JUDGMENT BHAT, J.:- 1. of the three accused in Sessions Case No.2/1982 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Parur, accused 1 and 2 were acquitted of the charge under Sec.380, I.P.C., and the third accused was acquitted of all the charges. Accused 1 and 2 were convicted under Sec. 302, 307 and 460 , I.P.C., read with Sec.34 , I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under Sec.302, I.P.C. R.I. for five years under Sec.307 , I.P.C., and R.I. for seven years under Sec.460, I.P.C., the sentences having been directed to run concurrently. Accused 1 and 2 have preferred Crl. Appeals Nos.28 of 19383 and 81 of 1983 while the State has preferred Crl. Appeal No.184 of 1983 challenging the acquittal of the third accused and Crl. Appeal No.205 of 1983 challenging the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 in regard to charge under Sec.380 , I.P.C., read with Sec. 34 I.P.C. 2. Since 1970, P.W.2 along with his wife, now deceased Lissy, and children, P.Ws.1 and 3 have been living in the house at Palissery. On the night of 19.5.1981, after supper, they went to bed. P.W.2 and Lissy slept on two separate cots in the room on the southern side while P.Ws.1 and 3 slept in the room on the northern side. The cot on which P.W.2 was sleeping was near the open window. He had kept M.O.1 torch near his pillow. According to the prosecution, the three accused came there at about 4 a.m., committed theft of the torch and removed it through the window. Using the cement gas pipe attached to the nearby latrine building, they climbed up, came to the terrace of the house, entered the house by opening the small door of the loft situated above the room next to the bed of P.W.2 (where the ladder was kept), entered the loft, came down the ladder and reached the bed room of P.W.2. They were armed with M.Os.15 and 16 knives and M.O.17 chisel. They inflicted four incised injuries on Lissy, who was asleep, and two incised injuries on the right check and right shoulder of P.W.2. P.W.2, who felt something falling on or touching his check, woke up and called out his wife, who had by that time died and therefore could not respond. P.W.2 cried out and called out to his son, P.W.1. P.W.2, who felt something falling on or touching his check, woke up and called out his wife, who had by that time died and therefore could not respond. P.W.2 cried out and called out to his son, P.W.1. P.Ws.1 and 3 woke up and went in their parents’ bed room. By that time, P.W.2 had switched on the light in the room. They heard sound of some persons jumping and running away. They realised that Lissy was dead. At the instance of P.W.2, his sons called the neighbours. P.Ws.4 to 7 came there. According to the prosecution, there were no eye witnesses to the occurrence. 3. P.W.1 and others took P.W.2 to the hospital at Angamaly where Doctor, P.W.17, examined him and directed that he should be taken to Government Hospital, Ernakulam. P.W.2 was, however, taken to a private hospital viz., Medical Trust Hospital, Ernakulam. He was admitted as an in-patient by P.W.71. He was treated by P.W.72 and discharged only on 10.6.1981. 4. The in-mates of the house had no idea about the identity of the assailants. P.W.1 went to the Angamaly Police Station at 6 a.m., and gave Ext.P1 information which was recorded by S.I. of Police, P.W.73 and the latter registered a case under Ext.P48 F.I.R., for offences under Secs.302 , 307 and 460 , I.P.C. read with Sec.34, I.P.C., against unknown persons. P.W.73 went to the scene and prepared Ext.P37 scene mahazar attested by P.W.63. P.W.81, C.I. of Police, Crime Detachment, Alwaye, took up investigation. Investigation was also conducted by other police officers, P.Ws.82 and 83 as also Deputy Superintendent of Police attached to the Crime Detachment, who ultimately laid the charge-sheet on 27.11.1981. He died before he could be examined in Court. 5. The case was duly committed to the Sessions. On the accused pleading not guilty to the charges framed against them, prosecution examined 83 witnesses and marked Exts.P1 to P74 series and M.Os.1 to 36 series. Exts.C1 and D1 series and D2 were also marked. When questioned by the Sessions Judge, the accused denied the incriminating circumstances and reiterated their innocence. 6. The charge of theft under Sec.380, I.P.C., related to M.O.1 torch. The learned Sessions Judge held that this charge has not been established. The learned Sessions Judge further held that the complicity of the third accused in the crime has not been established. When questioned by the Sessions Judge, the accused denied the incriminating circumstances and reiterated their innocence. 6. The charge of theft under Sec.380, I.P.C., related to M.O.1 torch. The learned Sessions Judge held that this charge has not been established. The learned Sessions Judge further held that the complicity of the third accused in the crime has not been established. However, he convicted accused 1 and 2 under Secs. 302, 307 and 460, I.P.C., read with Sec.34, I.P.C., and sentenced them as stated earlier. [Paragraphs 7 to 18 regarding discussion of evidence are omitted.