JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - This is an appeal from an order of remand passed by the lower appellate court directing the trial court to dispose of the suit afresh after deciding the issue "if it had pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit." 2. Mr. P.K. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, raises a short and simple question, namely, if the lower appellate court was in error in upsetting the decree and directing remand without a finding that the undervaluation has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or resulted in failure of justice. 3. The Plaintiffs instituted a suit for declaration of title and for confirmation of possession, in the alternative for recovery of possession. The suit was valued at Rs. 500/- as regards the relief for declaration of title and Rs. 100/- as regards the relief of permanent injunction. The Defendants asserted that the market value of the suit property would by Rs. 5500/- and hence the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court. 4. Despite the traverse by the Defendants and the specific allegation that the court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction, no issue was raised and the question was not gone into. Having lost in the suit the Defendant preferred an appeal and contended before the lower appellate court that, inasmuch as if his plea was accepted, the court would lack pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit, the trial court should have framed an issue regarding the valuation of the suit and its pecuniary jurisdiction to try it, the judgment and decree of the trial court were to be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh disposal. The lower appellate court accepted the contention and remitted the matter to the trial court with a direction that it should try the suit afresh after framing two issues, namely, if the suit was under-valued and if the court had pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. 5. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has brought to my notice the provisions contained in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and Section 21(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act reads as hereunder 11. 5. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has brought to my notice the provisions contained in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and Section 21(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act reads as hereunder 11. Procedure where objection is taken on appeal or revision that a suit or appeal was not properly valued for jurisdictional purpose: (1) Notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 14 of 1882, an objection that by reason of the over-valuation, or undervaluation of a suit or appeal a court of first instance or Lower Appellate Court which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an appellate Court unless (a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues; were first framed and recorded, or in the Lower Appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that Court, or (b) the Appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that the suit or appeal was over-valued or under-valued and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merit. (2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), but the Appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in Clause (b) of that Sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeals to itself, it shall dispose of the appeal as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or Lower Appellate Court. (3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the Appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court, with respect to the hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suit or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal. (4) The provisions of this section with respect to an Appellate Court shall so far as they can be made applicable apply to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 14 of 1882 or other enactment for the time being in force.... It is clear from the aforesaid provision that where objection as to jurisdiction has not been taken in the court of first instance, objection to that effect shall not be entertained by the appellate court. Where objection has been taken in the court of first instance but the disposal of the suit has not been prejudicially affected, the appellate court has to ignore the objection and proceed to dispose of the appeal as if there was no defect of jurisdiction. Clauses (a) and (b) though connected by the expression 'or' are to be read conjunctively, as has been held by the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others. It is worthwhile to quote some of the observations: The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in law is when a Court entertains a suit or an appeal over which it has no jurisdiction, and what the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is on that position. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and where-ever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such a defective cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was 'coram non judice', and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position. The question is what is the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position. Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the CPC an objection that a Court which had no jurisdiction-over a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason of over-valuation or under-valuation, should not be entertained by an appellate Court, except as provided in the section. Then follow provisions as to when the objections could be entertained, and how they are to be dealt with. The drafting of the section has come in and deservedly for considerable criticism; but admidst must that is obscure and confused, there is one principle which stands out clear and conspicuous. It is that a decree passed by a Court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for over-valuation or under-valuation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for the section null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or under-valuation, should be dealt with under that section and not otherwise. The reference to Section 578, now Section 99, Code of Civil Procedure, in the opening words of the Section is significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the defects mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the case, except from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of over-valuation or under-valuation. It is with a view to avoid this result that Section 11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a Court based on over-valuation or under-valuation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or under-valuation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the CPC enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the CPC enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99, CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the Appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained u/s 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. The principle underlying the provision is that when a case has been tried by a court on merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it has resulted in failure of justice and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The aforesaid view gets further support from the amendment of Section 21 of the CPC by way of insertion of Sub-section (2) by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976. which reads as hereunder: (2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Objection as to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court shall not be entertained by the Appellate or Revisional Court unless. Objection as to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court shall not be entertained by the Appellate or Revisional Court unless. (a) objection was taken in the Court of first instance, (b) at the earliest opportunity (where issues are settled, at or before such settlement) and. (c) there has been consequent failure of justice. In Pathumma and Others Vs. Kuntalan Kutty Dead by Lrs. and Others. objection was raised to the decree on the ground of absence of territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court observed that three conditions were essential to be fulfilled in order that an objection to the place of suing might be entertained by an appellate or revisional court, namely, (1) objection was taken in the court of first instance. (2) it was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues were settled, at or before such settlement and, (3) there had been a consequent failure of justice. These three conditions must co-exist. The same view has been taken in the case of Nand Kishore and Another Vs. Prabhu Narain and Others, . 6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has taken me through the decision of the lower appellate court. Nowhere has the appellate court recorded a finding that it was satisfied that disposal of the suit was prejudicially affected or there was a consequent failure of justice. Hence an important condition on fulfillment of which objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction to dispose of the suit can be entertained was lacking. The appellate court, therefore, went wrong in vacating the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and remanding the matter for fresh disposal. I, therefore, vacate the appellate decision and remit the matter to the lower appellate court for disposal of the appeal on merits. The appeal and the cross-appeal are accordingly disposed of. There would be no order as to costs.