JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - This is petitioner's application dated September 2, 1985 to withdraw the petition moved on May 27, 1985 under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 2. Facts relevant in brief are these : The petitioner has been tenant of the southern portion of premises No. 23. The northern portion (which is in dispute) was in the tenancy if one D.P. Srivastva. Upon the application of the opposite party No. 2, this was allotted to him by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on May, 15,1985. The opposite party No. 2 allegedly entered into possession and gave intimation of the same the following day. The landlord had on April 23,1985 applied for release under Section 21(1) (a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. There was compromise entered into between the landlord and D.P. Srivastava on May 15,1985 and the Prescribed Authority directed release of the portion to the landlord on the basis thereof. The petitioner contents that on May 15, 1985 D.P. Srivastva the tenant granted licence to him in respect of this portion under Section 2 - A of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and on the footing thereof the petitioner stepped in possession and intimated the same to the authorities on May 16, 1985. 3. In proceedings initiated thereafter under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of this portion preliminary order was made on May 16, 1985 followed by attachment dated May 18, 1985. Hearing in that case took place on the evening of May 20, 1985. Against the order of allotment dated May 15, 1985 in favour of the opposite party, the landlord had filed revision No. 137 of 1985 in the court of the District Judge which passed interim order on May 20, 1985 to the following effect "The possession of the party shall not be disturbed till 27th May, 1985. Put up for disposal on 27. 5. 1985. 4. The petitioner maintains that copy of this order was produced before the Magistrate seized of proceedings under Section 145 Code of Criminal Procedure but despite this he directed release in favour of the opposite party No. 2 on May 20,1985 recording the finding that the opposite party was in possession at the date of the preliminary order. 5. 1985. 4. The petitioner maintains that copy of this order was produced before the Magistrate seized of proceedings under Section 145 Code of Criminal Procedure but despite this he directed release in favour of the opposite party No. 2 on May 20,1985 recording the finding that the opposite party was in possession at the date of the preliminary order. In pursuance thereof, the opposite party No. 2 was put in possession through the police aid on May 21,1985. 5. On May 27, 1985 the petitioner moved the contempt petition under Section 10 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 alleging that the opposite party committed contempt having disregarded the interim order made by District Judge dated May 20, 1985 in the revision as quoted above. The learned single Judge passed the following interim order upon"the contempt petition on May 27, 1985 : "Admit. Issue notice returnable by 15th July, 1985. If the police found the applicant in possession on 21st May, 1985, then the possession over northern part of 23, Civil Lines, Gorakhpur will be restored to the applicant. A copy of the order shall be given to the applicants counsel today, on payment of usual charges." This was modified by a other learned single Judge on 14th, 1985 which reads as under: "The learned counsel for the parties agreed that this matter may come up on 15th July, 1985 before the appropriate Bench for further orders. It is further agreed that possession of respondent No. 2 Gajendra Prasad Pandey Manager "Aj" Bengalow shall not be disturbed till 28th July, 1985 in pursuance of the order dated 27.5.85 passed by Hon'ble Om Prakash, J. I, therefore, direct that the case may come up for further order on 15th July, 1985 and the possession of respondent No. 2 aforesaid upon the property in dispute shall not be disturbed in pursuance of the order dated 27.5.85 till 28th July, 1985." 6. On July 31, 1985 this Court made the following interim order : "List for hearing in the week commencing on 2nd September, 1985. Counter affidavit for the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 may be filed in the mean time. The interim stay granted on 14th June, 1985 shall continue in operation until further orders." 7. On July 31, 1985 this Court made the following interim order : "List for hearing in the week commencing on 2nd September, 1985. Counter affidavit for the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 may be filed in the mean time. The interim stay granted on 14th June, 1985 shall continue in operation until further orders." 