-Ed.] 19. From the above discussion, it is patent that P.Ws.31, 32, 34 and 39 identified the three accused while P.Ws.35 and 36 identified the first accused, in the presence of two others, while P.W.30 could not identify any of the three persons. There is no dispute that the accused were strangers to these witnesses. Test identification parade had not been conducted. Therefore, it is contended by learned counsel appearing for the accused that identification made by these witnesses in Court cannot be accepted. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Kannan v. State of Kerala Kannan v. State of Kerala 1980 MLJ.(Crl.) 1: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1127: (1979)2 S.C.J. 373. In order to appreciate this contention, we think it is not sufficient if we refer only to this decision. We would like to refer to a catena of pronouncements of the Supreme Court on this subject. 20. One of the earliest decisions is that in Vaikuntam Chandrappa v. State of A.P Vaikuntam Chandrappa v. State of A.P A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1340 In that case, test identification parade had been conducted and there were three correct identifications and six wrong identifications. Considering the result of the parade and the attendant circumstances, the Court held that identification made in Court was not reliable. The Court observed that substantive evidence is the statement in Court; but the purpose of test identification is to test that evidence and the safe rule is that the sworn testimony of evidence in Court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to the witnesses, generally speaking, requires corroboration which should be in the form of an earlier identification proceeding. In Budhsen v. State of U.P Budhsen v. State of U.P 1971 MLJ.(Crl.) 131: (1971)1 S.C.J. 223: A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1321 also test identification proceedings had been conducted and on an alaysis of the entire evidence, the Court rejected the identification. The Court pointed out that the facts which establish the identity of an accused person are relevant under Sec.9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in Court and the identification made at the trial is inherently of a weak character, and that evidence in order to carry conviction should ordinarily clarify as to how and under what circumstances the witness came to pick out the particular accused. The Court further indicated that the purpose of prior test identification is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of the evidence and it is considered as safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses as to identity of accused who were strangers in the form of earlier identification proceeding, though there may be exceptions to the general rule, when, for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely without such or other corroboration. The Court also stressed that identification proceedings belong to the investigation stage and are generally held with the primary object of enabling the witnesses to identify persons concerned in offence and this serves to satisfy the investigating officers of the bona fides of the witnesses and also to furnish evidence to corroborate their testimony in Court. More or less similar observations are found in Rameshwar Singh v. State of J. & K Rameshwar Singh v. State of J. & K 1972 MLJ.(Crl.) 364: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 102: (1972)1 S.C.J. 594, Hasib In the latter decisions also, after analysing the facts and circumstances of the cases, the Court found identification in Court to be valueless. 21. In the case in Delhi Administration v. Bal Krishan Delhi Administration v. Bal Krishan 1972 MLJ.(Crl.) 205: (1972)1 S.C.J. 347: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 3 there was no test identification parade held and identification was made for the first time in the course of trial held 14 months after the occurrence. The occurrence took place at night, though two lanterns and torchs were present. A large number of persons were involved in the dacoity. The occurrence took place at night, though two lanterns and torchs were present. A large number of persons were involved in the dacoity. It was held that the identification in Court could not be relied upon. However, the Court observed that it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that after the lapse of a long period, witnesses would, in no case, be able to identify the dacoits they had seen in the course of a dacoity committed during the night. However, the Courts will have to be extremely cautious when such evidence is before them. In the case in S.T. Shinde v. State of Maharastra S.T. Shinde v. State of Maharastra (1974)4 S.C.C. 213 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 791 the evidence in Court was accepted in the light of surrounding evidence. The Court observed that the evidence of test identification proceedings admissible under Sec.9 of the Evidence Act could at best be supporting evidence