Judgment :- 1. The 1st respondent, Arya Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Company, New Delhi, entered into an agreement with the 2nd appellant, the Director of Fisheries, Kerala, on 18-1-1965 for the supply and erection of 100 ton ice cum cold storage plant at Willing ton Island. The agreed amount of the contract was Rs.9,40,000/-. The Ist respondent started the work and the appellants were making payments for the various items of work. There was some progress for the work. However, as time passed, disputes arose between the parties and the matter was referred to arbitration by virtue of Clause.15 of the agreement. There were two arbitrators and they passed an award on 2-11-1978. The 1st respondent put forward various claims and the Arbitrators awarded Rs.1,64,950/- for the materials supplied by them, and Rs.1,00,00/- towards their claims. Under Clause.3 of the award the Arbitrators granted the relief in the following terms: "that for future delay for the next one year the Claimant will be paid 40 per cent more over the agreed amount of the contract less the amount of the work already done plus an amount of Rs.300/-per month towards overhead charges during the period the contract is in force." The claimant later filed execution petition for the realisation of the amount due as per Clause.3 of the award. There were litigations between the parties and ultimately the amount was quantified at Rs. 5,05,500/-. 1A. As soon as the first award was passed the appellants thought it fit to cancel the contract and therefore the contract between the two parties was terminated with effect from 17-11-1978. The 1st respondent objected to the cancellation and raised various other claims. In view of the cancellation of the contract, the 1st respondent sought to refer all the matters in dispute to arbitration. The 1st respondent nominated their Arbitrator under S.9 of the Arbitration Act and served notice on the appellants. The appellants did not nominate any Arbitrator. The Arbitrator chosen by the 1st respondent went ahead with the arbitration proceedings. Notice was issued to the appellants. They did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. The Arbitrator ultimately passed an award or 17-5-1982. The Arbitrator awarded Rs.22,72,500/- to the 1st respondent. The appellants did not nominate any Arbitrator. The Arbitrator chosen by the 1st respondent went ahead with the arbitration proceedings. Notice was issued to the appellants. They did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. The Arbitrator ultimately passed an award or 17-5-1982. The Arbitrator awarded Rs.22,72,500/- to the 1st respondent. The operative portion of the award is as follows: "I HEREBY AWARD AND DIRECT AS FOLLOWS: Point No. 1:- Whether the cancellation of the contract for supply of materials and installation of 100 ton Ice-cold-storage plant at Willington Island is legal and valid? Finding:- I find that the cancellation is illegal and invalid. Point No. 2:- Who is responsible for the delay In completing the balance work, whether the respondents or claimants? Finding-- The respondents are responsible for the delay in completing the balance work. Point No. 3:- What is the amount of damage awardable? Point No. 4:- What is the amount of compensation awardable to the claimants for the delay in completing the work from 17-5-1977 till the date of claim? Point No. 5:- What is the amount payable to the claimants as loss of profits? Findings:- Those 3 points viz. 3, 4 & 5 can be considered together with reference to the statement of claims. In the statement of claims, the claimant claims: (a) Rs.22,72,500/- as "compensation for the delay at the rate allowed by the joint Arbitrators in the previous Award which has become final", I allow the claim and direct that the respondents should pay to the claimant Rs.22,72,500/- under this head. (b) The claimant has claimed Rs.36,000/- as expenses for visit of executives etc. I disallow this claim. (c) Claimant has claimed Rs.9,000/- as salaries of staff etc. This claim is rejected. (d) The claimant has claimed Rs. 10,000/- as loss of profit for the balance work: This claim is rejected. (e) Rs.30,000/- is claimed for unauthorised selling of materials. This claim is also disallowed (f) Rs.2,000/- is claimed as Sundry expenses by the claimant. This claim is rejected. Point No. 6- This point is more or less covered by the decision on points 3,4 and 5. No additional amount is allowed. Point No. 7:- What is the order as to costs? This claim is also disallowed (f) Rs.2,000/- is claimed as Sundry expenses by the claimant. This claim is rejected. Point No. 6- This point is more or less covered by the decision on points 3,4 and 5. No additional amount is allowed. Point No. 7:- What is the order as to costs? Finding:- The claimant and respondents should pay to the Sole Arbitrator Rs.2,500/- each towards Arbitration fee and Rs.250/- each towards Secretarial expenses, within 2 weeks from the date of receipt of notice of passing this award The claimant has already paid Rs.250/- their share of secretarial expenses. The respondents did not pay Rs.250/- as secretarial expenses as directed earlier. They should pay this amount also within 2 weeks of the receipt of notice of passing the award. In case, the respondents fail to pay, the claimant should pay the respondents' share of Rs.2,750/- also within 2 weeks of getting further notice from the Arbitrator and in that case, they can realise Rs.2,750/- also from the respondents as part of the Award amount over and above Rs.22,72,500/- allowed under clause (a) of points 3,4 and 5 above." The learned Government Pleader who appeared on behalf of the appellants mainly contended that the Arbitrator has exceeded his authority and committed manifest disregard of the provisions of the law and the Arbitrator misconducted himself, and there was no basis for the award of such a huge amount to the 1st respondent. It was also contended that the award is vitiated by error apparent on the face of it. According to the learned counsel for the appellants the entire award is based on the previous award passed on 2-11-1978 and the Arbitrator has incorporated that award in the impugned award and thereby made the present award a speaking one. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the award is a non-speaking one and the same is not vitiated by any error on the face of the award and the Arbitrator has not committed any error of law or fact. Therefore the award is beyond the ken of judicial review. 2. The learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petition for setting aside the award was time-barred and the court below has found so and therefore this appeal is to be dismissed on that ground. This appeal has been preferred under S.39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 2. The learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petition for setting aside the award was time-barred and the court below has found so and therefore this appeal is to be dismissed on that ground. This appeal has been preferred under S.39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. After the passing of the award notice was issued to the parties. The award was filed in court on 17-6-1982. Appellant filed objection on 16-8-1982, wherein a prayer was included to set aside the award. 2A. When the award is filed by the Arbitrator, the court will issue notice to the parties under S.14(2) of the Arbitration Act. The period of limitation for filing the application to set aside the award starts from the date of receipt of the notice from court under S.14(2) of the Act. Under Art.119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 the period of limitation for filing application to remit the award for re-consideration or for setting aside the award is 30 days from the date of service of the notice by the Court informing the parties of filing of the award. 3. The Gouri below held that the petition for setting aside the award was barred by limitation for the reason that the appellant failed to implead the Arbitrator in the proceedings. The Arbitrator was impleaded only on 18-10-1982, i.e. about two months after the filing of the petition. The court below was of the view that the date of impleading is to be treated as the date of filing the petition. This finding is incorrect. 3A. The Arbitrator is not a necessary party, in a petition to set aside an award. Even if the petition to set aside the award has been filed on the ground of misconduct of the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator is only a formal party, not a necessary party. No relief is claimed against the Arbitrator. R.12 of the Kerala High Court Rules framed under S.44 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is only intended to give notice to the Arbitrator in case petition for setting aside award is made on the ground of misconduct of the Arbitrator. This rule has been framed with the avowed object of giving opportunity to the Arbitrator to apprise him of the allegations made against him, if any, and to offer his remarks. This rule has been framed with the avowed object of giving opportunity to the Arbitrator to apprise him of the allegations made against him, if any, and to offer his remarks. The petition to set aside an award cannot be said to be defective for want of non joinder of the Arbitrator as a party. The Arbitrator could be impleaded at any stage. The court below has erred in finding that the petition was barred by limitation and the objection raised by the respondent in this regard is overruled. 4. The next important point that would arise for consideration is whether the award passed by the Arbitrator is vitiated by error apparent on the face thereof and whether the Arbitrator has exceeded his authority. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the award has clearly incorporated the earlier award and the entire claim has been allowed on that basis. The fact that the contract was terminated by the 2nd appellant was not taken note of by the Arbitrator. The learned counsel for the respondents contends that the award is non-speaking and the award only refers to the claim put forward by the contractor and the court is not competent to go into the merits of the claim and probe into the various factors that impelled the Arbitrator to come to that conclusion. 