7. On June 6, 1985 petitioner made a declaration in writing before the City Magistrate representing the Collector wherein he referred to this premises and contended that he is in occupation of the same. The declaration sought was under the Press Registration Act. The District Magistrate granted a declaration on August 5, 1985, wherein it was stated that the premises in question was in the occupation of the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter initiated O.S. No. 1508 of 1985 in the Court of the Munsif wherein he sought temporary injunction against the opposite party. In junction was granted ex part in his favour on August 12, 1985. The opposite party maintains that on August 5, 1985 the employees of the petitioner alongwith the certain antisocial elements removed the belongings of the opposite party by force from this premises, First information report was lodged in respect of this event. In collusion with district authorities the opposite party found on August 14, 1985 that there was police force deputed out side the premises and lie was not allowed to enter the house on the basis of the aforementioned order of the District Magistrate dated August 5, 1985 and the interim injunction issued by the civil court dated August 12, 1985. This interim injunction was vacated by the trial court on August 24, 1985 upon objection raised from the side of the opposite party. The petitioner filed appeal to the District Judge against the order dated August 24, 1985 which is pending. The contention on the petitioner's behalf in this respect is that possession had been handed over by the opposite party No. 2 to him on May 27, 1985 in terms of an oral agreement. 8. The petitioner applied on September 2, 1985 for the contempt petition being dismissed as withdrawn, the same being no longer pressed. This application was allowed ex parte on September 6, 1985. The opposite party No. 2 filed objection on September 17,1985 whereupon the order was recalled on January 29, 1986. 8. The petitioner applied on September 2, 1985 for the contempt petition being dismissed as withdrawn, the same being no longer pressed. This application was allowed ex parte on September 6, 1985. The opposite party No. 2 filed objection on September 17,1985 whereupon the order was recalled on January 29, 1986. Thereafter the application dated 2nd September, 1985 for withdrawal of the contempt petition has come up for hearing before me. 9. Sri B.P. Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 contends that the application made for the withdrawal of the contempt petition from the side of the petitioner is malafide and there can be no withdrawal made by him as a matter of right. It is urged that if withdrawals were permitted, that would create difficulty in the way of the opposite party in getting back possession which the petitioner has managed to takeover in defiance of the interim order of this Court dated may 27, June 14, and July 31, 1985. The reason assigned is that on the contempt petition being withdrawn this interim orders will also lapse. 10. I have heard the learned counsel and perused the record. 11. Learned counsel invites reference to the observations of the Supreme Court appearing in the recent case of Amrit Nahata v. Union of India and others, (1985) 3 SCC 382 at page 385 : "While considering the request for withdrawal of the proceedings initiated for taking action for contempt of the Court, the court would generally be guided by the broad facts of the case and more particularly whether respect for judicial process would be enhanced or dwindled by either granting or refusing to grant the request. There is a marked difference between a complaint made by an individual for wrong done to him and a petition moved before this court inviting the Court to take notice of the fact that its contempt has been committed. The contempt is of the Court and not of the individual. Therefore, Section 15 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 confers power on this Court as well as on the High Court to take suo motu action or on a motion made by amongst other, the Solicitor - General. The contempt is of the Court and not of the individual. Therefore, Section 15 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 confers power on this Court as well as on the High Court to take suo motu action or on a motion made by amongst other, the Solicitor - General. It is for the Court to determine whether the act complained of tending to scandalise the court if viewed with certain severity with a view to punishing the person would in the larger interest of the society enhance respect for the judicial process, or too sensitive altitude in such matter may even become counter - productive. The power lo commit for contempt of court has to be exercised with the greatest caution. Neither too sensitive attitude nor an easy escape from performing the harsh duty would help in maintaining respect and decorum for the judicial process which is essential for establishing a society based on rule of law. The Court is to steer clear between two extremes but it must be remembered that the petitioner who has moved for taking action in contempt is not entitled as a matter of right to withdraw the petition whenever it suits his purpose. Once the Act, which prima facie shows that contempt of the court has been committed, is brought to the notice of the court, it is the court which has to decide whether the contempt has been committed or not or whether it is appropriate to take action or at a later date whether to drop the proceedings. The matter is primarily between the Court and the contemner. It is for this reason that while we arc inclined to grant request for withdrawal of petitions we consider it proper to give few reasons why we consider it proper at this stage lo permit withdrawal of the two petitions." 