JUDGMENT A.N. Dikshita J. 1. By means of this writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution the Petitioners have prayed for issue of a writ ot certiorari for quashing the judgment and order dated 17-05-1980 allowing the revision and modifying the decree for the eviction of the Defendant-opposite-parties (hereinafter referred to as the Petitioners) tromp the shop in suit. 2. The facts of the case are that the Petitioners are the tenants of a shop No. 219 situate at Mohalla La pat Nagar, Pargana Konch, district Jalaun owned by Respondent No 2 Mukundi Lai at the rate of Rs. 13.50 per month (Rs. 12/-as rent and Rs. 1.50 as water-tax) till 15.7.72. After the said date (15.07.197 2) the rent of the shop was enhanced to Rs. 17.50 per month (Rs. 15/- as rent and Rs. 2. Oas water-tax). 3. respondent no 2 Mukundi Lal. the landlord owner filed a suit (Suit No. 6 of 1976) against the Petitioners for their adjustment and for recovery of arrears of rent, damages etc. in the cowl of Judge Small Causes, Konch Jalaun on the allegations hair the Petitioners had noi paid the rent since 30th of June, 1971. Inspire of the service of a notice dated 19-01-1976 which was served on the Petitioners on 23.01.1976 the Petitioners being in arrears of rent for not less than four months and failing to pay the same, are thus liable to eviction within the meaning of Section 20(2)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (Act XIII of L972) hereinafter referred to as Act XllI of 1972. It was also alleged that the Petitioners were also liable to eviction in view of the fact that they have denied the title of the landlord and as such committed a breach of the provisions as enshrined u/s 20(2)(f) of ActXI Uof 1972. Respondent No. 2 claimed the relief of eviction from the shop in suit and also for recovery of Rs. 630/- arrears of rent and damages w.e.f. 15.12.72 to 15.12.76. 4. The Petitioners contested the suit on various grounds. It was alleged on behalf of the Petitioners that Plaintiff-Respondent No 2 alone had no right to maintain the suit as after the death of Babu Lai Plaintiff-Respondent No 2 along with Madan Lal, his son Jagdish Prasad and Widow Gaura Devi became the landlord owners of the shop in suit. 4. The Petitioners contested the suit on various grounds. It was alleged on behalf of the Petitioners that Plaintiff-Respondent No 2 alone had no right to maintain the suit as after the death of Babu Lai Plaintiff-Respondent No 2 along with Madan Lal, his son Jagdish Prasad and Widow Gaura Devi became the landlord owners of the shop in suit. It was further alleged that even the Nagar Palika, Konch from whom the lease was taken by Babu Lai has not been impleaded in the suit. The Petitioners categorically denied the allegation that they are in arrears of rent or have committed any default so as to attract the provisions of Section 20(2)(a) of Act XIII of 1972. The Petitioners however alleged that no amount is due against them as they have already deposited a sum of Rs. 1,346/- in the court. It was further stated by the Petitioners that on the expiry of the lease which was granted by Nagar Palika on 31.3.71 a notice was given by Nagar Palika, Konch, district Jalaun calling upon the Petitioners to deposit the rent w.e.f. 01.04.1971 and also to execute an agreement failing which legal action would be initiated against the Petitioners. This notice, apparently was given by Nagar Palika, Konch under assumption that the lease granted in favour of Babu Lai in respect of the suit-shop expired on 31.3.71. The Petitioners in view of the receipt of the said notice from Nagar Palika, Konch, district jalaun sent a reply of the notice sent by the Nagar Palika and called upon the Respondent No. 2 to intimate as to whom the rent is to be paid. However, as neither Nagar Palika nor Respondent No. 2 replied to the notice sent by the Petitioners a suit numbered as O. S. No. 177 of 1974 titled as Chhhjgu Ram and Param Sukh v. Mukundi Lai, Jagdish Prasad. Municipal Board, Konch and Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Konch was filed by the Petitioners seeking the declaration as to which of the Defendants is entitled to receive the rent w.e.f. 1.4.1971. This suit (Suit No. 177 of 1974) was decided and it was declared that the Respondent No. 2 is the person competent and entitled to receive the rent and the Petitioners are tenants of Respondent No. 2. The Petitioners after the decision of the suit (177 of 1974) sent Rs. This suit (Suit No. 177 of 1974) was decided and it was declared that the Respondent No. 2 is the person competent and entitled to receive the rent and the Petitioners are tenants of Respondent No. 2. The Petitioners after the decision of the suit (177 of 1974) sent Rs. 192/- by money order to Respondent No. 2 but it was refused by Respondent No. 2. The Petitioners deposited Rs. 396/- by tender dated 24-12-1974 within the meaning of Section 30(2) of Act XIII of 1972 and Rs. 950/- on 21.11.1977 the first date of hearing in suit. 5. The