( 1 ) IN this Writ Petition in which the petitioner, a member of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS for short), has questioned the constitutional validity of Clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to rule 5 (a) of the Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules, 1954, ('the Rules' for short), the following question of law arises for consideration : "whether on the coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ('the Act' for short) and the establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to retain or entertain petitions presented under that Article before it, challenging the constitutional validity of any law regulating recruitment and conditions of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and decide such petitions stood excluded and got vested in the Central administrative Tribunal ?" ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are as follows : (i) The petitioner is a member of the Indian Administrative Service, borne on the Karnataka cadre. By order dated 8th March, 1982 of the State Government, he was appointed as the commissioner of the Corporation of the City of Bangalore, which is a non-cadre post, declared as equivalent in rank to that of the Divisional Commissioner included in Schedule - III of the rules. He assumed office of the Commissioner on 12th March, 1982. On this taking charge of the said post, pay slip was given to him by the Accountant General, permitting him to draw the initial salary of Rs. 2,500/- in the Supertime pay scale of Rs. 2500-125/2-2750. After the expiry of two years from the date of his appointment to the said post on 8th March, 1984, the petitioner claimed by his letter dated 19th March, 1984 that he should be given the first increment in the said pay scale. This request of the petitioner was turned down in view of clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Rule 5 (a) of the Rules. It was pointed out that according to the above Rules, the petitioner would be entitled to count his service for purpose of drawing increments in the supertime scale only from the date on which his junior in the. It was pointed out that according to the above Rules, the petitioner would be entitled to count his service for purpose of drawing increments in the supertime scale only from the date on which his junior in the. A. S. was appointed to the supertime scale and as his junior Sri G. Muniyappa was appointed to the cadre post in super-time scale on 28th February, 1983, the petitioner would be entitled to count his service only from the said date for the purpose of grant of increment in the Super-time scale. The petitioner does not dispute that the above view taken by the Accountant General is correct according to the Rule referred to above. The petitioner, however, has challenged the constitutional validity of the said provision on the ground that as the provision denies to a member of the service appointed to an ex-cadre post the benefit of a part of the service rendered by him in a Supertime scale post,. e. , till the date on which a junior of his is promoted to a cadre post to which the concerned ex-cadre post is declared equivalent, for the purpose of eligibility for drawing increment, is discriminatory and therefore violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the constitution. This Writ Petition was prescribed before this Court on 11th September, 1984. (II) During the pendency of this Writ Petition, the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act No. 13 of 1985) enacted by the Parliament, pursuant to the power given to it under Article 323a of the Constitution, came into force. The Central Government constituted the Central administrative Tribunal w. e. f. 1st November, 1985 under Section 4 (1) of the Act and a Bench of the said Tribunal has been established in the State of Karnataka, at Bangalore. Section 14 of the act specifies the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal. According to the said provision, all matters relating to the grievance of civil servants regarding recruitment to any All India Service and all service matters concerning members of All India service and holding civil posts under the Union, which were prior to its coming into existence, exercisable by all the Courts except the Supreme Court of India are vested in the said Tribunal. Section 15 is a similar provision regarding the jurisdiction and powers of a State Administrative tribunal constituted under Section 4 (2) of the Act in respect of Members of State Civil Service of the concerned State. Section 28 of the Act provides for exclusion of jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, in respect of all matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Central and the State Administrative Tribunal under Sections 14 and 15 respectively. Section 29 of the Act provides for transfer of every suit or other proceedings pending before any Court or other Authority immediately before the date of the establishment of a Tribunal, to the Central Administrative Tribunal or the State Administrative Tribunal as the case may be. In view of the provisions contained in Sections 14, 28 and 29 of the Act, the question set out first arises for consideration. ( 3 ) AS the question is of vital importance affecting the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 228 of the Constitution and the answer to the question would apply equally in respect of the jurisdiction of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, when the matter came up on 20th october, 1986, Sri Santhosh Hegde, the learned Advocate General, was directed to appear in the case and to place his views on the question and the matter was adjourned to 4th November, 1986. Accordingly, the learned Advocate General has made his submissions. For the reasons furnished by him, which are set out in detail later in this order, he submitted that the answer to the question should be in the negative. This was also the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri G. P. Shivaprakash. ( 4 ) AS this question arises in several other cases also, I permitted such of the Advocates who were desirous of addressing arguments with reference to the question, for an against, to make their submissions. Accordingly, Sarvashri K. R. D. Karanth, B. Veerabhadrappa, N. B. Bhat, mahadeva Menon and A. V. Albal, made their submissions. All of them supported the stand taken by the learned Advocate General and the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Sri shivashankar