which can be used only to corroborate the substantive evidence regarding identification of the accused as the doer of the criminal act. The earlier proceedings have no independent value; nor is the identification proceedings the only type of evidence that can be tendered to confirm the evidence of a witness regarding identification of accused in Court. Identity could also be fixed by circumstantial evidence. The case in Harbhajan Singh v. State of J. & K Harbhajan Singh v. State of J. & K (1975)4 S.C.C. 480 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1814 was a case of identification made in Court without prior test identification proceedings. The Court indicated that absence of such proceedings is not necessarily fatal, particularly when corroborative circumstances are available. 22. A Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in R.T.No.1 of 1983 and Crl. Appeals Nos.161 and 163 of 1983 has culled out the principles deducible from the above decisions (See 1984 K.L.T. 31(S.N.). We respectfully agree with the same. Substantive evidence of identification of an accused is the evidence given and identification made by a witness in Court. If an accused is known to a witness it would be a futile exercise to put him up for identification. If, however, an accused is not previously known to a witness, the investigating agency has to consider whether test identification parade should be arranged. Such a step has dual significance. If an accused is known to a witness it would be a futile exercise to put him up for identification. If, however, an accused is not previously known to a witness, the investigating agency has to consider whether test identification parade should be arranged. Such a step has dual significance. It furnishes to the investigating agency an assurance that the investigation is proceeding on correct lines. It also furnishes corroboration of the evidence to be given by the witness in Court at the trial stage. It is thus important both for the investigating agency and for the accused. It would also be fair to the witness concerned as there may be a chance of his memory fading. Nevertheless, the result of test identification parade is not substantive evidence in law. When a stranger witness makes identification of an accused in Court, the Court, may way of caution or prudence, seeks some assurance before accepting the identification as correct. That assurance would be available from the positive result of test identification parade. Successful identification parade renders it safe for the Court to act upon the identification made in Court. However, it cannot be said that absence of test identification parade is fatal in all cases. Assurance could be available from other sources and circumstances. It cannot be laid down as a principle of law that after lapse of a period, witness would, in no case, be able to identify a person whom he had seen for the first time earlier. Witness might have had a fair opportunity of seeing the accused, of noting his features and appearance. There might have been something in the context, manner and circumstances of the meeting which would render it easy for the appearance of the accused to fix itself in the memory of the witness; something might have taken place shortly thereafter which would have enabled the witness to recollect the prior meeting and the person concerned. Presence of these features may also lend assurance to the Court in acting on the identification made in Court by a witness even in the absence of a test identification parade. The circumstances mentioned above are only illustrative and not exhaustive. Whether there are circumstances lending assurance to the conscience of the Court in a given case would depend on examination of the facts and circumstances obtaining in that case. 23. The circumstances mentioned above are only illustrative and not exhaustive. Whether there are circumstances lending assurance to the conscience of the Court in a given case would depend on examination of the facts and circumstances obtaining in that case. 23. As we have already indicated, P.Ws.31, 32, 33, 35 and 39 are stranger witnesses. Naturally, the Court would look to some assurance regarding the accuracy of the identification made by them in Court. We find such assurance in the circumstances of the meetings and the subsequent events. The meetings were all at night in remote areas in rural parts. P.Ws.31 and 32 met the accused in the tea shop at about 11 p.m. Accused must have been there for a fairly substantial period, ordering tea and buns and consuming the same. P.Ws.34 and 35, shop keepers, saw the accused at about 11 p.m. One of them talked to the first accused who was wearing pants and shirt, asking for the way to Karippala. P.W.39 saw the accused at 12 mid-night, at a very odd hour, in strange circumstances. The very next morning, all these witnesses heard about the murder of Lissy. The odd nature of the meetings and the conduct of the accused followed by the news of the murder of the next morning would certainly have impressed the minds of these witnesses in varying degrees. This has to be taken along with the evidence of P.W.30, who spoke about the journey of three persons a K.S.R.T.C. bus from Trichur to Karukutty and the commotion created by them in the bus at their inability to get down at the place of their choice and also the evidence of P.W.28, to the effect that on the day prior to the occurrence, first accused went to her house enquiring about the whereabouts of Lissy and said that he was going to Trichur. These circumstances certainly offer assurance to the Court in acting on the identification made by these witnesses in Court of the various accused. 