5. It has been held by various decisions that an award is liable to be set aside, if it is found to be vitiated by error apparent on the face of it. The Supreme Court in Thawardas v. Union of India (AIR 1955 SC 468) considered this question and held that the court can interfere in the matter and set right an award provided the error appeared on the face of the award. The court has explained what is error apparent on the face of the award and held: "S.16(1)(c) covers cases in which an error of law appears on the face of the award. But in determining what such an error is, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which a question of law is specifically referred and those in which a decision on a question of law is incidentally material (however necessary) in order to decide the question actually referred. But in determining what such an error is, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which a question of law is specifically referred and those in which a decision on a question of law is incidentally material (however necessary) in order to decide the question actually referred. If a question of law is specifically referred and it is evident that the parties desire to have a decision from the arbitrator about that rather than one from the Courts, then the Courts will not interfere, though even there, there is authority for the view that the Courts will interfere if it is apparent that the arbitrator has acted illegally in reaching his decision, that is to say, if he had decided on inadmissible evidence or on principles of construction that the law does not countenance or something of that nature. An arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law or misapply it in order to do what be thinks is just and reasonable. He is a tribunal selected by the parties to decide their disputes according to law and so is bound to follow and apply the law, and if he does not, he can be set right by the Court provided his error appears on the face of the award. The single exception to this is when the parties 'choose specifically to refer a question of law as a separate and distinct matter." The Supreme Court also considered a question of this nature in Mis. Alopi Parshad and sons v. The Union of India (1960-2 SCR 793). That was a case in which the appellants therein entered into a contract with the Governor-General for the supply of ghee required for the Army personnel. After the outbreak of World War II there was an enormous increase in the demand of ghee by the Government and the appellants requested for enhancement of rates. The Government did not enhance the rate and the appellants continued to supply ghee. Dispute arose between the parties and the matter was referred to the Arbitrator. The Court held that the award which ignored the express terms of the contract prescribing the remuneration payable could not be justified as proceeding upon the basis of quantum merit. Compensation quantum merit could be awarded for the work done or services rendered only when the price thereof was not fixed by a contract. The Court held that the award which ignored the express terms of the contract prescribing the remuneration payable could not be justified as proceeding upon the basis of quantum merit. Compensation quantum merit could be awarded for the work done or services rendered only when the price thereof was not fixed by a contract. For work done or service rendered pursuant to the terms of a contract, compensation quantum merit could not be awarded where the contract provided for the consideration payable in that behalf Relying on Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (LR 50 IA 324) the Court held:- "that the award was liable to be set aside because of an error apparent on the face of the award. An arbitration award may be set aside on the ground of an error on the face of it when the reasons given for the decision, either in the award or in any document incorporated with it, are based upon a legal proposition which is erroneous. But where a specific question is referred, the award is not liable to be set aside on the ground of an error on the face of the award even if the answer to the question involves an erroneous decision on a point of law. In the present case there was a general reference and not a specific reference on any question of law." It was also held in Union of India v. A. L. Rallia Ram (1964-3 SCR 164) that an award is liable to be set aside if it is proved that there is error apparent on the face of the award. In Orissa Mining Corporation v. P. V. Rawlley (AIR 1977 SC 2014) the Court held that the arbitrator could not enlarge the scope of the contract and if he entertained fresh claims that would be exceeding the jurisdiction conferred on him and the court held that an award passed by the arbitrator by exceeding his jurisdiction was error apparent on the face of the award. The finding of the Supreme Court is to the following effect: "When an agreement is filed in court and order of reference is made under S.20(4) then the claim as a result of the order of reference is limited to a particular relief and the arbitrator cannot enlarge the scope of the reference and entertain fresh claims without a further order of reference from the court. Thus, on the facts of this case it was held that the amount had been specified in the plaint and when the reference was confined to the claim made in the plaint the arbitrator would have to restrict his award only to the claim, but the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction in embarking on the claim that was for the first time put forward before him by the respondent. There was, therefore, an error apparent on the face of the award." The scope and ambit of the court's power to set aside an award on the ground of error apparent on the face of the award also engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in Chellappan v. Secretary, KSEB (1975 KLT 287). The court held: "An error of law on the face of the award means that you can find In the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous (see Lord