Judgment :- 1. These two second appeals revolve round the interpretation of a Will executed by a common ancestor of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7. The first respondent in both the appeals is the plaintiff in the suit for partition and separate possession of 1/6th share in the suit properties. Admittedly, the suit properties belong to one Sooryanarayana Chetti who died in 1928. By his will dated 25-1-1926 he bequeathed the suit properties and other properties in favour of his wife Thiruvengadathammal. The latter executed a will dated 13-5-1931, distributing her properties among her grandsons, sons and others. Thiruvengadathammal had two sons and a daughter. The plaintiff in this suit is the daughter of one of the sons of Thiruvengadathammal, viz, Chidambaram Chettiar. The first defendant is the brother of the plaintiff. The second defendant is the daughter of Thiruvengadathammal. Defendants 3 to 6 are the grandchildren of Thiruvengadathammal through her other son Manikavasagam Chettiar. The seventh defendant is the wife of the first defendant. The 6th defendant died pending suit and her legal representatives were brought on record as defendants 48 to 51. Thiruvengadathammal died on 14-5-1931. According to the plaintiff, the present suit properties fell to the share of Chockalinga Chettiar another brother of the plaintiff. Chockalingam had a daughter, by name Gomathi who predeceased him. Chockalingam died on 16.3.1957. The plaintiff claims that Chockalingam had only a life estate in the properties and on his death, there was a reverter to Thiruvengadathammal, the testatrix and as she had already passed away, the property devolved on her heirs and that the plaintiff was thereby entitled to 1/6th share and the other shares belong to defendants 1 to 7. Defendants 7 to 46 were alienees in possession of various properties and they were claiming under alienations made by Chockalingam Chettiar as well as Gomathi. According to the plaintiff, any right acquired by the alienees came to an end on the death of Chockalingam Chettiar and that she was entitled to partition and separate possession of the properties. Hence she has filed the present suit. 2. The alienees contended that by separate written statements that the plaintiffs claim of reverter to Thiruvengadathammals estate on the death of Chockalingam was unsustainable and that on a proper construction of the will of Thiruvengadathammal, the property belonged to Chockalingam absolutely. Hence she has filed the present suit. 2. The alienees contended that by separate written statements that the plaintiffs claim of reverter to Thiruvengadathammals estate on the death of Chockalingam was unsustainable and that on a proper construction of the will of Thiruvengadathammal, the property belonged to Chockalingam absolutely. Some of the defendants contended that the suit was barred by limitation. Some others claim to have prescribed title by adverse possession. It was also contended by some of the defendants that Chockalingam Chettiar had left him surviving his third wife, by name, Meenakshi, and that he had a son by name Easki and as they were alive, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any right in the suit property. It is not necessary for me to set out in detail the various contentions raised in the written statements as the entire matter will depend upon the interpretation of the will of Thiruvengadathammal. 3. Both the Courts below have taken the view that Chockalingam got only a life estate under the will of Thiruvengadathammal and on his death, there was a reverter to Thiruvengadathammals estate and the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7 being heirs of Thiruvengadatbammal, were entitled to the property. The contention that Chockalingams third wife and a son through her, were alive was not accepted by the courts below. Consequently, the courts below have passed a preliminary decree for partition of plaintiffs 1/6th share and for 1/12th share of each, of defendants 3 and 4 in the suit properties other than items 8 to 11, of the second schedule and item 3 of the 8th schedule. There is no necessity for me to refer to the controversy regarding the items excluded by the courts below from the purview of the decree for partition, as it is not the subjectmatter of the second appeal. 4. It will be convenient to give the genealogy of the parties so that the facts can be understood in a better manner— Table It will be seen therefrom that Thiruvengadathammal had two sons and a daughter. At the time when she executed the will, her son Chidambaram Chettiar had a daughter and two sons while the other son Manickavasagam Chettiar had 3 sons and 2 daughters. At the time when she executed the will, her son Chidambaram Chettiar had a daughter and two sons while the other son Manickavasagam Chettiar had 3 sons and 2 daughters. Before proceeding to consider the terms of the will, I must refer to the well known note of caution issued by Joyce, J. in Stanford v. Sanford1, in the following terms:— “It has been said by the court of appeal that the true way to construe a will is to form an opinion apart from the decided cases, and then to see whether these decisions require any modification of that opinion; not to begin by considering how far the will in question resembles other wills upon which decisions