24. The prosecution suggestion is that during several hours of the night accused were wandering about with a view to locate the house of P.W.2. It was in the course of such journey that they were seen by the above witnesses. The journey would have lasted several kilometres, going by the distances spoken to by these witnesses. 24. The prosecution suggestion is that during several hours of the night accused were wandering about with a view to locate the house of P.W.2. It was in the course of such journey that they were seen by the above witnesses. The journey would have lasted several kilometres, going by the distances spoken to by these witnesses. Learned counsel for the accused contended that this version cannot co-exist with the suggestion of the prosecution that first accused was very familiar with the house of P.W.2 in as much as he had worked there for a number of years previously. We do not find any inconsistency in these positions. First accused undoubtedly was working in the house of P.W.2 for several years and must have been very familiar with the interior of the house, the premises and the surroundings. That need not necessarily mean that he would have been equally familiar with the long route to that house. This has to be further appreciated in the light of the evidence given by the disinterested witness, P.W.30, conductor of a bus, that three persons who travelled in his bus from Trichur to Karukutty wanted to get down at a particular place and because there was no authorised stop at that place he did not stop the bus there and they had to get down near the Karukutty Railway Station. In these circumstances, it is only natural that the first accused would have found it difficult to find the exact route from the place where they alighted from the bus. 25. According to the prosecution, movements of the accused after the occurrence had been noticed by P.Ws.44 to 46. None of these witnesses identified any of the accused. But they deposed to have seen three persons at about 5 a.m. in the road. P.W.44 lives one kilometre north of the scene of occurrence and his house is on the western side of the Nalukettu junction. Generally, he wakes up at 5 a.m. As usual, he woke up and came out to the yard to pass urine. When he got up, he saw three persons walking along the road on the eastern side of the house and proceeding northwards up the gradient. One of the three persons (who was wearing pants) was pushing a cycle (Others were mundu and shirts). At the gradient, it would not be possible to ride a cycle. When he got up, he saw three persons walking along the road on the eastern side of the house and proceeding northwards up the gradient. One of the three persons (who was wearing pants) was pushing a cycle (Others were mundu and shirts). At the gradient, it would not be possible to ride a cycle. Later, he went to the local tea shop and heard about the occurrence. On the eastern side of the road, near his residence, he found two chappels lying, which he identified as M.O.27 series. P.W.45 resides on the western side of Nalukettu junction which is six kilometres away from Koratty junction. He sleeps in the verandah of his house. At about 5 a.m., he woke up and saw three persons running westwards along the road in front of the house. One of them wore pants and the others were mundu. At 6 a.m., he went to the local junction and at the south-western corner, he saw a cycle lying down and blood on a stone. The persons who ran away were young men. The cycle was lying near the house of P.W.46. P.W.46 has a tea shop near the Nalukettu junction, north of the road lying east-west. Road to the east is steep. The road to the west leads to Koratty. He heard about the occurrence at about 9 a.m. Earlier, at about 5 a.m., he heard a sound in front of his tea shop. He got up and opened the door and saw three persons running westwards to junction. He saw cycle lying in the southern gutter. They were running away from the place where the cycle was lying. One of the persons wore pants and shirt and the others wore mundu and shirts, all of them being young men. In the evening, Police came and took away the cycle after testing it. He identified the cycle as M.O.25. All these witnesses are absolutely disinterested witnesses against whom nothing has been suggested. Their evidence bears the stamp of truth. 