JUDGMENT Om Prakash - This is a second appeal by the appellant (Plaintiff) against the judgment and decree D/- 1-7-1981. passed by Sri B.D. Agarwal, District Judge, Kanpur setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. 2. The facts as gleaned from the judgement of the lower appellate court, are that the plaintiff, an ex-serviceman, was appointed as guard on temporary basis at the State Bank, Etah Branch with effect from 10-4-1971 and continued as such till 31-5-1971. He was again appointed for the same post on 14-10-1971 and continued till 12-11-1971. The post of the guard is in the subordinate cadre of the State Bank for which minimum and maximum educational qualification was not prescribed. On Mar 1,1967, a communication (Ext. A17) was sent to all the Agents in all the Branches of the Kanpur Circle by the Deputy Secretary and Treasurer intimating the former that "only such persons should be considered for recruitment to the subordinate cadre, who have not passed the matriculate or its equivalent examination but who are otherwise wholly conversant with the regional language and/or Hindi/English". On 25th Mar, 1972, a memo was issued to the plaintiff by the State Bank, Farrukhabad Branch intimating that for recruitment of guards, an interview would be held on 1-5-1972 and the plaintiff might appear if he so desired. The plaintiff did appear in the said interview on 1-5-1972 with his School Leaving Certificate of having passed Class IX from a school at Hathras in District Aligarh. In August, 1972, the plaintiff filled in a form for High School Examination, 1973, conducted by the U.P. Board, which he passed in Ilnd Division as per result declared on 2nd July, 1973. On 15-9-1973, the Regional Manager sent a letter to the Branch Manager, Kanpur intimating that the plaintiff had been selected for the post of Bank Guard on six months probation. The Branch Manager was also asked to satisfy himself in regard to the plaintiffs educational qualification, inter alia that he was not above IIIrd Class matriculate (Ext. A21). On 12-11-1973, the Regional Manager issued the memo of appointment to the plaintiff intimating that he had been selected for appointment as a guard on six months probation' subject, inter alia, to production of satisfactory proof of educational qualification. A21). On 12-11-1973, the Regional Manager issued the memo of appointment to the plaintiff intimating that he had been selected for appointment as a guard on six months probation' subject, inter alia, to production of satisfactory proof of educational qualification. The plaintiff was required to report to the Branch Manager, Medical College Branch, Kanpur before 23-11-1973 (Ext. A2). Thereupon, the plaintiff reported for duty to the Branch Manager, Medical College Branch of the State Bank at Kanpur. The plaintiff continued in service ever since 4-12-1973 as Bank Guard and by letter D/- 11-6-1974, the plaintiff was intimated by the Branch Manager that under the instructions received from the Head Office, the former was confirmed in the existing appointment with effect from 4-6-1974 (Ext. A28). 3. On 12-6-1974, the plaintiff applied to the Branch Manager, Medical College Branch, Kanpur for according permission to appear at the Intermediate Examination, 1975. In the said application, he stated the fact that he had passed High School Examination with IInd Division in 1973. On July 13, 1974, the plaintiff requested the Branch Manager to forward his application, of date to the Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Kanpur for the post of clerk (Typist) advertised on 26th July, 1974 (Ext. A13). 4. On 5th Aug. 1974, the State Bank of India, Kanpur issued a memorandum to the plaintiff calling upon him to explain within three days the reasons "for fully and knowingly concealing the facts of your having passed High School Examination with a view to seek the employment in the Bank although you were not eligible which casts doubt on your integrity and bona fide" (Ext. 12). To this, the plaintiff submitted his explanation dated 10th Aug. 1974 (Ext. A14) stating that he had appeared in High School Examination in the year 1973 and at the time of interview, he was non-matriculate and no concealment was done by him. Upon consideration of the matter, the Regional Manager wrote to the Branch Manager on Mar. 13, 1975 under Ext. A18 thus : - "With reference to your S/L No. 42/299, dated the 10th Aug. 1974, the explanation submitted by Shri Bhagwan Saraswat, Bank Guard has not been found satisfactory. Had Sri Saraswat declared the facts of his passing the High School at the time of his appointment, he would not have been considered for appointment in the Bank. A18 thus : - "With reference to your S/L No. 42/299, dated the 10th Aug. 1974, the explanation submitted by Shri Bhagwan Saraswat, Bank Guard has not been found satisfactory. Had Sri Saraswat declared the facts of his passing the High School at the time of his appointment, he would not have been considered for appointment in the Bank. It has, therefore, been decided to terminate his services by giving him 3 months' salary and allowances in lieu of notice immediately. Accordingly, please serve the memorandum on Shri Saraswat on the lines of the enclosed draft and send us a copy thereof in due course for our perusal and record.". 5. Thereupon, the Branch Manager issued the impugned order D/- 17-3-1975 to the plaintiff (Ext. A15) intimating that his services have been terminated with immediate effect. A payment order for 3 months' salary in lieu of the required notice was enclosed. 