Sankar Prasad Chattakhandi v. State Bank Of India — 1986 DIGILAW 414 (CAL)

JUDGMENT 1. THESE three writ rules arise out of substantially similar facts and raise common questions of law. 2. THE petitioners were officers in the Central Accounts Office of the State Bank of India. As they were on the verge of superannuation (58 years of age), their cases for extension upto 60 years of age came up for consideration before the Bank Authorities and the refusal to grant such extension has fed to the institution of the present writ proceedings. During the pendency of the writ proceedings before this Court the petitioners retired. 3. THE propriety and correctness of the refusal of extension constitutes the lis, involved in the present proceedings. The entire lis, as i shall presently indicate, hinges on the interpretation of paragraph 19 of the State Bank of India Officers. (Determination of Terms and conditions of Service) Order 1979. The apparent simplicity of the said paragraph 19 has been overwhelmingly given a pompous burial by the complications, introduced through subtle and adept submissions, made by Counsel of the respective parties. Added to it, was the frequent reminder about the far-reaching consequences and effect a judicial interpretation of the said paragraph 19 would have on the employment policy of the Bank, which made me ponder and responder with maximum anxiety as a judge. 4. AS stated earlier, the petitioners, were refused extension in terms of paragraph 19 referred to hereinabove, beyond 83 years of age. Such refusal was by the Review Committee consisting of the Managing director and the Deputy Managing Director upon acceptance of the opinion of the General Manager (Corporate Operations) to the effect that the petitioners "lacked in potential" and they were not of continued utility to the bank', as these officers had not the necessary ability and usefulness in fields other than Central Accounts Office. It is pertinent to note, in this connection, that the chief Manager. Central Accounts Office, where the petitioner were working at the relevant time, recommended grant of extermination to 60 years of age in the cases of all the petitioners. It is pertinent to note, in this connection, that the chief Manager. Central Accounts Office, where the petitioner were working at the relevant time, recommended grant of extermination to 60 years of age in the cases of all the petitioners. Before I enter into and deal with the respective submissions, made on behalf of the contesting parties, it would be convenient to quote the relevant part of paragraph 19, referred to above, which forms the substratum of the dispute involved :- (1) " An Officer shall retire from the service of the bank on attaining the age of fifty-eight years or upon the completion of thirty years' service or thirty years' pensionable service if he is a member of Pension Fund, whichever occurs first. Provided that the competent authority may, at its discretion, extend the period of service of an officer who has attained the age of fifty-eight years or has completed thirty years' service or thirty years' pensionable service, as the case may be, should such extension be deemed desirable in the interest of the Bank, so however, that the service rendered by the concerned officer beyond 58 years of age except to the extent of the period of leave due at that time will not count for the purpose of pension. " 5. MR. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, appearing in support of the petitioners, has contended, in the first place, that paragraph 19 imposes an obligation on the Bank to consider the cases of all the retiring officers for extention and thus creates a right in favour of such officers to be considered for such extension. According to Mr. Mukherjee, in view of the tremendous advancement in the field of service jurisprudence, commensurate with the concept of a Welfare state, it is no longer open to the employer Bank (which is a Governmental Authority) to refuse to consider for or to grant, even if the officers satisfy the relevant criteria, extension, by relying on the use of the word 'discretion' in the above proviso to the said paragraph 19. While developing his above submission, Mr. Mukherjee has contended that it is an accepted position in law, without any scope for controversy, that an Executive Government or a Governmental Authority does no longer possess an arbitrary power to act. While developing his above submission, Mr. Mukherjee has contended that it is an accepted position in law, without any scope for controversy, that an Executive Government or a Governmental Authority does no longer possess an arbitrary power to act. In view of its constitution, government or governmental authorities operate under same inherent fetters even in the matter of jobs and granting of largess or contracts or. distribution of doles and all such actions must be informed with reasons, which are the only safeguards against mala fide and arbitrary action on the part of such authorities. If actions are not so informed, constitutional safeguards, for example Articles 14 and 16 and/or 19, immediately spring into action and restrain the operation of such actions. In the present case, in-spite of the use of the words that 'the competent authority may, at its discretion', the Bank authorities cannot refuse to recognise the right of an officer to be considered and considered fairly and rationally and without bias or discrimination, for extension. This is notwithstanding the legal position that none can claim extension as of right. According to Mr. Mukherjee, the basis, on which such a right is claimed, is to be found in the fetters on the powers, exercisable by the government or governmental authorities, to act in such matters without arbitrariness and with reasons. Mr. Mukherjee justifies this concept from another standpoint. He argues that if an officer is found unfit for extension he has a right to know reasons for being found unfit; otherwise, he contends, the protection guaranteed by articles 14 and 16 and/or 19, would be rendered nugatory. Referring to the materials in the present case, Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that the proforma, which is a vital document for consideration of the competent authority for the purpose of extension of service and copy of which has been annexed as Anexure 'c' to the affidavit- in- reply clearly indicates the criteria for such consideration. Such criteria are the service records of immediately three preceding years, general intelligence, job knowledge, initiative and resourcefulness, performance while holding current assignment and immediately preceding assignment, recommendation of the controlling authority and recommendation of the Circle Management Committees. In the cases of the writ petitioners none of the said criteria; excepting the recommendation of the Circle Management committee if there be any, can be said to have been unfavorable. In the cases of the writ petitioners none of the said criteria; excepting the recommendation of the Circle Management committee if there be any, can be said to have been unfavorable. It does not appear to be reasonable on the part of the competent authority to refuse extension to the petitioners, though simultaneously granting extension to two other officers of the Central Accounts Office, whose service records were no better than those of the petitioners. 