Dunedin in Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Ballao Co., 1923 AC 480 (AIR 1923 PC 66). In Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. (1967) I SCR 324 AIR 1967 SC 1032), this court adopted the proposition laid down by the Privy Council and applied it. The Court has no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case and to examine the documentary and oral evidence on the record for the purpose of finding out, whether or not the arbitrator has committed an error of law." 5A. The validity of the impugned award has to be tested in the light of the principle enunciated in the various decisions. The validity of the impugned award has to be tested in the light of the principle enunciated in the various decisions. From the above quoted decisions it is clear that when an award of the arbitrator may be set aside on the ground of error apparent on the face thereof and when the error of law on the face of the award means that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can say is erroneous. In Alien Barry and Co. v. Union of India (AIR 1971 SC 696) the Supreme Court clarified the position regarding the jurisdiction of the court to look into the documents to find out whether the award is vitiated by error apparent on the face of it. The Supreme Court relying on Kelanton v. Duff Development Co. (1923 AC 396) observed as follows: "6 The principle is that the Court, while examining an award, will look at documents accompanying and forming part of the award. Thus, if an arbitrator were to refer to the pleadings of the parties so as to incorporate them into the award, the Court can look at them. In some cases, however, Courts extended the principle and set aside the award on a finding that the contract though only referred to but not incorporated into the award as part of it, had been misconstrued and such misconstruction had been the basis of the award" and further observed as follows in Para.7: "The Privy Council upheld the award stating that it was impossible to say what was the mistake on the face of the award which the arbitrators had made as they had not tied themselves down to any legal principle which was unsound. The mere fact that the Court would have construed a document differently than the arbitrator would not induce the Court to interfere unless the construction given by the arbitrator is such that it is against the well-established principles of construction." 6. In the instant case the further question that would arise for consideration is whether the previous award passed by the two arbitrators has been incorporated in the impugned award and if so whether this Court can go into the merits of the claim as it is purely based on the earlier award. In the instant case the further question that would arise for consideration is whether the previous award passed by the two arbitrators has been incorporated in the impugned award and if so whether this Court can go into the merits of the claim as it is purely based on the earlier award. If the previous award was expressly incorporated in the present award, the Court is competent to go it to the previous award as well as the claims put forward by the 1st respondent contractor. Denning, L. J. stated in D. S. Balaiber and Co. Ltd. v. Leopold Newborne (London) Ltd. ((1953) 2 Lolyd's LIZ 427) as follows: "The question whether a contract, or a clause in a contract is incorporated into an award is a very difficult one. As I read the case, if the arbitrator says: 'On the wording of this clause I hold', so and so, then that clause is impliedly incorporated into the award because he invites the reading of it; but if an arbitrator simply says, 'I hold that there was a breach of contract', then there is no incorporation." It is also useful to refer to the decision reported in F. R. Abasalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd. (1933 AC 592). The appellants therein entered into a contract with the respondents who were the employer for erecting 24 he uses subject to the conditions set forth in the schedule to the contract. The relevant conditions in the contract that fell to be considered were Nos. 26, 30 and 32. Dispute arose between the parties and the matter ended in an arbitration award. The contractors were directed to pay certain amounts to the employer. The matter went before the House of Lords. Lord Russel of Killowen considered the question whether the term of the contract was incorporated in the award. It was held: "There still remains the question whether this error of law is apparent on the face of the award. I think it is. The award recites the contract and refers in terms to the provisions of condition 30. Lord Russel of Killowen considered the question whether the term of the contract was incorporated in the award. It was held: "There still remains the question whether this error of law is apparent on the face of the award. I think it is. The award recites the contract and refers in terms to the provisions of condition 30. Condition 30 accordingly is incorporated into and forms part of the award just as if the arbitrator had set it out verbatim and had then proceeded to state the construction which he placed upon it: The Court can look at it just as it looked at the answers of the Divisional Court." 