12. In that case the action was initiated under Section 15 of the 1971 Act on the motion of the Solicitor - General of India on the ground that the contemners were guilty of wilful disobedience to the directions and order of the Supreme Court with regard to the preservation of the particular film and thereby interfered with the due course of judicial proceedings and their conduct was intended and calculated to interfere with and obstruct the administration of justice , 13. The distinction between civil contempt and criminal contempt is well known in the case of Tarit Kami Biswas , AIR 1918 Cal 988 (SB) it was pointed out by Sri Asutosh Mookerjee, inter alia, relying upon the English authority, of (1890) 15 P. D. 59 (O' Shea v. O' Shea and Parnell) "A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court. A civil contempt, on the other hand is failure to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein. Consequently, in the case of a criminal contempt, the proceeding is for punishment of an act committed against the majesty of the law and as the primary purpose of the punishment is the vindication of the public authority the proceeding confirms as nearly as possible to proceedings in criminal cases. In the case of a civil contempt on the other hand the proceeding in its initial stages at least, when the purpose is merely to secure compliance with a judicial order made for the benefit of a litigant, may be deemed instituted at the instance of the party interested and thus to possess a civil character." 14. A learned single judge of this court in Vijai Pratap Singh v. Ajit Prasad Jain and others, AIR 1966 All. 305 , quoted from the same English authority at page 308 pointing "The present proceeding is for a contempt of court. Of course, there are many contempts of court that arc no of a criminal nature ; for instance, when a man does not obey an order of the court made in some civil proceeding to do or to abstain from doing something as where an injunctions granted in an action against defendant, and he does not perform what he is ordered to perform and then a motion is made to commit him for contempt that is really only a procedure to get something done in the action, and has nothing of a criminal nature in it." 15. In civil contempt, it is worthy of note, the object of the proceedings is to enforce compliance with any order made by a court and not to punish for interference with the administration of justice by a Court See : State v. Padma Kant Malviya, AIR 1954 All 523 (FB). In civil contempt, it is worthy of note, the object of the proceedings is to enforce compliance with any order made by a court and not to punish for interference with the administration of justice by a Court See : State v. Padma Kant Malviya, AIR 1954 All 523 (FB). In State v. Dasrath Jha, AIR 1951 Patna 443, the distinction was thus noticed by the Division Bench : - "There is fundamental distinction between contempts that are criminal and those that are civil. The farmer consists in a conduct that offends the Majesty of Law and undermine the dignity of the Act. A civil contempt, on the other hand, is a failure to obey act's order issued for the benefit of the opposing party and the principal object of a civil contempt is to secure the enforcement of the order. A proceeding for contempt cannot be regarded as a criminal proceeding merely because it ends in imposing a punishment on the contemner. Contempt's have been divided broadly into two classes according to the purpose which is sub served by the proceeding. Contempt which is punished for disobedience of an order of the Court with a view to enforcing the rights of private parties is distinguished from contempt which is punished for vindicating the dignity of the Court. The latter is regarded as criminal and primitive while the farmer is regarded as civil and remedial."Zikar v. State , AIR 1952 Nagpur 130 (Division Bench). 16. The distinction has received statutory recognition also as is manifest on comparison of the definition given to the expressive 'civil contempt' and 'original contempt' in Section 2(b) and (c) respectively of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 17. Where, as in the present case, the matter is of civil contempt initiated at the instance of a private party with the object primarily to enforce an order or direction given by the subordinate Court, (to with, the interim injunction dated 20th May, 1985 passed in the civil revision by the District Judge,) there evidently is greater scope to the concerned party to give up pursuing this remedy. There might be various reason in support thereof. The party might feel this to be futile in the light of subsequent development in a case. He may hope to secure the object more effectively or expeditiously, through another course like the civil remedy through Court or the like. There might be various reason in support thereof. The party might feel this to be futile in the light of subsequent development in a case. He may hope to secure the object more effectively or expeditiously, through another course like the civil remedy through Court or the like. The proceeding might be unduly prolonged or be embarrassing or expensive otherwise. The Court has to have vigilant eye even in such a situation; the withdrawal would not be allowed where it appears to suffere from malafides, but short of that depending on the facts and circumstances, the rule generally observed in relation to criminal contempt may not be involved with the same rigorous in matters which are civil, in my opinion. 