6. MR. Mukherjee has submitted secondly that the opinion of the general Manager (Corporate operations) upon consideration of the proforma, is not only irrelevant but is wholly extraneous. The impugned refusal of extension, having been based upon such irrelevant extraneous materials, the same, Mr. Mukerjee contended, is liable to be struck down. Thirdly, the impugned refusal of extension has also been challenged by Mr. Mukherjee on the ground of malafides. He has built up his case of mala fide on the fact of involvement of the petitioners in an earlier writ proceeding (CO. 5085 (W)/81) challenging orders of transfer against them. By getting the said transfer orders declared illegal and inoperative, the petitioners annoyed the authorities and incurred their wrath with the result that the competent authority did not consider the cases of the petitioners for extension in a dispassionate manner but with a closed and motivated mind. To lend support to the said allegation of mala fide, Mr. Mukherjee, on behalf of the petitioners, referred, in the above context, to the specific cases of extension granted to the two other officers M/s. Saradindu Sen and Ramjoy Bhattacharjee, who were not involved in the aforesaid writ proceedings against transfer orders but whose service records did not disclose better criteria than those of the petitioners and who had been working in the Central accounts Office and were not moved outside the same even after the disputed extension. He has further relied upon the un-controverted allegation of the petitioners that except the petitioners, no other officer has been refused extension upto 60 years in the history of the Central Accounts Office. 7. MR. Subrata Roychowdhury, appearing on behalf of the Bank authorities, has strongly contested the propriety had correctness of the submissions, made by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the writ petitioners. 8. MR. 7. MR. Subrata Roychowdhury, appearing on behalf of the Bank authorities, has strongly contested the propriety had correctness of the submissions, made by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the writ petitioners. 8. MR. Roychowdhury has contended, in the first place, that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in the absence of any pleading about existence of any right statutory or' contractual in favour of the petitioners. Mr. Roychowdhury's stand is that, in the absence of such pleading, no writ of Mandamus can issue. Secondly, it has been contended by Mr. Roychowdhury that, after the attainment of the age of superannuation by the petitioners, ail their rights come to an end and, in that matter neither the bank nor the petitioners had any option. The language of paragraph 19 according to Mr. Roychowdhury was mandatory and even the Bank had no authority to keep the service life of the petitioners continuing. The proviso, according to Mr. Roychowdhury, was an enabling provision, by which the Bank had the 'discretion' to grant extension to an officer beyond the age of 58 years on fulfillment of the basic requirement of that proviso, namely when the continuance of the officer after superannuation could be found desirable in the interest of the bank. Mr. Roy chowdhury was emphatic about the discretionary nature of the Bank's authority and strongly refuted existence of any obligation on the part of the Bank. In that context, his further submission was that, even if the Bank refused to consider the case of any particular officer, the officer had no right to claim such consideration, not to speak of challenge being thrown to the same as arbitrary, malafide or motivated. 9. THIRDLY, Mr. Roychowdhury [has contended that, in the cases of the petitioners, the question about the nature of the rights and obligations of the respective parties under paragraph 19 has become academic as, on consideration, the petitioners have been found not fit for such extension. 10. IN support of his above contentions, Mr. Roy Chowdhury has produced a number of service records, including those of the petitioners and of M/s. Ramjoy Bhattacharjee and Sarabindu Sen, which, according to Mr. Roychowdhury, unmistakably establish that there were cogent reasons for refusal of extension to the petitioners and grant of extension to the other two officers. Indeed, Mr. 10. IN support of his above contentions, Mr. Roy Chowdhury has produced a number of service records, including those of the petitioners and of M/s. Ramjoy Bhattacharjee and Sarabindu Sen, which, according to Mr. Roychowdhury, unmistakably establish that there were cogent reasons for refusal of extension to the petitioners and grant of extension to the other two officers. Indeed, Mr. Roychowdhury's argument is that the fast development of the Bank has an important bearing on the Bank's decision and the desirability of extension of service of an officer in the interest of the Bank cannot be said to exist, if he is not fit to meet the challenge of such fast development and if his service cannot be utilised by the Bank except for a limited purpose as in the case of the petitioners, whose utility, admittedly, so to say, was confined to the Central Accounts Office. Fourthly, Mr. Chowdhury has assailed the merit of the allegation of malafide of the petitioners. Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted, on the basis of, the materials produced, that the refusal of extension is clearly justifiable and fully justified and the absence of any influence on the mind of the competent authority due to involvement of the petitioners in the transfer cases in question is well established. 11. LASTLY, Mr. Roy Chowdhury has contested the correctness of the allegations of illegality of the (refusal on the ground of consideration of alleged irrelevant and extraneous material, to wit the opinion of the General Manager (Corporate Operations) by producing Office Order and Memorandum showing that he was equivalent to a Circle Management Committee, as far as the Central Accounts Office was concerned. in the hierarchy of the Bank's administration. 