JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - By means of this petition under, Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 6-9-78, 13-3-81 and 25-1-83 (Annexures 6, 8 and 9). The petitioner has further prayed for a writ of Mandemus directing Respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4 not to interfere with the petitioner as Principal of the College. 2. The facts lie in a narrow compass and they are these. The petitioner was appointed as Principal of the College in June 1866 and was confirmed on the said post in 1967. His appointment was approved by the Vice-Chancellor of the Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur by order dated 6-6-1966 (Annexure-1). A contract of service was also entered into between the petitioner and the Committee of Management of the College, but the service of the petitioner was illegally terminated by order dated 3-5-68 with effect from 24-4-68 by the then Manager of the College. According to the petitioner the Manager was not entitled to pass such order of termination. The petitioner had, therefore, filed a regular suit in the Civil Court Additional Civil Judge, Moradabad in January, 1970 against the Committee of Management of the College including the University of Gorakhpur for the relief of declaration that the petitioner was Principal of the College and was entitled to his salary and other allowances payable to him. 3. The Management of the College however, resisted the suit denying the plaint allegations. Even though a finding was recorded that the petitioner's services were illegally terminated, hut the suit was dismissed on 5-4-77 mainly on the ground that the Civil Court at Moradabad has no jurisdiction. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the District Judge, Moradabad. Before this Court in Second Appeal a compromise was arrived at between the petitioner and the Committee of Management (Executive Committee of the College), The terms of the compromise were that the petitioner would be reinstated on the post of Principal in view of Resolution No. 12 dated 23-12-76, he has taken over charge of the office of Principal on 18-10-77 and was entitled to his seniority and fixation of pay as if he continued to work on the post and he was also entitled to arrears of pay and other allowances to the extent the same was payable to him. The University of Gorakhpur, however, was excluded from the compromise. During the pendency of the suit, Respondent No. 2 was appointed as Principal of the College by the Committee of Management on 1-9-74 and he also gave an undertaking that the judgment and order passed in the suit would be acceptable to him. But he did not make any application for implement rather he made an application for impleadment in Second Appeal and opposed the compromise. The said application of Respondent No. 2 for impleadment in Second Appeal was dismissed. In fact, the petitioner served the College only since 18-10-77 till 31-12-77 and again resumed duty on 11-7-79. The Management of the College requested the Deputy Director of Education (Finance) to fix the salary of the petitioner but the same could not be done. The petitioner made a representation under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act, before the Chancellor, who, by his order dated 23rd July, 1980 remanded the matter to the Vice-Chancellor for fresh consideration (Annexure 8 to the amendment application). In the mean time the petitioner has taken appointment in K. G. K. College, Moradabad in lecturer's grade and .is working there. The Vice-Chancellor in pursuant c of order dated 23-8-80 decided the matter again by his order dated 13-3-81 (Annexure 9 to the amendment application) and held that there was nothing to be done at this stage. The petitioner again made a reference to the Chancellor, which appears to have been dismissed. Against these orders present petition has been filed. 4. Sri P.C. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that Respondent No. 2 has given an undertaking that he would abide by the result of the suit and would vacate the office of Principal in case the suit is decreed, and ultimately the suit has been decreed by this Court in terms of compromise dated 14-7-78 arrived at between the petitioner and the Management of the College in Second Appeal No. 1959 of 1974, hence the Vice-Chancellor and the University, even though were not made parties, but were bound by the judgment and decree in the Second Appeal. It was further urged that as Respondent No. 2 given an undertaking that he would abide by the result of the suit and as the suit has been decreed, he should abide by the undertaking and cannot wriggle out of it. It was further urged that as Respondent No. 2 given an undertaking that he would abide by the result of the suit and as the suit has been decreed, he should abide by the undertaking and cannot wriggle out of it. In the result he should vacate the office of Principal in pursuance of the terms of compromise, and that the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor committed error apparent on the face of record in not treating the petitioner as principal in pursuance of the order in compromise. 5. Sri B.D. Agrawal, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 urged that the undertaking was not of the terms as suggested by the petitioner. No. copy of terms of undertaking has been filed. Its terms cannot be ascertained. In the absence of proof about clear terms of the undertaking, neither its contents can be enforced, nor its breach can be punished. In any case the Respondent No. 2 did not give the undertaking to abide by the result of the suit in the form of collusive compromise, rather he has agreed to abide by the result of the suit if decided on merits. The compromise was arrived at between the petitioner and the Committee of Management and the University was not made party to the compromise. Even though the University was a party to the suit but it was exonerated from the compromise in Second Appeal. Hence the Respondent No. 2 cannot be held to be bound by his undertaking. It was further urged that the compromise was collusive inasmuch as on the date when the compromise was arrived at (i. e. 14-7-78), the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (for short the Act) has already come into force. In view of Section 60-E under Chapter IX-A of the Act special provisions have been made for payment of salary to teachers and other employees of the degree colleges. Prior to the enforcement of the Act the payment of salary to teachers and other employees of the Degree Colleges was to be made by the Management of the College and the State Government had nothing to do. Prior to the enforcement of the Act the payment of salary to teachers and other employees of the Degree Colleges was to be made by the Management of the College and the State Government had nothing to do. But in view of Section 60-E and 60-D (5) of the Act the payment of salary has to be made by the State Government of course, the amount of fee received from the students and other income from the College had to be computed towards the income out of which t o payment has to be made to the teachers. In view of this provision on the State Government became responsible for payment of salary. The terms of the compromise could not have been legally arrived at without the State Government being made a party to it. In fact, the person who was liable to pay salary war a legal party. The compromise was arrived at by the Management, when in fact, it was not liable to pay salary. The compromise was collusive. The State Government or the University cannot be deemed to be bound by the terms of the compromise. 