trial court decreed the suit for recovery of the arrears found due besides the costs of the suit but dismissed the suit for eviction. The Petitioners had deposited Rs 396/- as stated above on 24.12.1974 in Suit No 177 of 1974. This amount was withdrawn pri r to the decision of the instant suit, which was decided on 3.10.1978. While dismissing the suit the trial court no doubt held that the Petitioners had committed default but in view of the fact that the entire amount as provided in the Act has been deposited by the Petitioners in the suit on the first date of hearing, hence they are entitled to the benefit provided u/s 20(4) of Act XIII of 1972 and as such dismissed the suit for eviction. It was also found by the trial court that as the deposit has not been made with any condition hence the decree for eviction cannot be passed. The trial court further found that the Petitioner has no where denied the title of Respondent No. 2 and as such no breach of Section 20(2)(f) has been committed by the Petitioners. 6. Feeling aggrieved Respondent No. 2 preferred a revision (SCC Revision No. 20 of 1979) to the Court of District Judge, Jalaun to Orai which was transferred to the Court of HI Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Jalaun at Orai for disposal according to law. 7. The provisional court came to the conclusion that the Petitioners has infect denied the title of Respondent No. 2 and as such were liable to adjustment u/s 20(2)(f) of Act XIII of 1972. On the ground of default the provisional court found that the Petitioners being defaulters have committed breach of Section 20(2)(a) and as such are liable to eviction. The provisional court came to the conclusion that the Petitioners has infect denied the title of Respondent No. 2 and as such were liable to adjustment u/s 20(2)(f) of Act XIII of 1972. On the ground of default the provisional court found that the Petitioners being defaulters have committed breach of Section 20(2)(a) and as such are liable to eviction. It further came to the conclusion that the deposit made u/s 30(2) of Act XIII of 1972 cannot endure for the benefit of the Petitioners and as such the amount cannot be adjusted as provided u/s 20(4) of Act XIII of 1972 and as such the Petitioners are liable to eviction. 8. The revision was thus allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court was thus modified and the suit for eviction of the Petitioners from the shop in suit was also decreed. It is, however, significant that the provisional court ordered that the amount deposited either u/s 30(2) or Section 20(4) shall be adjusted towards the satisfaction of the decree. 9. The instant petition has been preferred by the Petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the judgment and order dated 17.05.1980 decreeing the suit of the Respondent for the eviction of the Petitioners. 10. The case of the Petitioners is two fold. Firstly that at no stage the Petitioners ever denied the title of the Respondents and as such the provisions of Section 20(2)(f) cannot be attracted. Secondly, the Petitioners have contended that they would not be deemed to be a defaulter and in any case if any amount was due, they had deposited it either u/s 30(2) or on the first date of hearing as contemplated by Section 20(4) of Act XLII of 1972 and hence they are entitled to the benefit of the said provisions in being thus relieved of their liability for eviction. 11. Counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of Respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 has maintained that the Respondent No. 1 rightly came to the conclusion that the Petitioners have denied the title of the landlord Respondent No. 2 and also that the Petitioners are not entitled to the benefit as enjoined u/s 20(4) of the Act and the deposit made by the Petitioners u/s 30(2) would be of no avail. 12. 12. Counsel for the parties have been heard at length. 13. Before dwelling upon the controversy by us it would be significant to mention that while hearing the petition doubts were created as regards the deposit made by the tenant of his liability from eviction u/s 20(4) of Act XITI of 1972. Hon ble R.M. Sahai, J. referred the consideration of this aspect by a larger Bench as the case of Gulab Singh v. I A.D.J. 1981 ARC 517 provided that the deposit made by a tenant u/s 30(2) could not be taken into account while calculating the deposit made on the first date of hearing thus depriving the tenant of the benefit of Section 30(4) of the Act However, this decision in the case of Gulab Singh v. I Addl. District Judge did not consider and take into account the provisions of Sub-Section (6) of Section 30 provided that a deposit made by a tenant in this Sub-section shall be deemed to be a payment to the landlord. 14. Consequently in view of the observations of Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J. this case has been placed before us for a decision. 15. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that at no stage the Petitioner ever denied the title of the Respondent Nos. 2 to 6. Annexure-1 to the writ petition is the notice which was given by the Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Konch intimating the Petitioners that the lease which was granted in favors of Babu Lai Vaish for the disputed shop has expired on 31.3.71 and as such Babu Lai Vaish ceases to be a lessee w.e.f 1.4.71 with the Municipal Board. Konch failing which necessary action would be initiated against the Petitioners. Promptly the Petitioners sent a reply to the Municipal Board as well as to Mukundi Lai Respondent No. 2 about the said fact as contained in the notice sent by Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Konch. The Petitioners called upon both of them to intimate within 15 days after mutually settling the controversy amongst them as to whom the rent is payable failing which the rent would be deposited in the court and which is liable to be withdrawn by the person found competent and entitled to it. The Petitioners called upon both of them to intimate within 15 days after mutually settling the controversy amongst them as to whom the rent is payable failing which the rent would be deposited in the court and which is liable to be withdrawn by the person found competent and entitled to it. However, the controversy as to who is entitled to receive the rent remained alive as Mukundi Lai and others and Municipal Board, Konch could not arrive at a settlement for some time nor were the Petitioners ever intimated and thus compelling the Petitioners to file a suit in the Court of Munsif, Konch which was numbered as Suit No. 177 of 1974 and titled as Chhinge Ram and Param Sukh v. Mukundi Lai and others, Municipal Board, Konch through its President and Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Konch were imp leaded as Defendant Nos. 3 and 4. In this interpleaded suit a relief for declaration was claimed as to who is entitled to receive rent of shop No. 209 situate at Mohalla Lajpat Nagar, Manik Chowk, Konch w.e.f. 1.4.1971 i. e. whether Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 or Defendant Nos. 3 and 4. This suit was decided on 29.4.75 and it was held that Respondent No. 2 is entitled to receive the rent being its landlord. 16. As stated the suit for eviction, recovery of rent, damages etc. was filed by the Respondent No. 2 against the Petitioner. Perusal of Annexure-1 the notice sent by Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Konch and its reply Annexure-2 as well as copy of the plaint annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition clearly indicate that the tenant was under a confide doubt as to whether the Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are entitled to receive the amount w.e.f. 1.4.1971 or the Municipal Board, Konch. It was under such circumstances that the rent was deposited in the court u/s 30(2) of the Act The trial court (Judge Small Causes Court, Konch) while deciding this issue came to the conclusion that the Defendants (Petitioners) had not denied the title of the landlord and as such are not liable to eviction u/s 20(f) warranting eviction of the Petitioner. This finding was apparently based on the material before the trial court and unless any procedural irregularity or error of law was found the provisional court was not justified in upsetting such finding of fact while coming to conclusion that the Defendant-Petitioner were liable to eviction u/s 20(2)(f) of the Act. The provisional court thus exceeded his Jurisdiction in reversing these findings by ignoring the provisions of Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. Findings of fact recorded by the trial court have been appraised by Respondent No. 1 and had been reversed On an appraisal of evidence produced by the parties as a court of appeal instead of extracting any error of law as contemplated by Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. Controversy as regards the power or jurisdiction of the provisional Court u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act had come up for consideration before this Court on more than one occasion. In the case of Ram Narain v. Kanhaiya Lai Vishwakarma 1965 AWR 645 it was held that while exercising powers u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act the District Judge has power in law to satisfy himself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a court of small cause was according to law. It was further held that the provisional court is not competent to look into the evidence of the parties and to decide whether such findings of fact arrived at by the court below are justified by evidence on record or not. Only the question of law is liable to be considered while exercising the powers u/s 25 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. 