12. ON behalf of both the contesting parties a number of decisions of the Supreme Court as also of High Courts have been cited and relied upon, which will be examined by me at appropriate places. I propose now to deal with the first point about maintainability of the writ application in the absence of any pleading about existence of any judicially enforceable legal night as argued by Mr. Roy Chowdhury. The point, in the present cases need not detain us long, as the instant writ petitions, containing prayers for writ of Mandamus, demanding forbearance on the part in the respondents, embody the necessary and essential averments, on which such prayers can be sustained. 13. Roy Chowdhury. The point, in the present cases need not detain us long, as the instant writ petitions, containing prayers for writ of Mandamus, demanding forbearance on the part in the respondents, embody the necessary and essential averments, on which such prayers can be sustained. 13. ON a fair reading of the said averments, it is sufficiently clear that the petitioners claim a two-fold right-a-right to be considered for extension upon attainment of the age of superannuation and a right to be fairly considered for the same, untainted by bias, arbitrariness, malice or discrimination and their claim for relief is based on the violation of this right by the respondents. Whether, in the instant case, the petitioners have succeeded in establishing this right and its alleged violation is matter on the merits but the pleading of the same, as noted above, in the light of he other allegations made, is sufficient for the maintainability of the writ applications and outs at the root of Mr. Roychowdhury's objection. I am, therefore not inclined to hold that the petitions are not maintainable on the ground of absence of proper and appropriate pleadings and 1 overrule Mr. Roy Chowdhury's submission on the point. 14. THE next question, which I take up for consideration, is, of much greater substance and importance, on the decision of which the fate of the lis largely depends. It may be noted, at this stage, that both the parties base their respective claims on the relevant part of para graph 19 (1) of the State Bank of India officers (Determination of terms and conditions of service) Order 1979. I have already quoted the said relevant part of paragraph 19 (1)which on proper analysis, resolves itself into two iner-linked or inter connected parts, the second part being constituted by a proviso. The substantive part of the said sub-paragraph provides for retirement of an officer on the happening of the contingency, mentioned therein, whereas the second part embodies in the form of a proviso, a provision for extension after age of super-annuation on fulfillment of the conditions, mentioned in the said proviso. As I have already noted, according to Mr. Mukherjee, the said proviso really creates a two fold right, with corresponding obligation against the Bank authorities, in favour of every officer on. As I have already noted, according to Mr. Mukherjee, the said proviso really creates a two fold right, with corresponding obligation against the Bank authorities, in favour of every officer on. the verge of super-annuation, namely, a right to be considered for extension and a right to a fair and rational consideration, untainted by any bias discrimination or malice. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the said proviso does not create any right whatsoever in favour of any officer but merely enables the Bank authorities to grant extension to any of such officers after superannuation at its discretion provided, the Bank authorities are- satisfied that such extension would be desirable in the interest of the Bank. Mr. Roy chowdhury is categorical in his stand and has even gone to the length of asserting that the Bank is not obliged to consider for extension the case of every officer on the verge of superannuation. In that background Mr. Roy Chowdhury has emphatically submitted that the question of fair or rational consideration, untainted by was, discrimination or malice does not arise. 15. IN my view, the contention of Mr. Mukherjee has great force and deserves acceptance for reasons, which I shall presently indicate. 16. AS seen above the relevant part of paragraph 19 (1) consists of two parts - a substantive part and a proviso, and, under well-known canons of construction, the proviso is the controlling part. It controls the substantive part and regulates its operation (vide Crais "statute law" page 218 lines J to 4 Seventh Edition and Maxwell "the Interpretation of Statutes" 12th Edition, pages 190-191) and the substantive part cannot be read without the proviso. The effect is that the termination of service life, as contemplated by the substantive part, becomes subject to the proviso and the proviso must be given its full effect before determining such termination under the substantive part. I am unable to accept Mr. Roy Chowdhury's submission that 'the substantive part should be applied to terminate the service life on superannuation before invoking the proviso and considering or applying the same. The service life would come to an end under the substantive part only when the extension, contemplated by the proviso, is not available or only when such extension is refused on cogent reasons upon a due consideration of the relevant materials. The service life would come to an end under the substantive part only when the extension, contemplated by the proviso, is not available or only when such extension is refused on cogent reasons upon a due consideration of the relevant materials. The dominant consideration must, in the above context, rest on the proviso and, for a solution, of our present problem, we must look to its interpretation. No doubt, the proviso uses the words "the competent authority may at its discretion extend the period of service of a superannuated officer" but such discretion, in the context of radical changes and rapid developments that have taken place in the field of service jurisprudence, cannot be said to be an absolute or unfettered discretion but a discretion, the exercise of which must be based on reasons. If any authority is needed for the purpose, reference may be made to the case of State of Gujarat v. Krishna Cinema, reported in A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1650 and the case of Kasturilal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir reported in A. I. R. 1980. S. C. 1992. The archaic law of master and servant has passed into fossils and the present goal is a Welfare State, so much so that judiciary, which is known as the sentinel of democracy, has unhesitatingly