Judgment :- 1. These appeals arise from the common order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Palghat in Arb. O.P. Nos. 4 and 5 of 1980. The Food Corporation of India is the appellant in M.F.A. Nos. 118 and 128 of 1982. It challenges the order of the learned judge dismissing its application to set aside the award and allowing the respondent's application to make the award a rule of court. 2. The appellant (the "Corporation") and the respondent (the "Contractor") entered into an agreement in writing No. F4 (9)/75 dated 10-4-1975 for loading, unloading, handling, transporting, etc. of goods belonging to the Corporation. The period of the contract was originally stipulated to be from 12-4-1975 to 11-7-1975, with a provision for extension upto one year. The period was accordingly extended from 12-7-1975 to 11-7-1976 upon the terms and conditions contained in the contract dated 10-4-1975. The contract refers to the place of operation as the area comprised within a radius of 15 K.M. from the Olavakod Railway Station. It briefly describes the work which the Contractor was expected to carry out. Clause.19 is the arbitration clause providing for reference to a sole Arbitrator, appointed by the Managing Director of the Corporation, of disputes and differences arising out of or in any way touching or concerning the contract. Clause.15 provides for reference to arbitration in respect of disputes arising outside the contract which the parties were not in a position to settle by negotiations. Appendix VI contains the schedule of rates in respect of various items of work which the Contractor was expected to carry out in the event of his being called upon to do so during the period of contract. As per the agreement the Contractor is entitled to be paid at 350 per cent over and above the prescribed scheduled rates. There is no complaint that the Contractor was not so paid. The complaint of the Contractor at all material times was that he was not paid rates in excess of the agreed rates, i.e., in addition to the said 350 per cent over the prescribed rates. 3. After the original contract expired at the end of the extended period, that is on 11-7-1976, the parties entered into a fresh contract in writing, that is, agreement No. F2/14/75 dated 15-7-1976. This agreement contains several terms which are more favourable to the Contractor. The rates are revised. 3. After the original contract expired at the end of the extended period, that is on 11-7-1976, the parties entered into a fresh contract in writing, that is, agreement No. F2/14/75 dated 15-7-1976. This agreement contains several terms which are more favourable to the Contractor. The rates are revised. Other stipulations have been made. The Contractor is entitled to be paid at 626 per cent over the prescribed rates, which are different from those prescribed under the earlier contract. Here also the Contractor has no case that he was not so paid. The complaint of the Contractor is that he was not paid additional rates, that is, in excess of fee 626 percent over the prescribed rates under the second contract. 4. By letter dated 26-12-1975 the Contractor requested the Managing Director of the Corporation to refer to the arbitrator under Clause.19 of the agreement No. F4(9)/75 dated 10-4-1975 the disputes which arose between the parties in regard to claims arising under Clause.5(b) of the schedule of rates. That claim was for additional payment in excess of the stipulated rates for work done under Clause.5(b). The Contractor specified the disputes which he wanted the Corporation to refer in the following words: "(a) Whether the applicant is entitled to get loading and unloading charges while transporting food grain bags from Food Corporation of India godown to the Modern Rice Mill of the Food Corporation of India, Olavakkot. (b) Whether the Food Corporation of India have failed to fulfil the obligations on their part by providing work slips and payments thereby to the applicants and (c) to decide all the matters connected with the above said claims, as requested by the applicant." 5. On 26-7-1978 the Managing Director of the Corporation appointed the Arbitrator in respect of "certain disputes and differences in connection with contract No. F4(9)/75 dated 11-4-1975." We wish to emphasise that memorandum dated 26-7-1978 appointing the Arbitrator specifically refers to one and only one contract, that is the contract dated 11-4-1975. The Arbitrator was not therefore appointed in respect of any other contract. This is an aspect of the matter on which counsel for the appellant lays much stress and we shall presently revert to it. 6. The Arbitrator after hearing the parties made bis award dated 2-9-1980. It is a speaking award. The Arbitrator was not therefore appointed in respect of any other contract. This is an aspect of the matter on which counsel for the appellant lays much stress and we shall presently revert to it. 6. The Arbitrator after hearing the parties made bis award dated 2-9-1980. It is a speaking award. He himself says that the award is made "with reasons in brief." He specifically refers to S.70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and various decisions of Supreme Court under that Section. The legal principle underlying that Section has been made the basis of the award. He classifies the claims, amounting in total to R1. 4,52,154/ under beads (a) to (e). Claim (d) relating to salary and batta was rejected. Claims (a), (b) and (c) are claims for payment in excess of what had been paid by the Corporation in accordance with the stipulated rates, i.e., claims for payment over and above the stipulated percentage over the scheduled rates. Claim (e) is for interest which the Arbitrator awarded at six per cent instead of the claim at 18 percent. 7. The appellant's counsel Shri. Ravikumar in his extremely well prepared arguments makes two fundamental submissions which we think are indeed formidable. He submits that the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction and committed an error apparent on the face of the award in awarding rates in excess of what had been prescribed under the agreement. The Arbitrator, he points out, disregarded the principle stated by the Supreme Court in M/s. Alopi Parshad v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 588; K. P. Poulose v. State of Kerala, AIR 1975 SC 1259; Jivarajbhai v. Chintamanrao. AIR 1965 SC 214; Thawardas v. Union of India, AIR 1955 S.C 468; and Orissa Mining Corpn, v. P. V. Rawlley, AIR 1977 SC 2014, in so tar as he ignored the limits and bounds of the contract and awarded amounts as if the principle of quantum meruit was applicable, notwithstanding the terms expressly stipulated by the parties in their agreement. This principle, counsel says, the Arbitrator ignored, notwithstanding the specific objection filed by the appellant before the Arbitrator on this point. 