26. In this connection, we have to examine the evidence relating to M.O.25 cycle. P.W.43 deposed that the cycle belonged to him and he sold it to P.W.42. P.W.2 corroborated this version and further deposed that the licence continued in the name of P.W.43 without change. He used to keep the cycle in the verandah of his house, which is house-cum-tea shop situated by roadside. P.W.43 deposed that the cycle belonged to him and he sold it to P.W.42. P.W.2 corroborated this version and further deposed that the licence continued in the name of P.W.43 without change. He used to keep the cycle in the verandah of his house, which is house-cum-tea shop situated by roadside. He had kept the cycle in the verandah on the 19th night and found it missing. The next at 11 a.m., he heard about the death of Lissy. He made enquiries for the cycle and ultimately gave a complaint, Ext.P22. He identified the cycle as M.O.25. There was a criminal case also regarding the cycle but it ended in acquittal. 27. P.W.76 is the photographer attached to the Ernakulam Crime Branch Office and P.W.78 is a Finger Print Expert attached to the Crime Branch Office, Alwaye. The evidence of P.Ws.78 and 81 would show the five latent finger prints were found on the cycle. Their evidence read in the light of the evidence of P.W.76 would show that of them one was a clear finger print and others were blurred and the one clear finger print was identified as that of second accused, reasons for which conclusion are given in Ext.P71 and spoken to by P.W.78. 10 identifical ridge characteristics were noticed. That is the main reason for the opinion given by P.W.78. On comparison with reference to the enlarged photographs, we are also satisfied about the correctness of the reason and opinion given. 28. Main contention urged on behalf of the accused in regard to the finger print evidence is that the cycle was lying exposed to sun for several hours till latent finger prints were developed and therefore the latent finger prints would have disappeared and the entire evidence must have been concocted after the arrest of the accused persons. Learned counsel also placed reliance on the following passage occurring at page 263 of the second edition of the second edition of the book “Handwriting and Thumbprint Identification and Forensic Science” by H.R. Hardless: “A latent print, however, does not last long. The sweat drys up and in due course the ridges in the print fade away. Its existence therefore, depends upon climatic conditions. No specific time can be given for the life of a latent print.” We fail to see how this passage is of any help. The sweat drys up and in due course the ridges in the print fade away. Its existence therefore, depends upon climatic conditions. No specific time can be given for the life of a latent print.” We fail to see how this passage is of any help. It only indicates that life of a latent print depends upon climatic conditions, though no specific time can be suggested. In this connection, we would also refer to “Fingerprints” by F. Brewester, 1936 Edn. and “Practical Fingerprinting” by B.C. Bridges, 1942 Edn. In the former book, at page 97 it is stated: “Kunhe gives the results of two experiments of latent impressions made on glass, one of which was developed twenty-one days and the other ninety days, afterwards, both the developed impressions giving perfectly clear results.” In the latter book, at page 224, it is stated: “Various authorities differ as to the period of time that finger prints may endure upon touched surfaces. Obviously, the atmospheric conditions must affect this duration, but the physical state of the person who left the traces, and the nature of the surface where the prints adhere, are also of high importance. Fingerprints will usually remain viscid for several days when left upon glass, steel or other smooth and non-porous surfaces…… The most favourable results are obtained when the impressions have been made by a short time, and while the exudation is still sticky and not as yet contaminated by dust or other foreign matter. But despite the time element, fingerprints may be developed, under certain favourable conclusions, and by the proper methods, even when all the moisture has dried; this may be years after they were recorded.” In these circumstances, we find it difficult to accept the contention urged on behalf of the accused particularly in the light of total lack of specific cross-examination of the expert witness on this point. 