declared, by progressive interpretation of Articles 14, 16 and 19 that an Executive Government or a governmental Authority, in view of its inherent constitution, cannot act, even in the matter of distribution of a largess or allotment of contracts including service contracts with the same freedom as that of a private employer. Every governmental action or action of governmental authorities must be free from the vice of bias, discrimination, arbitrariness and mala-fides. That is why the practice of laying down procedures in the performance of acts by the Executive Government, public authorities or governmental authorities has received increased recognition from day to day and it is now an axiomatic truth that such authorities must record the reasons for any particular action so that the protection, guaranteed by Articles 14, 16 and 19 may be come effective and available, as desired by the makers of the constitution, such recording of reasons acting as an essential safeguard and restraint against arbitrariness of such authorities. Whenever a challenge is thrown, hands of justice extend themselves to strike at the very root of illegality and injustice, emanating from such arbitrary actions. No doubt it is well accepted that an officer, as in the present case, cannot claim an extension as of right. But at the same time, it is also well established that he can claim consideration for such extension and fair and bona-fide consideration for such extension as of right and can claim to be apprised of the reasons, when such extension is refused, to object to an arbitrary and unjust refusal. 17. IN the present case, this right emanates from paragraph 19 (1)the substantive part, read with the first proviso, which, as stated above are inter-linked or inter-connected and cannot and should not be read disjunctively in the light of the relevant constitutional provisions of Articles 14 and 16 (which embody the principle of equality)and the relative Rule of Administrative law, judicially noted as well established in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramanna v. International Air Port Authority, reported in A. I. R. 1979 s. C. . 1628, where the court, speaking through Bhagawati, J. as His lordship then was, accepted the growth of the aforesaid concept of equality and reasons in actions of 'the Execuive Government, governmental authorities or public authorities mot merely as remification of article 14 but as a rule of administrative law judicially evolve to sub-serve the socio-economic justice, which is the conscious end of state policy. The said decision extended and reaffirmed the principles, laid down earlier in the cases of A. S. Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, reported in A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 984, Sukdeb v. Bhagatram, reported in a. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1331 and Erusian Equipment and Chemicals v. State of West Bengal, reported in A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 266. In the case of Ajay hasia v. Khalid Mujib, reported in A. I. 1r. In the case of Ajay hasia v. Khalid Mujib, reported in A. I. 1r. 1981 S. C. 487, the Supreme court quoted with approval the principle laid down in Maneka Gandhi's case reported in A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 597, inter-alia, to the effect that an action which is arbitrary is necessarily involved in negation of equality and no attempt should be made to truncate the great equalising principle enunciated in Article 14 of the Constitution, which is the pillar, on which rests securely the foundation of democracy and republic. The Court forbade any pedantic or loxicographic approach in the matter of application of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme court reiterated the principle laid down in the case of E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in A. I. R. 1974 S. C. . 5 55, to the effect that Article 14 is of a highly activist magnitude and embodies a guarantee against arbitrariness and finally concluded by saying that whenever there was arbitrariness Article 14 immediately sprang into action to strike down such arbitrary state action. In that background of evolution of the principle of reason, equality and' fairness in actions of public authorities, Mr. Roy Chowdhury's sweeping argument that mere user of the word 'discretion' is sufficient to vest the Bank authorities with absolute and unfettered discretion, both in the matter of consideration for extension as also in the matter of grant of extension, cannot be accepted as in the light of the said principle, the touch-stone of this discretion will be the trinity reason, equality and fairness -and the validity of its exercise will have to be tested on the same. 18. IN my view it is obligatory on the Bank authorities, under paragraph. 19 (1) read with the first proviso as quoted above, to consider the case of every officer on the verge of superannuation for extension and to consider the same fairly and rationally and without malice or arbitrariness or offending discrimination. Mr. Mukherjee is right in his submission that the proviso to sub-paragraph 1 of paragraph 19 creates a right in favour of a retiring employee to be considered for extension without discrimination and arbitrariness on the part of the authorities and consequently a right to object to an arbitrary and unjust refusal of extension. Mr. Mukherjee is right in his submission that the proviso to sub-paragraph 1 of paragraph 19 creates a right in favour of a retiring employee to be considered for extension without discrimination and arbitrariness on the part of the authorities and consequently a right to object to an arbitrary and unjust refusal of extension. I am fortified in my view by the unreported decision of the Division Bench of this Court in F. M. A. T. No. 62 of 1979 (Kaustubh Kanti Maity Sc Ors. v. State of W. B. 8c Ors.), wherein Chittatosh Mookherjee, J. delivering the judgment on 31. 5. 