JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - Two orders have been challenged in this petition one dated 5-12-84 passed by the State Government remitting an industrial award to the Labour Court for reconsideration in the purported exercise of power under S. 6(4) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter Referred to as the Act) and the other dated 16-8-85 whereby the State Government transferred the proceedings which were commenced consequent upon the first order from the Labour Court, Meerut to the Industrial Tribunal-V Meerut, under S. 6-G of the Act. 2. The facts relevant for the decision of this petition are these. The petitioner claims to be workman within the meaning of the aforesaid Act having been employed by Messrs. Electra (India) Ltd., the respondent 5 herein. The said respondent terminated the services of the petitioner by an order dated 4-4-77 whereupon a dispute was raised by the petitioner which gave rise to a reference by the State Government by an order dated 5-5-79 under S. 4K of the Act for the adjudication of the Labour Court, Meerut. The Labour Court answered the reference by an award dated 2-3-84 in favour of the petitioner and against the Management holding that the termination of the petitioner's services was null and void and directing the reinstatement of the petitioner with the benefit of backwages. In between the Management had sought to raise a preliminary objection and brought the matter to this Court by way of a petition but without any success. The said award was sent to the State Government for publication under S. 6(3) of the Act. Before, however, the award could be published the State Government remitted the award for reconsideration of the Labour Court in the purported exercise of powers under S. 6(4) by an order dated 5-12-84. Both the parties participated in the proceedings. Subsequently the Management moved an application dated 25-3-85 before the State Government with a request that the proceedings be transferred from the Labour Court, Meerut to another Court as it did not expect justice and fair hearing from that Court. The petitioner filed an objection against the same asserting that the application filed by the Management was devoid of any substance and was yet another device to delay the disposal of the case. The comments of the Presiding Officer were also invited by the State Government upon the application of the Management. The petitioner filed an objection against the same asserting that the application filed by the Management was devoid of any substance and was yet another device to delay the disposal of the case. The comments of the Presiding Officer were also invited by the State Government upon the application of the Management. A true copy of the comments dated 12-4-85 is Annexure `8' to the petition. Thereafter the State Government passed an order on 16-8-85 transferring the case from the Labour Court, Meerut to the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut. The first order dated 5-12-84 passed by the State Government remitting the award was assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the State Government had no power to remit the award under S. 6(4) beyond 30 days from the date of the receipt by the State Government of the award from the Labour Court. 3. The submission is devoid of any substance. In the first place, there is no material whatever on the record which might substantiate the claim of the petitioner that the award was remitted by the State Government beyond 30 days from the date of its receipt by it. The date of the receipt of the award by the State Government has not been disclosed by the petitioner either in the petition or even in the rejoinder affidavit. Secondly, in our considered view the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of S. 6 are not hedged in or restricted by sub-sec. (3) of S. 6. Indeed sub-sec. (3) of S. 6 which provides that the State Government shall publish the award of a Labour Court within 30 days from the date of its receipt has been made specifically subject to sub-sec. (4) of S. 6. The only limitation which has been placed by the legislature on the power of the State Government to remit an award of a Labour Court or Tribunal is that it should be exercised before the publication of the award. That this is so is borne out by the plain language of S. 6(4) which is unambiguous. This conclusion is further fortified by Section 6A of the Act which provides that an award shall become enforceable only on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under S. 6. Before the publication of the award it is not enforceable. This conclusion is further fortified by Section 6A of the Act which provides that an award shall become enforceable only on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under S. 6. Before the publication of the award it is not enforceable. The State Government is hence free to remit the award for reconsideration before it is published. The view that we have expressed above is fully supported by a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1978 All LJ 1118 in the case of V.E. Thomas v. State of U.P.. In that case also it was argued that the State Government was bound to take a decision under S. 6(4) within 30 days of the receipt of the award. Repelling the submission, the Bench observed : "On a plain reading of Section 6(4) we find no justification to uphold the petitioner's contention. Section 6(3) no doubt, requires the State Government to publish award of the Labour Court or Tribunal within a period of 30 days from the date of its receipt but this provision is subject to sub-section (4) which confers power on the State Government to remit the award for reconsideration of the adjudicating Authority. S. 6(4) does not prescribe any period of limitation of 30 days for the exercise of the power to remit the award for reconsideration to the Adjudicating Authority." 4. With respect, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view expressed in the above decision. This disposes of the challenge to the first order passed by the State Government on 5-12-1984. 