7. If the impugned award is examined and interpreted in the backdrop of these decisions it could be seen that the arbitrator has incorporated the previous award and the impugned award is purely based on the earlier award. The 1st respondent contractor claimed several items of damages. All these claims, except claims, 3, 4 and 5, were rejected. Claims 3, 4 and 5 were considered together and a total amount of Rs.22,72,500/- was awarded as compensation. The reason for arriving at this amount is mentioned in the award itself. The words incorporated in the award make clear reference to the previous award. According to the learned counsel for the appellants the entire award is based on the previous award and by quoting the recitals in the previous award the arbitrator has incorporated the same. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that the quoted words in the impugned award was only a reference to the claim put forward by the 1st respondent contractor and it in no way refers to the earlier award. We do not accept this contention. 8. A plain reading of the award would show that the arbitrator was not simply stating the nature of the claim put forward by the contractor. The claim statement of the respondents would go to show that the 1st respondent did not claim any specific amount by way of damages. Claim No. 4 was a prayer for compensation for the delay in completing the work from 1975-77 till the date of the award, whereas the words quoted in the award, i. e. "compensation for the delay at the rate allowed by joint arbitrators in the previous award which has become final" refer to the previous award. Claim No. 4 was a prayer for compensation for the delay in completing the work from 1975-77 till the date of the award, whereas the words quoted in the award, i. e. "compensation for the delay at the rate allowed by joint arbitrators in the previous award which has become final" refer to the previous award. So we are of the view that the award in question is a speaking award and the Arbitrator has incorporated the earlier award passed by the two arbitrators on 4-11-1978. 8A. The 1st respondent contractor entered into an agreement with the 2nd appellant in 1965. The nature of the contract was that the 1st respondent would supply and erect air-conditioning and refrigerating machines and the Government would furnish the site including the buildings. The Government could not carry out the contemporaneous civil work to be carried out by them. As the Government could not perform their part of the contract, the respondent-contractor alleged that they had supplied several valuable materials for the erection of the ice plant and they had sustained heavy loss. The 1st respondent also alleged that the delay in executing the work was entirely due to the non-performance of the contract by the Government. This dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration. Two arbitrators were appointed. The 1st respondent contractor prayed for enhancement of rate. That was allowed by the arbitrator. The award dated 2-11-1978 allowed the contractor to realise 40 percent more over the agreed amount of the contract less the amount of work already done plus an amount of Rs.300/- per month towards overhead charges. The enhanced rate at 40 percent was allowed in respect of the work to be done by the contractor after the award. The purport of the first award was to settle the claims as on that date and to give 40 per cent more for the work to be carried out later. It is important to note that about 15 days after the award the Government cancelled the contract. The counsel for the respondents contended that the termination of the contract was illegal and therefore the 1st respondent was entitled to treat the contract as if the contract was in full force. We cannot accede to this contention. 9. The claim statement filed by the petitioner before the arbitrator was on the basis that the Government rescinded the contract illegally. We cannot accede to this contention. 9. The claim statement filed by the petitioner before the arbitrator was on the basis that the Government rescinded the contract illegally. In fact, this point was referred to the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator found that the contract was terminated illegally and on that basis the 1st respondent claimed general damages for the loss sustained by him and also claimed Rs.10,000/- as damages for loss of profit. This claim was rejected by the Arbitrator. The 1st respondent opted to claim damages and had never contended that he proceeded with the work for which compensation had to be given on the principle of quantum merit. Strangely enough the contractor claimed damages for delay in completing the project when the contract itself came to an end on 15-11-1978. There could not be any delay in completing the contract. The entire claim put forward by the 1st respondent-contractor towards compensation for delay in executing the work was based on a total misconception and the arbitrator has not applied his mind and mechanically awarded the amount, without understanding the nature of the claim or its sustainability. The present award was on the footing that the contractor was entitled to Rs.5,30,500/- per annum for the delay in completing the work. When the contract itself was terminated by the Government, there could not be any delay in the execution of that work. 10. Thus, it could be seen that the contractor made an unsustainable claim and the Arbitrator allowed the same without evaluating its apparent error. The award passed in such a manner is vitiated by error apparent on the face thereof. 