JUDGMENT Parmeshwar Dayal, J. - This writ Petition was originally filed by Ram Gopal who died during the pendency of writ petition and his son Ram Kumar was substituted in his place. 2. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the orders contained in Annexures 2 and 4. 3. The dispute relates to house No. 722, situate in Rakabganj, Faizabad. The opposite party No. 3 Gopal Krishna has been the landlord of the house and Ram Gopal has been the tenant of its ground floor for a number of years. Gopal Krishna resided in the adjacent house No. 722. He purchased the disputed house No. 722 in the year 1970. In the first floor of this house there was an office of Jan Sangh. In June, 1971, the first floor of the disputed house was vacated and landlord entered into occupation of the same. The landlord then moved an application under Section 21 (1)(b) of Act 13 of 1972 for possession of the disputed house on the grounds that it was in a dilapidated condition and it required demolition and reconstruction, The tenant Ram Gopal, now Ram Kumar, claimed that the landlord after entering into possession of the first floor damaged the roofs etc. of the first floor with an intention of evicting him. He filed a Civil Suit No. 317 of 1971 in which suit, temporary injunction was granted in his favour and the landlord was restrained from further damaging the condition of the first floor of the disputed house. The landlord filed Misc. Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1975 which was dismissed. The judgment is contained in Annexure1. In that suit, the tenant Ram Gopal was permitted to make necessary constructions and the petitioner claimed that he carried out the repairs and now the disputed house has not been in a dilapidated condition. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application under Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act, vide order contained in Annexuie2, against which order the tenant Ram Gopal filed Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1979 which was dismissed on 12111982. 4. The application of the landlord was allowed by the Prescribed Authority on a previous occasion also and on appeal the case was remanded whereafter the impugned orders were passed. 5. 4. The application of the landlord was allowed by the Prescribed Authority on a previous occasion also and on appeal the case was remanded whereafter the impugned orders were passed. 5. The contention of the petitioner has been that during the pendency of Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1979, he moved an application for local inspection and the Presiding Officer of that appellate Court made a local inspection and endorsed his local inspection note on 2141982, as contained in Annexure3, whereby he found that the condition of the disputed premises was not dilapidated. He further claimed that after that the Presiding Officer was transferred. The judgment in Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1979 was given by another Presiding Officer and till then the landlord tried to delay the disposal. He has assailed these orders contained in Annexures2 and 4 on the ground that there has been a distinction between a dilapidated building and a damaged building and that it was the act of the landlord that the building became damaged since the landlord wanted to evict him. 6. Section 21 (1)(b) reads that the Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely: 21 (1)(b) "that the building is in dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction". 7. In the aforesaid Section itself there is nothing to reveal that if the house is not in a dilapidated condition and it is damaged then in the latter case what result would follow and if there should be any distinction in that event In the case of Smt. Chando Devi and others v. lllrd Additional District Judge, Mathura (1984 All LJ 556: 1984 (2) LCD 45), it was held that the word "dilapidated"' cannot be read in isolation or divorced from the context in which it is used. Requirement of reconstruction gives clue to the sense in which the word "dilapidated" should be understood. In order to attract Section 21(1) (b) the building in question must be beyond repairs and it has to be demolished and reconstructed. Requirement of reconstruction gives clue to the sense in which the word "dilapidated" should be understood. In order to attract Section 21(1) (b) the building in question must be beyond repairs and it has to be demolished and reconstructed. The legislature intended by introducing Section 21(1) (b) of the Act that a dilapidated building shall be that building which is decayed in the natural course and not that which is made dilapidated deliberately. This is why nothing about the damaged building has been mentioned in the Act. So, it has to be seen if the landlord has deliberately damaged the building with a view to evict the tenant as the landlord was interested in evicting the tenant. If it is made permissible to a landlord to damage or make his building dilapidated for achieving his ends of evicting the tenant, there would be a gross misuse of the provisions of Act 13 of 1972. 8. The appellate Court in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1975 has observed in its judgment that obviously the first floor was kept by the defendantlandlord in order to cause damage to the roof itself. The appellate court in that case did not hold that it was dilapidated in the natural course of events. Rather, it held that it was damaged as the words "certain resultant damage to the house was also to be got repaired in decayed/' The Presiding Officer of the appellate Court also, during his inspection, found that the building in question was not in a dilapidated condition. Rather, it was damaged and that it was the first floor only which was not habitable as contained in Annexure3. Any objection against these observations was not filed by the landlord. Then, in paras 9,45 and 46 of the counter affidavit of the landlord it was mentioned that the visual look of the house was changed at the time of local inspection and that by the patch work conducted by the tenant, the real state of affairs remained underguised. All these facts indicate that the first floor of the disputed house was damaged by the landlord himself and subsequent repairs were carried by the tenant to an extent that the building no more remained dilapidated as contemplated by the word "dilapidated" in the Act. All these facts indicate that the first floor of the disputed house was damaged by the landlord himself and subsequent repairs were carried by the tenant to an extent that the building no more remained dilapidated as contemplated by the word "dilapidated" in the Act. These facts further indicate that the damage caused to the disputed building was not such that it could not be repaired. 9. The opposite party landlord relied on the various reports given by the Advocate Commissioners and Junior Engineer regarding the dilapidated condition of the disputed premises. He further referred to the notice issued by the Nagarpalika contained in Annexure C15 of his counter affidavit. But these reports and the notice of Nagarpalika are of no avail to the landlord. It is on record itself that the building in question was repaired to such an extent that it could not be called to be in a dilapidated condition after the year 1982, and the notice from Nagarpalika could be no proof against these facts established by the record. 10. The landlord relied on the case of R. D. Gupta v. Additional District Judge, and others (1976 All India Rent Control Journal 502) in which case it was held that while considering the meaning of the word "dilapidated", it has to be kept in mind that the building must be in a ruinous condition or fallen down and that it is not correct that it is unsafe or unfit for habitation. It was further held that if a part of the building is in a damaged or disrepairs requiring reconstruction, the same may fulfil the requirements of the word "dilapidated". Obviously, this case is not helpful to the landlord because the tenant has been living in that building and he has made repairs in that building to such an extent that it is not in dangerous condition. If the first floor of the building was purposely damaged by the landlord, he cannot take advantage of his own wrong or mischief or excesses. He further relied on the case of Smt. Chandrawati v. District Judge, Pauri and others ( 1979 AWC 632 ) in which case the word "dilapidated" was defined as a building which was in a state of decay or of partial ruin or disrepair. He further relied on the case of Smt. Chandrawati v. District Judge, Pauri and others ( 1979 AWC 632 ) in which case the word "dilapidated" was defined as a building which was in a state of decay or of partial ruin or disrepair. If the first floor of the disputed building was damaged, it cannot be said that the entire building was partially ruined before it was duly repaired. It was not in a state of decay. So this case is not helpful to the opposite party He further relied on the case or Baldeo Raj v. IVth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur & others (1982 ARC 333) in which case it was held that the Court is required to see that whether the building is in a dilapidated condition and was required for the purpose of demolition and new construction. If all these standards are applied to this case, even then the disputed house cannot be called to be in a dilapidated condition. For reasons discussed above, this petition is fit to be allowed. 11. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the orders contained in Annexures2 and 4 are quashed. The application of the landlord under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act stands dismissed. No order for costs.