1979 observed - "that although holder of an officiating or temporary appointment has no irrevocable right to the post, it does not necessarily follows that such holder of a temporary or officiating appointment has no right whatsoever to challenge his reversion. When administrative directions are illegal, ultra vires or arbitrary or for collateral purpose, the' court under Article 226 may interfere. "the distinction sought to be drawn by Mr. Roychowdhury by emphasising the fact that the services of the appellants in the above appeal were dispensed with by obtaining services of other similarly placed employees to satisfy the need for such officiation does not command itself to me as in the present case M/s. Ramjoy Bhattacharjee and Saradindu Sen were granted extension to serve the Central Accounts Office. Tim next point which arise for consideration is whether in the instant case the discretion under the proviso has been properly exercised m light of the tests laid down above for -an exercise of the same in other words whether in refusing extension to the petitioners while giving the same to M/s. Bhattacharjee and Sen, the Bank authorities have acted according to the norms laid down by the Supreme court and have not been guilty of deviation into arbitrariness, malafide and offending discrimination. On this aspect of the matter two important question arise for immediate consideration (1) the criteria or the materials, on the basis of which the opinion as to desirability of continuance of an officer beyond superannuation in terms of paragraph 19 first proviso, may be arrived at and (2) who are the authorities empowered to form such opinion. 19. On this aspect of the matter two important question arise for immediate consideration (1) the criteria or the materials, on the basis of which the opinion as to desirability of continuance of an officer beyond superannuation in terms of paragraph 19 first proviso, may be arrived at and (2) who are the authorities empowered to form such opinion. 19. ON the above, both the contesting parties have referred to and relied on the contents of the Circular dated 10th of September, 1976, which is Annexure 'a' to the supplementary affidavit of Jagadish Chandra Saha, dated 21st day of March, 1. 984 and the proforma annexed thereto, as according to both, the relevant criteria and other authorities are to be found in the same. 20. MR. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners, while accepting that, in case of extension beyond 58 years of age the tests may be rigid, has strongly argued that the above preforma clearly specified such criteria or materials as the service records of immediately three preceding years, general intelligence, job knowledge, initiative and resourcefulness, performance while holding current assignment and immediately proceeding assignments, recommendations of the controlling authority and recommendations of the Circle management Committee. On the basis; of such materials, according to Mr. Mukherjee, the competent authority is to form its opinion. Mr. Mukherjee has contended that as, apparent from above, the opinion of the General Manager (Corporate operations) is a wholly extraneous matter and the impugned refusal of extension to the petitioners having been based on consideration of such opinion of the General Manager (Corporate Operations) is liable to be struck down. Mr. Mukherjee has further contended, in this connection, that the opinion of the General Manager (Corporate operations) again being based on a consideration of absence of utility of the petitioners in departments other than the Central Accounts Office is wholly irrelevant as even on the Bank's own accepted policy, the petitioners were not liable to be transferred outside the Central Accounts office which would remain unaltered even if the Bank succeeds in the pending appeal from the transfer case and thereby obtains a reversal of the finding of G. N. Roy, 3. in the writ case before him to the effect that the transfer of the petitioners in the said case including present petitioners, were not to serve any interest of the Bank but would operate to its detriment. in the writ case before him to the effect that the transfer of the petitioners in the said case including present petitioners, were not to serve any interest of the Bank but would operate to its detriment. In support of his above arguments, Mr. Mukherjee has drawn my attention to the failure of the Bank authorities to place any material before this court to show that any officer of the Central Accounts Office has been transferred out of it in violation of the said policy, the instances cited by the bank being, of officers who did not belong to the central Accounts Office and the fact that even the two officers, namely Sri R. Bhattaeharjee and Mr. S. Sen who were granted extension on the basis that they were willing to accept transfers outside the central Accounts Office, have not been so transferred and that their performances, which fell for consideration of the competent authority, were in the Central Accounts Office only. Mr. Roychowdhury, appearing for the respondent Bank authorities has submitted that the desirability of extension of the service of an officer beyond the age of superannuation has to be judged not merely on the criteria indicated by Mr. Mukherjee but also upon consideration of his continued utility or potentiality bearing in mind the well known fact that in the context of the fast development of the bank, the number of its branches has increased from 400 in 1955 to 6500 and the strength staff has gone upto 2,00,000, to render effective the policy of the bank to extend the facilities of banking service to the rural people. According to Mr. Roychowdhury, an officer, who belongs to Managarial cadre, is expected to play a dynamic role in meeting now challenges and his service can be said to be of continued utility only when the same can be utilised by the Bank by transferring him to any establishment or branch according, to exigencies. On the basis of the aforesaid stand, Mr. Roychowdhury, has contended that willingness and adaptability of the officer to meet new challenges are really the over-riding factors for consideration. 21. MR, Roychowdhury also challenges the propriety of the submission of Mr. Mukherjee to the effect that the opinion of General Manager (Corporate Operations) is a wholly extraneous material. According to Mr. Roychowdhury, has contended that willingness and adaptability of the officer to meet new challenges are really the over-riding factors for consideration. 