17. In the case of Rama Shanker Gupta v. II Add). District Judge, Ballia 1980 ARC 207 it was held that no assessment of evidence is required The Court can only decides the question of law in revision. It has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for itself. In any case it cannot enter into evidence, assess it and after appraisal determine an issue of fact. 18. It has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for itself. In any case it cannot enter into evidence, assess it and after appraisal determine an issue of fact. 18. In the case of Laxmi Kishore v. H.P. Shukla 1979 AWC 746 it was held that while deciding a revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act the Court has only to satisfy itself that the trial court's decree or order is according to law. In so far as the question as to whether the Defendants (Petitioners) had denied the title of the landlord Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 was a pure question of fact and the findings recorded by the trial court on appraisal of evidence on this question was obviously a finding of fact. The impugned order passed by Respondent No. t considering and determining this finding of fact is on the face of it in the teeth of the decision of this Court in the case of Laxmi Kishore v. H.P Shukla (Supra). 19. In the case of Smt. Indra Mukhi Verma v. I Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad it was held that the provisional Court has no such powers to reappraise or reassess the evidence while determining the finding of fact and if it has done so, it has manifestly exceeded the jurisdiction as contemplated u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. The Respondent No. 1 thus exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it within the meaning and intent of Section 25 of the said Act and the judgment and order dated 17.5.80 deserves to be quashed. 20. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then submitted that Respondent No. 1 erred in law in holding the Petitioner a defaulter It has been very strenuously urged that Respondent No. 1 exceeded his jurisdiction as contemplated u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. The Respondent landlords slept a notice dated 20.1.76 calling upon the Petitioner to pay the rent w.e.f. 1.7.1971. This notice was served on the Petitioners on 23.1.76 The landlord-Respondents claimed that as the rent was not paid to them by 23.2.76 the Petitioner is a defaulter and is liable to pay damages for wrongful use and occupation. A suit No. 16 of 1976 was thus file i by Respondent Nos. This notice was served on the Petitioners on 23.1.76 The landlord-Respondents claimed that as the rent was not paid to them by 23.2.76 the Petitioner is a defaulter and is liable to pay damages for wrongful use and occupation. A suit No. 16 of 1976 was thus file i by Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 in the court of Judge Small Cause Court. Konch. Jalaun. The contention of the landlord-Respondents that the Petitioner had committed default in payment of rent so as to claim eviction as enjoined u/s 20(2)(a) was seriously countered. There is no dispute that an amount of Rs 396/- was deposited by the Petitioners u/s 30(2) of the Act on 24.12.74. On the application having been allowed by the Court this amount was withdrawn by the landlord-Respondents-vide voucher No. 9991 on 31.3.78. The tenant Petitioner then sent two money orders dated 7.8.75 for Rs. 192/- and another dated 25.7.76 for Rs. 380/-. These two money orders were not accepted but refused by the landlords-Respondents. The landlords -Respondents have claimed a decree for Rs. 630.90 being the rent w.e.f. 15.12.1973 to 15.12.1976 obviously foregoing the amount which was barred by limitation. However, the amount of rent due to the landlord and Respondents against the Petitioner is as under : 1-7-71 to 15-7-72 12/- per month 150/-16-7-72 to 15-12-76 15/- per month 795/--16-12-76 to 15-2-77 15/- per month 30/- -------- Total 975/- ------- It would thus be apparent that an amount of Rs. 975/- was due. Adding costs of the suit of Rs. 174/- plus interest Rs. 96.75 the amount comes to Rs. 1,245.75. While adjusting the amount of Rs. 396/- which was deposited by the Petitioners on 24.12.74 u/s 30(2) of the Act and which was withdrawn by the landlords Respondents on 31.4.78 an amount of Rs. 950/- was deposited in suit No. 16 of 1976. Thus the tenants-Petitioners had deposited Rs. 1346/- on the first date of hearing. 21. The controversy that encompasses this aspect as to whether the Petitioner has committed default in payment of rent so as to attract the provisions of Section 20(2)(a) of Act XIII of 1972. 950/- was deposited in suit No. 16 of 1976. Thus the tenants-Petitioners had deposited Rs. 1346/- on the first date of hearing. 