8. Counsel is right, in our view, in pointing out that the contract contains specific provisions for payment for work specified thereunder. This principle, counsel says, the Arbitrator ignored, notwithstanding the specific objection filed by the appellant before the Arbitrator on this point. 8. Counsel is right, in our view, in pointing out that the contract contains specific provisions for payment for work specified thereunder. The parties having agreed upon those terms are bound by them, and the principle of quantum meruit, as embodied in S.70 of the Contract Act, has no application whatever. The Supreme Court stated in M/s. Alopi Parshad v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 588,595: "Compensation quantum merit is awarded for work done or services rendered, when the price thereof is not fixed by a contract. For work done or services rendered pursuant to the terms of a contract, compensation quantum merit cannot be awarded where the contract provides for the consideration payable in that behalf Quantum merit is but reasonable compensation awarded on implication of a contract to remunerate, and an express stipulation governing the relations between the parties under a contract, cannot be displaced by assuming that the stipulation is not reasonable" When a proposition of law is stated in the award as its basis, and that proposition is erroneous, the award is liable to be set aside or remitted on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the award: N. Chellappan v. KSEB AIR 1975 SC 230. 9. The arbitrator in resorting to the principle in S.70 of the Contract Act, as seen from the award, has not only committed an error apparent on the face of the award, but has acted in excess of his jurisdiction. There was no submission to him to resolve the dispute on the principle of S.70. The submission was specifically for resolution of the disputes in terms of the express provisions of the contract and not outside them. 10. The second submission of Shri. Ravikumar is equally formidable. He points out that the arbitrator was appointed in respect of disputes which arose under contract No. F 4 (9)/ 75 dated 11-4-1975. But the claims and the award admittedly included those in relation to the subsequent con tract No. F2/14/75 dated 15-7-1976. That contract was not referred to in the memorandum of the Corporation appointing the arbitrator. Nor bad it been referred to by the Contractor himself in his letter dated 26-12-1975 requesting the Corporation to appoint an arbitrator. But the claims and the award admittedly included those in relation to the subsequent con tract No. F2/14/75 dated 15-7-1976. That contract was not referred to in the memorandum of the Corporation appointing the arbitrator. Nor bad it been referred to by the Contractor himself in his letter dated 26-12-1975 requesting the Corporation to appoint an arbitrator. At no time had any request been made by the Contractor in respect of the disputes arising under the subsequent contract dated 15-7-1976. At no time had the Corporation appointed an arbitrator in respect of that contract. The Corporation raised objections before the arbitrator as regards bis jurisdiction to deal with the claims arising under the second contract dated 15-7-1976. Nevertheless, the arbitrator made the award in respect of claims admittedly arising both under the first contract and the second contract. The composite award taking in claims under a contract which bad not been referred to him is thus vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the award. It is also vitiated for the reason that the arbitrator travelled far outside the field of reference and thus exceeded his jurisdiction. In this connection the observation of the Supreme Court in M/s. Alopi Parshad v. Union of India. AIR 1960 S.C. 588,593 is apposite: "Granting that the Agents had incurred this additional expenditure under the head 'establishment and contingencies' when the contract expressly stipulated for payment of charges at rates specified therein, we fail to appreciate, on what ground, the arbitrators could ignore the express covenants between the parties, and award to the Agents amounts which the Union of India had not agreed to pay to the Agents. The award of the arbitrators, awarding additional expenses under the head of establishment and contingencies, together with interest thereon, is on the face of it erroneous It 11. For these reasons we agree with the appellant's counsel that the award ought to have been set aside by the court below. 12. As we stated earlier, the second agreement dated 15-7-1976 contains stipulations more favourable to the Contractor. The Contractor perhaps has a valid claim, if properly agitated before the appropriate forum without undue delay, in respect of the second contract. We do not of course express any view on that aspect. 12. As we stated earlier, the second agreement dated 15-7-1976 contains stipulations more favourable to the Contractor. The Contractor perhaps has a valid claim, if properly agitated before the appropriate forum without undue delay, in respect of the second contract. We do not of course express any view on that aspect. All that we say is that the Contractor was totally misguided in not specifically asking f or a reference respecting claims arising under the second contract. The contract limits the time for making a request for the appointment of an arbitrator to one year. Nevertheless we have no doubt that, should a request be made by the Contractor to refer the disputes arising under the second contract (No. F2/14/75 dated 15-7-1976) such request would be favourably considered by the Corporation by condoning the delay in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. 13. M.F.A. Nos. 225 and 228 of 1982 are the Contractor's appeals against the order of the court below setting aside the award in respect of interest. The Contractor claimed interest at 18 percent, whereas the arbitrator awarded interest at six per cent. The court below found that the contract did not contain any provision for payment of interest. The court accordingly set aside the award in respect of interest. That was, in our view, a correct decision. 14. In the circumstances we set aside the order of the court below, except in so far as it relates to interest. Accordingly M. F. A. Nos. 118 and 128 of 1982 are allowed with coats. M.F.A. No. 225 and 228 of 1982 are dismissed without any order as to costs. The learned counsel for the respondent in M. F. A. Nos. 118 and 128 of 1982 and for the appellant in M.F.A. Nos. 225 and 228 of 1982 makes an oral application under Art.134A of the Constitution of India for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In our view, these cases do not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The leave sought is accordingly refused. Leave Refused.