Bhat, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Central Government, appearing for the first respondent made his submission which according to him could constitute the basis for answering the question in the affirmative. All of them supported the stand taken by the learned Advocate General and the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Sri shivashankar Bhat, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Central Government, appearing for the first respondent made his submission which according to him could constitute the basis for answering the question in the affirmative. ( 5 ) (1) Before considering the contentions urged by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it is necessary to set out the provisions of Articles 323a and 323b of the Constitution, which were introduced into the Constitution by Section 46 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 as also to set out the salient aspects of the Act. The two Articles read : administrative Tribunals : "323a (1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by the administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the government of India or of any Corporation owned or controlled by the Government. (2) A law made under Clause (1) may - (a) provide for the establishment of an administrative tribunal for the Union and a separate administrative tribunal for each State or for two or more States; (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals; (c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and rules of evidence) to be followed by the said tribunals; (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in Clause (1); (e) provide for the transfer to each such administrative tribunal of any cases pending before any court or other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are bases had arisen after such establishment; (f) repeal or amend any order made by the President under Clause (3) of article 371d; (g) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees) as Parliament may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of such tribunals. (3) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force. Tribunals for other matters. 323-B (1) appropriate legislature may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunals of any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2) with respect to which such legislature has power to make laws. Tribunals for other matters. 323-B (1) appropriate legislature may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunals of any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2) with respect to which such legislature has power to make laws. (2) The matters referred to in Clause (1) are the following, namely :- (a) levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax; (b) Foreign exchange, import and export across customs frontiers; (c) Industrial and labour disputes; (d) land reforms by way of acquisition by the State of any estate as defined in Article 31a or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights or by way of ceiling on agricultural land or in any other way; (e) ceiling on urban property; (f) election to either House of Parliament or the House or either House of the Legislature of a state, but excluding the matters referred to in Article 329 and Article 329a; (g) production, procurement, supply and distribution of foodstuffs (including edible oilseeds and oils) and such other goods as the President may, by public notification, declare to be essential goods for the purpose of this article and control of prices of such goods; (h) offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in sub-clauses (a) to (g) and fees in respect of any of those matters; (i) any matters incidental to any of the matters specified in sub-clause (a) to (h ). (3) A law made under Clause (1) may - (a) provide for the establishment of a hierarchy of tribunals; (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals; (c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and rules of evidence) to be followed by the said tribunals; (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 136, with respect to all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said tribunals; (e) provide for the transfer to each such tribunal of any cases pending before any Court or any other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment; (f) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees) as the appropriate Legislature may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of such tribunals. (4) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provisions of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force. Explanation : In this article, "appropriate Legislature", in relation to any matter means parliament or, as the case may be, a State Legislature competent to make laws with respect to such matter in accordance with the provisions of Part. " Article 323 provides for the constitution of Administrative Tribunals for adjudicating disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of civil servants of the union as well as of the States. Clause 2 (d) of the Article, provides that the Parliament may by such law exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution with respect to the disputes and complaints referred to in clause (1 ). Clause (3) provides that the article would have effect notwithstanding any other provision in the Constitution. Article 323b provides for constitution of Tribunals in respect of various matters specified in clause (2) thereof. Clause (3) provides that the article would have effect notwithstanding any other provision in the Constitution. Article 323b provides for constitution of Tribunals in respect of various matters specified in clause (2) thereof. The said clause also provides that the constitution of each of the Tribunals contemplated by the article is for adjudication of disputes, complaints or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2 ). Clause 3 (d) of Article 323b provides for exclusion of jurisdiction of all Courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme court under Article 136 with respect to all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunals so constituted. Clause (4) is similar to clause (3) of Article 323a and gives overriding effect to the Article. (2) It is pursuant to the power conferred on the Parliament under Article 323a, the Act has been enacted. This is evident from the wording of the Preamble. The wording of the Preamble to the act when the Act was first enacted