21. The controversy that encompasses this aspect as to whether the Petitioner has committed default in payment of rent so as to attract the provisions of Section 20(2)(a) of Act XIII of 1972. This provision of Section 20(2)(a) removed the bar for filing of a suit and provides that a suit may be filed for eviction of tenant from a building after determination of his tenancy where the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service of a notice of demand. For a better appreciation the provisions as enshrined in Section 20(2)(a) of the Act are extracted and recited herein below : 20(2). A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely: (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand. 22. The tenant-Petitioner had deposited the amount as shown above u/s 30(2) of the Act amounting to Rs. 396/- on 24-12-74 and has sent money orders for Rs. 192/- on 7.8.75 and another money order for Rs. 380/- on 25.7.76. The suit was apparently filed on 15.12.76. However, on the refusal of the amount the tenant Petitioner deposited the entire amount of rent, interest, costs of the suit. As shown above the amount of Rs. 950/- was deposited on 21.1.77 i. e. on the first date of hearing in the suit. However Act XIII of 1972 further provides protection to a tenant who has committed default by enjoining Section 20(4) of Act XIII of 1972. The provision enshrined u/s 20(4) of Act which absolves liability of tenant to eviction and keeping his tenancy intact is reproduced herein below i " 20 (4). However Act XIII of 1972 further provides protection to a tenant who has committed default by enjoining Section 20(4) of Act XIII of 1972. The provision enshrined u/s 20(4) of Act which absolves liability of tenant to eviction and keeping his tenancy intact is reproduced herein below i " 20 (4). In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays (or tenders to the landlord or deposits in court) the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine present per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefore any amount already deposited by the tenant Under Sub-section (I) of Section 30, the court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground ; Provided that nothing in this Sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. 23. The trial court thus recorded a finding of fact that the Petitioners were entitled to benefit of the provisions as contained in Section 20(4) thus relieving the tenant-Petitioners against their liability for eviction. 24. The main grievance of the landlord-Respondents is that the amount deposited u/s 30(2) of the Act would not entail for the benefit of the Petitioner. In support of his contention learned Counsel has placed reliance in the case of Ocular Singh v. I Addl. District Judge (Supra). Apparently Sub-section (6) to Section 30 providing that a deposit made by a tenant under this Sub-section shall be deemed to be payment to landlord was not considered. In order to determine the controversy it is necessary to peruse the provisions of Sub-clause 2 of Section 30 which is reproduced herein below: 30 (2). District Judge (Supra). Apparently Sub-section (6) to Section 30 providing that a deposit made by a tenant under this Sub-section shall be deemed to be payment to landlord was not considered. In order to determine the controversy it is necessary to peruse the provisions of Sub-clause 2 of Section 30 which is reproduced herein below: 30 (2). Where any benefice doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may, until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent court or by settlement between the parties, continue to deposit the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such building. This Sub-clause provides for eventuality that where a benefice doubt or dispute has arisen in regard to the payment of rent to the person in respect of any building, the tenant may deposit the rent showing the circumstances for such deposit. The provision further contemplates that till the removal of such doubt or the settlement of such dispute by any competent court or any mutual settlement arrived at between the parties the tenant may continue to deposit the rent which may become due in respect of such building. In the instant case a benefice dispute has arisen in the mind of the tenants-Petitioners pursuant to the notice sent by the Municipal Board Konch for which an interpleaded suit was filed claiming a decree for declaration as to who is entitled to receive amount of the building in occupation of the tenant-petitioners. There is nothing on material to show that after the decision in Suit No. 177 of 1974 any amount was deposited by the Petitioner. Moreover the landlord Respondents had withdrawn the amount deposited u/s 30(2) of the Act on 31.3.78. It would thus not lie with the landlord-Respondents to allege that the tenant Petitioner had committed a default in payment of rent or that they are not entitled to claim the benefit as provided under the Act. Another aspect which apparently was not considered in the case of Gulab Singh v. I Addl. District Judge (Supra) is that the provisions of Sub-clause (6) of Section 30 were not considered by the Court. Another aspect which apparently was not considered in the case of Gulab Singh v. I Addl. District Judge (Supra) is that the provisions of Sub-clause (6) of Section 30 were not considered by the Court. Sub-clause (t) of Section 30 provides as under: 30 (6) In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such deposit to the person in whose favor it is deposited in the case referred to in "Jib- Section (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in Sub-section (2). Sub-section (6) of Section 30 being a deeming clause has the effect of treating a deposit as payment to a person. It is thus abundantly clear that the Petitioners in view of the deposit having been made u/s 30 Sub-clause (2) as well as the requisite deposit being made on the first date of hearing as required u/s 20(4) of the Act were entitled to absolve themselves from their liability to eviction. 