29. Prosecution would contend that accused committed theft of the cycle during the night and all of them rode the cycle and at the particular place they fell down from the cycle and sustained injuries thereby. Thereafter, either because of injuries or because day was already breaking they abandoned the cycle and ran away. The accused, of course, would deny this. They also denied that they had any injuries. P.W.81, the investigator, deposed that he accosted the three accused on the night of 3.6.1981. and arrested them. Thereafter, either because of injuries or because day was already breaking they abandoned the cycle and ran away. The accused, of course, would deny this. They also denied that they had any injuries. P.W.81, the investigator, deposed that he accosted the three accused on the night of 3.6.1981. and arrested them. He found injuries on their body and prepared body mahazars, Exts.P13 and P14 and P17 respectively. The body mahazars would indicate healing injuries on the three persons. P.W.81 further deposed that on 3.6.1981 he sent the three accused to the local Government Hospital for medical examination. Doctor, P.W.68, examined them and issued wound certificates, Exts.P43 and P45. P.W.68 deposed that the accused came to the hospital at about 12.30 p.m. First accused had healing abrasions on the right forearm and left knee, the abrasions being more than seven days old. Second accused had a healing abrasion (more than seven days old) on the right thigh. Third accused had a healing abrasion (more than seven days old) on the right knee and right leg. In her opinion, the injuries would have, been sustained 1 to 3 weeks prior to her examination. There is no reason why this evidence should not be accepted and that is consistent with the prosecution case. 30. P.W.68 further deposed that she asked the three accused how they sustained injuries and they said that they sustained injuries on account of fall from cycle. This version had been recorded in the wound certificates and spoken to by the witness in Court. We find no reason why the doctor's evidence in this behalf cannot be accepted, though the accused denied it. 31. Learned counsel for the accused contended that the accused were sent to the doctor by P.W.81, the investigator, after arresting them and thus when the doctor talked to the accused they were in police custody and therefore, the statements given by the accused to the doctor are inadmissible underSec.26 of the Evidence Act. Sec.17 of the Evidence Act defines ‘admission’ as a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances mentioned “hereinafter”. Sec.21 states that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative-in-interest. Sec.21 states that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative-in-interest. Therefore, statements made by the accused to the doctor contained admissions regarding the cause of injuries sustained by them which are admissible under Sec.21. Secs.24 to 26 render confessions inadmissible. Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise is declared irrelevant in a criminal proceeding under Sec.24. This section has no application in the present case. Sec.25 states that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. This is not a case of confession made to a police officer and therefore this section is not attracted. Sec.26 states that no confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. If the statement made by the accused to the doctor can be regarded as confession, since the confession was made by the accused while in the custody of police officer, Sec.26 would be attracted. 32. But the question is whether these statements constitute confession. Confession is not defined in the Indian Evidence Act. Every admission is not a confession. Stephen in his Digest on the Law of Evidence defines confession as an admission made at any time by a person charged with crime or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. The Privy Council in Narayana Swami v. Emperor Narayana Swami v. Emperor (1939)1 MLJ. 756: A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 47explained and dealt with this definition but did not follow it. In the words of the Privy Council, a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself a confession e.g., an admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused death with no explanation of any other man's possession. This view has been followed consistently by the Supreme Court. See Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 354: 1952 S.C.J. 545, Om Prakash 33. This view has been followed consistently by the Supreme Court. See Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 354: 1952 S.C.J. 545, Om Prakash 33. An almost identical case came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in K. Padayachi v. State of Tamil Nadu K. Padayachi v. State of Tamil Nadu 1972 MLJ.(Crl.) 251: (1972)1 S.C.J. 395:A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 66. In that case also the accused had injuries. While in police custody, the accused told the doctor that the injuries were caused by the deceased. The admissibility of this statement was challenged but the supreme Court held that it was properly admissible in evidence and should be relied upon as an admission under Sec.21 of the Evidence Act, and the admissibility is not barred under Sec.26 of the Evidence Act. That is because, the statement did not amount to confession. A confession must either admit in terms the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and an admission of a gravely incriminating fact even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession. If a statement falls short of such a plenary acknowledgment of guilt, it would not be a confession even though the statement is of some incriminating fact which taken