repeated verbatim the language of Article 323a. By Act 19 of 1986, the Preamble was amended making a specific reference to Article 323a of the constitution. The Preamble, as amended, reads : "an Act to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or any local or other Authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance of Article 323a of the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. " The salient aspects of the Act are as below : section 2 (q) of the Act defines 'service matters'. " The salient aspects of the Act are as below : section 2 (q) of the Act defines 'service matters'. It reads : "'service matters', in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation (or society) owned or controlled by the Government, as respects - (i) remuneration (including allowances, pension and other retirement benefits; (ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation; (iii) leave of any kind; (iv) disciplinary matters; or (v) any other matters whatsoever. " Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act provides for the establishment of Central Administrative tribunals. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act empowers the Central Government to establish an Administrative Tribunal for any State on receipt of such a request from the State Government. Section 5 of the Act provides for the composition of Tribunals and Benches thereof. According to sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act, each Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman and such number of Vice-Chairman and other members as the appropriate Government may deem fit and subject to the provisions of the Act, the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal may be exercised by the Benches thereof. Section 5 (2) provides that a Bench shall consist of one judicial member and an administrative member. Section 5 (4) (b) authorities the Chairman to transfer the vice-Chairman of a Bench or other member thereof to any other Bench. Section 6 (1), (2) and (3) of the Act prescribed the qualification for appointing a Chairman. Vice-Chairman and judicial member and administrative member. It reads : "6. Section 5 (4) (b) authorities the Chairman to transfer the vice-Chairman of a Bench or other member thereof to any other Bench. Section 6 (1), (2) and (3) of the Act prescribed the qualification for appointing a Chairman. Vice-Chairman and judicial member and administrative member. It reads : "6. Qualification for appointing Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other members - (1) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Chairman unless he - (a) is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or (b) has, for at least two years, held the office of Vice-Chairman; or (c) has, for at least two years, held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India. (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Vice-Chairman unless he - (b) is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or (b) has, for at least two years, held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than of a Secretary to the Government of India; or (bb) has, for at least five years, held the post of an Additional Secretary to the Government of india or any other post under Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of an Additional Secretary to the Government of India; or (c) has, for a period of not less than three years, held office as a judicial Member or an administrative Member. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judicial Member unless he - (a) is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a Judge of a High Court; or (b) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that service for at least three years. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judicial Member unless he - (a) is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a Judge of a High Court; or (b) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that service for at least three years. (3a) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as an Administrative Member unless he -(a) has, for at least two years, held the post of an Additional Secretary to the Government of india or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of an Additional Secretary to the Government of India; or (b) has, for at least three years, held the post of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India; and shall, in either case, have adequate administrative experience. "Sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Act designates President as the appointing authority to appoint Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Central as well as the State Tribunals. Section 6 (7) provides that appointment of Chairman or Vice-Chairman or Member possessing the qualification specified in sub-section (3) of Section 6 should be made only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Section 8 of the Act fixes the tenure of office of Chairman, vice-Chairman as five years or 65 years of age whichever is earlier and of the Member as five years or 62 years of age whichever is earlier. Section 9 provides for the procedure for resignation and removal of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members of Tribunal. Section 4 of the Act, which confers jurisdiction, powers and authority on the Central Administrative Tribunal reads : "14. Section 9 provides for the procedure for resignation and removal of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members of Tribunal. Section 4 of the Act, which confers jurisdiction, powers and authority on the Central Administrative Tribunal reads : "14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal : (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to - (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by civilian; (b) all service matters concerning :- i) a member of any All-India Service; or ii) a person not being a member of an All-India Service or person referred to in Clause (c) appointed to any civil service to the Union or any civil post under the Union; or iii) a civilian not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in Clause (c) appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence, and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government; (c) All service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) or Clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by a State Government or any local or other authority or any corporation or society or other body, at the disposal