Damu Mahato and Jaichandra Biswas have been convicted u/s. 3(a) of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 for 'being in possession' of coal belonging to the Railways valued at RUPEES FOUR ! The accused petitioners come from the lowest starta of the society and at all relevant time they were working as gangmen of the Railways. Fifteen long years have rolled by yet the sword of Democles hang over their poor heads. 2. The prosecution case is that on 17.12.69 in broad day light a posse of the Railway Protection Force headed by an Inspector and two Head Rakshaks marched along the Railway tracks to detect theft of railway coal. The accused being railway gangmen were at or by the railway tracks. The pro­secution case is that one goods train came and a number of persons were seen standing by the track tied up some currency notes to a pole, the driver received the notes and allowed coals to roll down from the engine. A number of persons tried to collect them, however on eyeing the members of the force they took to their heels but the two Gangmen stood there, even after the culprits had made good their escape ; the accused waited held high with two bags of coal and they were caught 'red handed'. As such, the prosecution case is that the driver and the fireman of the Goods train obtaining money from some persons caused some coal belonging to the Railways to fall from the railway engine and the accused picked them up. The prime offenders, therefore, were the driver and the firemen of the engine. The police submitted an offence report stating that there was no sufficient evidence against Raj Kumar Rajdhar, the driver of the train and Shital Prasad Ray and Prafulla Chandra Pandit, the firemen of the engine. The prosecution therefore admitted that there was no satisfactory material to show that the driver and the firemen intentionally or knowingly allowed coal to fall from the engine. Under these circumstances, the first part of the prosecution story, the foundation of the prosecution case that coal was thrown from that particular engine had wobbled and tottered before the case entered into Court. In other words, the prosecution capitulated that there was no foundation for their case that the seized coals were thrown out from a railway engine. Under these circumstances, the first part of the prosecution story, the foundation of the prosecution case that coal was thrown from that particular engine had wobbled and tottered before the case entered into Court. In other words, the prosecution capitulated that there was no foundation for their case that the seized coals were thrown out from a railway engine. It is, therefore, rational to assume that the prosecution had reasonable cause for not arraigning the driver and the firemen. It is logical to conclude that they were not prosecuted as the railway engine was not a coal powered one and possibly a diesel powered engine. This was perhaps the prime reason why the driver and the firemen were not put on their trial. The driver and the firemen were not examined as witnesses nor arraigned as co-accused. On the contrary, the prosecution surrendered their case that coals were thrown from that particular railway engine. 3. When that part of the prosecution case was dismembered by the prosecution itself, I am left with the case that the members of the Railway Protection Force apprehended the accused with two bags of coal worth RUPEES FOUR ONLY ! What a story ? The members of the Railway Protection Force ran along the railway tracks, a number of persons fled away but the two accused, Railway Gangmen stood still holding the bags containing some coal. Others escaped and none could be apprehended. It is difficult to accept the story that the accused remained stationary holding the bags to enable the Railway Protection Force personnel to nab them. It might have been that coals were lying nearby and the accused were considered suspects. The accused being railway gangmen were supposed to be there. There is no evidence that they were not on duty at the place. In this view of the matter the prosecution case must fail. 4. The second aspect of the matter is whether the seized coals were 'railway property' as contemplated u/s. 2(d) of Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 which reads as follows : "2. There is no evidence that they were not on duty at the place. In this view of the matter the prosecution case must fail. 4. The second aspect of the matter is whether the seized coals were 'railway property' as contemplated u/s. 2(d) of Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 which reads as follows : "2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context other­wise requires, - * * * * * (d) 'railway property' includes any goods, money or valuable security or animal, belonging to, or in charge or possession of, a railway administration." Apart from the testimony of P. W. 4, Shri B. R. Soloman, Senior Instructor, Technical School (Rly.X New Bongaigaon who asserted this far and no further that such coals are used by the railways there is no other reliable evidence adduced by the prosecution. The witness has not affirmed that such coals are exclusively used by the railways and/or they belong to the railways or they were in charge or possession of any railway administration. There is no convincing evidence to show that the seized coal belonged to or in charge of or possession of any railway administration. Such coals are found in plenty carried by the Railways, belonging to others. Such common arti­cles lying by the railway tracks cannot invariably be said to be property belonging to the railways. There is no convincing evidence to show that the seized coals were 'railway properties". 5. The next question is whether the accused were found in possession of any railway property reasonably suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully obtained. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish that the accused persons were an possession of the railway property reasonably suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully obtained. As alluded, the prosecution has failed to show that the coals were railway property. There is no evidence to show that they could reaso­nably be suspected as stolen property of the railway. All articles lying by the railway tracks do not per se belong to the railways. If coal or other common articles are found by the railway tracks no reasonable person can ipso facto assume that they belong to the railways and/or those were stolen property. Many such articles slip out or fall from wagons, bogies and trucks. It cannot, therefore, be said that all such articles are stolen propertes. If coal or other common articles are found by the railway tracks no reasonable person can ipso facto assume that they belong to the railways and/or those were stolen property. Many such articles slip out or fall from wagons, bogies and trucks. It cannot, therefore, be said that all such articles are stolen propertes. There can not be any presump­tion that when common articles are so found they must be reasonably suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully ob­tained. There is no evidence that the accused had unlawfully obtained or had stolen the articles from the possession or charge of any railway administration. In the result, I am constrained to hold that there is no material to show that the accused were in possession of any property reasonably suspected of having been stolen nor is there any evidence to show that the accused person unlawfully obtained any railway property. I hold that there is no material to how that the accused were found in possession of coals. I also told that the property allegedly found with the accused persons have not been proved to be railway property. Further I hold that there is no material to reach the conclusion that the articles were stole property of the railway and/or unlawfully obtained by the accused. I am of the opinion that the prosecution was bound to prove beyond reasonable doubt the essential ingredients of the offence u/s. 3 of "the Act". Only upon proof of the fact that the article was the railway property and they were reasonably suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully obtai­ned by the accused, the burden could have been shifted on the accused persons to show that they were in lawful possession of the articles. In the instant case, the conditions precedent of sec. 3 of "the Act" have not been established by the prosecution. 6. As a rule the High Court never interferes with the concurrent findings of fact reached by the courts below. But if the conclusions are reached overlooking the relevant facts and without considering the principles of Criminal Law that burden of proof to establish the essential ingredient of the crime rests on the prosecution, it would be the duty of this court to interfere with such findings to uphold the ends of" justice. But if the conclusions are reached overlooking the relevant facts and without considering the principles of Criminal Law that burden of proof to establish the essential ingredient of the crime rests on the prosecution, it would be the duty of this court to interfere with such findings to uphold the ends of" justice. In the instant case, the courts below have failed to consider what were the essential ingredients of the offence. The courts below also failed to consider that the prosecution had failed to establish the ingredients of the offence and the relevant factors or evidence in favour of the accused. As such, I am constrained to hold that the decisions of the courts below are "purported decisions" and not "real decisions". If the court reaches the conclusion that the decisions are purported decisions this Court has jurisdiction to set aside "the purported deci­sions" in exercise of its revisional power u/s. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In Anisminic Ltd. vs. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 2 AC 147 it has been held that there is no finality of a decision or a decree if it happens to be a purported order and not a "real" order in that it was not rendered in accordance with the law. The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court, of course while consi­dering the power of the High Court to issue Writs or orders under Article 226 of the Constitution in Nagendra Nath vs. Commissioner of Hills Division, AIR J958 SC 3981 Kaushiaya Devi vs. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 , Parry & Co., vs. Second Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1970 SC 1334 , Union of India vs. Tarachand Gupta. AIR 1971 SC 1558 and M.L. Sethi vs. R.P. Kapur, AIR 1972 SC 2379 . The revisional power of the High Court can surely be exercised when the courts below commit jurisdictional error or disregard the law in the course of its exercise of jurisdiction. A manifest error apparent on the face of the records is always correctable by the High Court in exer­cise of power u/s. 401 of 'the Code'. As such, to uphold the cause of justice, the impugned orders must be set aside, which I hereby do. 7. A manifest error apparent on the face of the records is always correctable by the High Court in exer­cise of power u/s. 401 of 'the Code'. As such, to uphold the cause of justice, the impugned orders must be set aside, which I hereby do. 7. For the reason alluded to I hold that the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offence u/s. 3 read with Sec. 4 of 'the Act' and accordingly, the conviction and sentences of the accused are set aside. In the result, the petition is allowed and the accused are acquitted.