along with other evidence tends to prove the guilt of the accused; such a statement is only an admission but not a confession. In these circumstances, we hold that the statements made by the accused to the doctor are not confessions under the Indian Evidence Act but are admissible under Sec.21 of the Evidence Act. xxx xxx xxx xxx [Paragraphs 34 to 41 regarding discussion of evidence omitted - Ed.] 42. Learned Sessions Judge has found, and we have agreed broadly with his conclusions, that the following circumstances have been satisfactorily established by the prosecution: 1. At about 4 a.m., in the early hours of the morning of 20.5.1981 Lissy was killed by cutting with sharp-edged weapons like M.Os.15 and 16 and incised injuries were inflicted on P.W.2 also with such weapons. 2. P.W.2, Lissy and the children were the only in-mates of the house. There has been no suggestion that anyone of the in-mates might have been responsible for the occurrence. 3. 2. P.W.2, Lissy and the children were the only in-mates of the house. There has been no suggestion that anyone of the in-mates might have been responsible for the occurrence. 3. The room in which Lissy and P.W.2 were sleeping had access from the terrace by opening the small door between the loft and the terrace since there were no shutters in between that room and the room in which the wooden ladder to the loft was kept. The evidence regarding inquest would show that blood stains were found in that room. 4. By climbing up the cement gas pipe attached to the latrine one could reach the terrace and then enter the scene of occurrence. Latent finger prints were seen on the gas pipe and there were foot marks on the adjacent wall of the latrine. This would clearly lead to the inference regarding the manner in which the assailants reached the scene of occurrence. 5. For about four or five years from 1970, first accused was working as domestic servant in the house of P.W.2. Her must have known that the confession of the door shutters between the loft and the terrace was such that they could be pushed open from outside. He must also have known that Lissy had gold ornaments. 6. Accused 1 and 3 were working together for sometime several years ago at Madras. Third accused desired to go to Persia. On the morning prior to the occurrence, first accused (who was wearing M.O.22 pants) met P.W.28 and enquired about the whereabouts of Lissy and left saying that he was going to Trichur. Three persons travelled in a bus from Trichur to Karukutty, reaching Karukutty Railway Station at about 8.30 p.m. They wanted to get down at a place where there was no bus stop and created a commotion when they were unable to do so. Three persons went to the tea shop of P.W.31's nephew Paul situated five kilometres away from Karukutty Railway Station. They consumed tea and bonus for which first accused made the payment. They have been identified as the three accused. First accused was wearing pants and had a black bag similar to M.O.18. They were seen near the shops of P.Ws.34 and 35. First accused asked for the way to Palissery Karippala. They consumed tea and bonus for which first accused made the payment. They have been identified as the three accused. First accused was wearing pants and had a black bag similar to M.O.18. They were seen near the shops of P.Ws.34 and 35. First accused asked for the way to Palissery Karippala. This was at about 11 p.m. At about mid-night, the three accused (one wearing pants and others mundu) were seen proceeding along the road from Poothamkutty to Mookkannur. 7. During night, M.O.25 cycle belonging to P.W.42 was stolen. Three unidentified persons (one of them wearing pants and others mundu) were seen rushing away along the road (at points one kilometre north of the scene and beyond), one of them pushing a cycle along a steep gradient. Near that place were seen lying M.O.27 series chappels. Three unidentified persons (one of them wearing pants and others mundu) were running westwards along the road. A cycle and a stone with blood were lying nearby. 8. Blured latent finger prints and a clear latent finger point identified as that of second accused were seen on the handle bar of the cycle. 9. The three accused, at the time of their arrest, were seen to have healing injuries. First accused had purchased band aid, a few days after the occurrence. The three accused told the doctor that they sustained the injuries on account of fall from cycle. 10. M.O.19 banian was found lying by roadside 300 metres away from the scene. That banian was purchased by the elder brother of first accused and kept in his house. 11. M.O.18 bag was recovered some distance away from the scene. Earlier, first accused was seen carrying a bag like M.O.18. 12. Latent finger prints of accused Nos.1 and 2 were found on the cement gas pipe attached to the latrine of P.W.2's house. 43. We have bestowed our anxious consideration to these circumstances which have been proved satisfactorily. We have no doubt in our mind that these circumstances constitute a chain of links which clearly, categorically and unerringly point to the guilt of accused 1 and 2 in regard to the crime. It is evident that they had yet another companion. 