of the Central government for such appointment. " (d) Section 15 of the Act is similarly worded and specifies powers and authority of State administrative Tribunals in relation to service matters and recruitment to State Civil Services and posts. " (d) Section 15 of the Act is similarly worded and specifies powers and authority of State administrative Tribunals in relation to service matters and recruitment to State Civil Services and posts. Section 17 of the Act confers power on the Tribunal to punish for contempt of itself in the same manner as the High Court has under the provisions to the Contempt of Courts Act. Section 18 of the Act provides for distribution of business amongst the Benches. Clause (1) of section 18 provides that the power to distribute the work could be made by a Notification by the appropriate Government. Clause (2) of Section 18 provides that if any question arises as to whether any matter falls within the purview of the business allocated to a Bench of a Tribunal, the decision of the Chairman thereon, shall be final. Section 19 provides for making the applications before the Tribunals. Section 20 provides that ordinarily the Tribunal shall not admit an application unless the applicant has exhausted the remedy available under the Service rules. Section 21 prescribes the period of limitation as one year for making an application from the date on which the final order was made. Section 22 prescribes the procedure and powers of the Tribunals. According to the said provision, the Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down by the C. P. C. , but it is required to act in conformity with the rules of natural justice. Sub-section (3) of Section 22 confers on the Tribunal the power available to a Civil Court under the C. P. C. in respect of matters specified in clauses (a) to (i) thereof. Section 23 provides that every applicant before the Tribunal has a right to take the assistance of a legal practitioner. Under Section 24, normally, the Tribunal cannot pass any interim order unless copies of the application are served on the opposite parties and opportunity is given to such parties of being heard, but under certain circumstances the Tribunal can dispense with the above requirement and grant an interim order for a period not exceeding 14 days. Section 25 of the Act confers power on the Chairman to transfer cases from one Bench to another. Section 26 provides that the decision of the Bench shall be taken by majority. Section 27 provides for the execution of the orders of the Tribunal. Section 25 of the Act confers power on the Chairman to transfer cases from one Bench to another. Section 26 provides that the decision of the Bench shall be taken by majority. Section 27 provides for the execution of the orders of the Tribunal. Section 28 of the Act provides for exclusion of jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and Section 29 provides for transfer of all pending cases before any Court which falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 28 of the Act. Sections 28 and 29 read : "28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts except the Supreme Court :- On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service matter concerning members of any Service, or persons appointed to any Service or post, no court except - (a) the Supreme Court; or (b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force. shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers of authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters. " "29. (1) Transfer of pending cases :- Every suit or other proceeding pending before any court or other authority immediately before date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal : provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before a high Court. (2) Every suit or other proceeding pending before a court or other authority immediately before the date with effect from which jurisdiction is conferred on a Tribunal in relation to any local or other authority or corporation or society, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after the said date, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal. Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before a high Court. " ( 6 ) IT is common ground that the answer to the question, which arises for consideration in this case, depends upon the true meaning of the words 'disputes and complaints' used in Article 323a of the Constitution, for the reason that it is pursuant to the said Article the Parliament has enacted the Act, providing for the establishment of Administrative Tribunals for the purpose of adjudication of disputes and complaints relating to recruitment and conditions of service of Civil servants as clearly indicated in the Preamble. Therefore, the jurisdiction, power and authority conferred on the Tribunal must necessarily fall within the scope and ambit of Article 323a of the constitution. In other words, the ambit of the expressions 'service matters' defined in Section 2 (r) of the Act and of the jurisdiction, power and authority conferred on the Tribunal under section 14 or 15 of the Act and of exclusion of jurisdiction of other Courts provided for under sections 28 and 29 of the Act must also be ascertained only having due regard to the meaning of the words 'disputes and complaints' used in Article 323a of the Constitution. It is also pertinent to note that the provision for exclusion of jurisdiction under clause (d) is expressly stated to be only with respect to the disputes and complaints referred to in clause (1 ). ( 7 ) THE submissions made by Shri G. P. Shivaprakash, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, are as follows :- Disputes and complaints for the adjudication of which an Administrative Tribunal could be constituted under Article 323a was in respect of disputes and complaints arising out of violation of the law regulating the conditions of service or recruitment of civil servants. Such law could be either by or under an Act of Legislature or the Rules made under an Act of Legislature or by the Rules made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, under the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution or in the absence of law made by the appropriate Legislature or rules made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, by an order made by the appropriate Government in exercise of its executive power which is co-existance with that of the power of the Legislature. A question as to whether any such law so enacted or