JUDGMENT 1. - These two matters arising out the same order passed by the Sessions Judge, Tonk dated January 7, 1981 relate to grant of maintenance to Mst. Atiqua Bee under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The undisputed facts are that Mst. Atiqua Bee was given in marriage to Shakil Mohd. by her father on November 24, 1964 when she was less than 15 years of age. Shakil Mobd. filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against Mst. Atiqua Bee on December 13, 1977, while the latter filed a suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of exercise of her option of puberty on January 13, 1978. The cases of Mst. Atiqua Bee was that after attaining the age of puberty, she exercised her option of puberty and repudiated the marriage. The learned Munsif, Tonk accepted the contention of Mst. Atiqua Bee and passed a decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of her exercising the option of puberty and dismissed the husband's suit for restitution of conjugal rights, by a ccmmon judgment dated July 2, 1980. 3. During the pendency of the aforesaid litigation between the parties in the civil court Mst Atiqua Bee filed an application on November 5, 1977 in the court of Judicial Magistrate Tonk under Section 125 Cr. P.C. claiming maintenance. The learned Magistrate by his order dated September 29, 1979 directed Shakil Mohd. to make payment of a sum of Rs. 100/- per month by way of maintenance to Mst. Atiqua Bee After the decree for dissolution of marriage was passed on July 2, 1980, Shakil Mohd. discontinued payment of maintenance amount to Mst. Atiqua Bee Thereupon Mst. Atiqua Bee filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate, Tonk complaining against the non-payment of maintenance amount and claiming that Shakil Mohd. be directed for payment of the maintenance amount at the rate of Rs. 100/- per months from October 23, 1979. Shakil Mohd. raised an objection that after the decree for dissolution of marriage was passed by the learned Munsif on July 2, 1980. Mst. Atiqua Bee was not entitled to payment of maintenance amount under Section 125, Cr. P. C. The Judicial Magistrate by his order dated December 11, 1980 rejected the objection raised by Shakil Mohd. and directed him to make payment of arrears of maintenance amount to Mst. Mst. Atiqua Bee was not entitled to payment of maintenance amount under Section 125, Cr. P. C. The Judicial Magistrate by his order dated December 11, 1980 rejected the objection raised by Shakil Mohd. and directed him to make payment of arrears of maintenance amount to Mst. Atiqua Bee from November 27, 1980 amounting to Rs. 1,300/-at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month. 4. Shakil Mobd. filed a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Tonk and raised the same objection which was advanced by him before the Judicial Magistrate, Tonk that after dissolution of marriage on the ground of exercise of the option of puberty, he was not required to make payment of maintenance amount to Mst. Atiqua Bee, as she could not be considered as a divorced wife. The learned Sessions Judge, Tonk by his order dated January 7, 1981 partly allowed the revision petition and modified the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Tonk dated December 11, 1980 and held that Mst. Atiqua Bee was not entitled to payment of maintenance amount on July 2, 1980, the day on which the decree for dissolution of marriage was passed. 5. Both the parties have filed applications under Section 482, Cr. P.C. before this court against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Tonk, The argument advanced by the learned counsel for Shakil Mohd, is that once the option of puberty was exercised by Smt. Atiqua Bee and marriage was dissolved on that ground, the marriage ceased to be a marriage and should be treated as having never liken place. On the other hand, the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for Mst. Atiqua Bee is that Mst. Atiqua Bee was a divorced wife, as defined under Section 125, Cr. P.C., and as such she was entitled to grant of maintenance amount. 6. Earlier to the passing of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1919 if a marriage of a minor was contracted by the father or father's father the contract of marriage was valid and binding and could not be declared a nullity by the minor on attaining puberty. P.C., and as such she was entitled to grant of maintenance amount. 