43. We have bestowed our anxious consideration to these circumstances which have been proved satisfactorily. We have no doubt in our mind that these circumstances constitute a chain of links which clearly, categorically and unerringly point to the guilt of accused 1 and 2 in regard to the crime. It is evident that they had yet another companion. There is room for strong suspicion against the third accused in view of the fact that he had known first accused earlier and wanted to go to Persia and was seen in the company of the other accused during the night and had injury also. But the failure of the prosecution to trace out his latent finger print either on the cycle or on the gas pipe would render it unsafe to hold that he was the third person in the company of accused 1 and 2. But there can be no doubt in the mind of any reasonable person that accused 1 and 2 were two among the three persons who proceeded to the scene of occurrence during the night and committed the murder of Lissy and inflicted injuries on P.W.2. The circumstances are wholly consistent with their guilt and totally inconsistent with their innocence. Accused 1 and 2 offer no explanation for anyone of the incriminating circumstances marshalled by the prosecution. In these circumstances, we find that the learned Sessions Judge was justified in holding that the guilt of accused 1 and, 2 has been established beyond the reasonable doubt. 44. Lissy died almost instantaneously. One of the. injuries has been shown to be necessarily fatal. The injuries must have been inflicted with sharp-edged weapons similar to M.Os.15 and 16. There can be no doubt that these injuries were inflicted by accused 1 and 2, singly or jointly, with the intention of causing the death of Lissy. They have been rightly found guilty of the offence punishable under Sec.302 , I.P.C., read with Sec.34, I.P.C., in that regard. 45. The injuries found on P.W.2 were no doubt simple injuries. The injuries were found on the right side of the fact cutting the parotid gland and on the back of the left shoulder. These injuries also must have been inflicted using sharp-edged weapons like M.Os.15 and 16. The medical evidence shows that had the first injury been slightly lower, the carotid artery would have been cut resulting in death. The injuries were found on the right side of the fact cutting the parotid gland and on the back of the left shoulder. These injuries also must have been inflicted using sharp-edged weapons like M.Os.15 and 16. The medical evidence shows that had the first injury been slightly lower, the carotid artery would have been cut resulting in death. From the nature of the attack on Lissy, it must be taken to be established that P.W.2 also was attacked with the intention of causing his death. Luckily, he survived. We find that the learned Sessions Judge was justified in holding that it was a case of attempted murder punishable under Sec.307 , I.P.C., read with Sec.34, I.P.C. 46. Accused 1 and 2 committed house trespass with a view to commit these offences. There can therefore be no doubt either about their guilt under Sec.460, I.P.C. From the nature of the preparations made for crime, from the nature of the crime itself and the conduct of the two accused, there can be no doubt that the various overt acts were committed in pursuance of the common intention entertained by both of them to commit the murder of P.W.2 and Lissy. The conviction entered against them under Secs. 302 , 307 and 460 , I.P.C. read with Sec.34, I.P.C., does not warrant interference. We find the sentences imposed also to be proper and justified. 47. We are inclined to agree that the offence under Sec.380, I.P.C., has not been established. This charge centers round M.O.1 torch. Recovery of the torch appears to be rather suspicious. Therefore, we do not find any ground to interfere with this acquittal. 48. The State is dissatisfied with the acquittal of the third accused. We have already indicated that though there are certain items of circumstantial evidence against the third accused, in the absence of discovery of his finger prints either on the cycle or near the scene, it would not be sufficient to hold him guilty of any of the offences. We therefore decline to interfere with his acquittal. 49. We have already indicated that though there are certain items of circumstantial evidence against the third accused, in the absence of discovery of his finger prints either on the cycle or near the scene, it would not be sufficient to hold him guilty of any of the offences. We therefore decline to interfere with his acquittal. 49. It is brought to our notice that accused 2 and 3 are undergoing life sentence on conviction for an offence under Sec. 302, I.P.C., read with Sec.34, I.P.C. It is declared that the life sentence imposed on the present second accused in that case shall run concurrently with the life sentence imposed on him in this case. In the result, we dismiss the appeals. Appeals dismissed.