6. The plaintiff then submitted a representation (Ext. A16) on 18-4-1975, which was without any result and then the suit was instituted on 19-5-1975 challenging the impugned termination order D/- 17-3-1975 as void. He contended that the action amounted to punishment and the same was in breach of the statutory provisions and in violation of the principles of natural justice. It was averred that the appointment was made by the Regional Manager and, therefore, the Branch Manager was not competent to direct the termination. The relief was sought that the impugned order be declared as void and the plaintiff be declared to have continued in service. Also a mandatory injunction was claimed directing the defendant not to give effect to the impugned order. The defendant resisted the suit on the ground, inter alia, that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. According to the defendant the suit gave rise to industrial dispute for which the proper forum was the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was contended that a matriculate or a person having higher qualification was not qualified to be appointed as guard and that the plaintiff had concealed his educational qualification with a view to get the service and that there was no violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 7. It was contended that a matriculate or a person having higher qualification was not qualified to be appointed as guard and that the plaintiff had concealed his educational qualification with a view to get the service and that there was no violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 7. The trial court framed several issues including the issue of jurisdiction and found that the defendant failed to prove that being matriculate was disqualification for being appointed to the subordinate service of the State Bank, that the plaintiff was not informed of the fact that being matriculate was disqualification, that whereas the appointment was made by the Regional Manager, the termination was done by the Branch Manager, that the impugned order was not termination simpliciter, but by way of punishment and that the impugned order was in violation Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This is how the suit for declaration and for mandatory injunction was decreed. 8. Then, the defendant appealed to the District Judge, who endorsed the view of the trial court that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was found that the impugned order was not termination simpliciter, but was passed by way of punishment. It was further found that the impugned order violated Article 16. It was further held that the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff was pure and simple relationship of master and servant and that there was no statutory restriction of obligation limiting the power of the defendant to terminate that relationship. The learned District Judge, therefore, held that the remedy of the plaintiff could lie only in damages for wrongful termination and he was not entitled to seek declaration and to be reinstated. The judgment and decree of the trial court granting declaration and mandatory injunction were thus reversed. 9. Aggrieved by the findings of the learned District Judge, the plaintiff has come up in second appeal. I heard the submissions of Sri B.D. Madhyan, learned counsel for the plaintiff and of Sri S.N. Verma, learned counsel for the defendant. The first question for consideration in this appeal is whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration that the impugned order terminating services was null , and void. I heard the submissions of Sri B.D. Madhyan, learned counsel for the plaintiff and of Sri S.N. Verma, learned counsel for the defendant. The first question for consideration in this appeal is whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration that the impugned order terminating services was null , and void. The view taken by the learned District Judge was that a pure and simple relationship of master and servant was there between the defendant and the plaintiff and no declaratory decree could be passed for the purported wrongful dismissal. He took the view that the remedy of the plaintiff was only for damages for wrongful dismissal. Sec. 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 specifically bars specific performance of the contract of personal service. There is well settled law by now that no declaratory decree under S. 34 would be made, where the result would be the same which could have been after the specific performance of the contract of personal service. The effect of the declaratory decree will be the one that the relationship of master and servant will subsist which is specifically barred by S. 14. Specific performance of such a contract is barred, because wrongful dismissal can be fully compensated in terms of money. The Supreme Court in Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1971 SC 1828 : (1971 Lab IC 1129) observed in para 4 at page 1829 of AIR = at p. 1130 of Lab. I.C. : - "It is a well settled principle that when there is a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration, that the contract of service still subsisted, would not be made in the absence of special circumstances because of the principle that Courts do not ordinarily grant specific performance of service. This is so, even in cases where the authority appointing an employee was acting in exercise wafk statutory authority. The relationship between the person appointed and the employer would in such cases be contractual, i.e. as between a master and servant, and the termination of that relationship would not entitle the servant to a declaration that his employment had not been validly determined.". Similar view was taken in A. Francis v. Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur, (1962) 3 All ER 633 and Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board, ((1958) 1 All ER 322). Similar view was taken in A. Francis v. Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur, (1962) 3 All ER 633 and Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board, ((1958) 1 All ER 322). The submission of Sri Madhyan is that in the instant case, the relationship is not purely that of master and servant, but the plaintiff being an employee of the State Bank which is a State instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, acquired a status and, therefore, that status could not be disturbed by the State instrumentality arbitrarily or whimsically without giving an opportunity of being heard. He added that there may not be any obligation of giving an opportunity of being heard before terminating services where there is a relationship purely of master and servant, but termination of services without such opportunity in the case of an employee who acquired a status would be void. 10. The cases of dismissal broadly fall into three classes; firstly, dismissal of a servant by the master, secondly, dismissal from office held during pleasure, and thirdly, dismissal from office where there must be something against a man to warrant his dismissal. It is in the third category of cases that an employee cannot be dismissed without first letting him know what is alleged against him and hearing his defence or explanation. In a case of purely master and servant relationship, the servant is not entitled to say that he was not heard by his master before his dismissal. Such a question of being heard or not can only arise where the authority employing the servant is under some statutory or other restriction as to the kind of contract which it makes with its servants on the grounds on which it can dismiss them. So the question for consideration is whether the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff was purely a relationship of master and servant and whether the plaintiff being an employee of the State Bank which is (sic), admittedly, is entitled to declaration on ground of termination being in breach of rules of natural justice. So the question for consideration is whether the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff was purely a relationship of master and servant and whether the plaintiff being an employee of the State Bank which is (sic), admittedly, is entitled to declaration on ground of termination being in breach of rules of natural justice. The submission of Sri Madhyan is that the State Bank being an instrumentality of the State was bound to follow the principles of natural justice that enjoin upon it to afford an opportunity of being heard before terminating the services of any employee and the termination order passed without such opportunity (i.e.) without following the rules of the natural justice, was void. This is how he argued that the plaintiff became entitled to the declaration. In the case of Vaish Degree College, AIR 1976 SC 888 : (1976 Lab IC 576), three well recognised exceptions to the general rule that there will be no declaratory decree in the case involving master and servant relationship, were reiterated and they are : (1) Where a public servant is sought (o be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. (2) Where a workman is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law, and (3) Where a statutory body is in breach or violation of mandatory provisions of the Statute. In Indian Airlines Corporation case, (1971 Lab IC 1129) (supra) also, the Supreme Court referred to the above exceptions. Sri Madhyan to support his contention that the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration, contended that this case fell in the third exception. The exceptions Nos. 1 & 2 were not invoked by him. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the case of the plaintiff falls in exception 3 and whether he is entitled to a declaration. There are two ingredients of exception 3 : (1) that the dismissal is by statutory authority; and (2) that such action was taken by the statutory authority in breach of mandatory obligation, imposed by statute. Sri Madhyan does not say that the State Bank violated any statutory rules, but his simple submission is that the State Bank violated rules of natural justice in that no opportunity of being heard was afforded to the plaintiff before having terminated his services and therefore, the termination order is void. Sri Madhyan does not say that the State Bank violated any statutory rules, but his simple submission is that the State Bank violated rules of natural justice in that no opportunity of being heard was afforded to the plaintiff before having terminated his services and therefore, the termination order is void. The submission of Sri Verma was that exception 3 can be invoked only when the statutory body violated the mandatory provisions of a statute. Violation of rules of natural justice, Sri Verma says, does not come within the sweep of exception 3. He further submitted that the service conditions of the bank employees are governed by Shastri Award followed by Desai Award and not by any statutory rules and that Shastri Award and Desai Award do not have the statutory force and, therefore, for the violation of any term of those awards, exception 3 cannot be invoked. It is not disputed by Sri Madhyan that Shastri Award and Desai Award do not have the force of statute and the rules incorporated therein, are not statutory rules. The question, therefore, is whether the exception 3 can be read to mean that it takes within its sweep the violation of rules of natural justice as well. The submission of Sri Madhyan was that any order passed by the statutory authority in * violation of principle of natural justice would be as void as the order passed by the statutory authority in violation of the statutory rules. It is not the effect of the violation of the rules of natural justice which will determine the scope of exception 3, as the effect of violation of principles of natural justice and the violation of statutory rules may be the same that a given order is void, but the question is of interpretation of exception 3 whether that can be widened so as to include the violation of principles of natural justice within its ambit. The exception 3 has been stated repeatedly by the Supreme Court and its language is quite clear and unambiguous. In no case, was it ever said by the Supreme Court that a declaratory decree would be awarded even when a statutory authority terminated the services in violation of the rules of natural justice. The exception 3 has been stated repeatedly by the Supreme Court and its language is quite clear and unambiguous. In no case, was it ever said by the Supreme Court that a declaratory decree