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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

1986 DIGILAW 43 (HP)

PREM CHAND v. STATE OF H. P

1986-08-19

P.D.DESAI, R.S.THAKUR

body1986
JUDGMENT P. D, Desai, J.—The affidavit-in-reply filed in the present case makes a curious reading. It is strange to find the State Government, which is committed to the goal of a Welfare State, coming forward with assertions of the nature therein made in defence to claims ^advanced by the petitioners which, prima facie, appear to be just, legitimate and lawful. The posture adopted in the affidavit betrays a total lack of commitment to the Constitutional philosophy of socio-economic justice enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution as well as in the Directive Principles of State Policy enunciated in Part IV thereof and also a blisseul ignorance of the principles of equality and rationality embodied in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It also conveniently omits to take note of the Jaw laid down by the Supreme Court in a series of cases and of the decisions rendered and orders made by this Court in numerous cases in which the State was a party and which are presumed to be within its knowledge. One could have contemplated a die-hard private employer coming forward with such a plea in defence but not the State, which has always to function as a model and as an enlightened employer. Such defences ill-come from the mouth of the State and the Court legitimately expects that it will not have to countenance a defence of this nature in any similar case in future. The responsibility really lies on the shoulders of those whose duty it is to advice the State in legal matters to ensure that no defence is taken which is not in consonance with the Constitutional provisions as well as with the law declared by this Court and by the highest court in the country. 2. In Rattan Lal and others v. The State of Haryana and others, (1985) 4 SCC 43, the policy of giving ad hoc appointments for defined periods and renewing them after a fictional break year after year was deprecated as "pernicious" and as leading to a breach of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution since it unnecessarily subjected the employees" to an arbitrary hiring and firing policy. It was observed that such a situation could not be permitted to last any longer. It was observed that such a situation could not be permitted to last any longer. The State was, therefore, directed to take immediate steps to fill up the vacancies in a regular manner in accordance with law and to allow the existing ad hoc teachers to continue to hold the posts till regular appointment took place. A further direction was issued to consider sympathetically the question of relaxing the qualification of maximum age prescribed for appointment to the posts in the case of those ad hoc teachers who had been victims of such system and also to consider the regularisation of those who had under the extant rules become entitled to such benefit. The State was asked to pay to them the salary and allowances for the period of Summer Vacation (the period of fictional breaks) alongwith other benefits such as maternity or medical leave etc., as long as they held office under the Courts order. 3. In L, Robert DSouza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and another, AIR 1982 SC 854, the Supreme Court pronounced way back in 1982 in the context of casual labour employed in the construction projects of the railways that it was "highly unethical, contrary to the constitutional philosphy of Socio-economic justice" to continue to treat such workmen serving for 10, 20 and 30 years at a stretch without break as daily-rated workmen and observed that it was high time that the railway authorities remedied "the utterly unfair" situation "wholly denying socio-economic justice" and brought its employment policy "in conformity with the modern concept of justice and fair play to the lowest and the lowliest". 4. In Dhirendra Chameli and another v. State of U. P., (1986) I SCC 637, the question was whether a number of persons, who were engaged as casual workers on daily wage basis and who were doing the same work as was being performed by the regular employees, were entitled to the same salary and allowances as were being paid to those regular employees. The plea of the casual workmen to that effect, which was based on the principle of "equal pay for equal work", was being resisted by the Central Government on the ground that since they were employed in temporary organisations located at different places in the country and that since there were no sanctioned posts to which regular appointments could be made, those casual employees could not claim to receive the same salary and perquisites as regular employees. However, the fact that the casual workmen were performing the same duties as were being performed by the regular employees was not in dispute. Against the aforesaid factual background, the Supreme Court made the following observations : "It is peculiar on the part of the Central Government to urge that these persons took up employment with the Nehru Yuvak Kendras knowing fully well that they will be paid only daily wages and therefore they cannot claim more. This argument lies ill in the mouth of the Central Government for it is an all too familiar argument with exploiting class and a welfare State committed to a socialist pattern of society cannot be permitted to advance such an argument. It must be remembered that in this country where there is so much unemployment, the choice for the majority of people