Ashutosh Roy v. Anjali Sarkar — 1986 DIGILAW 44 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Sukumar Chakravarty, J : This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed on 12.11.79 by Shri N. Rob, the learned Subordinate Judge, Additional Court, Nadia in Money Suit No.2 of 1978 (M. S. No. 8 of 1977 in the court of Subordinate Judge, Nadia). 2. Plaintiff Anjali Sarkar filed the aforesaid Suit as an indigent person against the defendant Ashutosh Roy for recovery of the total damage of Rs 100000/- (Rs 10000/- for defamation and Rs.90,000/- for breach of contract). 3. It was the case of the plaintiff in brief that the plaintiff and the defendant were close neighbours in their village Anandanagar intervened by only two houses and that they were class-mates in the village primary school in their childhood and close intimacy grew between them. Then the plaintiff was about 13, the defendant gave a proposal to marry the plaintiff who however refused. 4. In 1970, the plaintiff was the student of 1st year Science of Nabadwip Vidyasagar College and the defendant was then a student of 3rd year Science of that College. One day when the plaintiff was returning home after college hours, the defendant on the way again proposed to marry the plaintiff and the plaintiff agreed and accordingly the defendant entered into an oral contract with the plaintiff to marry her within a very short time. After the said oral contract, the plaintiff and the defendant were mixing freely and the plaintiff was doing anything and everything at the dictation of the defendant. In July, 1971, the defendant one day reminded the plaintiff about the oral contract and further agreed that he would not marry any other girl except the plaintiff. Upon such oral contract, the defendant asked the plaintiff to live with him as husband and wife and the plaintiff began to live with the defendant as such from July, 1971. The defendant had regular sexual intercourse with the plaintiff and as a result of the same, the plaintiff became pregnant thrice one after another and the defendant each time managed the abortion of the pregnancy of the plaintiff at Nabadwip Private Nursing Home. At that time also, the defendant assured the plaintiff that he would marry the plaintiff when he would get a suitable job after passing the B. Sc. Examination. The defendant passed the B. Sc. At that time also, the defendant assured the plaintiff that he would marry the plaintiff when he would get a suitable job after passing the B. Sc. Examination. The defendant passed the B. Sc. Examination in 1972 and got an appointment in November/December 1973, and he was posted at Howrah after completion of his training for one year. After his posting on 2.2.75, the defendant took the plaintiff to Calcutta and kept her in a Ladies' Hostel there and defrayed all expenses of the plaintiff. On 3.6.75, the defendant accompanied by the plaintiff returned home and they went to their respective house. On 5.6.75, the defendant married a girl named Nani Roy. The defendant did not inform the plaintiff about the said marriage and plaintiff could not know about the said marriage before. On 7.6.75, the defendant refused to marry the plaintiff after his marriage with Nani and committed the breach of the contract to marry the plaintiff. The defendant by his such conduct and acts made the plaintiff's life miserable and ruined and she was lowered in the estimation of the public. The plaintiff accordingly brought this suit for the relief as claimed. 5. The defendant contested the suit after filing the written statement. The defendant denied all the material allegations of the plaintiff. The defendant admitted that the plaintiff and the defendant were co-villagers but denied that they were close neighbours and that close intimacy grew between them while they were reading in the primary school. The defendant denied that he ever made any proposal of marriage to the plaintiff while she was about 13. The defendant contended that he was not aware if the plaintiff was the student of 1st year Science in 1970 in Nabadwip Vidyasagar College when he was a student there and denied that he ever entered into any oral agreement with the plaintiff in 1970 or subsequently to marry the plaintiff. The defendant denied also that upon any such oral agreement, he asked the plaintiff to live with him as husband and wife and that the plaintiff lived with him as such since July 1971. The defendant denied that he had any sexual intercourse with the plaintiff and that as a result of his sexual intercourse; the plaintiff become pregnant thrice and that on each occasion, the defendant got abortion caused to her in any nursing home. The defendant denied that he had any sexual intercourse with the plaintiff and that as a result of his sexual intercourse; the plaintiff become pregnant thrice and that on each occasion, the defendant got abortion caused to her in any nursing home. The defendant denied that he ever assured the plaintiff that he would marry her when he would get a job after passing the B. Sc. Examination. The defendant however admitted that he passed the B. Sc. Examination in 1972 and got the appointment of Junior Engineer under P & T Department in Calcutta in 1973 and underwent a training for one year. The defendant denied that after his