6. Earlier to the passing of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1919 if a marriage of a minor was contracted by the father or father's father the contract of marriage was valid and binding and could not be declared a nullity by the minor on attaining puberty. However, by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 (hereinatter referred to as "the Act") all restrictions on the option of puberty, in case of a minor girl whose marriage was aranged by her father or grand father, were removed and under sub-section (vii) of Section 2 of the Act, a woman married under the Muslim law was entitled to obtain a decree for dissolution of her marriage on the ground that she, after being given in marriage by her father or other guardian before she attained the age of fifteen years. repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years provided the marriage had not been consumated, it was on this ground that the decree for dissolution of marriage was passed by the Munsif. Tonk on July 2, 1980 in favour of Mst. Atiqua Bee. Thus from the decree passed by the civil court, the following facts were established, namely, (i) the marriage took place before Mst. Atique Bee attained the age of 15 years, (ii) the marriage has not been consumated and (iii) she repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of 18 years. 7. In (1) Mst. Aishan and others v. Jodha Ram and others, AIR 1938 Lahore 719 , it was held that amongst Sunnis the rule of Mohmedan law respecting the doctrine of the option of puberty was that a girl who was unaware of her marriage when she attained puberty retained her option of repudiation until she became aware of the marriage and she could exercise the tight to repudiate the marriage. It was also held in that case the after attaining the legal of puberty, the marriage ceases to be a marriage and must be treated as having never taken place. 8. A learned Judge of the Lahore High Court while deciding the case of (2) Muhammad Baksh v. The Crown through Khuda Baksh and others, AIR 1950 Lahore 13 . It was also held in that case the after attaining the legal of puberty, the marriage ceases to be a marriage and must be treated as having never taken place. 8. A learned Judge of the Lahore High Court while deciding the case of (2) Muhammad Baksh v. The Crown through Khuda Baksh and others, AIR 1950 Lahore 13 . it observed that the mere fact that section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 gave a right to a girl whose marriage was arranged by the father or the grand father during for dissolution of marriage by exercising the option of puberty did not imply that apart from the provisions of section 2, she has no right to exercise the option of puberty and that the court's orders was riot necessary for conferring validity on the exercise of the option of puberty (SIC). According to the learned Judge, the Court's order de laring dissolution of marriage was only necessary to invest it with the judicial imprimatur in order to avoid any possible disputes. 9. But, in (3) Mohammad Kukaji v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1960 MP 24 , the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the decree of the court was necessary to invalidate the marriage which was repudiated by the wife by exercising the option of puberty. It was observed that mere exercise of option of repudiation did not operate by itself as a dissolution of the marriage but the repudiation is required to be confirmed by the court and a decree for dissolution of marriage by the court was necessary. 10. In Article 275 of the principles of Mahomedan Law by Mulla (eighteenth Edition), the law on the subject has been stated thus, the mere exercise of option of repudiation does not by itself operate as dissolution of marriage as the repudiation must be confirmed by the Court Until then the marriage subsists, and if other party to the marriage dies before a decree for dissolution of marriage is passed the other party will inherit from him or from her, as the case may be. 11. In (41) Mst. Zohara Khatoon v. Mohd. 11. In (41) Mst. Zohara Khatoon v. Mohd. Ibrahim , while dealing with the definition of 'wife' given in the explanation to section 125(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that a woman who was a divorce or who has obtained divorce from her husband and has not remarried was included in the definition of 'wife'. It is not necessary in this case to go to the question of the impact of the recent enactment by parliament regarding applicability of the provisions of Section 125 Cr. P.C. to the divorced Muslim woman, as in this case the real question to be considered is as to when a Muslim woman was given in marriage by her father or other guardian before she attained the age of 15 years and the marriage was not consumated, but was repudiated by the woman before attaining the age of 18 years, whether she could be held to be a divorced wife. 12. If the marriage has not been consumated and the wife repudiates the marriage before attaining the age of 18 years and such repudiation is subsequently confirmed by the court, then the marriage ceases to subsist. The decree for dissolution of marriage recognised the termination of marriage brought about by the exercise of the option of puberty. Once the right of puberty is exercised before attaining the age of 18 years and on the basis of the repudiation of the marriage, a decree for dissolution is obtained from a court of law, thereafter the woman ceases to be a wife and she has no right to claim any amount of maintenance from her former husband. It would be unequitable to hold that although the woman herself, by exercising the option of puberty, has brought about the dissolution of marriage, yet she made a claim for maintenance from her