Y. K. Sabharwal,j. ( 1 ) IN this Letters Patent Appeal, the challenge is tothe correctness of the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court, whohad dismissed the appellant s execution first appeal and had upheld the orderof the executing court dismissing the objection filed by the appellant underorder 21, Rule 97 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 2 ) THE litigation from which this appeal arises appears to have a chequered history. The decree which is now sought to be executed was passed in theyear 1976 and litigation has thereafter been pending between the parties forthe last about ten years and the relevant facts are as follows. ( 3 ) THE appellants in this appeal are sons of Smt. Sudarshan Kumariwife of Shri Behari Lal Sharma (respondent No. 2 ). Smt Sudarshan Kumarientered into an agreement to sell the property No. M-48, Kalkaji, New Delhi,to Sh. Satya Swarup Singh Bhatti (Respondent No. 1) vide agreement dated 26/04/1970 which was also signed by Shri Behari Lal Sharma, husbandof respondent No. 2 and father of the appellants. A supplementary agreementdated 19. 6. 1970 was also entered into between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2, and under this agreement some more amount was paid byrespondent No. 1 to respondent No. 2. In January 1972 respondentno. 1 filed a suit for specific performance against respondent No. 2. Thesuit was decreed by the Commercial Sub Judge Delhi on 3/08/1976. A Regular First Appeal (RFA 315/76) filed by respondent No. 2 was dismissedby this Court on 22/05/1980. It appears that permission was grained bythe competent authority for sale of the property in question to respondentno. 1, decree-holder. Respondent No. 2 filed objections challenging the validityof the sale permission. The said objections were filed on or about 10/10/1980. The said objections were dismissed by the trial court on l. 4. 1981. Against the order dated 1. 4. 1981, the J. D. respondent No. 2 filed an Executionfirst Appeal No. 3/81 in this court. It further appears that along with thisexecution First Appeal, an application was filed seeking stay of the operationof the order of the trial court dated 1/04/1981, and stay of furtherproceedings before the trial court. The said application was supported by anaffidavit of Shri Subodh Kumar who is one of the appellants before us. It further appears that along with thisexecution First Appeal, an application was filed seeking stay of the operationof the order of the trial court dated 1/04/1981, and stay of furtherproceedings before the trial court. The said application was supported by anaffidavit of Shri Subodh Kumar who is one of the appellants before us. The said appeal (EFA 3/81) was dismissed by a learned single Judge of thiscourt on 2 ,th April 1981. ( 4 ) RESPONDENT No. 2 took the matter to the Supreme Court byfiling two Special Leave Petitions, one challenging the dismissed of RFA 315/78and other challenging the dismissal of EFA 3/81. Both the Special Leavepetitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 25/09/1981. Respondent No. 2 filed two review petitions for the review of the orders dated 25/09/1981. The said review petitions were also dismissed by thesupreme Court on 16/03/1982. ( 5 ) AFTER the aforesaid protracted litigation, a sale deed in respect ofthe property in question was executed and registered in favour of respondentno. 1 on 14/10/1982. ( 6 ) THE matter, however, did not rest with the execution and registrationof the sale deed. On 12/11/1982 one Yadav Chander Sharma filedobjections to the execution. The said objections were dismissed on 23/04/1983. Shri Sharma filed Civil Revision 660/83 challenging the dismissal of hisobjections. The said Civil Revision was dismissed by a learned single Judge ofthis court on 4/08/1983. The said Shri Yadav Chander Sharma, itappear, filed a suit on or about 18/10/1982 for permanent injunctionrestraining respondent No. 2 from executing the warrant of possession. Alongwith the suit, an application for grant of an ad interim injunction was alsofiled. The application for grant of an ad interim injunction was dismissed bythe trial court on 19/09/1983. The appeal against the order dated 19/09/1983 was dismissed by the Senior Sub Judge, Delhi, on 8/11/1983. It was thereafter that the objections were filed by three sonsof the judgment debtor on or about 10/11/1983, which were alsodismissed by the trial court on 17/11/1983. The order of the trialcourt was upheld by a single Judge of this court, and the Execution Firstappeal filed by the appellants was dismissed in limine on 30/11/1983. The correctness of the judgment dated 30/11/1983 is under challengein this appeal. ( 7 ) THE appellants had filed objections under Order 21, Rule 97, Codeof Civil Procedure. The order of the trialcourt was upheld by a single Judge of this court, and the Execution Firstappeal filed by the appellants was dismissed in limine on 30/11/1983. The correctness of the judgment dated 30/11/1983 is under challengein this appeal. ( 7 ) THE appellants had filed objections under Order 21, Rule 97, Codeof Civil Procedure. In our view the provisions of Order 21, Rule 97 of the Codeof Civil Procedure are clear and under the said provision, it is only thedecree-holder who can move the executing court. It is well settled that a thirdparty resisting the execution has no locus standi to claim investigation by theexecuting court into his alleged right or title prior to his dispossession as Order21 Civil Procedure Code did not contemplate any such enquiry at the instance of a thirdparty either under Rule 35 and 36 or Rules 95 and 96. The remedy of such athird party under Order 21 is only after dispossession under Order 21 Rule100 Civil Procedure Code The provision of Order 21 Rule 97 is enabling provision for thebenefit of the decree-holder only. The learned trial court rightly held that theapplication of a third party under Older 21 Rule 97 is not maitainable. ( 8 ) SHRI. O. N. Vohra, learned counsel for the appellants, after somearguments, conceded that the judgment of the execution court as also oflearned single Judge of this court is correct to the extent that the appellantscould not invoke the provisions of Order 21 Rule 97 Civil Procedure Code and the objectionswere rightly dismissed. He, however contended that while rightly dismissing theobjections, the trial court and the learned single Judge should not have madeobservations on the merits, in particular, the objection that the objectionswere dishonest and frivolous. We do not agree with this contention. Thehistory of the litigation shows that in case the contention of the counsel forthe appellants is accepted, this would defeat the ends of justice instead ofsubserving the same. In our view the observations that the objections weredishonest and frivolous were rightly made by the trial court and the learnedsingle Judge of this court. Keeping in view the history of the litigation thecourts were perfectly justified in expressing the prima facie view that theobjections were being put forth to delay the execution and were dishonestand frivolous. As stated above, the objectors are the sons of the judgmentdebtor. Keeping in view the history of the litigation thecourts were perfectly justified in expressing the prima facie view that theobjections were being put forth to delay the execution and were dishonestand frivolous. As stated above, the objectors are the sons of the judgmentdebtor. Their mother had been claiming, right upto the Supreme Court, thatshe was in sole and exclusive possession of the property in dispute. One ofthe appellants had filed and affidavit in support of the appeal filed byrespondent No. 2 acting for and on her behalf. Admittedly, the appellantsare living with judgment debtor-respondent No. 2 in the property inquestion. The objections were filed two days after the dismissal of the appeal filed byshri Y. C. Sharma. The appellants did not claim any interest in the propeltytill before filing the objections in the year 1983, although the litigation commenced in the year 1972. In the background of these facts the Court wasfully justified in holding the objections as dishonest and frivolous. ( 9 ) WE find no merit in this appeal, and the same is consequentlydismissed with costs, which we quantify at Rs. 1,000. 00.