25. Inviting the harmonious construction of Section 30(6) and Section 20(4) which have been reproduced above it is clear that the tenant would not be deemed to be a defaulter. When a deposit u/s 30 is made then the condition that he is in arrears of rent as provided u/s 20(2)(a) would not be attracted as the plea of default would be non-est On the first date of hearing the tenant invoked the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act by depositing the entire amount after adjusting the amount that had been deposited u/s 30(2), of the Act. This Act undoubtedly was enacted as a piece of social legislation primarily or mainly to protect the tenant from frivolous evictions. It is settled principle that while considering the provisions as enshrined u/s 7(c) of the Old Act or Section 30 of this Act the Court should adopt a beneficial rule of construction so as to fulfill the underlying policy and intent of the Act and which is more beneficial to the person for whose benefit the statute has been brought to bole. In the case of Shanker Lal Sharma v. Ram Adhar 1985 (2) ARC 331 it has been held that the deposit made by tenant would, entitle him to absolve himself of his liability of eviction where the amount had been deposited in court. 26. In the case of Shanker Lal Sharma v. Ram Adhar 1985 (2) ARC 331 it has been held that the deposit made by tenant would, entitle him to absolve himself of his liability of eviction where the amount had been deposited in court. 26. In the case of Ram Gopal and Others Vs. Hari Shanker, (1985) AWC 210 it was again held that even if the deposits were illegal the same were sot required to be deposited again and were clearly adjustable. In any case the tenant was entitled to claim benefit of such deposits. 27. Admittedly the tenant Petitioners had deposited the amount in court. The benefit of such deposits should be accorded to the tenant as has been held in Abdul Hamid v. District Judge, Bulandshahr 1984 (I) ARC 31. In Bishambhar Krishna Kothari v. Devi Dutt 1979 AU 217 it was held that the amount deposited by the tenant would be withdrawn by the landlord and on his failure to do so the tenant could not be penalized. 28. The Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Vijai Laxmi Gangal v. Mahendra Pratap Garg 1985 (II) ARC 298 also took a similar view that where the amount had been deposited the tenant is absolved of his liability as in view of such deposits Section 20(2)(a) would not de attracted. In the case of Ram Das Vs. The V Additional District Judge and Others, (1985) AWC 856 it was held that where the rent has been deposited the tenant would be absolved of his liability of eviction. This view finds adequate support in the cases of Puran Chand Gupta v. II Addl. District Judge, Agra 1983 (I) ARC 817, Hemraj v. Smt. Maheshwari 1979 UP RCC 141, Murlidhar v. Smt. Ram Piari Nigam 1978 UP RCC 321. 29. In the case of Bhikha Lai v. Munna Lai 1973 AWR 35 it was held that where the tenant had deposited the rent in court being the past arrears and while replying to the notice had clearly stated about such deposits and his willingness to help the landlord in the withdrawal if required the tenant would not be deemed to be a defaulter. 30. 30. In view of the above discussions it is clear that the Petitioners would sot be deemed to be a defaulter as contemplated u/s 20(2)(a) of the Act and were entitled to protection as contemplated u/s 20(4) of the Act. The Respondent No. 1 while exceeding his jurisdiction has enjoined u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act erred in law in holding the Petitioners a defaulter and modifying the decree to the extent of his eviction also. The finding of fact recorded by the trial court that the tenant had achieved the requirement as provided u/s 20(4) was illegally upset on erroneous assumptions of law. The judgment and order passed by Respondent No. 8 on 17.5.80 thus deserves to be quashed. 31. In the result the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed with costs. The judgment and order dated 17.5.80 modifying the decree for eviction of the Defendant Petitioners from the shop in dispute are set aside. However, the Petitioners shall pay to the Respondent No. 2 the entire rent due till 30.6.86 within three months or deposit the same in the Court u/s 30 of the Act XIII of 1972.