Judgment :- 1. This is a revision filed by the legal representatives of the first defendant in O. S.73/57. The said suit was a suit for partition. The respondents in this revision petition are the plaintiffs. O. S.73/57 was ended in compromise and a compromise decree followed. 2. The challenge raised in this revision is against the order of the execution court holding that the compromise decree is executable. The revision petitioner offers three contentions: (1) The decree is not executable; (2) the decree is barred by limitation; and (3) the decree requires registration and since the decree has not been registered, the execution court cannot give effect to the decree. 3. The suit was for partition of certain items of properties belonging to the plaintiffs and defendants. Certain items were scheduled in the plaint. The compromise decree no doubt takes in properties not scheduled in the plaint. The compromise decree comprehends also items of properties scheduled in the written statement of defendants 2 to 10. 4. Now I shall refer to the substance of the decree on which the controversy has arisen in these proceedings. Certainly the kingpin of the controversy is F schedule property. For precision, I note the relevant portion of the decree and the compromise petition. Para.5 of the decree reads thus: 'that the contesting defendants 2 to 10 are satisfied that the properties described in schedule F. claimed by them as belonging to the family as of the absolute right of the 1st defendant." Para.6 runs thus: 'that the 1st plaintiff having paid on this day Rs. 2500/- on the 1st defendant agreeing to convey the F schedule properties in favour of the 1st plaintiff, subject to his life estate the 1st defendant do convey the F schedule property in favour of the 1st plaintiff subject to the life estate." The relevant paragraphs in the compromise petition read thus: "(c) The contesting defendants 2 to 10 are satisfied that the properties described in. schedule F hereto claimed by them as belonging to the family as of the absolute right of the 1st defendant." "(d) As per the terms of the yadasth dated 27-5-1953 the 1st defendant has undertaken to pay Rs. 800 to the 1st plaintiff on her coming of age. This amount is still outstanding and is due to her. schedule F hereto claimed by them as belonging to the family as of the absolute right of the 1st defendant." "(d) As per the terms of the yadasth dated 27-5-1953 the 1st defendant has undertaken to pay Rs. 800 to the 1st plaintiff on her coming of age. This amount is still outstanding and is due to her. The 1st defendant has performed the marriage of the 1st plaintiff by spending amounts from his pocket, and also maintained her till the time of her marriage. In adjustment of that claim and counter-claims and in full settlement thereof, and also in consideration of the love and affection which the 1st defendant bears towards the 1st plaintiff, the said two parties hereby agree that the 1st defendant should receive Rs. 2,500/-from the 1st plaintiff and the former should convey to the latter the F schedule properties described here below, subject to the reservation of a life estate in his favour. Accordingly, the 1st defendant has received the said sum of Rs. 2500/- from the 1st plaintiff this day and he is hereby conveying the F schedule properties in favour of the 1st plaintiff, subject to the life estate." (Emphasis added). 5. I shall first consider whether the decree is bad for non-registration. This question has to be answered on the basis of S.17 of the Registration Act. S.17(1) enumerates documents of which registration is compulsory. S.17(2) provides that nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) would apply to the instruments enumerated as sub-clauses (i) to (xii). Sub-clause (vi) reads thus: "(vi) any decree or order of a court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding." The exemption has to be noted. It is clear that no registration is required of a decree even though it is a compromise decree if it relates to immoveable property which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding. What should be the reason and principle behind the provision for exemption from registration, a decree which embodies an order of court. The avowed object of the Registration Act making it compulsory that certain documents to be registered is for the purpose of ensuring publicity of record in order to facilitate proof of execution and to prevent fraud. What should be the reason and principle behind the provision for exemption from registration, a decree which embodies an order of court. The avowed object of the Registration Act making it compulsory that certain documents to be registered is for the purpose of ensuring publicity of record in order to facilitate proof of execution and to prevent fraud. These objects are sufficiently secured when the proceeding between the parties is one that takes place with the attendant publicity in a court and given effect to by a decree which would be in normal circumstances difficult to forge or fabricate. 6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners submits that the properties sought to be recovered by the plaintiffs-decree-holders on the strength of the decree, are not properties which were the subject-matter of the suit. Hence that part of the decree suffers from the vice of non-registration. He submits that the disputed properties were not scheduled in the plaint and that properties scheduled in the plaint alone would form the subject-matter of the suit. I find it difficult to agree with the counsel. The words used are not immoveable properties which are the subject-matter of the plaint. On the other hand, the words used are properties Other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding. The expression 'subject-matter' contemplates that specific immoveable property must be the subject-matter of the litigation. There must be a claim or assertion of a right to or in the specific immoveable property, which must have been set up in the the litigation and relief sought in respect thereof, in order that the decree or order of the court may be said to comprise immoveable property as the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding. 7. When a question is raised that a particular part of a compromise decree is or not in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, that question, in my view cannot be answered on the basis of the plaint alone. It has to be answered taking into account the reliefs claimed and the matter which arose for decision in the case on the pleadings of the parties. When I say pleadings of the parties, I want to make it clear that it will comprehend both the plaint and the written statement. It has to be answered taking into account the reliefs claimed and the matter which arose for decision in the case on the pleadings of the parties. When I say pleadings of the parties, I want to