JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - Who has the right to begin the suit in accordance with the provisions of Order 18, Rule 1 of the CPC ('Code', for short) is the core question for consideration in this revision. 2. It is necessary at the outset to state a few facts which emerge from the pleadings of the parties. The plaintiff-petitioner is the owner of Schedule 'A' house of the plaint which fell to his share in a family partition. The other portion of the house described in Schedule 'B' of the plaint had fallen to the share of his late brother Gopal Chandra Mishra, husband of defendant No. 2 and father of defendants 3 to 6. Late Copal Chandra Mishra sold Schedule 'B' house in favour of defendant No. 1 on 20-2-1969. During absence of the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 raised some constructions on her portion of the house (Schedule 'D') obstructing free flow of light and air to the plaintiff's house. Therefore, the plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 12 of 1971 against defendant No. 1 which ended in compromise. According to the terms of the compromise, defendant No. 1 undertook not to make any constructions beyond five feet on the east of the partition wall dividing Schedules'A'and'B' and to leave an open space of three feet between the said boundary wall and the new construction. But despite the compromise decree inclusive of the aforesaid terms, defendant No. 1 made construction upto a length of fifty feet, whereby, there was diminution of light and air to the plaintiff's house as in Schedule 'A' seriously jeopardising his right of easement. Therefore, he instituted a suit praying for mandatory injunction for removal of the construction already made by infringing his right of easement for free flow of light and air and for permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from making any construction on Schedule 'B' so as to effect his right of easement in future. Defendant No. 1 has denied all the aforesaid facts and has specifically stated that although the earlier suit ended in compromise, there was no stipulation that she would not make any construction beyond five feet on the east of the boundary wall dividing the houses as in Schedules 'A' and 'B'. Defendant No. 1 has denied all the aforesaid facts and has specifically stated that although the earlier suit ended in compromise, there was no stipulation that she would not make any construction beyond five feet on the east of the boundary wall dividing the houses as in Schedules 'A' and 'B'. As a matter of fact it was decided that she was entitled to construct to an extent of fifty feet leaving a space of three feet in between the boundary wall and the new construction. Therefore, either on account of fraud being perpetrated by the plaintiff or due to mutual mistake, instead of fifty feet, five feet was reduced into writing in the compromise petition. 3. The following issues have been framed in the suit: 1) Had the plaintiff Khaparali houses on the back side of the first floor of his house In the year 1951 and if so, whether the said Khaparali houses were converted into R. C. roof ? 2) If the plaintiff's right to light and air has been obstructed by construction of house by defendant No. 1. 3) If the rooms existing on the ground,floor of the house of the plaintiff have been rendered unhabitable due to the alleged construction made by defendant No. 1 ? 4) Has the alleged construction been made by defendant No. 1 after obtaining permission from the Cuttack Municipality and the Greater Cuttack Improvement Trust ? 5) If the compromise decree dt. 17-12-1971 is binding on the defendants ? 6) If the plaintiff has got any cause of action for the suit ? 7) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled ? 8) Has the defendant's construction caused injury to the plaintiff's right to light and air and whether the said injury, if any, is material and whether pecuniary compensation would afford adequate relief in respect to the said injury ? Out of these issues, issue No. 5 is the central issue relating to the validity of the decree passed in Title Suit No. 12 of 1971 which was effected on compromise between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. The other issues ralate to the plaintiff's claim of the right of easement for free flow of light and air unobstructed by any construction made or to be made by defendant No. 1 on Schedule 'B', 4. The suit was initially dismissed by the learned Munsif, First Court, Cuttack. The other issues ralate to the plaintiff's claim of the right of easement for free flow of light and air unobstructed by any construction made or to be made by defendant No. 1 on Schedule 'B', 4. The suit was initially dismissed by the learned Munsif, First Court, Cuttack. But on appeal, the learned District judge reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and remanded the suit for further hearing after framing a new issue (issue No. 8) and giving the following direction : "...The suit be disposed of in view of the directions given above after allowing the parties to amend their pleadings and adducing such evidence, both oral and documentary, in respect of issue No. 5 and the additional issue framed only." When the suit was taken up for hearing by the learned Court below after remand, a dispute between the parties arose as to who should begin In the impugned order it was held that in view of the directions given by the learned first appellate Court the plaintiff should begin. It is against this order that the revision has been filed. According to Mr. S. K. Dey, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-petitioner, the onus of proof of fraud or mistake in the compromise decree lies on defendant No. 1 and, therefore, she must discharge the same by adducing evidence. Therefore, it is defendant No 1 who must begin the suit. Thereafter the plaintiff shall lead evidence in support of other issue. 5. An almost identical question came up for consideration in Nitei Sahu and Another Vs. Chanda Bewa, in which it was held that the principle is well-settled that in case of a pardanashin lady it is incumbent upon the transferee to clearly establish that she executed the document after fully understanding the contents thereof and signed it after the contents were read over and explained to her. The same principle also applies to the case of an illiterate lady. When the onus is on the plaintiff to establish first that she is either a pardanashin or an illiterate lady or both, she is to begin the suit under Order 18, Rules 1 and 3 of the Code. The same principle also applies to the case of an illiterate lady. When the onus is on the plaintiff to establish first that she is either a pardanashin or an illiterate lady or both, she is to begin the suit under Order 18, Rules 1 and 3 of the Code. It must, however, be made clear that if the plaintiff satisfies the Court, after evidence has been gone into, that she is either a pardanashin or an illiterate lady, then the onus would shift to the defendants to establish that the document was read over and fully explained to her and it was thereafter that she put her signature after fully understanding the contents thereof. Apart from the principle laid down in the decision, the general principle of law is that commission of fraud has to be proved by the party alleging the same. In view of the admitted fact that Title Suit No. 12 of 1971 was compromised between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and the further fact that the defence of the latter is that a particular stipulation of the compromise decree was either due to fraud or due to mutual mistake, initially the burden of proof of issue No. 5 is on defendant No. 1. She must have to prove that the stipulation was on account of fraud or mutual mistake, whereafter the burden will shift to the plaintiff to prove that the stipulation was in fact incorporated in the compromise petition which formed part of the decree and defendant No. 1 was fully aware of it. With regard to the additional issue, the burden is on the plaintiff. 6. In view of the aforesaid discussion, defendant No. 1 shall begin the suit with regard to issue No, 5. Thereafter, the plaintiff shall adduce evidence with regard to additional issue No. 8 and by operation of Rule 3 of Order 18 of the Code, defendant No. 1 shall then adduce evidence with regard to the said issue. Subject to the aforesaid direction, the civil revision is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. No costs. Final Result : Allowed