the rule or order so made, which regulates the conditions of service of civil servant, is itself void or invalid on the ground that it is violative of the provisions of the Constitution, does not fall within the expression 'disputes and complaints relating to service matters for the adjudication of which tribunal is required to be constituted. There is no warrant for the interpretation of Article 323a or the provisions of the Act so as to exclude the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution which undoubtedly includes the power of judicial review of legislation with reference to the constitutional framework and the restrictions and conditions imposed on the Legislature and/or the executive by the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, on the coming into force of the Act and the establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not ousted in so far it relates to judicial review of legislation pertaining to service matters. The provisions of the Act do not confer any power on the Central or State Administrative Tribunal to decide constitutional validity of the laws. ( 8 ) SRI Shivshankar Bhat, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Central Government, submitted that even the question as to whether a provision of law regulating the condition of service or recruitment is constitutionally valid or not, could also be regarded as a dispute, or a complaint to the extent the said provision violates any constitutional provision. ( 8 ) SRI Shivshankar Bhat, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Central Government, submitted that even the question as to whether a provision of law regulating the condition of service or recruitment is constitutionally valid or not, could also be regarded as a dispute, or a complaint to the extent the said provision violates any constitutional provision. If that was so, the Tribunal constituted pursuant to the specific power given under Article 323a could exercise such jurisdiction and as the power of deciding constitutional validity of the provisions of any law is vested on the High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution that power could be exercised by the tribunal and consequently the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent gets automatically excluded in view of clauses 2 (d) and (3) of Article 323a. The Article saves only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate General, however, maintained, that except the Supreme Court and the high Courts established under the Constitution on whom the jurisdiction to decide constitutional validity of any law is conferred by the provisions of the Constitution themselves, no other Court or Tribunal has got the power to decide the constitutional validity of any law and the provisions of Article 323a did not make any departure from that basic and inviolable scheme under the constitution. Elaborating his submission, he said as follows : Under the scheme of the constitution, the power and responsibility to decide the constitutional validity of the laws is exclusively vested in the Supreme Court and the High Courts established by the Constitution itself. The qualification of persons eligible to be appointed as Judges of the High Court and the method and procedure for appointment and the essential conditions of service of the Judges are all prescribed by the Constitution itself. Further, the security of tenure of the Judges of the High court is ensured by Article 217 (1) (b) of the Constitution, accordingly to which it is the same as the security of tenure of the Judges of the Supreme Court vide Article 124 (4) of the Constitution. Article 226 confers jurisdiction on the High Court to issue prerogative Writs or to make order for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. Article 226 confers jurisdiction on the High Court to issue prerogative Writs or to make order for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. This power includes both power of judicial review of administrative action as also judicial review of Legislative action of the State and to issue Writs appropriate to the case concerned. Article 228 of the Constitution clearly indicates that the power and obligation to decide the constitutional validity of the laws is exclusively conferred and imposed on the High Courts. (See Raja Ganga Pratap Singh v. Allahabad Bank Limited) (AIR) 1958 SC 293. Under the provisions of the Act, person who is, or is eligible to be appointed as a Judge of the High Court is made eligible to be appointed to the tribunal. But persons who are not Judges of the High Court, who do not possess the qualification to be appointed as Judges of the High Court, who had held civil posts of the stature referred to in Section 6 of the Act are eligible to be appointed as Members of the Tribunal. Further, as far as the security of tenure is concerned, a member of the Tribunal could be removed by the President if such member is found guilty of any misbehaviour on an enquiry to be held by a Supreme Court Judge, nominated by the President. It is impossible to attribute an intention to the Parliament to confer the power to decide the constitutional validity of the laws on a Tribunal to be established and constituted by the executive under an Act of Legislature. In this behalf, it is pertinent to refer to Article 323b, which is similarly worded and introduced to the Constitution by Constitution 42nd Amendment Act. Under that Article the power to constitute Tribunals in respect of matters specified in the said Article could be exercised either by the Parliament or by the Legislature of the State concerned. Whatever interpretation is given to Article 323a, in view of the similarity of wordings, would equally be applicable to Article 323b. Under that Article the power to constitute Tribunals in respect of matters specified in the said Article could be exercised either by the Parliament or by the Legislature of the State concerned. Whatever interpretation is given to Article 323a, in view of the similarity of wordings, would equally be applicable to Article 323b. If Article 323a were to be understood as conferring jurisdiction on the Parliament to exclude jurisdiction of the High courts under Articles 226 and 228 of the Constitution relating to the decision on questions of constitutional validity of the laws, it would mean any Legislature of a State would also have the power to impair the jurisdiction of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in that behalf. It could not be, and was not, the intention