21. MR, Roychowdhury also challenges the propriety of the submission of Mr. Mukherjee to the effect that the opinion of General Manager (Corporate Operations) is a wholly extraneous material. According to Mr. Roychowdhury the Central Accounts Office; in the administrative hierarchy, is under the control of the General Manager (Corporate operations), who is equivalent to a Circle Management Committee in respect of the Regional Office or branch office in a circle. As the opinion of the Circle Management Committee is a relevant material in the matter of grant of extension of officers belonging to such Regional Office or Branch office, the opinion or recommendation of the genera) Manager (Corporate operations) is similarly relevant in the matter of grant of extensions, to officers attached to the Central accounts Office. In this connection, reliance was placed by Mr. Floy Chowdhury on an office order dated 19th March, 1981. a xerox copy of which was placed before me after service on the learned. Advocate for the petitioners and also service records of a number of officers belonging to the different departments to substantiate the above mentioned procedure in support of the decision of refusal of extension in the cases of the writ petitioners and grant of extension in the cases of Shri R. Bhattaeharjee and Shri S. Sen. Mr. Roychowdhury has taken the stand that the incontrovertible position that the writ petitioners service could be best utilised and utilized only in the Central Accounts office justified the correctness of the Bank's decision as the other two officers concerned, namely M/s. R. Bhattacharjee and S. Sen were willing to perform duties even outside the Central Accounts Office and the Bank rightly found desirability in their continuance after super annuation. Mr. Roychowdhury was very emphatic in arguing that from the notes of the General Manager (Corporate operations), xerox copies of which were produced, relating to the refusal of extension to the writ petitioners, it would be absolutely clear that he was not acting under any malice for the writ petitioners' involvement in the transfer case but his entire decision was bona-fide arrived at upon consideration of the Banks over-all interest. Mr. Mr. Roychowdhury has procuded xerox copies of the relevant records relating to a number of cases of extension including those of the writ petitioners and Shri Bhattacharjee and Shri Sen. 22. IN my view, the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the recommendation of the General Manager (Corporate operations) is an extraneous material has no substance. The records produced on behalf of the respondents clearly estaniish that the Central Accounts Office is in the organizational hierarchy, under the control of General Manager (Corporate operations) as a Regional Office or a Branch Office is under the control of the Circle Manage merit Committee. The proforma clearly justifies the relevance of the recommendation of the Circle management Committee. The suitable amendment in the proforma to find a place for the recommendation of the General Manager ' (Corporate operations) as far as the Central Accounts Office is concerned is not arbitrary nor unreasonable but fits in with the propriety of such administrative Procedure. Coming to submissions of Mr. Mukherjee on the substantive merits of the rejection by the competent authority of extension in. the cases of the writ petitioners, would like to consider certain factual materials, available from the records, produced before me. 1) Cases of all the writ petitioners as also of M/s. R. Bhattacharjee and S. Sen were for consideration of desirability of extension after attainment by them of 58 years of age and the disputed extensions were to be operative more or less between February, 1982 and February 1984 except in the case of petitioner S. C. Bose, who attained the age of 58 years in 1983 and the age of 60 years on 1. 8. 85. 2) The service particulars, incorporated in the relative proforma, were order the headings of general intelligence, job knowledge, initiate and resourcefulness for three years proceeding namely from 1978 to 1980 and 1980 to 1982 in the case of Sri S. C. Bose and the recommendations of the 'chief Manager concerned of the Central Accounts office for such extension appear to have been based on a consideration of such particulars. 3) in the case of Sri Chattakhandi and Sri N. L. Ghosh as also Sri s. Sen and Sri R, Bhattaeharjee the Chief Manager Mr. Mahendru's recommendations were sent to the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel and Services) under a forwarding letter dated 19th of November, 1981 which had a post script". 3) in the case of Sri Chattakhandi and Sri N. L. Ghosh as also Sri s. Sen and Sri R, Bhattaeharjee the Chief Manager Mr. Mahendru's recommendations were sent to the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel and Services) under a forwarding letter dated 19th of November, 1981 which had a post script". P. S. in this connection we may add that m/s. S. B. Chattakhandi and N. L. Ghosh are two of the petitioners in the High Court case of CO. No, 5085 (W) of 1981 against the banks orders for their transfer as advised by you in your letter No. 7/9a/110 dated 15th of 3une of 1981" after enumeration of the relevant comparative remarks, namely (a) Sri Chattakhandi areas in which the officer has shown good results "a since and dependable officer is done commendable good work wherever he is posted. " potential " He has capable of rendering further useful service to the bank. " (b) Sri N. L. Ghosh areas in which the officer has shown good result "heard working and conscientious in duties in dealing with refused application (Provident Fund) of claimants potential his continued services upto 29. 2. 84 will be useful to the bank" (c) Sri, S. Sen areas in which officer has shown good results "sri Sen has done commandable good work in clearing a large number of long outstanding. . . . . . S. B. I. extra general account. He has also reorganised the reconciliation department to give a thrust in writing to the entries in branch clearing general account. Potential"has continued services upto 31. 1. 84 can be very usefully, utilised in any assignment in the bank including challenging positions in the reorgnised set up. " (d) Sri Ram jay Bhattacharjee areas in which the officer has shown good results. "he has kept the balancing of S. B. I. Provident Fund account upto date by putting extraordinary hard work. " Potential his continued service upto 29. 2,84 will be useful to the "bank. 4. In the case of Sri S. C. Bose the recommendation for the extension was made by the Chief Manager Mr. P. V. Rao and relevant comparative remarks were as follow: areas in which the officer has shown good results. (i) He has through grasp of the problems connected with the reconciliation of entires reported by branches in the schedules 13 and 18. P. V. Rao and relevant comparative remarks were as follow: areas in which the officer has shown good results. (i) He has through grasp of the problems connected with the reconciliation of entires reported by branches in the schedules 13 and 18. it considering the large amount of arrears relating in the said reconciliation work the extension of service by two years if given to the official would be in the interest of the bank as he has the requisit capabilities and sincerity to deal with the objects, potential "his- continued service from 6. 8. 83 to 31. 2. 83 will be beneficial to the bank. ' "a The cases of Sri S. p, chattakandi and Sri N. L. Ghosh as also sri S. Ser and Sn R. Bhattacharjee appear to have been referred to the General Manager (Corporate Operations) on 24. 