have been given.” The learned Judge has also quoted the dictum of Kay, J. in Williams v. Pounder 1, which runs as follows:— “The rule is to construe a will at res magis valent quam pereat, and to give effect, so far as possible, to all the words used by the testator.” This principle has been reiterated by our court including the Supreme Court in several cases. The terms of one document are never identical with the terms of another document and the interpretation of the document in question has to be only on the basis of all the terms of the said document. Now turning to the will in question, the testatrix has bequeathed the properties set out in the first schedule thereto to her grandsons through Chidambaram Chettiar, viz., Sooryanarayanan and Chockalingam. She has made clear that they should not alienate the property in any manner during their life time and that they had only a right to enjoy the income from the properties. She has also expressly stated that if they create any sort of encumbrance that will not be valid in law. After conferring such estate on them, she has stated that after their life time, the property should be taken by the male santhathi or santhathis born to them, who shall take it absolutely. It is better to extract this portion of the will in Tamil as that has given rise to the controversy before this Court:— Tamil 5. With regard to the properties in Schedule 1-A of the will, they have been bequeathed to the son of the testatrix Chidambaram Chettair absolutely. It is better to extract this portion of the will in Tamil as that has given rise to the controversy before this Court:— Tamil 5. With regard to the properties in Schedule 1-A of the will, they have been bequeathed to the son of the testatrix Chidambaram Chettair absolutely. The properties set out in second schedule have been given to the three grandsons through Manickavasagam on similar terms as are found with reference to the sons of Chidambaram Chettiar. The properties described in the third schedule have been bequeathed in favour of grand daughter Parvatha Ammal who is the daughter of Manickavasagam Chettiar. Again the legatee gets only a life estate and the remainder is given to her male santhathi or santhathis. The fourth schedule properties are given to one Cheliathammal alias Vairathammal, who is the daughter of the sister of the testatrix. Here again what is given to is only life estate and the vested remainder is given absolutely to the male varisu (heirs) of the legatee. The fifth schedule is given for charitable purposes, and the 6th schedule is given to Sivagnanathammal, wife of Manickavasagam Chettiar. Here also, the legatee gets only a life estate and remainder is given to the sons of Manickavasagam Chettiar absolutely. It is not necessary to refer to the other clauses of the will. 6. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the two grandsons Sooryanarayanan and Chockalingam who are sons of Chidambaram Chettiar got only a life estate in the properties given to them and after their life time, the properties should go to their respective male child or male children and as in this case there was no male issue for Chockalingam his share reverted to the estate of Thiruvengadathammal to be taken by her heirs. This contention has been accepted by the courts below. The courts below h ave taken the view that the words ‘’ or ‘’ would only refer to male issue or male issues. In other words, they would refer to male issue in singular and male issues in plural. The courts below have also alternatively considered whether the term would include female issues also. The courts below h ave taken the view that the words ‘’ or ‘’ would only refer to male issue or male issues. In other words, they would refer to male issue in singular and male issues in plural. The courts below have also alternatively considered whether the term would include female issues also. They have taken the view that even assuming that female issues would be included within the meaning of that term, such female issues shall take only a contingent interest and the property would vest in them only in the absence of any male issue at the time of death of Chockalingam. On the facts of this case, the only female issue, viz., Gomathi, having died during the life time of Chockalingam, the conclusion of the Courts below is that her contingent interest lapsed and life estate of Chockalingam continued to be so without any enlargement. 7. The cardinal maxim to be followed by courts in construing a will is to ascertain the significant intention of the testator. The intention has to be gathered primarily from the language of the document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have thought if she had been better informed. On a proper reading of the entire document in question, I am of the view that the construction adopted by the Courts below on the relevant clauses is erroneous. It is seen from the will that the testatrix intended to distribute the estate among her descendants and desired that it should not be frittered away by the direct legatee. She wanted the properties to reach the hands of her great-grand children. She did not want any collaterals of her grandsons to take a share in them. There is no indication whatever to exclude females or deny them the right of succession. On the other hand, we find that she