil is to be chosen. In my opinion, the lesser evil would be to consider the correctness of the order rejecting an application than permitting a vanquished party to enjoy the fruits of the wrong for long. ( 6 ) THE Execution Proceeding is pending. Therefore, wrong possession of a judgement-debtor would not give him any right. The chance of losing the right to be in possession of the property for further period can be mitigated if costs are paid to the judgement-debtor. In this background let me examine the correctness of the order on the application dated 4-2-1980. As I have already stated, the parties as well as the Courts were under the wrong impression that the application dated 7-1-1969 was registered as Misc. Case No. 2 of 1970. Under confusion by order dated 26-10-1979, M. J. C. No. 2 of 1970 was dismissed for default. Four months after the present application has been filed to recall the said order. The executing Court has not considered if the application can be treated as an independent application, since the effect of dismissal of the earlier application for default has not been taken into consideration. The Executing court has also not considered the cause of delay for filing the application dated 4-2-1980, even if it is treated to be an application for restoration of the earlier application. The Executing Court without dismissing the application dated 7-1-1969 for default could have considered the application on merit since there was already evidence on record. " Mr. Y. S. N. Murty, relied upon two decisions of this Court reported in (1986) 62 Cut LT 178 (Naka Dandu v. Sodi Savitri and (1985) 1 Orissa LR 156 (Govinda Chandra Tripathy v. Pal Hira Purchase Ltd.) to submit that there is no scope for exercise of inherent power in an execution proceeding. In (1986) 62 Cut LT 178 (supra) specific provision was there under O. 21, C. P. C. for which S. 151 was not made applicable. In the decision reported in (1985) 1 Orissa LR 156 (supra) there was also specific provision for which S. 151, C. P. C. was not applicable. In (1986) 62 Cut LT 178 (supra) specific provision was there under O. 21, C. P. C. for which S. 151 was not made applicable. In the decision reported in (1985) 1 Orissa LR 156 (supra) there was also specific provision for which S. 151, C. P. C. was not applicable. In the present case if it is found that specific provision would be there S. 151 would not be applicable. If, however, there would be no specific provision the right of a party cannot be defeated which is sought to be protected under S. 151, C. P. C. On the aforesaid discussion, I am satisfied that the order of the executing court is liable to be set aside to give a chance to the petitioner to agitate the question afresh. The prejudice caused to the judgement-debtors can be mitigated by payment of compensation of Rs. 500/- (rupees five hundred ). ( 7 ) IN the result, the civil revision is allowed and the impugned order of the Executing Court is set aside. Subject to payment of Rs. 500/- as costs to the judgement debtors by the petitioner on or before 1-12-1986 on which date both parties shall appear before the Executing Court for fixing a date of hearing of the application dated 4-2-1980 being satisfied that the condition has been satisfied. There shall be no order as to costs in this civil revision. Revision allowed. .