make it clear that it will comprehend both the plaint and the written statement. I feel that the term 'suit' is comprehensive enough for holding such a view and if the compromise relates to all those matters which fall to be decided in the case, it could not be said that any part or the compromise is beyond the subject matter of the suit. There is, I feel, a large body of authorities telling that where a compromise relating to matters outside the scope of the suit is a part of the consideration for the agreement as to matters directly involved in the suit, the entire compromise has to be taken as one unit, as an integral whole, and that compromise decree is a decree relating to the subject-matter of the suit. Where a compromise comprehends really an adjustment of the rights and differences in regard to all matters in dispute between the parties whether as framed in the plaint or set up by way of defence in the written statement and if the compromise purports to be a final settlement and adjustment of the inter-se disputes between the parties on a fair and satisfactory basis acceptable to the parties, I feel that this court should hold that all the matters settled by the compromise related to the suit. 8. Now, I may refer to the decision reported in 1977 K.L.T. 877 (Venkita Reddiar v. Noordeen). Viswantha Iyer. J. observed thus: "If a decree or order is expressed to be made on a compromise and comprises immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding, that requires registration. Ordinarily by the attachment the property is placed at the disposal of of the court to satisfy the amount due under the decree. The defendant is prohibited f and restrained until further orders of the court from transferring or charging the property. The plaintiff's right to bring to sale in execution the right, title and interest of the defendant in the attached property thus gets protected. Though this order of attachment does not create any interest or charge in the property, indirectly the property is secured for the plaintiff. The plaintiff's right to bring to sale in execution the right, title and interest of the defendant in the attached property thus gets protected. Though this order of attachment does not create any interest or charge in the property, indirectly the property is secured for the plaintiff. In that way it has got involved in the suit when a charge is created over it by the compromise and forms the consideration for it, it can fairly be deemed to be the subject-matter of the suit." So, it has to be noted that this court has taken the view that the properties attached in the suit also, in certain circumstances, will become the subject matter of the suit within the meaning of the term of subject-matter of the suit used in S.17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act. In view of the above discussions, I feel no doubt that the properties now claimed by the plaintiff are the subject-matter of the suit and as such no registration is required under S.17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act. 9. Now the second defence that the decree is barred by limitation. The counsel submitted that the question of limitation is a question of law relating to the jurisdiction of the court. I cannot disagree with this submission. Certainly, this court, while exercising its jurisdiction under S.115 C.P.C. cannot correct errors of fact, however gross they may be, or even errors of law. This court can interfere with only errors which have relation to the jurisdiction of the court. Only when a subordinate court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, this court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction. Points of law may be linked with questions of jurisdiction. Plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is certainly a plea of law, which to my mind, at times, may concern the jurisdiction of the court which tries the proceedings. A finding on these questions in favour of a party who raised those questions would in certain circumstances, oust the jurisdiction of the court from further proceeding with the trial of the suit or proceeding. A finding on these questions in favour of a party who raised those questions would in certain circumstances, oust the jurisdiction of the court from further proceeding with the trial of the suit or proceeding. An erroneous finding on these pleas, therefore, would be in the domain of questions of jurisdiction falling within the purview of S.115 C.P.C. I may at once add that an erroneous decision on a question of law having no relation to questions of jurisdiction will not be corrected by this court under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The counsel is right in canvassing the question of limitation in this revision petition. I have to examine this question. 10. The compromise decree provides that the plaintiff will be entitled to the property now sought to be recovered in execution after the expiry of the life estate of the 1st defendant created by the compromise decree itself. The starting point of limitation of the execution of such a decree is on the expiry of the life estate created by the decree. The counsel on both sides agreed that the 1st defendant died and the life estate came to an end only in 1981. So prima facie there is no limitation for the execution of the decree. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that a reading of the decree would show clearly that there is no transfer of title in regard to the suit property by the decree. He wants me to note the particular words used in the decree: ".....subject to his life estate the 1st defendant do convey the F schedule property in favour of the 1st plaintiff." The counsel urges that this statement in the decree would not give a right to the plaintiff in presente on the date of the decree. In answer to this point in the argument, the learned counsel for the respondents draws my attention to the compromise petition and submits that a proper interpretation has to be given to the clause in the decree, after understanding the relevant clause in the compromise petition also. In the compromise petition, it is stated thus: "accordingly the 1st defendant has received the said sum of Rs. In the compromise petition, it is stated thus: "accordingly the 1st defendant has received the said sum of Rs. 2,500/- from the 1st plaintiff this day and he is hereby conveying the F schedule properties in favour of the 1st plaintiff, subject to the life estate." It seems to me clear that on the date of the decree, the consideration for the transfer of the right in F schedule properties has been received by the 1st defendant and that he has transferred the right in the property. This aspect of the matter gives an answer to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that since there was no transfer of the right of the 1st defendant in F schedule property, by the decree, execution ought to have been laid; for the plaintiff to obtain all the rights of the defendant in the property, within the period of limitation. I have already said that the plaintiff obtained a transfer of the right of the defendant in the property by the decree itself. It does not require the execution of the decree, for the plaintiff to obtain the title to the property. So no plea of limitation can successfully be based on this aspect of the case, I hold that the decree is not barred by limitation. 