of the Parliament to arm the State Legislature with the power to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts conferred by the Constitution to decide the constitutional validity of the laws and confer it on a Tribunal to be constituted under a law enacted by it. Further, it is also pertinent to note that a Tribunal constituted within the territory of a State cannot be completely outside the purview of the jurisdiction of the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, even on the basis that in respect of specified matters referred to in Articles 323a and 323b, the intention of the Parliament was to provide for the establishment of a Tribunal to decide cases whose decision would be final in the specified cases subject only to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the constitution so as to ensure speedy disposal of such disputes and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, it cannot have the effect of depriving the High Courts of their jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to ensure that all Court and Tribunals within the territorial limits of the High Court in respect of which it exercises jurisdiction, do not exceed their jurisdiction. He said that if in a given case, the Tribunal constituted under Article 323a or 323b entertains a case which is not within its jurisdiction and a writ of prohibition is sought for from the High Court to prevent the Tribunal from proceeding with the case, the High Court not only would have the power, but also would be under a duty to issue a writ of prohibition preventing such Tribunal from exercising jurisdiction not vested in it. This is evident from a comparison of Articles 323a and 323b, with Clause (7) of Article 371d which provides for exclusion of power of superintendence of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh over the Andhra administrative Tribunal, but there is no corresponding clause in Article 323a or 323b. Any other view would result in affecting the basic structure of the Constitution and consequently section 46 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, which introduced Articles 323a and 323b into the Constitution, itself would be liable to be struck down as affecting the basic structure of the Constitution, for, judicial review of Legislative action and maintenance of rule of law which means that all Courts and Tribunals must function within the framework of law under which it is constituted and if they exceed their jurisdiction, it is the function of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction they function to prevent such exceeding of jurisdiction, constitutes the basic structure of the Constitution as expounded by Supreme Court in Keshavanand Bharathi v. Union of India AIR1973 SC 1461 , (1973 )4 SCC225 , [1973 ]suppscr1 and reiterated in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR1975 SC 2299 , 1975 (Supp)SCC1 , [1976 ]2 SCR347 and Minerva Mills v. Union of India AIR1980 SC 1789 , (1980 )3 SCC625 , [1981 ]1 SCR206 , 1980 (12 ) UJ727 (SC ). The learned Advocate General received support for his submission regarding the status and jurisdiction of the High Courts under the Constitution from the following two decisions of the supreme Court : (1) In East India Commercial Co. v. Collector of Customs (AIR) 1962 SC 1903 at 1905. In that case a customs authority took the liberty of disregarding the law declared by the High Court within whose territory it was exercising power. v. Collector of Customs (AIR) 1962 SC 1903 at 1905. In that case a customs authority took the liberty of disregarding the law declared by the High Court within whose territory it was exercising power. The Supreme Court analysed the scheme of the constitution regarding the powers and jurisdiction of the High Courts under the Constitution and said that even in the absence of an Article similar to Article 141 in the Constitution in respect of the law declared by the High Court, the law declared by the High Court would be binding on all the Tribunals in the State coming within the scope of Article 227. Relevant portion of the judgment reads : "this raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest Court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Article 215, every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Article 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Article 227, it has jurisdiction over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a Tribunal can do so, all the subordinate Courts can equally do so for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate Courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that all the Tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working : otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that all the Tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working : otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer. " (2) In the case of Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank AIR1967 SC 1494 , 1968 (16 )BLJR1 , 1967 Crilj1380a , [1967 ]3 SCR163 the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a Tribunal situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the high Court which is not a subordinate Court within the meaning of that expression used in article 228 of the Constitution is not a Tribunal which is amenable to the jurisdiction of the High court, under Article 227. The relevant portion reads : "in our opinion, Article 228 of the Constitution does not indicate that unless a High Court can withdraw a case to itself from another Court for disposing of a substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, the latter Court is not subordinate to the High Court. This article is only intended to confer jurisdiction and power on the High Court to withdraw a case for the purpose mentioned above from the ordinary Courts of law whose decision may, in the normal course of things, be taken up to the High Court by way of an appeal. Article 227 is of wider ambit : it does not limit the jurisdiction of the High Court to the hierarchy of Courts functioning directly under it under the Civil Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code but it gives the High Court power to correct errors of various kinds of all courts and tribunals in appropriate cases. Needless to add that errors as to the interpretation of the Constitution is not out of the purview of Article 227 although the High Court could not, under the powers conferred by this Article, withdraw a case to itself from a tribunal and dispose of