former husband on the alleged ground of her being a divorced wife. It would be unequitable to hold that although the woman herself, by exercising the option of puberty, has brought about the dissolution of marriage, yet she made a claim for maintenance from her former husband on the alleged ground of her being a divorced wife. Where the marriage of a mohammedan minor girl is contracted by her father or grand father before the attains the age of puberty and subsequently before attaining the age of 18 years, she repudiated the marriage, exercising right of puberty and alleging that the marriage has not been consumated, the court while passing the decree for dissolution of marriage gives judicial recognition to exercise of the option of puberty by the girl who cannot be held to be the divorced wife of her former husband after the decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of repudiation is passed by the court. In my view, the marriage contracted by the father or the guardian of the minor girl is a voldable contract at the option of the girl and the same ceases to subsist as soon as the decree for dissoultion of marriage, on the ground of repudiation thereof by exercising the right of puberty, is passed. 13. In the present case, after July 2, 1980 a decree for dissolution of marriage was passed by the civil court only on the ground that the marriage was contracted by the father of Mst. Atiqua Bee before she attained the age of 15 years and she filed a suit for dissolution of marriage, repudiating the same before she attained the age of 18 years. It was also the admitted case of the parties that the marriage was never consumated In these circumstances the marriage which was a voidable contract at the option of Mst. Atiqia Bee stood rescinded on the exercise of the option of puberty by her and as h:r claim was recognised by the court by passing for decree for dissolution The marriage then ceased to exist. I am therefore. satisfied that Mst. Atiqua Bee was not entitled to any amount by way of maintenance from Shakil Mohd. after the decree for dissolution of marriage, on the ground of repudiation thereof by the exercise of the right of puberty, was passed on July 2, 1980. 14. I am therefore. satisfied that Mst. Atiqua Bee was not entitled to any amount by way of maintenance from Shakil Mohd. after the decree for dissolution of marriage, on the ground of repudiation thereof by the exercise of the right of puberty, was passed on July 2, 1980. 14. Under Mohammedan law, a husband is bound to maintain his wife so long as she is faithful to him and obeys all reasonable orders. As the husband filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights and the question of repudiation of marriage by Mst. Atiqua Bee, before she attained the age of 18 years was disputed. Shakil Mohd. was bound to make payment of maintenance amount at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month to Mst. Aliqua Bee till his suit for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the civil court on July 2, 1980. The civil court decided both the suits together by a common judgment on July 2, 1980, namely one filed by Shakil Mohd. for restitution of conjugal rights and the other tiled by Mst Atiqua Bee for dissolution of marriage on the ground of repudiation thereof by exercising the right of puberty, Thus, until July 2, 1980 the rights of the parties in respect of the existence of the marriage were disputable. As I have already observed above, the marriage of a mohammedan minor contracted by the father or the guardian was a voidable contract at the option of the minor after attaining the age of puberty and before attaining the age of 18 years. It cannot be held that the marriage was an absolute nullity or was non-existent from its very inception Mohammedan law recognises that a girl can be given in marriage by a father or grand father and such contract of marriage is voidable at the option of the minor girl on attaining the age of puberty. The marriage continues to be a valid marriage, if after attaining the age of puberty it is consumated or the girl does not repudiate the marriage before attaining the age of 18 years. It cannot, therefore, be held that the contract of marriage of a minor Mohammedan girl by the father or guardian suffers from any infirmity at the time when the contract of marriage was entered into. It cannot, therefore, be held that the contract of marriage of a minor Mohammedan girl by the father or guardian suffers from any infirmity at the time when the contract of marriage was entered into. Being a voidable contract it would cease to exist upon the repudiation of the marriage by the girl before attaining the age of 18 years by exercising the option of puberty and upon the passing of a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of such repudiation Therefore, Mst. Atiqua Bee was entitled to grant of maintenance amount upto July 2, 1980, when the decree for dissolution of marriage was passed. 15. In the result, both the applications filed under Section 482 Cr. P. C. are dismissed. No order as to costs.Petition Dismissed. *******