12. Now I turn to the question of executability of the decree in regard to the recovery of F schedule property, after the expiry of the life estate of the 1st defendant. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the decree is not executable since the decree is silent as to what should happen in default of non-delivery of the property on the expiry of the life estate of the 1st defendant. 13. In A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2065 (Parkash Chand v. Harnam Singh), Chandrachud, J., as he then was, observed thus: "A clause in a decree passed in terms of an arbitration award providing that on the happening of certain events the vendor shall be entitled to take back possession of the property does not make the award declaratory so as to make it incapable of execution. The intendment of the award is that on the happening of stipulated events the vendor would be entitled to apply for execution of the award and obtain possession of the property. The intendment of the award is that on the happening of stipulated events the vendor would be entitled to apply for execution of the award and obtain possession of the property. The mere fact that the award fails to mention filing of an execution application does not make it declaratory. It is never a pre-condition of the executability of a decree that it must provide expressly that the party entitled to a relief under it must file an execution application for obtaining that relief." In A.I.R. 1931 Patna 179 (Atal Behary v. Barada Prasad) the court observed thus: "Incidental to the relief to which a plaintiff is entitled in a decree for specific performance arising on a contract for sale, the Court has a right to grant possession of the property. A contract for sale includes not only the execution of the necessary document but also putting the vendee in possession of the property. Therefore if there is an omission in the plaint or in the decree about possession the executing court is Dot debarred from granting the plaintiff the possession of the property." This view was reiterated by the Patna High Court in Janardan Kishore Lal v. Girdhari Lal (A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 701) and Parameshwar Mandul v. Mahendra Nath (A.I.R. 1961 Pat. 466). The Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts have also taken the same view in Kartik Chandra v. Dibakar (A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 362), Subodh Kumar v. Hiramoni Dasi (A.I R.1955 Cal. 267) and Pt. Balmukand v. Veer Chand (A.I.R. 1954 All. 643). The extract given below from Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn. Vol. 36: 351-52) tells the principle behind this approach made by the courts. "Ancillary relief may be obtained after judgment in an action for specific performance where such further relief becomes necessary". 14. It cannot be doubted that the executing court can grant delivery of possession of property even where no such relief is specifically granted by the decree for specific performance for the contract of sale. In Andy Thankappan v. Raghava Panicker (1972 K.Q. 975) Unnikrishna Kurup. J. said thus: "To say, that in an agreement for sale of the property the parties have merely undertaken to execute a sale deed, but that there was no intention to band over possession of the property would be ignoring the realities and taking an artificial and restricted view of the situation. J. said thus: "To say, that in an agreement for sale of the property the parties have merely undertaken to execute a sale deed, but that there was no intention to band over possession of the property would be ignoring the realities and taking an artificial and restricted view of the situation. The parties, merely for the sake of obtaining a sale deed, would not enter into a contract. The obvious intention is that a sale deed should be executed and the property covered by the sale deed should be put in the possession of the vendee. To divorce the two reliefs would be to create an artificiality not warranted by law". 15. I have quoted these authorities only for the purpose of evolving a principle to be applied in the instant case. I feel that it will not be a realistic approach in the matter of execution of a decree, if I say that the compromise decree now sought to be executed is not an executable decree. In view of the principles laid down in the authorities, I have quoted above, the execution court has rightly repelled this contention. The plaintiff has executed the decree and recovered the property. It is wholly unjust to allow a party to a compromise to take advantage of a part of it and to resist its adverse effect as to the rest of it Lord Buckmaster in Hemanta Kumari v. Mid Zem dari Co. (A.I.R. 1919 P.C. 79) observed thus :- "Upon this point it is important, to observe, in the first place, that if this really were a term of the arrangement, it is not to be found, in the agreement; and secondly, that, if it affects the contract, it must affect it in toto and that it is impossible for the appellant, having accepted and received the advantage of the compromise so far as it related to the lands in the suit, now to resit its effect upon the other portion of the lands to which it related". 16. The revisional power of the High Court is purely a discretionary power. The High Court, in my view, should not take a narrow and technical view and necessarily interfere even in cases where an order has been made irregularly or even improperly unless the court is satisfied that serious injustice or irreversible hardship would result from a failure to do so. The High Court, in my view, should not take a narrow and technical view and necessarily interfere even in cases where an order has been made irregularly or even improperly unless the court is satisfied that serious injustice or irreversible hardship would result from a failure to do so. I need not say that no party can claim as of right a revision of the order of the Court below under S.115 C.P C. The High Court should revise an order of the court below only in aid of justice, of course, justice in accordance with law and not merely to give effect to technicality. If the principles of equity, justice and good conscience tell the court that the interference would not advance justice, this court will not interfere in a revision. In the result, I see no merit in this Civil Revision Petition. The C.R.P. is dismissed. No order as to costs.