is to starve or to take employment on whatever exploitative terms are offered by the employer. The fact that these employees accepted employment with full knowledge that they will be paid only daily wages and they will not get the same salary and conditions of service as other Class IV employees, cannot provide an escape to the Central Government to avoid the mandate of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. This article declares that there shall be equality before law and equal protection of the law and implicit in it is the further principle that there must be equal pay for work of equal value.” The writ petitions, therefore, were allowed and the casual workmen were directed to be paid with retrospective effect the same salary as was being received by the regular employees and they were also held entitled to the benefits of the same conditions of service. But this is not all. But this is not all. The Supreme Court proceeded to make the following further observations : "But we hope and trust that posts will be sanctioned by the Central Government in the different Nehru Yuvak Kendras, so that these persons can be regularised. It is not at all desirable that any management and particularly the Central Government should continue to employ persons on casual basis in organisations which have been in existence for over 12 years." 5. In Surinder Singh and another v. Engineer-in-Chief, C. P. W. D. and others, (1986) 1 SCC 639, the casual workmen employed on daily wage basis in the Central Public Works Department for several years claimed that they be paid the same wages as permanent employees engaged to do identical work. The plea was resisted on the same grounds which were advanced in Dhirendra Chameli s case and also on the further ground that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" was a mere abstract doctrine which could not be enforced in the court of law. The argument was repelled in the following terms and the relief as prayed was granted : "The Central Government like all organs of the State is committed to the Directive Principles of State Policy and Article 39 enshrines the Principle of equal pay for equal work The Central Government, the State Governments and likewise, all public sector undertakings, are expected to function like model and enlightened employers and arguments such as those which were advanced before us that the principle of equal pay for equal work is an abstract doctrine which cannot be enforced in a court of law should ill come from the mouths of the State and State undertakings. We allow both the writ petitions and direct the respondents, as in the Nehru Yuvak Kendras case, to pay to the petitioners and all other daily rated employees, the same salary and allowances as are paid to regular end permanent employees with effect from the date when they were respectively employed. The respondents will pay to each of the petitioners a sum of Rs. 1,000 towards their costs. We also record our regret that many employees are kept in service on a temporary daily wage basis without their services being regularised. The respondents will pay to each of the petitioners a sum of Rs. 1,000 towards their costs. We also record our regret that many employees are kept in service on a temporary daily wage basis without their services being regularised. We hope that the government will take appropriate action to regularise the services of all those who have been in continuous employment for more than six months.” 6. In the interim/final orders passed by this Court in several cases also, findings have been recorded and observations have been made in similar terms. There is no need to refer to them since the ground is now covered by the Jaw declared by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid terms in the cases above-mentioned and also because the State Government has been a party in may of those cases and knows that similar is the law declared by this Court as enforceable in this State. 7. Apart from the foregoing, the matter requires examination from another angle. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter refer red to as "the Act") is in force in the State of Himachal Pradesh. Section 2 (j) of the Act defines the word "industry" and, prima facie, the Himachal Pradesh Government Forest Printing Press is "industry" within the meaning of the said definition. The word "employer" has been defined in section 2 (g) of the Act to mean in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department. The expression "unfair labour practice is defined in section 2 (ra) of the Act to mean "any of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule. Item-10 of the Fifth Schedule specifies the following as an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer : "To employ workmen as badlis, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen." Chapter V-C of the Act contains two sections which prohibit and prescribe penalty for committing unfair labour practices. Section 25-T occurring in the said Chapter, inter alia, enacts that no employer shall commit any unfair labour practice. Section 25-T occurring in the said Chapter, inter alia, enacts that no employer shall commit any unfair labour practice. Section 25-U provides that any person who commits any unfair labour practice shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. It is thus apparent that the employment of workmen in a casual or temporary capacity for years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is an -unfair labour practice" entailing prosecution of the employer, that is, the head of the department, where no different authority is prescribed. 