posting, he took the plaintiff to Calcutta and kept her in any Ladies' Hostel and defrayed all expenses. The defendant denied that he and the plaintiff together returned to their village on 3.6.75 and went to their respective houses. The defendant admitted that he married Nani Roy on 5.6.75 and that everyone in the village knew about the marriage and contended that it was false to say that the plaintiff did not know about that marriage. It was further contended that the plaintiff made false allegation when she stated that the plaintiff refused to marry her on 7.6.75 after his marriage on 5.6.75. The defendant denied that he ever made any contract to marry the plaintiff and contended that accordingly the breach of such contract by him did not arise. The defendant denied that any action of him or his conduct lowered the plaintiff in the estimation of the others. It was contended that the plaintiff on the self same allegations started criminal case which was found to be false and once ended in final report and again ended in the quashing of the proceeding itself. The defendant was therefore not liable to pay any damage. 6. The learned trial Judge on consideration of the materials on the record, passed the judgment and decree for the total amount claimed, by way of damage. 7. The defendant being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree has preferred this appeal on the ground that the learned trial Judge has committed mistake both in facts and law in decreeing the suit. 8. Mr. Roy Chowdhury with his senior Mr. 7. The defendant being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree has preferred this appeal on the ground that the learned trial Judge has committed mistake both in facts and law in decreeing the suit. 8. Mr. Roy Chowdhury with his senior Mr. Datta appearing for the appellant- defendant has submitted that the learned trial Judge has erred in deciding the case on his personal views and impression instead of deciding the dispute between the parties on a consideration of the evidence adduced. According to him, the only evidence of the plaintiff (P.W.1) regarding the a alleged oral contract for marriage between the parties, cohabitation between them, impregnation of the plaintiff by the defendant thrice and causing of abortion of the pregnancy of the plaintiff by the defendant on each occasion was not at all reliable and believable in the absence of any corroboration when the defendant denied every such allegation on oath in his evidence and the learned trial Judge committed mistake in believing the evidence of the plaintiff in this respect which is inherently weak and infirm. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the learned trial Judge has committed mistake in believing that the letters Ex. 1 series were written by the defendant without getting them examined by the Handwriting Expert, when the defendant has denied that he wrote such letters and when the defendant has challenged them as manufactured. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the said letters even if assumed as genuine for the sake of argument never proved the contract for marriage between the parties, enjoyment of sex by the parties and abortion of the alleged pregnancy of the plaintiff. According to him, the oral contract for marriage as alleged by the plaintiff is hit by S. 23 of the Contract Act. His further submission is that the plaintiff has not proved that the acts and conduct of the defendant have lowered her prestige in the estimation of other by producing the evidence of any villagers or any other person. According to him, the leaned Judge committed mistake also in decreeing the claim for total damage in the absence of any basis for assessment of damages. 9. Mr. Chakravarty with Mr. Kanjilal appearing for the respondent plaintiff has however supported the judgment and decree in his submission. 10. According to him, the leaned Judge committed mistake also in decreeing the claim for total damage in the absence of any basis for assessment of damages. 9. Mr. Chakravarty with Mr. Kanjilal appearing for the respondent plaintiff has however supported the judgment and decree in his submission. 10. Plaintiff's definite case in the plaint is that the defendant entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff to marry her one day in 1970 on the way when the plaintiff was returning home from the college at Nabadwip where they were both students of course in different classes. No case of written contract for marriage was pleaded in the plaint which was filed on 12.5.76. One petition for amendment of the plaint by inserting the allegation of written contract on the basis of written undertaking Ex. 1 purported to have been made by the defendant was filed on 30.11.78 and the same being not pressed was rejected by the court on 6.9.79. Further case of the plaintiff in the plaint is that in the last part of July, 1971, the defendant one day reminded the plaintiff about his oral contract to marry her and further agreed that the defendant would not marry any other girl except the plaintiff. The alleged further agreement restraining the defendant from marrying any other girl excepting the plaintiff if any, as alleged by the plaintiff is undoubtedly void, being hit by S. 26 of the Contract Act. The other allegation of