would be awarded even when a statutory authority terminated the services in violation of the rules of natural justice. The consistent view of the Supreme Court has been so far that if the statutory authority acted in contravention of the statutory rules which are mandatory, then the action would be void. The underlying idea behind it is that a check is kept on the working of the statutory authority and if that exceeds beyond the statutory limit, then the action would be declared to be void. The matter can be seen from a different angle also. Sri Verma, already pointed out that under the State Bank of India Act, 1955, no statutory rules have been framed to govern the services of the bank employees and only the two awards, namely, the Shastri Award and Desai Award are there in the field to regulate the services of the bank employees,-which are not statutory. The existence of the awards has not been denied by Sri Madhyan. When the rules governing the services of the bank employees are already embodied in the Shastri/Desai Award which may not be statutory and the enforcement of which may not have been pressed, the existence of rules of natural justice cannot be conceived in juxtaposition to the rules, so incorporated in the Awards. 11. In support of his contention that the declaration can be awarded even when a State instrumentality acted in breach of rules of natural justice. Sri Madhyan relied on Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, AIR 1973 SC 855 : (1973 Lab IC 453) and drew my attention to para 18 thereof. In the said para, the Supreme Court observed : that termination or dismissal of what is described as a pure contract of master and servant is not declared to be a nullity, however wrongful or illegal it may be. The reason is that dismissal in breach of contract is remedied by the damages. In the said para, the Supreme Court observed : that termination or dismissal of what is described as a pure contract of master and servant is not declared to be a nullity, however wrongful or illegal it may be. The reason is that dismissal in breach of contract is remedied by the damages. The Supreme Court further observed as follows : "In the case of servant of the State or of local authorities or statutory bodies, courts have declared in appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary to rules of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the provisions of the statutes." 12. Relying on the above reproduced material, Sri Madhyan argued that a declaratory decree can be passed by a court even when the statutory authority acted contrary to the rules of natural justice. I am unable to accept this submission of Sri Madhyan. No rule has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the above reproduced portion but that contains only a statement of fact that the courts declared in appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal was contrary to rules of natural justice. It cannot be taken to be a rule laid down by the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court merely observed about what had been done by the courts. In the later portion of para 18 of the case of Sirsi Municipality (supra), the Supreme Court further observed : "Apart from the intervention of Statute there would not be a declaration of nullity in the case of termination or dismissal of a servant of the State or of other local authorities or statutory bodies.". From this observation, it can be concluded without doubt that the categorical rule laid down by the Supreme Court was that no declaratory decree would be passed unless there was contravention of statute. The case of Sirsi Municipality, (1973 Lab IC 453) (supra) was decided by their five Lordships including His Lordship M.H. Beg, J. who concurring with the order drafted by His Lordship A. N. Ray, J. drafted his separate order highlighting two additional points. It is in this separate judgment, His Lordship Beg, J. of course, explicitly said: "An express statutory provision or guarantee is not the only basis of a mandatory duty or obligation. It is in this separate judgment, His Lordship Beg, J. of course, explicitly said: "An express statutory provision or guarantee is not the only basis of a mandatory duty or obligation. It can be imposed either by a rule made in exercise of a statutory power or it may arise by implication when exercising a quasi-judicial function.". The observation so made by only one of their Lordships could not be said to lay down any rule in supersession of the earlier and the later view, consistently taken by the Supreme Court that the exception 3 could be invoked only when statutory authority acted in violation of mandatory provisions of the statute. For the reasons, I do not agree with Sri Madhyan that the scope of exception 3 can be broadened so as to include the violation of rules of natural justice within its ambit. Moreover, the case of Sirsi Municipality (supra) was absolutely on different facts and that is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. In the former, the question for consideration was whether exception 3 could be invoked, as there was a breach of Rule 143 of the Municipality. The Supreme Court took the view that Rule 143 imposed a mandatory obligation as the rules were made in exercise of the power conferred on the municipality by the statute and that the violation of such a rule rendered the resolution dismissing the services of a mid-wife in the hospital staff as void and the proper remedy in that case was declaration. So in Sirsi Municipality case (supra), the resolution dismissing the services of the respondent was not declared void for the reason of breach of rules of natural justice but for the reason of violation of mandatory obligation imposed by Rule 143, which was framed under a statute. 