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1986 DIGILAW 427 (KER)

ABDUL RAHIMAN v. RANI

1986-11-10

BHASKARAN NAMBIAR, MALIMATH

body1986
Judgment :- 1. This appeal is against the judgment of the learned single judge in OP No. 7306/85. The relevant facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal may briefly be stated as follows: The second respondent, the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat invited applications for grant of stage carriage permit for the route Pazbayannur-Govindapuratn. The notification inviting applications issued under S.57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act published in the gazette of 20th of September, 1973 stated that the applications will be received within thirty days from the date of publication of the notification in the gazette and that applications received beyond the prescribed time will not be considered. The appellant and the first respondent both submitted their applications. It appears that there was one more person who also made an application. Thus it is not disputed that there were three applications before the Regional Transport Authority in response to the invitation of the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Authority rejected all the three applications by its resolution dated the 9th of March, 1975 and directed fresh notification being issued for inviting applications. The said decision was challenged by the appellant and the first respondent in appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam. The said Tribunal allowed both the appeals and directed the Regional Transport Authority to dispose of the same on merits as early as possible. The third applicant not having challenged the adverse decision of the Regional Transport Authority, the competition thus stood confined to the appellant and the first respondent. The first respondent challenged the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ext. P4, which directed the application of the appellant to be considered on merits. The learned single judge has allowed the said original petition and quashed the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal so far as it directed that the appellant's application should be considered on merits. It is the said decision of the learned single judge that is challenged in this appeal. 2. It was contended by Sri. M. P. R. Nair, learned counsel for the appellant, that the learned single judge was not right in taking the view that the appellant's application having been filed 8 days after the last date fixed in the notification issued by the Regional Transport Authority, the said application was liable to be rejected. 2. It was contended by Sri. M. P. R. Nair, learned counsel for the appellant, that the learned single judge was not right in taking the view that the appellant's application having been filed 8 days after the last date fixed in the notification issued by the Regional Transport Authority, the said application was liable to be rejected. It was further contended that at any rate the learned single judge should have directed that the appellant's application should be treated as a suo mote application and clubbed along with the application of the first respondent and disposed of on merits. 3. S.57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') provides the procedure in applying for and granting permits. Sub-s. (1) of S.57 deals with applications for grant of contract carriage permits or private carriage permits. Sub-s. (2) with which we are concerned in this case deals with application for stage carriage permits and reads as follows: "An application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit shall be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, or, if the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for the receipt of such applications, on such dates." It is clear from this prevision that a suo mote application for a stage carriage permit has to be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect. If, on the other hand, the applications are made in response to the invitation by the Regional Transport Authority, such applications have to be made on or before the date fixed by the. Regional Transport Authority. So far as suo mote applications are concerned it is obvious that they have to be made not less than six weeks before the date on which the permit is expected to take effect to enable the Regional Transport Authority to have sufficient time to process the applications. As the statute itself has prescribed that the application should be filed not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, if an application is made within a lesser period, the same is liable to be rejected. As the statute itself has prescribed that the application should be filed not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, if an application is made within a lesser period, the same is liable to be rejected. That is what has been ruled by the Supreme Court in AIR 1960 SC 350 between Shrinivasa Reddy and others and State of Mysore and others. That was a case in which the application was made by a State Transport undertaking for grant of a permit under S.68F of the Act in respect of a notified route. When a State Transport undertaking makes an appropriate application under S.68F in respect of the notified route the Regional Transport Authority is bound to grant the permit. But the application in that case was not made at least six weeks before the date from which the permit was to take effect. As S.68F(1) provides that the application shall be made in the manner provided in Chap.4, the Supreme Court held that the manner prescribed in sub-s. (2) of S.57 gets attracted. Suo mote applications under sub-s. (2) of S.57 are required to be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect. As in mat case the application was not made at least six weeks before the date from which the permit was to take effect the Supreme Court held that the application was not made in the manner provided in Chapter IV and being actually in breach of S.57(2) no permit could be issued on