the plaintiff about the reminding of the plaintiff by the defendant as to the oral contract for marriage, if found to be true, may be accepted as corroboration to the alleged oral contract for marriage between the parties. P.W.1 is the only one witness on the side of the plaintiff. Besides the oral evidence of the plaintiff, plaintiff has produced some letters Ext. 1 to 1(g) purported to have been written by the defendant to the plaintiff. We shall consider the evidentiary value of the said alleged letters later on. Let us first of all consider whether plaintiff has succeeded in proving the oral contract for marriage between the parties by the oral evidence when it is the definite case of the plaintiff that the said contract was oral and not written. We shall consider the evidentiary value of the said alleged letters later on. Let us first of all consider whether plaintiff has succeeded in proving the oral contract for marriage between the parties by the oral evidence when it is the definite case of the plaintiff that the said contract was oral and not written. P.W.1 (plaintiff) has stated in her evidence that she was born January 5, 1952 and that the plaintiff and defendant are the residents of the same para of the same village Anandanagar and that they were class-mates in the village primary school and there was intimacy between them from their childhood. Her evidence shows that in 1970, the defendant passed Part I B. Sc. Examination from Nabadwip Vidyasagar College find that she got herself admitted in that college after passing the Higher Secondary Examination in 1970 and that she used to meet the defendant on her way to the college and also on her way back to her house and that intimacy grew between them. Her evidence further shows that defendant proposed to marry her and she agreed. Her evidence however does not show on what date the said proposal was offered and accepted although it appears from her cross-examination that the said proposal for marriage was made in 1970 December. P.W.1 (plaintiff) has stated in her evidence in cross-examination that none else is aware of the oral contract for marriage and that she did not disclose that to any body, and that she has no paper showing the defendant's proposal of December, 1970. In the last portion of her cross-examination she has however stated that one Jaydeb Ghosh is aware of the said oral contract for marriage but she has not stated how and wherefrom Jaydeb Ghosh became aware of the said contract. It is not the case of the plaintiff that Jaydeb Ghosh was present at the time of the contract or that she told him about the same. Plaintiff has not kept consistence in her statement in evidence. Again Jaydeb Ghosh also has not been examined in this suit. 11. Defendant (D.W.1) has admitted in his evidence that plaintiff was his class-mate in the village Primary School and that the plaintiff after passing the Higher Secondary Examination in 1970 got herself admitted in Vidyasagar College at Nabadwip when he was a student of 3rd year B. Sc. Again Jaydeb Ghosh also has not been examined in this suit. 11. Defendant (D.W.1) has admitted in his evidence that plaintiff was his class-mate in the village Primary School and that the plaintiff after passing the Higher Secondary Examination in 1970 got herself admitted in Vidyasagar College at Nabadwip when he was a student of 3rd year B. Sc. in that college and that they were on speaking terms while they were in the same college and that sometimes they used to come back together from the college. It is also in evidence that the defendant used to stay in the College Hostel and the plaintiff used to attend the college from her house at Anandanagar. Defendant has admitted also that the plaintiff was his class friend and he had intimacy with her. From the facts and circumstances as disclosed in evidence and as discussed above, it appears that the intimacy grew between the plaintiff and the defendant while they were class-mates in the village Primary School and the same continued when they were students in the same College in different classes, although the same has not been pleaded in the plaint. There is however nothing in the pleadings and evidence to show that the said intimacy between the parties developed into love with desire to marry each other. On the other hand, it is the case of the plaintiff that she refused the alleged marriage proposal of the defendant with anger while she was about 13 or 14. It has not been pleaded in the plaint by the plaintiff for stated in evidence that love prompted her to accept the alleged proposal of the defendant in 1970. It is not the case of the plaintiff that love was the consideration for the alleged oral contract for marriage. The plaint and evidence of the plaintiff rather indicate that the alleged sexual enjoyment was the consideration of the said oral contract for marriage as it has been pleaded both in the plaint and evidence by the plaintiff that upon such oral contract, she allowed the defendant to enjoy her sex, although no marriage was solemnised between them Mr. The plaint and evidence of the plaintiff rather indicate that the alleged sexual enjoyment was the consideration of the said oral contract for marriage as it has been pleaded both in the plaint and evidence by the plaintiff that upon such