has made direct bequests to her grand-daughter, sisters daughter and her own daughter-in-law. She did not want to confine her bounty to males only. The words used in the relevant clauses are . The Tamil word is equavelant to ‘or’ indicating an alternative. It is quite obvious that her first choice was male santhathi! Santhathi is a Sanskrit word freely and normally used in Tamil also. It is a term of wide import. It means ‘descendants’ or ‘issues’. The words used in the relevant clauses are . The Tamil word is equavelant to ‘or’ indicating an alternative. It is quite obvious that her first choice was male santhathi! Santhathi is a Sanskrit word freely and normally used in Tamil also. It is a term of wide import. It means ‘descendants’ or ‘issues’. In some of the decisions of this Court, it has been pointed out that the term ‘santhathi’ can be understood to mean not merely the children but also childrens children, childrens childrens children etc. In the context will mean male descendant or male issue. That itself will include and mean the plural of them too. That term is itself sufficient to cover all the male issues if there are more than one. When the testatrix provided for an alternative by using the word it can only mean that in the absence of a male issue, she wanted the property to be taken by other specified persons. One cannot expect that in the year 1931, an old woman in India introduced a clause with a sort of legislative meticulousness providing for singularity and plurality of great-grandsons. When the testatrix provided for an alternative bequest in the event of a failure of the first bequest, she has again used the term . Necessarily, this refers to descendants other than male descendants. Her intention was that if her grandson had male issues such male issues should take the properties and in the absence of them other issues or descendants of her grandsons should take the property. Consequently, Gomathi, the daughter of Chockalingam was entitled to get the property on the termination of the estate of Chockalingam. 8. The questions that will arise are, when did the estate vest in Gomathi and whether such an estate was a vested interest or a contingent one? It is a well known rule of construction that vesting should not be postponed for long. If a construction by which immediate vesting is possible, the same should be adopted. In this case Gomathi got a vested right as soon as she was born and it was liable to be defeated by the birth of a son to Chockalingam. As Chockalingam did not have any son, the vested interest of Gomathi was never defeated. On her death, her interest devolved upon Chockalingam, her father. There is no dispute that Chocklingam was the only heir of Gomathi. As Chockalingam did not have any son, the vested interest of Gomathi was never defeated. On her death, her interest devolved upon Chockalingam, her father. There is no dispute that Chocklingam was the only heir of Gomathi. In fact, in a prior suit O.S. 53 of 1950, Sub Court. Thirunelveli, in which the members of the family were parties, Gomathi was also one of the defendants and on her death, her father Chockalingam was recorded as her legal representative. 9. For adopting the aforesaid construction of the will, I derive support from the decision of a Division Bench in Nagaraja Iyer v. Seethalahshmi Ammal 1 . In that case, one Lakshmiammal executed a deed of settlement in favour of her brothers daughter Sivakamiammal, giving her a life estate and providing that after her lifetime, her male children and in their absence her female issue shall take the same with absolute rights. It was also provided that in the event of there being no issue whatever, the settlees mother Seethalakshmi Ammal and her heirs should take the property with absolute rights. The Division Bench held that what was given to Seethalakshmiammal, the mother of the settlee was a vested remainder, the time of distribution being the date of death of the settlee which was liable to be defeated if at that point of time, there were descendants of the settlee. It was held by the Bench that the intentation of the settlor was that the settlee should have a life interest and her mother a vested remainder in the property and that remainder was liable to be defeated if there was any issue of the settlee living at her death, and as that, contingency did not happen the defeasance clause in favour of the issue of the settlee never took effect. 10. Applying the rule laid down in that case, I hold that the vested remainder in the present case was with Gomathi which was liable to be defeated by the birth of a son to Chockalingam. The same principle has been reiterated in Ramasami v. Venkatammal 1 , by another Bench decision of this Court. The earlier Bench decision referred to above has been followed in this decision. The same principle has been reiterated in Ramasami v. Venkatammal 1 , by another Bench decision of this Court. The earlier Bench decision referred to above has been followed in this decision. The Bench has observed as follows:— “It can also be stated as a well recognised principle that even where the bequest is dependant upon a contingency, it will not necessarily prevent vesting of the estate till that contingency happens. Law favours early vesting of property In Hals-burs Laws of England, 3rd Edn. volume 39, at page 1120 it is stated—‘In cases where there is a doubt as to the time of vesting, the presumption is in favour of the early vesting of the gift, and, accordingly, it vests at the testators death or at the earliest moment after that date which is possible in the context, whether it is of real or personal estate; and it is presumed that the testator intended the right to be vested, subject to being divested, rather than to remain in suspense. The presumption is especially applicable in cases where the interest created is a remainder, the reason being that keeping the remainder contingent might in many cases exclude the issue of a person intended to take in tail by the parents dying before the remainder became vested.” 11. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan appearing for the plaintiff-first respondent draws my attention to the decision of a Division Bench in Sundararamier, K.M.S.L. v. K.N. Sarojini 2 , and contends that the word ‘santhathi’ should in the context be interpreted as ‘male descendant only’. In that case, the Bench had to deal with a provision for line of succession of trusteeship. Having regard to the year in which the document in question was executed and having regard to all the circumstances of the family in that case and various other factors, the Bench took the view that the settlor intended the devolution of the trusteeship only along the male line and that the word ‘santhathi’ was used in a restricted sense meaning a male heir. That decision will not help the plaintiff in this case, as the facts are entirely different. This is not a case relating to trusteeship. Further, I have already pointed out the various clauses of the will whereby the testatrix had conferred benefits on females also. 12. The next decision that is relied upon by Mr. That decision will not help the plaintiff in this case, as the facts are entirely different. This is not a case relating to trusteeship. Further, I have already pointed out the various clauses of the will whereby the testatrix had conferred benefits on females also. 12. The next decision that is relied upon by Mr. Rajagopalan is that of the Supreme Court in Rajee Kantha v. Smt. Santhi Devi 1 , The Supreme Court points out the difference between a contingent interest and vested interest and has held that in that case, the interest that was taken by the settlee was a vested interest. This decision does not in any way help the plaintiff in the present case. 13. Mr. Rajagopalan then relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in Rukhmanbai v. Shivram 2. In that case, the question which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether a life estate holder could lease out agricultural lands and whether the prohibition in the document against any alienation by the life estate holder would affect the validity of such lease. While holding that the life estate holder had a right to lease out the property as it was part of the administration of the estate, the Supreme Court observed that during the life time of the estate holder, the estate was vested in her and that her interest was not a contingent one I do not seek any how this decision helps the plaintiff. 14. From the materials on record, I find that the members of the family have also understood the terms of the will only in the aforesaid manner. Prior to the present suit there was a litigation by Shanmughasundarathammal who is the 7th defendant in the present case. She filed O.S.53 of 1950 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tirunelveli, against her husband Suryanarayanan on the basis of a settlement deed executed by him in 1944. She claimed the relief of partition and separate possession of the half share belonging to Suryanarayanan out of the properties bequeathed by Thiruvengadathammal. As we have seen earlier. Thiruvengadathammal gave the properties described in Schedule I of her will to both the grandsons Suryanarayanan and Chockalingam to be enjoyed by them for their life. After Suryanarayanan settled his share on Shanmugasundarathammal, she filed the suit O.S.53 of 1950 for a partition. In that suit, Chockalingam was the second defendant. As we have seen earlier. Thiruvengadathammal gave the properties described in Schedule I of her will to both the grandsons Suryanarayanan and Chockalingam to be enjoyed by them for their life. After Suryanarayanan settled his share on Shanmugasundarathammal, she filed the suit O.S.53 of 1950 for a partition. In that suit, Chockalingam was the second defendant. The other members of the family belonging to other branches were also impleaded therein. During the pendency of that suit, Gomathi died and Chockalingam was recorded as her legal representative. This shows that in the opinion of the parties, Gomathi got an interest in the properties and that was a heritable interest which passed on to her father on her death. Of course, I am not guided by the opinion of the parties while coustruing Ex.A1. I am only pointing out that my interpretation is also supported by the conduct of the parties. It must also be pointed out that plaintiff herself purchased some items of the suit properties from Chockalingam under Ex.B1 treating him as absolute owner thereof. The said properties were already subject to two othis executed by Chockalingam and plaintiff had undertaken to discharge the said othis as part of the consideration for her purchase. In fact, the othidars as well as their assigness have been made parties to the present suit, though not in the first instance, impleaded subsequently. 