13. Then Sri Madhyan relied on K. C. Joshi v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1046 ; (1985 Lab IC 1032). In this case, the appellant is a Store Keeper in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Corporation) and was removed from service on the ground of unsatisfactory work and also was informed of unsuitability without an enquiry and then he challenged his removal in a writ petition before this Court. In this case, the appellant is a Store Keeper in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Corporation) and was removed from service on the ground of unsatisfactory work and also was informed of unsuitability without an enquiry and then he challenged his removal in a writ petition before this Court. A Division Bench of this Court held that the appellant was a temporary employee of the Corporation; that the Corporation is not an industrial establishment within the meaning of expression in Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and, therefore, the Model Standing Orders enacted under the Act were not applicable to the undertaking of the Corporation and that the termination of service was not violative of Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1964, as the service of the appellant was not dispensed with on the allegation of misconduct, but as it was an order of termination of service simpliciter in accordance with the Regulation 25. The High Court also rejected the submission of the appellant that as the Corporation is a State or at any rate instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution and. therefore, he is entitled to the protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed and then the matter came up in appeal by Special Leave before the Supreme Court. In para 6 of the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court held : "Even if the employees of the Corporation, which is an instrumentality of the State, cannot be said to be the member* of a civil service of the Union or an All India service or hold any civil post under the Union, for the purpose of Articles 310 and 311 and, therefore, not entitled to the protection of Article 311, they would none-the-less be entitled to protection, of the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.". This decision cannot be availed of by the instant appellant, as the pronouncement was made in the appeal preferred against a judgment pronounced in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. There was no question in this case whether or not declaratory decree can be passed in favour of an employee of a State instrumentality, which did not violate any mandatory provisions of a statute. 14. There was no question in this case whether or not declaratory decree can be passed in favour of an employee of a State instrumentality, which did not violate any mandatory provisions of a statute. 14. From the law discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, the principle that can be deduced is that no declaratory decree under S. 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 can be awarded, unless a case of master and servant falls under one of the three recognised exceptions, as laid down in the case of Vaish Degree College, (1976 Lab IC 576) (SC) (supra). As the impugned termination order against the appellant was not passed by the State Bank, an instrumentality of the State in violation of any mandatory provisions of a Statute, I fully agree with the learned District Judge that the proper remedy was only to claim damages and not a declaration under S. 34. 15. The appellant also claimed an injunction which cannot be granted in view of S. 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as compensation in money would afford adequate relief in terms of cl. (c) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 38 thereof. 16. The second question for consideration in this appeal is whether or not jurisdiction was vested in the civil court to try the suit. Sri Verma vehemently argued that the State Bank is an industry within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and that the service conditions of the bank employees are governed by Shastri Award and Desai Award and any right arising therefrom could be enforced only under the Industrial Disputes Act either before the Labour Court or before the Industrial Tribunal. Sri Madhyan resisted the contention of Sri Verma by stating that the appellant does not seek enforcement of any right arising from either Shastri Award or Desai Award, but what he seeks is that the termination order passed in violation of principles of natural jutice be declared void and the appellant be continued in service. In short, Sri Madhyan urged that the suit was filed for getting the impugned order declared void for breach of rules of natural justice. Both the courts below negatived the contention of the respondent and accepted the contention of the appellant that the civil court has the jurisdiction to try the suit. In short, Sri Madhyan urged that the suit was filed for getting the impugned order declared void for breach of rules of natural justice. Both the courts below negatived the contention of the respondent and accepted the contention of the appellant that the civil court has the jurisdiction to try the suit. This question will not detain me for a long, because full and complete guidelines are available on this issue in the case of Premier Automombiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238 : (1975 Lab IC 1651), which was also relied on by the learned District Judge. In para 10 on page 2244 (of AIR): (at page 1657 of Lab. I.C.), the Supreme Court observed as under: "Classic enunciation of the law and classification of the cases in three classes was done by Willes, J. "with the precision which distinguished the utterances of that most accomplished lawyer, in the case of Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford" (1859) 6 CB (NS) 336 (vide the speech of Viscount Haldane at page 391 in the case of Neville v. London "Express" Newspaper Ltd., (1919) AC 368 (HL). The classes are enumerated thus : "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established by statute. There is that class where there is a liability existing at common law, and which is only re-enacted by the statute with a special form of remedy; there, unless the statute contains words