oral contract, she allowed the defendant to enjoy her sex, although no marriage was solemnised between them Mr. Datta learned counsel for the appellant defendant has submitted that even if it be assumed for the sake of argument without conceding that there was the oral contract for marriage as alleged by the plaintiff, then that such contract based on the consideration as mentioned above is immoral and as such opposed to public policy and accordingly hit by S. 23 of the Contract Act and in support of his such submission he has referred to paragraph 30 of the decision in the case of Gherulal Parkash v. Mahadebdas Maiya & ors reported in AIR 1959 SC 781 . It has been held therein that the word 'immoral' used in S. 23 of the Contract Act is restricted to sexual immorality. Section 23 of the Contract Act, omitting portions unnecessary for the present purpose, reads as follows: "The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law or .................... the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to Public policy." 12. We find sufficient force and substance in the submission of Mr. Datta and regard being had to the fact and circumstances as disclosed in the plaint and evidence of the plaintiff, we find that the said oral contract for marriage as alleged by the plaintiff is hit by S. 23 of the Contract Act, if at all there was any such contract. 13. The defendant has however denied both in the written statement and in evidence that he ever entered into any such oral contract for marriage. It is his definite denial to the allegation that he ever made any proposal for marriage in December, 1970 to the plaintiff while she was College student or earlier while the plaintiff was about 13 or 14 years old, and that the plaintiff agreed to the alleged proposal in 1970. In a case of this nature where there is oath versus oath and whore the evidence of the plaintiff has been found to be inconsistent, the evidence of the plaintiff without corroboration can not be relied on. In a case of this nature where there is oath versus oath and whore the evidence of the plaintiff has been found to be inconsistent, the evidence of the plaintiff without corroboration can not be relied on. In clause No. 1228 at page 770 under Part I 'Contracts to marry' in Halsbury's Law of England, Third Edition, Volume 19, while dealing with 'corroboration' it has been held as follows:–– "In order to maintain an action for breach of a promise to marry, it is necessary that the testimony of the plaintiff should be corroborated by other material evidence in support of the defendant's promise. What constitutes material evidence in corroboration is a question of law for the court and its sufficiency is a question of fact for the jury. The circumstance that the defendant, on being charged in the presence of a third person with having promised the plaintiff marriage, does not deny it or returns an evasive answer is evidence in corroboration to go to the jury add the corroborative evidence may relate to the circumstances which occurred before the alleged promise." 14. So corroboration in the instant case is necessary and essential. There is however no corroborative evidence either oral, documentary or circumstantial in this case, which may relate to the circumstances which occurred before the alleged oral contract for marriage excepting the only circumstance that they were co-villagers and were closely known to each other and there was intimacy between them. 15. Mr. Kanjilal appearing for the respondent-plaintiff has submitted that the subsequent conduct and development between the parties pursuant to such alleged oral contract would go to corroborate the contract for marriage. According to him the cohabitation between the parties upon such oral contract and impregnation of the plaintiff thrice one after another and abortion of such pregnancy of the plaintiff at the instance of the defendant, plaintiff’s living with the defendant as husband and wife although no marriage was solemnized, defendant’s letter and photos in the custody of the plaintiff and plaintiff’s stay in a Ladies' Hostel in Calcutta at the expenses of the defendant and plaintiff’s occasional stay with the defendant in the mess at Batckkhana Road, Calcutta while the defendant was living there on his appointment in P & T Department, lend support and corroboration to the oral contract for marriage. Plaintiff has no doubt alleged in her plaint that upon such oral contract for marriage, she began to live with the defendant as husband and wife at his desire from July 1971 although no marriage was solemnized between them, and that as a result of cohabitation between them, the plaintiff became pregnant thrice one after another and that each time the defendant caused abortion of the pregnancy of the plaintiff in Nabadwip Private Nursing Home. P.W.1 (Plaintiff) has stated so in her evidence. Her evidence is that in 1971, the defendant had sex with her and she conceived and that the defendant caused abortion in November 1971 in the Private Nursing Home at Nabadwip. Her evidence shows that her second abortion of the 2nd pregnancy was in March 1972 and the third abortion of her 3rd pregnancy was in April 1974. Her evidence is that when the defendant used to come to his house in the village, she used to go to