the same or determine merely the question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arising before the tribunal. " for these reasons the learned Advocate General said that the question should be answered in the negative. " for these reasons the learned Advocate General said that the question should be answered in the negative. ( 10 ) SRI V. Albal, learned Counsel, invited my attention to the Writ Petition filed by him, which is pending before this Court in which he has challenged the constitutional validity of Section 46 of the 42nd Amendment Act, by which Article 323a was introduced into the Constitution on the ground that the said Section was void as it affected the basic structure of the Constitution. In that writ Petition, the petitioner therein has challenged the constitutional validity of Article 323a which enables the Parliament to provide for transfer of Writ Petitions pending before the High courts under Article 226 of the Constitution either for enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose presented by civil servants regarding recruitment and conditions of service and to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts to retain or entertain such petitions, affected the basic structure of the Constitution. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel, who supported the stand taken by the learned Advocate General, submitted as follows :- A careful consideration of the scheme of Article 323a and the Act would indicate that though undoubtedly the Tribunal constituted under the Act in pursuance of the power given to the Parliament under Article 323a of the Constitution, is certainly a high power tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters falling within its jurisdiction and its decisions are only appealable to the Supreme Court, still the fact remains that it is not invested with jurisdiction to decide the questions relating to constitutional validity of the laws enacted by legislature or Rules made by the President or the Governor, who derive their power under the constitution. They also pointed out that as the power of the Parliament and of State Legislature to make laws was subject to the provisions of the Constitution having regard to entry 95 of list-I, entry 65 of List-II and entry 46 of List-III of the seventh schedule which are the entries which specify the topic relating to jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court also expressly state that the topic was only in respect of the matters in the list, and therefore by such laws the jurisdiction conferred by Acts of Legislature could only be affected and not the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution itself. ( 12 ) THE submissions made by the learned Advocate General and the other learned Counsel, raise several other important issues as are discernible from the submissions. The most important among them are : (1) Whether the High Court could exercise power of superintendence over the Administrative tribunal under Article 227 in view of the ratio, in the case of Jugal Kishore (supra) as the said power is not excluded by any of the clauses in Article 323a as have been done under clause (7) of Article 371d. (2) Whether the Administrative Tribunal or its Bench is bound by the law declared by the High court within whose territorial jurisdiction it functions, in view of the ratio in the case of East india Commercial Co. (supra ). (3) Whether Section 46 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act by which Articles 323a and 323b were inserted into the Constitution is itself invalid on the ground that it affected the basic structure of the Constitution in view of the ratio in the case of Keshavanand Bharati (supra ). As these questions do not directly arise for consideration in this case, it is unnecessary for me to consider them. Therefore, I confine, the consideration to the question set out in the first paragraph. ( 13 ) THE answer to the said question depends upon the true scope and ambit of Article 323a, sections 14, 28 and 29 of the Act. Before undertaking the interpretation of these provisions, it is necessary in the first instance to set out the basic principles of interpretation. (1) In the case of T. K. Mudaliar v. Venkatachalam AIR1956 SC 246 , [1956 ]29 ITR349 (SC ), [1955 ]2 SCR1196 , the Supreme Court stressed the important of the preamble thus : "in order to ascertain the scope and purpose of impugned section reference must first be made to the Act itself. The Preamable of a Statute is said to be a good means of finding out its meaning and as it were a key to the understanding of it. The Preamable of a Statute is said to be a good means of finding out its meaning and as it were a key to the understanding of it. " (2) In the case of Moti Ram v. N. E. Frontier Railway (1964-II-LLJ-467) Subba Rao, J. , (as he then was), enunciated the general rule of interpretation thus : "the general rule of interpretation which is common to statutory provisions as well as to constitutional provisions is to find out the expressed intention of the makers of the said provisions from the words of the provisions themselves. It is also equally well settled that, without doing violence to the language used, a constitutional provision shall receive a fair, liberal and progressive construction so that its true objects might be promoted. " (3) In the case of Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India AIR1971 SC 530 , (1971 )1 SCC85 , [1971 ]3 SCR9 the Supreme Court stated thus : "but a constitutional provision will not be interpreted in the attitude of a lexicographer, with one eye on the provision and the other on the lexicon. The meaning of the word or expression used in the Constitution often is coloured by the context in which it occurs : the simpler and more common the word or expression, the more meanings and shades of meanings it has. It is the duty of the Court to determine in what particular meaning and particular shade of meaning the word or expression was used by the Constitution makers and in discharging the duty the Court will take into account the context in which it occurs, the object to serve which it was used, its collocation, the general congruity with the concept or object it was intended to articulate and a host of other considerations. Above all, the Court will avoid repugnacy with accepted norms of justice and reason. The expression "provision of this Constitution relating to" in Article 363 means 'provisions having a dominant and immediate connection with' : it does not mean merely