8. The stand taken up in the affidavit-in-reply on behalf of the respondents needs examination against the aforesaid background. It is admitted that the petitioners have been working on daily wages for different periods ranging between nine and two years "intermittently", that is to say, with fictional or artificial breaks given at the interval of 90 days. All but one of them were initially so employed during the period between 1977 and 1984. The specific allegation in the petition that the duties performed by the petitioners are "the same and absolutely similar" to those which are performed by regular employees is nowhere denied and rightly so. The various reliefs claimed in the petition are, however, resisted on the basis of the following pleas : "The contention of the petitioners that they are working from 2 to 9 years continuously is incorrect. Break in engagement after every 90 days period of engagement has been given to the petitioners who are daily wages staff, in consonance with the instructions of the Government (Annexure R-I). The petitioners are being paid daily wages at the rates as sanctioned by the competent authority (D. C. Solan) from time to time. Since the petitioners are not regular employees, their contention for grant of perks admissible to regular employees of their corresponding category and other privileges is not maintainable. The petitioners who have been engaged on clear terms of daily wages basis have evidently no justifiable cause to claim emoluments admissible to regular staff working against permanent posts of corresponding category in the H. P. Forest Department, Printing Press, Kalaghat. The petitioners who have been engaged on clear terms of daily wages basis have evidently no justifiable cause to claim emoluments admissible to regular staff working against permanent posts of corresponding category in the H. P. Forest Department, Printing Press, Kalaghat. The comparison of emoluments of Regular employees of the Press, viz-a-viz the daily waged staff of corresponding job drawn by the petitioners is fallacious as these two sets of workers have different lawfully constituted rates of wages and other perks. As for the plea of engagement of daily waged workers without creating regular posts for their absorption the petitioners are themselves responsible as they were always at liberty to seek regular job elsewhere in the open market but chose to work on daily wages basis with the respondents at their own volition,....There is no justifiable cause with the petitioners to claim wages at par with the regular employees of the corresponding category as these petitioners have been engaged on daily wages and have been and are being rightly paid wages at the rates sanctioned by the Deputy Commissioner, Solan, for such categories of daily Wages Staff from time to time. No rightful perks and benefits admissible to the daily Waged Staff has ever been denied to the petitioners and the allusions drawn in this para of the petition is an unwitting sally of the petitioner into the realm of romanticism and a dangerous simplification of the solution of problem of daily waged staff, the problem being not an isolated spot and self contained to their case,.....The principle of equal pay for equal work as cited by the petitioners is not relevant as the petitioners have been and are being paid daily wages of their respective jobs as has been fixed by the competent authority (D. C. Solan) under the relevant law. No exploitation of the petitioners have been done as regards to the payment of wages admissible to daily waged workers." Every submission made in the extracted portions of the affidavit, which constitutes the bastion of resistance to the claims advanced in the petition, stands rejected by the decisions of the Supreme Court which have been cited above. In light of the well-settled legal position, the respondents owe a duty to themselves and to their employees like the petitioners to review the case in all earnestness and to accept such of their demands as are legitimate and well-founded. In light of the well-settled legal position, the respondents owe a duty to themselves and to their employees like the petitioners to review the case in all earnestness and to accept such of their demands as are legitimate and well-founded. It would be gracious on their part so to do for, in the ultimate analysis, the court is not powerless and would grant just relief, admissible to the employees in accordance with law. 9. For the foregoing reasons, it appears to be expedient in the interest of justice to direct the State Government to review the case and to place on the record of the case a fresh decision arrived at in accordance with law and in light of the observations made hereinabove on or before September 4, 1986. Unless the decision is so recorded within the time aforementioned, the Court will proceed to decide the case in accordance with law. Mean while, however, the court directs that the practice of giving artificial or fictional breaks at the interval of 90 days or at any other regular interval(s) to the petitioners and persons similarly situate and, indeed, to all the daily wage employees in the Forest Department of the State Government, shall be forthwith discontinued and such breaks, if any, administered in the past shall be condoned. The petitioners will be paid the salary and allowances, if any, for all the days covered by such artificial or fictional breaks from the dates of their initial appointment and such payment shall be made within six weeks from today. 10. To be listed on September 8, 1986. 11. Dasti copy. Order accordingly.