necessarily excluding the common law remedy, the plaintiff has his election of proceeding either under the statute or at common law. Then there is a second class, which consists of those cases in which a statute has created a liability, but has given no special remedy for it; there the party may adopt an action of debt or other remedy at common law to enforce it. The third class is where thef statute creates a liability not existing at common law, and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it With respect to that class it has always been held, that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute.". Relying on the aforesaid material, inter alia, the Supreme Court observed in para 23 on pages 2250-51 (of AIR) : (at pp. 1663-64 of Lab. Relying on the aforesaid material, inter alia, the Supreme Court observed in para 23 on pages 2250-51 (of AIR) : (at pp. 1663-64 of Lab. I.C.) as follows : "To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation ( to an industrial dispute may be stated thus : (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suit or concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in I a particular remedy. r ' (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suit or is to get an adjudication under the Act., (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its r enforcement is either S. 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.". 17. It was contended by Sri Madhyan that the suit was not brought for the enforcement of any right arising from any award governing the service conditions of the bank employees but the suit was filed by the plaintiff only for the enforcement of the rules of natural justice that were violated by the State Bank, which was, admittedly, an industry under the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned District Judge was of the view that "In the absence of exclusion, express or by necessary implication, the provisions of natural justice are to be considered as embodied in General Law including the ordinary law relating to contract concerning employment between master and servant" Finding so the learned District Judge further held that the jurisdiction of the civil court was alternative in view of the Ilnd principle. I fully agree with this view of the appellate court. The principles of natural justice form part of general and/or common law and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court will be alternative in such matters. I fully agree with this view of the appellate court. The principles of natural justice form part of general and/or common law and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court will be alternative in such matters. The plaintiff is not enforcing any right arising from the Industrial Disputes Act but his case is for the enforcement of the rules of natural justice, the remedy for the enforcement of which is not excluded either explicitly or impliedly by the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court will be alternative in view of the principle No. 2, as enunciated in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. case, (1975 Lab IC 1651) (SC) (supra). 18. Sri Verma to support his contention relied on an unreported judgment of N.N. Mithal, J. as pronounced in Second Appeal No. 1554 of 1971 Govind Prasad Agrawal v. State Bank of India on 14-5-1985. In this case, it was held that the jurisdiction vested only with courts/Tribunals created under the Industrial Disputes Act and not with the civil courts. To come to such a conclusion, N.N. Mithal, J. observed as under : "In the present case, the plaintiffs rights are dependent entirely upon the Shastri Award and Desai Award which were both made under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Those rights do not have the statutory force and can be enforced only within the limits of the Industrial Disputes Act". 19. Having so found, he held that no jurisdiction was vested in the civil court. This case is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. As in the latter, the plaintiff sought to enforce the rules of natural justice forming part of the general and/or common law for the enforcement of which the jurisdiction is vested in civil court in the alternative. The unreported case of Govind Prasad Agrawal (supra) was based on the reasoning that the employee of the State Bank sought to enforce the rights arising from the awards, made under the Industrial Disputes Act of the enforcement of which specific machinery was created under that Act. But the situation in the instant case is different, as no right arising from the Industrial Disputes Act was sought to be enforced but a right arising from the general law. For the reasons, I hold that the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not barred. 20. But the situation in the instant case is different, as no right arising from the Industrial Disputes Act was sought to be enforced but a right arising from the general law. For the reasons, I hold that the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not barred. 20. Before parting with the case, I would like to observe that the plaintiff appellant is singularly unfortunate as higher education, which ordinarily proves to be a boon for all, proved to be a curse for him. As factually found by the learned District Judge, no fact was concealed by the plaintiff from the bank. When he appeared for interview on 1-5-1972, then had passed only IX class and the High School Form was filled in August, 1972. He succeeded in the High School Examination only in July, 1973. So at the time of interview he was not matriculate and thus there was no concealment. Even if it is assumed that he was matriculate at the time of interview, it can hardly be a ground for his removal from the service. Looking to these, facts, nothing more can be done at this stage except suggesting the respondent to consider the possibility of the plaintiff of being re-employed in the bank sympathetically. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The parties, however, will bear their own costs throughout.