15. In view of the construction placed by me on the terms of the will Ex.A1, I have to hold that the plaintiff in the present suit cannot claim any interest in the suit properties as an heir of Thiruvengadathammal. The plaintiff will only be entitled to whatever she has purchased under Ex.B1 subject to the terms thereof. 16. Mr. B. Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant in S.A.365 of 1981 raised also a contention that the suit was barred by limitation. Chockalingam died on 16-3-1957. The suit was originally instituted in the court of the District Munsif, Tirunelveli, on 13-3-1969. It was found that the valuation of the properties exceeded the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court of the District Munsif and the plaint was returned for presentation before proper court. The return was made on 8-1-1971 and the plaint was presented in Sub-Court, Tirunelveli on 11-1-1971. The contention of Mr. It was found that the valuation of the properties exceeded the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court of the District Munsif and the plaint was returned for presentation before proper court. The return was made on 8-1-1971 and the plaint was presented in Sub-Court, Tirunelveli on 11-1-1971. The contention of Mr. Kumar is that the suit must be deemed to have been filed only on 11-1-1971 for the first time as this cannot be treated as a continuation of the suit filed in the Court of the District Munsif. The said date of presentation viz., 11-1-1971, being beyond the period of 12 years from the date of death of Chockalingam, the suit must be held to be barred by the provisions of Art. 65 of the Limitation Act, Art. 65 of the Limitation Act reads thus:— Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period beings to run 65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein bassed on title twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Explanation:—For the purpose of this Article:— (a) Where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainderman, reversioner or devisee, as the case may be, falls into possession. Explanations (b) and (c) omitted as they are not relevant.) 17. It is seen from that under explanation (a) when the suit is filed by remainderman or a reversioner, the possession of the defendant is deemed to become adverse when the estate of the remainderman or reversioner falls into possession. In other words, the plaintiffs estate as reversioner will fall into her possession on 16-3-1957 when Chockalingam died and the possession of the defendant is deemed to be adverse from that date and the suit should have been filed within 12 years therefrom viz., on or before 15-3-1969. The only way to get over the bar of limitation is to invoke the aid of S.14 of the Limitation Act, and exclude the period during which the suit was pending in the District Munsif Court, i.e. from 13-3-1969 to 8-1-1971. The only way to get over the bar of limitation is to invoke the aid of S.14 of the Limitation Act, and exclude the period during which the suit was pending in the District Munsif Court, i.e. from 13-3-1969 to 8-1-1971. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that in order to invoke S.14 of the Limitation Act, there must be a specific averment and pleading in the plaint as required by O.7, R.6, C.P.C. It is pointed out that in the present plaint, there is absolutely no averment whatever which would enable the plaintiff to claim an exemption from the bar of limitation. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Sha Manmal Misrimal v. Radhakrishna 1 that in the absence of a pleading of the grounds of exemption the plaintiff cannot rely on the exemption. Of course the proviso introduced in 1976 enables the court to permit the plaintiff to put forth additional grounds of exemption if they are not inconsistent with the grounds already pleaded. 18. It has been laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ramdutt Ramkissendas v. E.D. Sassoon and Co. 2, that where a suit has been instituted in a court which is found to have no jurisdiction and a second suit has been filed in a court of proper jurisdiction, the second suit cannot be regarded as a continuation of the first even though the subject matter and the parties to the suits were identical. Mr. Kumar relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Madhav Rao v. Ramkrishna 3 and contends that the burden of proving the entitlement to the benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act is upon the plaintiff and if he does not discharge that burden, that would not shift to the defendant to show the contrary. In that decision, the Supreme Court referred to the definition of ‘good faith’ in the Limitation Act, and held that for the purposes of S.14, the said definition should be applied. According to the Supreme Court, it is for the plaintiff to prove that the institution and prosecution of the first suit in the court of the District Munsif was done with due care and attention. 19. It is contended by Mr. According to the Supreme Court, it is for the plaintiff to prove that the institution and prosecution of the first suit in the court of the District Munsif was done with due care and attention. 