Judgment :- 1. This appeal is brought by the State from the order of the learned judge dismissing the appellant's application filed under S.446 of the Companies Act, 1956 read with R.9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. The learned judge declared that the orders of assessment under the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, in respect of which the amounts due were sought to be recovered, were null and void and of no effect. The learned judge held that those orders were made otherwise than in compliance with the rules of natural justice, in so far as the respondent-Official Liquidator, Palai Central Bank, had not been heard. 2. The orders of assessment in question are in respect of the assessment years 1975-76,1976-77 and 1977-78. The property belonged to the late Joseph Augustine, whose legal representative is John Mathew. As a director of the company at the relevant time, proceeding was initiated against Augustine and others under the Companies Act for misfeasance. As per the order of this Court. Augustine was held jointly and severally liable for over Rs. 4 crores In execution of that decree, a receiver was appointed by the company court to collect the income from the property. It is the income which was collected from the property during the relevant years that became the subject matter of assessment. 3. During the relevant years, the income was collected by the advocate-receiver appointed by the company court. For the year 1975-76, pre-assessment notice had been issued to the receiver. That was followed by an order of assessment on the basis of an estimate since the receiver did not respond to the notice. Subsequent to the assessment order, notice was issued to the Official Liquidator to pay the amount in terms of the order. The Liquidator took no action. For the two subsequent assessment years namely, 1976-77 and 1977-78, pre-assessment notices had been served both on the Official Liquidator and on the receiver. Neither of them took any action, except that the receiver informed the department that be was no longer the receiver. Orders of assessment were accordingly made in respect of both the years on the basis of estimate. Those orders were duly served upon the Official Liquidator. Nevertheless he remained silent. Ultimately the State filed the application under S.446 for recovery of the amounts due under the orders of assessment. Orders of assessment were accordingly made in respect of both the years on the basis of estimate. Those orders were duly served upon the Official Liquidator. Nevertheless he remained silent. Ultimately the State filed the application under S.446 for recovery of the amounts due under the orders of assessment. This application was dismissed by the learned judge as aforesaid with a declaration as to the illegality of the orders of assessment. 4. It is a well accepted principle of administrative law that, except in cases of total nullity a rare and exceptional phenomenon in public law the order of a competent authority remains effective and operative until set aside or declared void by due process of law. It is true that an error going to jurisdiction breach of natural justice is such an error makes the order void, but not so void as to be a total nullity. It is void only in so far as it is voidable: and until set aside or its invalidity declared, it continues to operate against the person against whom it was made. But once it is quashed, it is deprived of all legal effect right from its inception. On the other hand an order which is not void, but only voidable a distinction which is neither clear-cut nor logical in public law. and which is a concept inappropriately borrowed from private law-remains valid even when it is quashed for the period of its operation. See the authorities cited in Govindan Unnithan v. Industrial Tribunal. 1981 KLT 342; and, Indo-Marine Agencies v. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay, 1979 KLT 845. 5. The jurisdiction of the company court under S.446 in regard to debts represented by orders of assessment was considered by the Supreme Court in S. V. Kandekar v. V. M. Deshpande, (1972) 1 SCC 438,449: "The Income-tax Act is. in our opinion, a complete code and it is particularly so with respect to the assessment and re-assessment of income-tax with which alone we are concerned in the present case. in our opinion, a complete code and it is particularly so with respect to the assessment and re-assessment of income-tax with which alone we are concerned in the present case. The fact that after the amount of tax payable by an assessee has been determined or quantified its realisation from a company in liquidation is governed by the Act because the income-tax payable also being a debt has to rank pari passu with other debts due from the company does not mean that the assessment proceedings for computing the amount of tax must be held to be such other legal proceedings as can only be started or continued with the leave of the liquidation court under S 446 of the Act. The liquidation court, in our opinion, cannot perform the functions of Income-tax Officers while assessing the amount of tax payable by the assessee even if the assessee be the company which is being wound up by the Court. The orders made by the Income-tax Officer in the course of assessment or re-assessment proceedings are subject to appeal to the higher hierarchy under the Income-tax Act. There are also provisions for reference to the High Court and for appeals from the decisions of the High Court to the Supreme Court and then there are provisions for revision by the Commissioner of Income-tax It would lead to anomalous consequences if the winding up court were to be held empowered to transfer the assessment proceedings to itself and assess the company to income-tax. The language of S.446 must be so construed as to eliminate such startling consequences as investing the winding up court with the powers of an Income-tax Officer conferred on him by the Income-tax Act, because in our view the Legislature could not have intended such a result. 18. The argument that the proceedings for assessment or reassessment of a company which is being wound up can only be started or continued with the leave of the liquidation court is also, on the scheme both of the. Act and of the Income-tax Act, unacceptable. We have not been shown any principle on which the liquidation court should be vested with the power to stop assessment proceedings for determining the amount of tax payable by the company which is being wound up. Act and of the Income-tax Act, unacceptable. We have not been shown any principle on which the liquidation court should be vested with the power to stop assessment proceedings for determining the amount of tax payable by the company which is being wound up. The liquidation court would have full power to scrutinise the claim of the revenue after income-tax has been determined and its payment demanded from the liquidator. It would be open to the liquidation court then to decide how far under the law the amount of income tax determined by the department should be accepted as a lawful liability on the funds of the company in liquidation. At that stage the winding up court can fully safeguard the interests of the company and its creditors under be Act " This observation of the Supreme Court shows that the company court in dealing with an application under S.446 has no jurisdiction to embark upon an investigation into the correctness or legality of an order of assessment. That is a matter which has to be considered by the appropriate statutory authorities or by the High Court on reference or by the Supreme Court in appeal from the decision of the High Court. The jurisdiction of the Company court in such matters is confined to the question whether the debt arising from the orders of assessment being an unsecured debt is one which is payable in terms of the relevant provisions of Chap.5 (read with the provisions of the Insolvency Act, 1956). The debt in question, being an unsecured debt, ranked pari passu with other debts in the order of preference mentioned under S.530. That is the law which has to be applied in regard to the payment of debts. It is to that end that jurisdiction is conferred upon the liquidation court in matters arising under S.446. 6. Assuming that the orders of assessment were null and void for the reason that they were made otherwise than in compliance with the rules of natural justice a matter on which we have, with respect; considerable doubt in view of the undisputed facts of this case - the court sitting as a liquidation court was hot competent to act outside the confines of the Companies Act and make an order of declaration as to invalidity, as the learned judge has done. 7. 7. In the present case, pre-assessment notice bad been issued to the receiver appointed by the court in proceedings initiated at the instance of the respondent-Official Liquidator, That was for the year 1975-76. The knowledge of the receiver is accordingly attributable to the Official Liquidator being a party to the proceeding in which the receiver functioned. Apart from that, the Official Liquidator had been notified of the order of assessment on best judgment, and he took no steps to set aside that order. For the subsequent two years, as we have already observed, the Official Liquidator had received individual notice. We are accordingly of the view that, on the facts of this case, no rule of natural justice was violated to warrant the declaration which the learned judge made. All this apart, assuming that the declaration was warranted, it was not permissible within the confines of the provisions of the Companies Act. For all these reasons we set aside the order under appeal. 8. The question which really arose was one relating to recovery. That was the question which ought to have been considered, but was not considered in the light of the declaration made. In the circumstances, we remit the case to the learned judge sitting as Company Court to dispose the application afresh on the merits of the claim of the State for recovery after affording an opportunity to both the parties as regards their respective contentions. The appeal is allowed. The parties shall bear their respective costs.