11. The Arbitrator in passing the award misconducted himself. The word 'misconduct' has not been defined in the Act. It does not necessarily imply anything in the nature of fraud involving moral turpitude. It covers a wider and larger field than personal knowledge and behaviour or unreasonable or illegal act on the part of the arbitrator. It may be a mere failure on the part of the arbitrator to comply with the terms of the arbitration agreement. The word 'misconduct' has been explained by the Supreme Court in K P. Poulose v. State of Kerala (AIR 1975 SC 1259). That was a case in which the contractor claimed some extra amount towards an item which was not covered by the agreement. The word 'misconduct' has been explained by the Supreme Court in K P. Poulose v. State of Kerala (AIR 1975 SC 1259). That was a case in which the contractor claimed some extra amount towards an item which was not covered by the agreement. The arbitrator rejected the claim on the ground that the claim of the contractor was in respect of an extra work not covered by the agreement. The court held: "Misconduct under S.30(a) has not a connotation of moral lapse. It comprises legal misconduct which is complete if the Arbitrator on the face of the award arrives at an inconsistent conclusion even on his own finding or arrives at a decision by ignoring very material documents which throw abundant light on the controversy to help a just and fair decision. In the instant case the Arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings by ignoring the two very material documents to arrive at a just decision to resolve the controversy between the Department and the contractor. Even if Department did not produce those documents before the Arbitrator it was incumbent upon him to gel hold of all the relevant documents including the two documents in question for the purpose of a just decision. Further, he arrived at an inconsistent conclusion even on his own finding. The award suffered from a manifest error apparent ex facie." In a recent decision, Fertilizer Corpn, of India Ltd. v. M/s. Bharat Painters (AIR 1986 Orissa 82) the Orissa High Court set aside the award passed by the Arbitrator on the ground that the award was passed without considering the evidence. The dispute between the parties was in respect of a claim made by the respondent for reimbursement of the cost of Rs. 10 lakhs alleged to have been spent by the respondent for de-watering three lakhs Kilo-litres of water while executing the additional works in coal handling tunnel. No evidence either oral or documentary was led before the arbitrator by either party. The arbitrator visited the site on a particular day and thereafter passed an award for Rs. 8 lakhs and 20 thousand. The court held: "that by the time the Arbitrator inspected the site, the work is question had already been over and was not in progress. No evidence either oral or documentary was led before the arbitrator by either party. The arbitrator visited the site on a particular day and thereafter passed an award for Rs. 8 lakhs and 20 thousand. The court held: "that by the time the Arbitrator inspected the site, the work is question had already been over and was not in progress. In the premises, it goes beyond one's comprehension as to how the arbitrator, however expertise he might have, would arrive at a conclusion as to the quantity of de-watering which had taken place actually and what would be the cost of such de-watering. The conclusion of the arbitrator in such circumstances, must be held to be one backed by no evidence and therefore, such a conclusion can be interfered with by a Court even though the arbitrator has not given any reasons for arriving at the said conclusion. The determination made by the arbitrator in the facts and circumstances of the present case is perverse and such perversity on the part of the arbitrator amounts to misconduct within the ambit of S.30 of Arbitration Act enabling a court of law to interfere with the award." 12. On a careful analysis of the whole matter we are of the view that the award is vitiated by error apparent on the face thereof. The arbitrator has misconducted himself in passing such an award. The contract was for the construction of the ice plant and the same was rescinded by the 2nd appellant in 1978 itself. The claims pertain to period after the contract and that too for the delay in executing the work. There cannot be any delay in executing the contract when the contract itself had come to an end. If the contract was illegally terminated, the claim of the contractor could have been only for damages. That was one of the claims and it wag separately dealt with by the Arbitrator by rejecting it. Whatever is now ordered to be given to the contractor is outside the scope of the contract and the claim put forward by the contractor was not in respect of the contract or not arising out of the same. The Arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction in passing such an award. He had reached a conclusion which no person acting judicially and properly instructed in law could have reached and therefore the arbitrator has misconducted himself. The Arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction in passing such an award. He had reached a conclusion which no person acting judicially and properly instructed in law could have reached and therefore the arbitrator has misconducted himself. Accordingly we allow the appeal and set aside the award under S.30 of the Arbitration Act. The parties are directed to bear their costs.