19. It is contended by Mr. Kumar that in the present case there was an earlier litigation viz, O.S. 53 of 1950, in which the properties involved in this present suit were also the subject matter and that the valuation of the properties was well known to the plaintiff. According to him, the plaintiff did not act bona fide , when he valued the suit properties at a low figure and instituted the suit in the Court of the District Munsif. He refers to the fact that the first schedule to the plaint contains several buildings and the value thereof according to the Panchayat Register was Rs. 42,000. One significant fact that should be referred to in this connection is that P.W.1 the husband of the plaintiff has admitted that it was he who conducted the prior litigation O.S. 53 of 1950 on behalf of the plaintiff therein, who was related to him in more than one way. He admits that it is he who conducts the present litigation also. If the same person has conducted both the litigations, viz, O.S. 53 of 1950 and the present one, there is absolutely no justification for any wrong notion with regard to the value of the properties and fixing it at a low figure which will fall within the jurisdiction of District Munsif, Tirunelveli. The contention urged on behalf of the appellants that there was no good faith on the part of the plaintiff in filing the suit in the first instance in the court of the District Munsif has great force and cannot be rejected. There is absolutely no reason as to why the plaintiff waited for almost the entire period of 12 years after the death of Chockalingam before filing the present suit. The alienees who had been under the impression that Chockalingam was the absolute owner of the properties dealt with by him made valuable improvements on the properties by spending huge amounts as is apparent from their evidence. In fact the trial court has upheld the claim for compensation made by defendants 9, 10 and 26 to 31. 20. In answer to contention of the appellants Mr. In fact the trial court has upheld the claim for compensation made by defendants 9, 10 and 26 to 31. 20. In answer to contention of the appellants Mr. Rajagopalan appearing for the first respondent, submits that there is no plea of limitation in the written statements. This is not factually correct, as I find that the plea has been raised specifically in so many terms in the written statements of defendants 17 and 39, 40 to 42, and 44 to 46. In view of the same, the decisions in Peermohamed v. Kassim 1, and Banarsidas v. Kanshiram 2 relied upon by Mr. Rajagopalan cannot apply to this case. 21. It is next contended by Mr. Rajagopalan that even if the plea of limitation was raised in the trial court, as no issue was framed by the trial court on the question of limitation, it should be deemed to have been waived by the defendants. In this connection, reliance is placed on the decisions in Virayya v. Ademma 3 , and Shaik Budean Sab v. Nagamma 4 . I am of the opinion that neither of the decisions can be applied to the facts of the present case in view of the mandatory provisions of O.7, R.6, C.P.C., referred to earlier. It is for the plaintiff, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, to plead and prove the exemption from the bar of limitation. In both the cases referred to above, the starting point of limitation required to be proved by evidence. But this is a case in which the suit has been admittedly filed after the expiry of the period of limitation and but for the aid of S.14 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit. The doctrine of waiver as laid down by the aforesaid two decisions cannot apply to the facts of the present case. 22. Mr. Rajagopalan places strong reliance on the following passage in the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Rampal v. Diwan Devi 5. “S.14 of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. 22. Mr. Rajagopalan places strong reliance on the following passage in the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Rampal v. Diwan Devi 5. “S.14 of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding against the defendant shall be excluded where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in a good faith in a court which from a defect of jurisdiction is unable to entertain it. The expression good faith qualifies prosecuting the proceeding in the court which ultimately is found to have no jurisdiction. Failure to pay the requisite court fee found deficient on a contention being raised or the error of judgment in valuing a suit filed before a court which was ultimately found to have no jurisdiction has absolutely nothing to do with the question of good faith in prosecuting the suit as provided in S.14 of the Limitation Act. The High Court in our opinion was in error in holding that defective valuation and improper computation of court fees discloses a lack of good faith on the part of the plain tiff.” 23. The aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court will not help the plaintiff in the present case in view of the facts referred to already. As pointed out already, the plaintiff was a party to O.S. 53 of 1950 and all present suit properties were the subject matter thereof. Admittedly the husband of the plaintiff conducted that litigation and is conducting the present litigation also. It cannot be said that the defective valuation of the properties in the present suit was due to any bona fide mistake. In fact, the plaintiff has omitted to include certain properties in the first instance and she added them later and impleaded some more parties. A perusal of the order of the court of the District Munsif returning the plaint will show that the defective valuation was not due to any bona fide reasons and there was clear lack of good faith on the part of the plaintiff. 