5. The order of transfer dated 16-8-85 was assailed by the petitioner's counsel on two grounds. First, that the order dated 5-12-84 remitting the award itself being bad in law the subsequent order of transfer is also liable to be struck down for the reasons mentioned above. Second that the State Government has not exercised the power of transfer vested in it under S. 6-G of the Act on relevant and valid grounds. So far as the first ground of challenge to the order of transfer is concerned the same has already been dealt with above and it is not necessary to repeat our comments in respect thereto. 6. We, however, find considerable force in the second ground of attack. So far as the first ground of challenge to the order of transfer is concerned the same has already been dealt with above and it is not necessary to repeat our comments in respect thereto. 6. We, however, find considerable force in the second ground of attack. The sole ground on which the State Government has transferred the proceedings from the Labour Court is that the Labour Court was not justified in postponing the consideration of the application dated 7-2-85 moved on behalf of the Management for adducing fresh evidence to some future date. The State Government has observed that this order of the Labour Court was likely to give rise to an apprehension in the mind of the Management that it would not receive justice from that Court. In our opinion, the above ground is entirely untenable and unjustified. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Management along with their application moved before the State Government for the transfer of the case all that was stated in support of their allegation that they did not expect justice and fair hearing from the Labour Court was that an application was moved on its behalf before the Labour Court for filing fresh documentary evidence on the date fixed, viz., 7-2-85 but the Labour Court did not allow the Management to file those documents. In the comments submitted by the Presiding Officer, a true copy whereof is annexure 8 to the petition. It has been stated that the case was first taken up after it was remitted by the State Government on 9-1-85 on which date it was adjourned at the instance of the Management to 1-2-85. Thereafter it was got adjourned to 7-2-85. On 7-2-85 again the Management applied for adjournment whereupon the case was adjourned to 11-3-85 for hearing. In the application for adjournment dated 7-2-85 it was also prayed by the Management that they be granted opportunity to adduce fresh evidence. The Presiding Officer passed an order stating that the question of adducing fresh evidence shall be considered later at an appropriate stage and that the occasion for accepting fresh evidence had not yet arrived. He has also observed in his comments that on 11-3-85 the Management did not press their request for adducing fresh evidence. The Presiding Officer passed an order stating that the question of adducing fresh evidence shall be considered later at an appropriate stage and that the occasion for accepting fresh evidence had not yet arrived. He has also observed in his comments that on 11-3-85 the Management did not press their request for adducing fresh evidence. On the contrary, a request was made on behalf of the Management that the documents on the record of case No. 113 of 1978 be summoned and formal proof of the documents existing on that record be dispensed with which request was accepted by the Presiding Officer. Lastly, the Presiding Officer has stated that the question of not allowing the Management to adduce fresh evidence hence did not arise. 7. In our opinion, on these facts no authority could have reached the conclusion that the State Government has done, i.e., the postponement of the consideration of the request of the Management through their application dated 7-2-85 to some later date could reasonably give rise to an apprehension in the mind of the Management that it would not receive justice. The order of the State Government transferring the case is clearly arbitrary and is founded on irrelevant and non-existent grounds. A copy of the order sheet maintained by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has been filed with the rejoinder affidavit and a perusal of the same indicates that he was conducting the proceedings in a perfectly judicial manner and no Court or authority can, by any stretch, infer therefrom that the Labour Court was in the slightest degree biased against the Management. The State Government has directed the transfer of the case on mere unfounded conjectures and suspicion rather than on any concrete material. 8. Learned counsel for the Management vehemently contended that this Court should not interfere with the order of transfer as the petitioner is not likely to suffer any prejudice if the case is disposed of by the Industrial Tribunal. 9. We are not impressed by this submission at all. The order of transfer has serious implications and it ought not to be passed lightly. A case should not be transferred on the mere ground that the transfer of the case would not cause any prejudice to a party. Such exercise of power is wholly impermissible under S. 6-G of the Act. The order of transfer has serious implications and it ought not to be passed lightly. A case should not be transferred on the mere ground that the transfer of the case would not cause any prejudice to a party. Such exercise of power is wholly impermissible under S. 6-G of the Act. It should be borne in mind that the case has been remitted by the State Government to the Labour Court for a reconsideration and had been pending for quite some time before that Court. Just when it became ripe for hearing, the State Government stepped in and transferred the proceedings to another Court. The Labour Court had already given an award in favour of the petitioner and the award had been remitted to it only for a reconsideration and if the State Government had not unnecessarily and illegally stalled the proceedings by way of transfer, the proceedings would have come to an end long ago. It is not necessary to emphasise that the State Government should endeavour to ensure a speedy disposal of industrial disputes rather than treat the same causally ignoring the element of time. 10. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 16-8-85 passed by the State Government transferring the case from the Labour Court, Meerut to the Industrial Tribunal; Meerut, is quashed. The Labour Court, Meerut shall now proceed with the hearing of the case and dispose of the same expeditiously. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs from the respondent No. 5.