having a reference to. A wide meaning of the expression may exclude disputes from the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of rights or obligations, however indirect or tenuous the connection between the constitutional provision and the covenant may be. " (4) These basic principles were reiterated in the case of Keshavanand v. Union of India (supra ). A wide meaning of the expression may exclude disputes from the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of rights or obligations, however indirect or tenuous the connection between the constitutional provision and the covenant may be. " (4) These basic principles were reiterated in the case of Keshavanand v. Union of India (supra ). (5) In the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. Dikshitulu AIR1979 SC 193 , 1979 Lablc1672 , (1979 )2 SCC34 , [1979 ]1 SCR26 , which decision is the most opposite to this case, the question for consideration was whether the officers and servants of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and of subordinate Courts in that State falling under the exclusive control of the Chief Justice and the High Court under Article 229 and 235 of the constitution respectively fell within the expression of 'civil servants' and therefore came within the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Andhra Administrative Tribunal constituted under article 371d of the Constitution to decide disputes relating to their conditions of service raised by them. The Supreme Court laid down the principles of interpretation applicable to such a case and interpreted the expression 'civil servants' as not including the officers and servants of the high Court and the members of judicial service and officers and servants of the subordinate courts and consequently jurisdictional bar for the High Court of Andhra Pradesh enacted in the article must be held to be restricted. Relevant part of the Judgment reads : "63. The primary principle of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed "according to the intent of those that made it" (Coke ). Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language or the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself, proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean, or evocative or can reasonably bear meanings more than one, the rule of strict grammatical contraction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean, or evocative or can reasonably bear meanings more than one, the rule of strict grammatical contraction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well-recognised rules of construction, such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved, and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation. 64. Where two alternative constructions are possible, the Court must choose the one which will be in accord with the other parts of the statute and ensure its smooth, harmonious working, and eschew the other which leads to absurdity, confusion, or friction, contradiction and conflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment. These cannons of construction apply to the interpretation of our constitution with greater force, because the Constitution is a living, integrated organism, having a soul and consciousness of its own. The pulse beats emanating from the spinal cord of the basic frame work can be felt all over its body, even in the extremities of its limbs. Constitutional exposition is not mere literary garniture, nor a mere exercise in grammar. As one of us (Chandrachud, J. , as he then was) put it in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) while interpreting words in a solemn document like the Constitution, one must look at them not in a school masterly fashion, not with the cold eye of a lexicographer, but with the realization that they occur in 'a single complex instrument in which one part may throw light on the other' so that the construction must hold a balance between all its parts. 65. The phrase 'civil service of the State' remains more or less an amorphous expression as it has not been defined anywhere in the Constitution. 65. The phrase 'civil service of the State' remains more or less an amorphous expression as it has not been defined anywhere in the Constitution. Contrasted with it, the expressions 'judicial service of the State' and 'district Judge' have been specifically defined in Article 236, and thus given a distinctive, definite meaning by the Constitution makers. Construed loosely, in its widest general sense, this elastic phrase can be stretched to include the 'officers and servants of the High court' as well as members of the Subordinate Judiciary. Understood in its strict narrow sense, in harmony with the basic constitutional scheme embodied in Chapters V and VI, Part VI and centralised in Articles 229 and 235 thereof the phrase will not take in High Court staff and the subordinate Judiciary. 76. . . . . Article 371d as its heading itself proclaims - which derogates from the general scheme of the Constitution for a specific purpose general undefined phrases are not to be interpreted in their widest amplitude but strictly attuned to the context and purpose of the provisions. Conversely, had it been the intention of Parliament to include 'officers and servants of the High Court' and members of the 'judicial service of the State' and of the cadre of 'district Judges' in the phrase 'civil service of the State' occuring in Clause (3) of Article 371d, and thereby depart from the basic scheme of Chapters IV and VI, Part VI, the language commonly employed in sub-clauses should have read like this :- "class or classes of posts in the civil services of the State including posts in the 'judicial service of the State', and of 'district Judges' in the State; class or classes of posts of 'officers and servants of the High Court. " 77. In our opinion, non-use of the phrases 'judicial service of the State' and 'district Judges' (which have been, specifically defined in Article 236) and 'officers and servants of the High court' which have been designedly adopted in Articles 235 and 229, respectively, to differentiate them in the scheme of the Constitution from the other civil services of the State, gives a clear indication that posts held by the High Court staff or by the Subordinate judiciary were advisedly excluded from the purview of clause (3) of Article 371d. The scope of the non-obstante provision in sub-article (10) which gives an overriding effect to this Article is co-terminus with the ambit of the preceding clauses.