his house in the night to sleep with him and stay there for 5/6 hours in the night and that when the defendant was in Calcutta in a mess for the males, she used to go there also to sleep with him in the night in that mess. The defendant (D.W.1) has denied on oath all such allegations of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff's evidence all the abortions were caused in the aforesaid Nursing Home and that nurses caused the abortion and that the plaintiff did not sign the register but the defendant did everything in the said Nursing Home for causing the abortions. The defendant (D.W.1) has denied also all such allegations of the plaintiff. Plaintiff has however not called for any register of that Nursing Home nor has she summoned any official, doctor or nurse who were attached to that Nursing Home in support of her such statement P.W.1 (plaintiff) of course has stated in her evidence that the said Nabadwip Private Nursing Home is no more in existence. It has not been stated however that the nurses, the official, attendants and the doctors attached to the said Private Nursing Home are not alive or available. No explanation has been given why none of them has been examined in this case. It has not been stated however that the nurses, the official, attendants and the doctors attached to the said Private Nursing Home are not alive or available. No explanation has been given why none of them has been examined in this case. Learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff has submitted that abortion of the pregnancy of the unmarried girl was not legalised and lawful during the period of 1971 to 1974 and that accordingly it would not have been possible to produce any evidence from such Nursing Horne. The plaintiff will go to do the illegal and immoral acts one after another making the defendant responsible for the same and she will want the court to believe her only evidence testifying such acts without corroboration. This may be the wishful thinking of a lay-man or woman who is not conversant with law but we have been rather surprised to hear the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff urging the court to believe her sole evidence in this respect only on the ground that no lady would expose herself so before the court without any truth in it. We are however afraid to place any reliance on such evidence of the plaintiff without any corroboration. 16. P.W.1 (plaintiff) has stated in her evidence that the inmates of her house came to know the affair after two years and that they came to know in the early part of 1979, that is before the alleged 3rd abortion in April, 1974. It has transpired in evidence that the plaintiff has her father, step-mother and elder sister in her house. Why then none of them comes to support the pitiable condition of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not given any explanation in her evidence in this respect, nor has her learned counsel thrown any light in this respect in his submission. 17. None of the members of the Baithak Khana Road Mess or its landlord has been examined by the plaintiff to give support to her sole testimony to the effect that she frequently visited the defendant and spent night with him in the said mess at 74 Baithak Khana Road where admittedly the defendant used to live during his stay in Calcutta. The plaintiff has not examined also any member of official or attendant of the alleged Ladies' Hostel in Calcutta where she used to stay at the desire and expenses of the defendant. 18. So the aforesaid developments pursuant to the alleged oral contract, which have been sought to be brought in through the evidence of plaintiff alone to corroborate the said oral contract, having found to be unreliable because of lack of their corroboration, could not lend any support or corroboration to the said oral contract for marriage. 19. We are now left with the letters Ex. 1 to 1(g) and photos Ex. 2 and 2(a). Let us now see whether they lend any corroboration to the said oral contract for marriage. As regards the photographs Ex. 2 and 2(a), which have been produced from the custody of the plaintiff, the defendant (D.W.1) has admitted in his evidence that those are his photographs and has stated that he does not know how they have gone into the possession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also not stated anything in her evidence how she got the aforesaid photographs. She has not stated that it is the defendant who gave those photographs to her either out of love of intimacy. These photographs however do not lend any support to the alleged oral contract for marriage. They may at best lend support to the intimacy between the parties. 