11. 81 for his recommendation and on the same day, the General Manager (Corporate Opera tions) Mr, Nayar appears to have given iris views, recommending ex tension m the cases of Sri Sen and Sri R. Bhattacharjee in agreement with the Chief Manager in the following words : "i agree with the Chief Manager, G. A. Extensions recommended for two years" and non-extension in the cases of the writ petitioners' S. p. Chattakhandi and Sri N. L, Ghosh in disagreement with the Chief Manager for reasons recorded in his relative notes dated 24. 11. 81 and, on 11. 1. 82, the Review Committee consisting of the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director considered the master and accepted the recommendation of con-extension of the General Manager (Corporate Operations) in the cases of the Writ petitioners S. P. Chattakhandi and N. L. Ghose merely recording "extensions not granted. " 6. In the case of writ petitioner Sri S. C. Bose we have not got on the record the forwarding letter of the Chief Manager, sending his recommendations for extension to the higher authorities for consideration but the Genera! Manager's (Corporate Operations) recommendation of non-extension in disagreement with the Chief Manager appears to have been given in a note dated 27. 7. 83 and, on the same day, the Review Committee (Managing Director and Deputy Managing Director) appeared to have accepted the same by their note of even date which runs as follows :- "we have very carefully considered the matter. 7. 83 and, on the same day, the Review Committee (Managing Director and Deputy Managing Director) appeared to have accepted the same by their note of even date which runs as follows :- "we have very carefully considered the matter. We have perused the confidential reports on Sri Basu, the recommendation (or extension, made by. the Chief Manager, Central Accounts Office and also the recommendations for non-extension made by the general Manager (Corporate Operations. We are of the view that sri S. C. Bose is just, routine worker He lacks in potential and the attitude displayed by him clearly shows that he is not an officer who can meet challenges. We accordingly decide that no extension should be given to Sri Bose". As between the petitioners on the one hand and Sri R. Bhattacharjee on the other, the records, from which the relevant extracts have been quoted above, do not disclose any distinction, which would go against the petitioners even remotely except the petitioners' involvement in the writ proceedings against the transfer orders and yet Sri r. Bhattaeharjee the extension while the petitioners were denied the same. 23. UNDER the relevant part of paragraph 19 (1) including the proviso as quoted above, the matter of extension has to be decided' by the competent authority and under Circular, date 22nd of October. 1982 having retrospective effect from 1. 10. 79 (vide the supplementary affidavit dated 6. 2. 84 of Sri P. V. Rao) the said competent authority is the Review Committee consisting of the Managing Director (which term includes also the Deputy Managing Director) and it is this Review committee which has granted extension to. Sri S. Sen and R,bhattacharjee and refused extension to the writ petitioners, accepting in each case the recommendation of the General Manager (Corporate operations) and the reasons given by him. 24. AS stated above in the case of writ petitioners Sri Chattakhandi and sri. N. L. Ghosh the Review committee merely recorded "extensions not granted" and in the case of writ petitioner Sri S. C. Bose they gave a note which, in substance, repeated only the observations of the General Manager (Corporate Operations) that "sri Bose is just a routine worker. He lacks any potential and the attitude displayed by him clearly shows that he is not an officer who can meet the challenges" as the ground of refusal of extension. He lacks any potential and the attitude displayed by him clearly shows that he is not an officer who can meet the challenges" as the ground of refusal of extension. It is sufficiently clearly from what I have stated above that the impugned decisions of the Review committee in the cases of the writ petitioners Sri Chattakhandi and Sri Ghosh contain no reasons whatsoever and cannot be said to be informed with reasons unless such reasons are extracted from the relative. notes of the General manager (Corporate Operations) and in the case of Sri S. C. Bose also the position is substantially similar; In short, therefore the said impugned decisions are wholly founded on the relative notes of the general Manager (Corporate Operations) and their validity will depend upon the validity of the said notes in the light of the above tests. I have, therefore, to see how far the relative notes of the General Manager ' (Corporate Operations) satisfy the above tests laid down by the Supreme Court. 25. THE notes in question do contain reasons and may, therefore, be said to be informed with reasons and so the point before me narrows down to the consideration whether these reasons are valid in law and whether the notes in question are not tainted with vices which will invalidate them. 26. FOR the above consideration it - Is necessary to near in mind 1) That in the case for extension upto 60 years none of the officials concerned except the writ petitioners was involved in the writ cases before the High Court against, the transfer policy of Bank and in no other case in the Central Accounts Office except the writ petitioners be such extension been refused. ii) That a perusal of relevant notes of the General Manager (Corporate Operations)on which, as seen above, the impugned decisions are founded leaves no doubt in the mind that the extensions in questions were refused to the writ petitioners on account of their lack of potentiality and {negative attitude is refusing to meet the challenge of transfer as are emanating from their filing of writ against the Banks transfer orders. This is sufficiently demonstrated by General Manager (Corporate Operations)'s own words "1 feel that their reluctance to accept transfer is an acceptance of limitations of their capacity at this age. This is sufficiently demonstrated by General Manager (Corporate Operations)'s own words "1 feel that their reluctance to accept transfer is an acceptance of limitations of their capacity at this age. " With obvious reference to the said writ petition as a source even though the same, was expressing knowledge as irrelevant for constitution. (iii) That Sri Sen as also Sri Bhattacharjee (whose performance is in no way better than the petitioners) were given extensions as they were ready and willing to accept transfer and did not challenge the same whereas the petitioners were refused extension as they had challenged the transfer orders. iv) That in the matter of the extension in question the petitioners were discriminated against because of their involvement in the writ proceedings against the. transfer orders as persons with no better performance records than the petitioners was given extension as he was not involved in the transfer or similar proceedings. v) That in the cases of Sri S. P. Chattakhandi and Shri N. L. Ghosh the papers reached G. M. (Corporate operations) on 24. 