such an application. In these circumstances it was held that the order granting permit in favour of the undertaking is liable to be quashed; The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in regard to suo motu applications to be made under sub-S. (2) of S.57 must in our opinion equally be applied to applications made in response to the invitation by the Regional Transport Authority under sub-s. (2) of S.57. The language of sub-s. (2) of S.57 is very clear and specific. If the Regional Transport Authority fixes the date for receipt of applications, it is provided that such applications shall be made on such dates. The language of sub-s. (2) of S.57 is very clear and specific. If the Regional Transport Authority fixes the date for receipt of applications, it is provided that such applications shall be made on such dates. Fixation of the date for receipt of applications would become meaningless if the applications received beyond the specified date are to be entertained. The very object of specifying the date of receipt of applications is to indicate that applications filed beyond that date are liable to be rejected and cannot be taken into consideration. That is what was also made clear in the notification issued in this case under Sub-s. (2) of S.57 when it stated that applications filed beyond the specified date shall not be considered. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that applications filed beyond the specified date are liable to be rejected on that ground alone. No power has been conferred on the Regional Transport Authority to condone the delay and to entertain belated applications. Hence the Regional Transport Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain applications presented after the specified date. 4. It was however contended by Sri. M. P. R. Nair, learned counsel for the appellant, that a contrary view has been expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in W. A. No. 538 of 1976. On going through the facts of that case, we are satisfied that the question as to whether a belated application is liable to be rejected or not did not come up for consideration in that case. The only question that came up for consideration was as to whether the Appellate Tribunal's observation that the Regional Transport Authority will be at liberty to consider the application of the appellant in that case either independently or along with applications received in pursuance of the notification inviting application deserves to be interfered with or not. It is no doubt true that in that case the application of one of the applicants was rejected by the Regional Transport Authority as barred by limitation. That decision was reversed on appeal by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which, while remitting the case for disposal on merits observed that the Regional Transport Authority has liberty to club that application along with other applications. That decision was reversed on appeal by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which, while remitting the case for disposal on merits observed that the Regional Transport Authority has liberty to club that application along with other applications. It is only this observation of the Appellate Tribunal which gives such liberty that came up for consideration before this Court and not the question as to whether the Appellate Tribunal in that case was right in taking the view that the belated application can be entertained. Hence it is not possible to accept the contention that the decision in W. A. No. 538 of 1976 takes the view contrary to the one which we have expressed above. We are therefore inclined to agree with the view taken by the learned single judge that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal could not have directed the Regional Transport Authority to entertain the belated application of the appellant for consideration on merits. 5. Another argument of Sri. M. P. R. Nair is that the application of the appellant even it regarded as barred by limitation, could be treated as a suo mote application and dealt with on merits. The application of the appellant in fact is not a suo mote application. It is admittedly an application made in response to the invitation published by the Regional Transport Authority under sub-s. (2) of S.57 of the Act. The request of the appellant therefore would amount to calling upon the Court to treat the application made in response to the invitation of the Regional Transport Authority as a suo mote application made by the appellant, when on his own showing the application is not a sue mote application. The application mad; by the appellant is breach of the provisions of S.57(2) cannot be regarded as a suo mote application made by the appellant. If such a request is acceded to, it would render the provisions of S.57(2) nugatory and every application which is presented beyond the prescribed time will have to be regarded as a suo motu application. Hence we have no hesitation in taking the view that the application of the appellant cannot be regarded as a suo mote application. 6. If such a request is acceded to, it would render the provisions of S.57(2) nugatory and every application which is presented beyond the prescribed time will have to be regarded as a suo motu application. Hence we have no hesitation in taking the view that the application of the appellant cannot be regarded as a suo mote application. 6. As the application of the appellant cannot be regarded as a suo mote application and as it is liable to be rejected as an application received in response to the invitation of the Regional Transport Authority, there being no valid application of the appellant for consideration, the question of clubbing the said application for consideration along with the application of the first respondent does not arise. Hence we do not propose to express ourselves in regard to the question of clubbing of suo mote applications received in response to the invitation by the Regional Transport Authority. For the reasons stated above this appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.