20. Plaintiff (D.W.1) has stated in her evidence that they had correspondence between them and that she used to write to the defendant and that the letters were not full of love and contained information too. She has stated in her evidence that she is conversant with defendant's hand writing and that the letters Ext. 1 series were written by the defendant. The defendant (D.W.1) on the other hand, has stated in his evidence that he did not write the letters Ex. 1 to 1(g) and that plaintiff also did not write any letter to him. Out of the aforesaid letters Ex. 1 series, the letters Ex. 1 to 1(g) only bear the alleged signatures of the defendant. The learned trial court has compared the alleged signatures of the defendant on Ex. 1 and 1(a) with the admitted signatures of the defendant in the written statement and has arrived at the opinion that the signatures on Ex. 1 series, the letters Ex. 1 to 1(g) only bear the alleged signatures of the defendant. The learned trial court has compared the alleged signatures of the defendant on Ex. 1 and 1(a) with the admitted signatures of the defendant in the written statement and has arrived at the opinion that the signatures on Ex. 1 and 1(a) are in the hand of the defendant. On such opinion, the learned trial Court has proceeded with the idea that all the letters Ext. 1 series with their contents were written by the defendant. In our opinion, the learned trial court has not been justified to hold so. The learned trial Court did not get the handwriting of the contents of the letters Ext 1 and 1(a) bearing the alleged signatures of the defendant and the handwriting of the other letters compared with the admitted handwriting of the defendant. The learned trial court has not got the handwritings of the disputed letters Ex. 1 series examined by the Handwriting Experts who have got their special training and expertise in this respect Mr. Datta the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant has submitted that in a case of this nature where excepting the plaintiff's statement which has been denied by the defendant in evidence, there is no other evidence, the trial court ought not to have come to a decision regarding the authorship of the letters solely on the court's opinion under S. 73 the Evidence Act and in support of his submission be has relied on the decision to the case of State v. Pali Ram reported in AIR 1979 SC 14 . In paragraph 29 of the said decision, it has been held as follows:–– "The matter can be viewed from another angle also. Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any handwriting expert, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with regard to the identity of a handwriting which forms the sheet-anchor of the prosecution case against a person accused of an offence, solely on comparison made by himself. It is therefore, not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two agree with each other, and the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert." 21. Mr. Kanjilal has however submitted that the plaintiff in this case has given evidence that she is conversant with the handwriting of the defendant and that the letters Ex. 1 series including the letters, Ex. 1 and 1(a) bearing the alleged signature of the defendant are in the handwriting of the defendant. So the learned trial court has not committed any mistake in basing his finding on the comparison of the disputed signatures on Ex. 1 and 1(a) with the admitted signatures of the defendant in the written statement under S. 73 of the Evidence Act. The judgment of the learned trial court however does not indicate that he considered also the evidence of the plaintiff in this respect. The principle of law as enunciated in the decision of the Division Bench of this court in 64 CWN 1067 (Bissaswar Poddar v. Nabadwip Chandra Poddar as referred to and drawn to our attention by Mr. Kanjilal is not in conflict with the Supreme Court decision in AIR 1979 SC 14 , and the same can never be disputed. P. B. Mukherji, J, in the decision in 64 CWN 1067 at page 1079 has held as follows:–– "When there is no evidence before the court on the genuineness of the signature the court can not certainly invent the question and then make a finding thereupon. But where there is evidence and in al cases of disputed signatures there is evidence on one side or the other, even though such evidence may not be the evidence of an expert, the court certainly can and it is its duty to use its eyes to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature." The relevant basic facts in that case were that Nabadwip Chandra Podder denied his signature on Ex. D but the plaintiff (Bisseswar) has equally said in evidence that it is nut only the signature of Nabadwip Chandra Podder but also that Nabadwip Podder signed it in his presence. 22. D but the plaintiff (Bisseswar) has equally said in evidence that it is nut only the signature of Nabadwip Chandra Podder but also that Nabadwip Podder signed it in his presence. 22. In the instant case it appears from the impugned judgment that the learned trial court has based his finding regarding the identity of the signatures on the disputed letters Ex 1 and 1(a) solely on his opinion by comparison under S. 73 of the Evidence Act and not on any other evidence. That has been legally wrong Ex 1 in a very small piece of paper reads as follows:- "I have been in love with you Anjali Sarkar, daughter of Sashi Bhusan Sarkar of Anandanagar, Post Bahadupur, Nadia and mixed with her as my wife. So I am willing to many you and I will marry you within next two months." Ex 1 appears to be a written undertaking or written contract for marriage, the consideration of which is the past love and free mixing between the parties as husband and wife. So this written contract is hit by S. 23 of the Contract Act. This written contract Ex. 1 again demolishes the plaintiff's case which is founded on oral contract. Mention