11. 1981 and he gave his elaborate dissenting note on the very same day and in the case of Shri S. C. Bose, the G. M. (Corporate operation) elaborate note against the Chief Manager's recommendations reached the Review Committee on 27. 7. 83 and on the same day the Review Committee gave its note, which required consideration of the two opposite views of the G. M. and G. M. The time factor on either occasion may well militate against proper and dispassionate consideration of the rival recommendations. From what I have stated above, I am clearly of opinion that the petitioners were refused extension solely because of their involvement in the writ proceedings against The Bank's transfer orders and in the circumstances, such refusal would be tainted with the vice of arbitrariness and unreasonableness as also offending discrimination and malice in law and in fact as well. 27. THE authorities already cited would amply support my above conclusion but to then i would like to add one more namely S. R. Venkateswar v. Union of India reported in AIR 1979 SC 49 , as it contains a lucid exposition of the relevant principles and the quotations from high authorities to elucidate the same. 28. 27. THE authorities already cited would amply support my above conclusion but to then i would like to add one more namely S. R. Venkateswar v. Union of India reported in AIR 1979 SC 49 , as it contains a lucid exposition of the relevant principles and the quotations from high authorities to elucidate the same. 28. BEFORE concluding the above discussion, I deem it my duty to indicate briefly my reason for not applying to the instant cases, the following decision cited by Mr. Roychowdhury namely, 1) AIR 1958 sc 37 (P. L. Dhingra v. Union of India) II) AIR 1960 SC 24 (M. Narasimhrachar v. State of Mysore) fill) AIR 1961 SC 1346 (Kailash 'chandra v. Union of India) IV) AIR 1970 SC 1314 (State of Assam v. Premdharbarua) V) A I R 1973 SC 671 (S. N. Palegar v. State of Mysore)VI) AIR 1971. SC 1716 (B. Narayana Murti v. State of A. P.. Those decisions are, in my view, clearly distinguishable as in the first place they dealt with rights, to get extension after retirement and not a right to be considered and considered fairly for extension as in the instant cases. There is no controversy raised even on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioners cannot claim an extension as of right unless they fulfill the criteria given in paragraph 19 of the regulations mentioned above. The only right the petitioners' claim is that they must be considered fairly upon attainment of the age of superannuation for extension and secondly because of the proviso to paragraph 19 (1) as interpreted by me there being no such provision in the said cited decisions. Moreover, it has to be remembered that the above cited decisions might not it in with the development of administrative law through subsequent judicial decisions culminating in the over bearing judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramana v. I. A. Authority reported m A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1628. 29. AS to the unreported Patna case Harnandan Singh v. S. B. of india and Ors. (C. W. J. C. Nb. 62 of 1982 (i so strongly relied upon by Mr. 29. AS to the unreported Patna case Harnandan Singh v. S. B. of india and Ors. (C. W. J. C. Nb. 62 of 1982 (i so strongly relied upon by Mr. Roychowdhury it is enough to say that that also is clearly distinguishable as in that case there were no materials to show discrimination or mala-fides and the right claimed was different the claim being of a right to get extension - and not a right to be considered and considered fairly for extension as in the instant cases - which was rightly refused. 30. ON my above findings, I am bound to hold that the refusal of extension to the petition is arbitrary, unreasonable and utterly discriminatory so as to violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and is also vitiated by malice which law abhor I hold accordingly and srikedown the impugned order of refusal. Since the petitioners have already retired the question naturally' arises as to what relief they would be entitled to even on the basis of the findings in their favour as indicated above. The petitioners having already attained the age of 6o years upto which they claimed the extension in the present Rules, there is no scope for a direction for extension of their services by the bank authorities but that does not mean that this court of Equity is helpless in the matter of granting relief to the petitioners. I have already found earlier that officer with no better service records has been granted extension upto 60 years of age. Bearing that in mind coupled with the fact that I have not accepted the reasons of refusal of extension in the case of the petitioners. I would direct the Bank authorities, the respondents, to treat the petitioners as if in service on extension till 60 years of age and grant necessary pecuniary relief on that basis. ' This is a procedure which received judicial approval as discernible from the principles laid down in the cases of Singara Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1499 and State of West Bengal v. Tapan Kumar Sen, reported in 86 C. W. N. 121 and in consequence with, the same and admirably fits in with justice and equity in the instant cases. Reference may also be made in the point to the case of Gurdial Singh fiji v. State of Punjab, reported in 1979 (1) S. L. R. 804. 31. I would accordingly make the Rules absolute to the above extent and grant pecuniary reliefs to the petitioners as indicated hereinbefore. The respondents are directed to forbear from giving any effect for or further effect to the impugned refusal of extension to the petitioners and to treat the petitioners as in service upto the age of 60 years, and to grant pecuniary benefits due to them on that basis in accordance with law. Such benefits should be disbursed within three months from this date. The respondents are further directed to pay 60 G. Ms. to each of the petitioners by way of costs of these proceedings. Rules made absolute in part.