24. The decision in Ramaswami v. Veeroyyan Raja 6, relied upon by Mr. A perusal of the order of the court of the District Munsif returning the plaint will show that the defective valuation was not due to any bona fide reasons and there was clear lack of good faith on the part of the plaintiff. 24. The decision in Ramaswami v. Veeroyyan Raja 6, relied upon by Mr. Rajagopalan will not help him, because in that case, the plaint was presented originally in a court having jurisdiction and at a later stage, as a result of a finding of the value of the subject matter of the suit, the plaint was returned for presentation to proper court. It cannot be said in this case that the court of the District Munsif had jurisdiction to entertain the suit when it was filed originally. Even at that time the value of the properties a was such that the suit was outside the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif. 25. In view of the aforesaid facts, I must hold that the present suit is barred by limitation. 26. On the aforesaid conclusions of mine, the present suit has to be dismissed in entirety. But, it is found that the two second appeals have been filed only by some of the defendants. S.A. 365 of 1981 is filed by defendants 9, 10, 17, 19, 20, 21, 32 and 44 while S.A. 380 of 1981 has been filed by defendants 26 to 32 only. The other defendants, who are alienees have not chosen to file any appeal. Nor have they been made parties to any of the appeals by the appellants herein. I do not think this to be a fit case to exercise my discretion under O.41, R.4, C.P.C., and give the benefits of my decision to persons who are not parties to the appeals. Hence, I allow the appeals only with reference to the appellants in the two appeals. The decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge of Tirunelveli and confirmed by the learned District Judge of Tirunelveli will be set aside only with reference to defendants 9, 10, 17, 19, 20, 21, 26 to 32 and 44 only and the properties owned by them and the suit as against them will stand dismissed. Both parties will bear their respective costs throughout. The decree passed with reference to the other defendants and other properties will not be disturbed. 27. Both parties will bear their respective costs throughout. The decree passed with reference to the other defendants and other properties will not be disturbed. 27. C.M.P. 12907 and 13315 of 1986:—In these petitions, the appellants seek permission to raise additional grounds regarding the question of limitation. I have already dealt with the question of limitation and these petitions are consequently allowed. However, I must point out that in C.M.P. 12907 of 1986, a ground is sought to be raised to the effect that Chockalingam Chettiars second wife Thayammal, is alive and the suit properties having devolved on Thayammal as the santhathi of Chockalingam Chettiar, the plaintiff has no right to the property. Curiously, in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it is stated that the fact that Chockalingam Chettiars wife Thayammal is alive came to the knowledge of the deponent only recently. I find from the records that Chockalingam Chettiars wife Thayammal was impleaded in the suit in the trial court as defendant No. 33. In fact in some of the writen statements filed by defendants, the existence of Thayammal had been referred to and it was only on such reference she was impleaded as party by the plaintiff. It is rather strange that the appellants in S.A. 365 of 1981 should claim that they came to know of the existence of Thayammal only recently. At any rate, the existence of Thayammal would not in any way alter the situation. If Chockalingam Chettiar had only a life estate and the vested remainder reverted to the estate of Thiruvengadathammal, then, Thayammal would not get any interest in the property by devolution. If on the other hand, Chockalingam got an absolute state on the death of his daughter. Gomathi, as held by me, it is not open to Thayammal, to challenge the alienations made by him. Consequently, the existence of Thayammal would not alter the result of the appeal. 28. C.M.P. 7155 and 7156 of 1984:—These two petitions are for amending the decree of the trial court and the lower appellate court to bring them in accordance with the judgments. In view of the fact that the suit has been dismissed as against the appellant in S.A. 380 of 1981, there is no necessity for any amendment of the decree. The decree of courts below will be modified in accordance with this judgment of mine. In view of the fact that the suit has been dismissed as against the appellant in S.A. 380 of 1981, there is no necessity for any amendment of the decree. The decree of courts below will be modified in accordance with this judgment of mine. There will be no order as to costs in any of the C.M.Ps.