may be made here that the plaintiff filed a petition for amendment of the plaint by inserting the words "written contract" and the contents of the Ex. 1 but later on allowed the said petition to be rejected as not pressed. The defendant has denied that he wrote any of the letters Ex 1 to 1(g) Mr. Kanjilal has frankly admitted in his submission that the letter Ex 1 appears to have been subsequently manufactured for the purpose of the suit and that the defendant does not appear to have written and signed the same. We also hold so. If the plaintiff can manufacture one, it is not unlikely that she might manufacture and fabricate others also. Out of the letters Ex 1 series, Ex 1(d) and Ex 1(g) are Inland letters and others are on different pieces of paper. Besides Ex 1 and 1(a), none of the other letters bears the signature of the sender or writer Sender's name in Ex. 1(d) as mentioned in the relevant place in the Inland letter is Anupama. The hand-writing of some letters does not tally with the handwriting in other letters. Besides Ex 1 and 1(a), none of the other letters bears the signature of the sender or writer Sender's name in Ex. 1(d) as mentioned in the relevant place in the Inland letter is Anupama. The hand-writing of some letters does not tally with the handwriting in other letters. Further plaintiff's evidence casts suspicion over the genuineness of the letters other than the Inland letters. She has stated in her evidence that besides the Inland letters, all other letters were made over to her without any envelope and in the next breath she has stated that the envelopes were lost. We therefore can not place any reliance on those letters. Further the contents of the letters except those of the letters Ex. 1, do not speak of any contract for marriage between the parties. At best they show some intimacy between the sender and the sendee and nothing more. The said letters even it relied on, do not lend corroboration to oral contract for marriage. The plaintiff therefore failed to prove that the defendant entered into any oral contract to marry the plaintiff and that the defendant committed breach of the same by marrying another girl Nani Roy on 5.6.75. The defendant has admitted that he married Nani Roy on 5.6.75. Ex. A, the certified copy of the petition of complaint under S. 376 IPC, filed by the plaintiff against the defendant on the allegation of rape on the plaintiff by the defendant on 3.6.75 and Ex. B, the certified copy of the judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal proceeding on the basis of that complaint on the ground of its falsity and absurdity, show that the plaintiff in the put brought a false criminal case against the defendant. In the plaint, the date of cause of action of the suit has been mentioned as 7-6-75 on the definite pleading in paragraph 19 of the plaint that the defendant did not inform the plaintiff about his marriage before his marriage and so the plaintiff could not know about his marriage and that on 7-6-75, after his marriage, the defendant has refused to marry the plaintiff and broken the contract. In evidence however, she hag stated that on 3.6.75, she came along with the defendant to their village from Calcutta and came to know of his marriage which took place on 5-6-75. In evidence however, she hag stated that on 3.6.75, she came along with the defendant to their village from Calcutta and came to know of his marriage which took place on 5-6-75. It therefore appears that the plaintiff has no regard for truth and takes recourse to falsehood to suit her purpose. We are conscious of the condition of the women in our society and in a fit and proper case, the Court extends its judicial arm to protect the dignity and respect of the women who belong to the weaker section still in our country. But in this case we find that the plaintiff could not prove her case and by her acts and conducts she has deprived herself of getting any relief or protection from the court. The learned trial Court therefore has not been justified in making the defendant liable for making any breach of contract as alleged. 23. Plaintiff claimed Rs. 10000/- as damages for defamation and Rs 90,000/- as damage for breach of contract for marriage. The learned trial Court decreed the suit for total damage of Rs 100000/- without any basis for assessment of such damage. Plaintiff has not brought any witness besides herself to say that the acts and conduct of the defendant have lowered the plaintiff in estimation of others. Rather the defendant has produced some local witnesses who have stated that they have not heard any affair between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the plaintiff has been living in the village as usual without any rumours against her. Still the learned trial Court decreed the damage for defamation. The learned trial Court was not at all justified in decreeing the suit for the damage as claimed. 24. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree as passed by the learned trial Court and dismiss the suit. We however make no order as to costs both in the appeal and in the suit. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to realisation of Court fee in this suit filed by the plaintiff as indigent person. M. N. Roy, J.: I agree. Appeal allowed. Suit dismissed.