18. Docs the petitioners move to withdraw at this stage suffer from malafides or may in itself inflict injury to the opposite party No.2 think not. The objection raised precisely by the opposite party is that if the withdrawal of the petition is allowed, the interim orders of this Court dated 27th May, 14th June and 31st July, 1985 would lapse and the opposite party may not in that event regain possession of which, accordingly to the opposite party, he was wrongly deprived during August 5 to 13 - 14th, 1985 by or the instance of the petitioner. This carries no force. Upon the withdrawal to the petition the interim orders would lapse from this date when the proceedings conclude and not earlier. The efficacy which these interim orders had would remain infact nonetheless for the relevant period. To put this in other words, in case the petitioner breached these orders (regarding which no opinion needs be expressed), this allegedly was in the month of August, 1985, when these orders were very much alive and the effect there of is not lost due to these orders lapsing on a much subsequent stage. The opposite party is, therefore, not rendered without adequate remedy. Apart from civil contempt, if any, alleged lo be committed by the petitioner in the process, the opposite party might treat his possessions unauthorised being in contravention of the Court's directives. The claim on this footing may be raised also in defence to O.S. 1508/85 initiated by the petitioner wherein appeal arising from temporary injunction is pending still in the district court. The claim on this footing may be raised also in defence to O.S. 1508/85 initiated by the petitioner wherein appeal arising from temporary injunction is pending still in the district court. On the mere footing of the contempt petition being withdrawn the petitioner may not, therefore, defeat the claim of the opposite party to regain possession. The grievance focused by the opposite party is mainly against the order of the District Magistrate dated 5th August, 1985 of the Press Registration Act which according to him, has been forged and made in conclusion. The following police action is also assailed. Nor does it appear that the application to withdraw is designed to subserve any such eudo the occaown to withdraw arose as narrated in the petitioner's affidavit also because of the appellant court finding it difficult to deal with the question of possession independly in the appeal arising against the order dated 24th August, 1985 passed by the trial court where by the petitioner application for temporary injunction was rejected in the aforementioned O.S. No. 1508 of 1985. The appeal may henceforth proceed on its merits in the court below but that does not affect adversely the consequence following due to the contravention, if any of the interim orders of this court in force at the relevant stage. 19. The decision in Sheo Kumar Saxena v. Zila Sahkari Vikas Sangh Gonda etc., AIR 1983 All 180 , cited by Srisingh proceeds on different footing and is clearly distinguishable. In that case the final order vacating the temporary injunction was passed as merits and the question then arise whether the party guilty of breach could be punished under Order 39 Rule 2 - A of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that the final order by which the interim order of injunction is vacated reflects Court's considered opinion not only on the question whether the interim order deserved to be continued but also on the question whether the applicant was entitled to interim injunction on the date the same was passed and the Court answered by saying that there will be no justification to punish the violator for not obeying an order which the Court itself, after full consideration, comes to the conclusion, the applicant was not entitled to. The withdrawal of the main proceedings, as sought in the present case, docs not on the contrary reflect upon the merits or the validity of the interim orders passed in the course thereof, and there is no adjudication involved over the same. The case is more in line on the other hand with Civil Misc. contempt application No. 103 of 1975 (Suraj Narain Dubey v. Jang Bahadur Singh etc. dated 8.9.1976) relied for the other side, in which this court took the view that 'in civil contempt the party who seeks the assistance of the court for enforcing an order passed by the court can be permitted to withdraw the proceedings initiated at his instance.' 20. The application is for these reasons allowed and the contempt petition permitted to be withdrawn.