6. Sri S.N. Upadhyaya appearing for the University and the Vice-Chancellor, has adopted the arguments raised by Sri B.D. Agrawal. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the petition appears to be devoid of merits. The first point for consideration is as to whether Respondent No. 2 was bound by the undertaking given by him. A copy of the undertaking has not been filed by the petitioner so that its terms can be ascertained. It was not made a pan of any order or decree. We are unable to ascertain the exact words of the undertaking. Unless the undertaking has been filed and its terms are clear and unambiguous, the same cannot be accepted to be valid. It is well known principle that an undertaking, in order to be effective and binding on the parties, must be shown to have been unequivocal and unqualified. Under the circumstances of the case it appears to us, as suggested by Sri B.D. Agrawal, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2, that the undertaking was qualified to the effect to at in case the suit was decreed on merits, he would vacate the office of Principal. 8. Under the circumstances of the case it appears to us, as suggested by Sri B.D. Agrawal, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2, that the undertaking was qualified to the effect to at in case the suit was decreed on merits, he would vacate the office of Principal. 8. In order that this undertaking could have been enforceable, or its breach was intended to be made actionable, its terms ought to have been filed in this Court and the same ought to have been proved with clarity and reasonable certainty. The particular terms of an under taking cannot be assumbed by us just on the suggestion or submission of the petitioner. In Hemant Kumari Devi v. Midhapore Zamindari Co. Ltd., 46, 1, A 240 (PC) it was held as follows : "But a perfectly, proper and effectual method of carrying out the terms of the section or undertaking would be for the decree to recite the whole of agreement and then to exclude with an order relating to that part which was the subject of the suit or it could introduce the agreement in a schedule to the decree or order". 9. In Halsbury's Laws of England, IVth Edition, the relevant part of para 75 page 44 is as follows : "75. Breach of undertaking : An undertaking given to the Court by a person or corporation in pending proceedings on the faith of which the Court sanctions particular course of action or inaction, has the same force as an in unction made by the Court and the breach of undertaking is a misconduct amounting to contempt. The Court will not commit a defendant unless both the terms of undertaking and the breach are clear beyond question She also Neath Canal Co. v. Ynisarwed Resolven Colliery Co. (1875) 10 Ch. App 450 ; Dent v. Dent and Hall, (1962) All ER 746." 10. It is accordingly evident from the above observation that in case an undertaking has been incorporated in the order of the Court and on that basis the Court passes a particular order, it becomes injunction and violation thereof would amount to contempt provided the terms of undertaking and breach thereof are crystal clear beyond question. In the instant case we are faced with the difficulty that neither a copy of the terms of undertaking has been filed by the petitioner nor by the contesting respondents. In the instant case we are faced with the difficulty that neither a copy of the terms of undertaking has been filed by the petitioner nor by the contesting respondents. No order has even been filed by the petitioner to indicate that on the basis of that undertaking the Court sanctioned a particular course of action. In case the terms of undertaking are not clear and the same has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, such terms of undertaking cannot be enforced nor on that basis any relief can be obtained from this Court. We are, accordingly, unable to hold that Respondent No. 2 has villaged the undertaking that he has given to the effect that he would abide by the result of the suit and the compromise in the suit may be treated as the result of the suit and he may be held to be bound by the same. Consequently we cannot hold him to be ground by any Such undertaking. 11. The next point for our consideration is that under Section 60-E and 60-D (5) of the Act, the liability to make payment of salary was that of the State Government and the Management of the Degree College has nothing to do in such matters. It would therefore be obligatory that if any compromise affecting the interest of the State Government was to be arrived at in any civil suit, the State of U.P. must have been made a party. In the instant case in Second Appeal the State of U.P. and the University were absolved and they were not made parties to the coin promise arrived at here in this Court. We are not expressing any opinion about its genuineness nor we are called upon to do so, but what would be its legal effect is certainly to be determined in the present petition. The State of U.P. was not made a party to the compromise and the payment of salary has to be made by the State. We are not expressing any opinion about its genuineness nor we are called upon to do so, but what would be its legal effect is certainly to be determined in the present petition. The State of U.P. was not made a party to the compromise and the payment of salary has to be made by the State. In case the petitioner was held to be Principal in the compromise between him and the management of the College, it is for the College to make payment of salary, whereas under law the College cannot make the payment and State of U.P. was liable to make payment of salary to the petitioner and its agency including the Director of Education and Deputy Director of Higher Education were to recognise the status of the Petitioner as Principal of the said College. But as the State of U.P., was not made party nor the University was made a party to the compromise arrived at in this Court. An our considered opinion they cannot be held to be bound by the compromise, For all practical purposes the compromise appears to be just a futile exercise. In this view of the matter even though the compromise may remain as it is, but on that basis the petitioner can neither claim himself to have become Principal nor he can claim payment of salary from the State of U.P. 12. In view of discussions made herein-above, the petition lacks merit and it is dismissed accordingly. We, however, make no order as to costs.