Judgment :- 1. The petitioners are land owners within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act (10 of 1969), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The first respondent wanted to claim the rights of a tenant within the meaning of the Act and to have his name registered as such under it. He could not succeed before the first authority, namely, the second respondent and the appellate authority, namely, the third respondent. However, on a revision preferred by the first respondent, the 4th respondent passed orders in the following terms: “The Revision petitioner and the respondents are referred to the Tahasildar, Tirumayam, for orders on the revision petition.” The above order of the 4th respondent is being put in issue in this writ petition. 2. Mr. S. Subbiah, learned counsel for the petitioners, would raise two contentions seeking interference in writ powers. One is that the 4th respondent has no power of remand under the Act. For this contention, learned counsel relies on a pronouncement of Mohan, J., in G. Shanmugham v. The District Revenue Officer, Thanjavur, and others 1 . Before I examine the legal position, it is better that I advert to the language of Ss. 6 and 7 of the Act. For this contention, learned counsel relies on a pronouncement of Mohan, J., in G. Shanmugham v. The District Revenue Officer, Thanjavur, and others 1 . Before I examine the legal position, it is better that I advert to the language of Ss. 6 and 7 of the Act. S. 6 deals with appeal and it reads as follows:— “Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-S. (8) of S. 3, Sub-S. (3) of S. 4 or Sub-S. (3) of S. 5 may within such period as may be prescribed, appeal to such authority as may be specified by the Government in this behalf (hereinafter referred to as the appellate authority) and the decision of such authority, on such appeal shall, subject to the provisions of S. 7 be final.” S. 7 of the Act deals with revision and it reads as follows: “The District Collector (or such officer as may be specified by the Government in this behalf,) may of his own motion or on the application of a party call for and examine the record of any record officer or appellate authority within his jurisdiction in respect of any proceeding under this Act and pass such orders as he may think fit: Provided that the District Collector (or the said officer) shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard” Mohan, J., had occasion to consider the question as to whether the Appellate Authority has got an inherent power of remand. The learned Judge adverted to two pronouncements of this Court rendered with regard to the appeal provision in the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960J, hereinafter for brevity referred to as the Rent Control Act. S. 23 of the Rent Control Act dealing with appeals did not in specific terms confer any right on the Appellate Authority to remand the matter for fresh disposal. The language of S. 23(3) of the Rent Control Act runs as follows: “The Appellate Authority shall call for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further enquiry as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appear’. The language of S. 23(3) of the Rent Control Act runs as follows: “The Appellate Authority shall call for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further enquiry as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appear’. A Bench of this Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Raghava Rao, J., in Rangaswami Naidu v. Second Judge, Small Causes, Madras 2 , opined that the Appellate Authority under the Madras Act 15 of 1946, which was the earlier Rent Control legislation, prevailing then, has not got all the ordinary powers of the appellate Court of the land and if it finds that the material on record is not sufficient, it can make further enquiry personally or through the Controller and decide the appeal itself but it cannot remand the case for fresh disposal by the Rent Controller. It must be noted that the language of the relevant provision in the Madras Act XV of 1946 was similar to the language of the present provision in the Rent Control Act. Kailasam, J., (as he then was) in Kuttappa Nair v. Shahul Hameed 3, while discountenancing the contention that the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act would have a power of remand, defined the scope of the power of the Appellate Authority in the following terms: “The section does not confer any right on the Appellate Authority to remand the matter for fresh disposal. All that the sub-section empowers the Appellate Authority to do is decide the appeal after making such further inquiry as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, Option is given to the Appellate Authority to make the further inquiry either personally or through the Controller. It is specifically provided that the Appellate Authority shall decide the appeal. The only power that is left with him is that if he does not make the ‘further enquiry’ himself personally, he may call the Controller to make ‘such further enquiry’. But the decision can only be by the Appellate Authority”. As we could see from the extract of S. 6 of the Act, just as in the case of S. 23(3) of the Rent Control Act, this provision does net specifically confer any right on the Appellate Authority to remand the matter for fresh disposal. But the decision can only be by the Appellate Authority”. As we could see from the extract of S. 6 of the Act, just as in the case of S. 23(3) of the Rent Control Act, this provision does net specifically confer any right on the Appellate Authority to remand the matter for fresh disposal. May be in that context, Mohan, J., thought fit to rely on the pronouncements of this Court referred to above, rendered with regard to the scope of the power of the Appellate Authority under S. 23(3) of the Rent Control Act. I need not necessarily draw any analogy or parallel from these pronouncements because in the present case I am called upon to find out the scope of the revisional powers under S. 7 of the Act. S. 7 of the Act, as we could see from the extract, is generously couched and it confers on the revisional authority a wide amplitude ‘to pass such orders as he may think fit.’ Ismail, J., (as he then was) in Ramamurthi v. Rangachari 1, had occasion to deal with the scope of the appellate power of the Commissioner under S. 69(1) of the Tamil Nadu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (22 of 1959). The said provision was couched in the following terms: “Any person aggrieved by any order passed by the Deputy Commissioner under any of the foregoing sections of this Chapter may, within sixty days from the date of the publication of the order or of the receipt thereof by him, as the case may be, appeal to the Commissioner and the Commissioner may pass such order thereon as he thinks fit”. The learned Judge opined as follows: “From this language two facts are clear. One is, the Commissioner is constituted as the appellate authority and the second is, there is no restriction whatever on the power of the Appellate Authority as to the manner of disposal of the appeal or the nature of the order which he can pass on the appeal. One is, the Commissioner is constituted as the appellate authority and the second is, there is no restriction whatever on the power of the Appellate Authority as to the manner of disposal of the appeal or the nature of the order which he can pass on the appeal. On the other hand, the power that has been conferred on the appellate authority is of the widest amplitude, when the section says that the Commissioner may pass such order as he thinks fit.” The learned Judge referred to profuse citations in this behalf and ultimately summed up his decision on this point as follows: “Consequently the decisions referred to above make it absolutely clear that the appellate power of the Commissioner which is not restricted by the statute either expressly or by necessary implication and which has been conferred in the widest possible terms includes a power to remand the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, namely, the original authority for reconsideration, which is incidental and necessary to effectuate the main appellate power conferred upon him and therefore I hold that there is no substance in the contention of the petitioners in all these writ petitions on this particular point.” Here also in S. 7 of the Act, the set of expressions used is “pass such orders as he may think fit”. Certainly, the ratio of Ismail. J., (as he then was) in Ramamurthi v. Rangachari 1 has got to be adopted while defining the scope of the revisional powers under S. 7 of the Act. Mr. K. Doraisami, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, brings to my notice a pronouncement of S. Natarajan, J., (as he then was) in V.S. Alwar Iyengar v. Tahsildar and Record Officer, Srivilliputhur and Ors. 2, where the learned Judge countenanced that the revisional Authority under the Act has undoubtedly got powers of remand, and in exercise of that power, it is open to him to remit the matter either to the first authority or to the Appellate Authority to consider the matter anew. Taking note of the above principles, I have to repel the first contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the 4th respondent lacked and lacks a power of remand while exercising revisional powers under S. 7 of the Act. 3. Taking note of the above principles, I have to repel the first contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the 4th respondent lacked and lacks a power of remand while exercising revisional powers under S. 7 of the Act. 3. Secondly, learned counsel would submit that in the impugned order, no reasons are given as to why an order of remittal was necessitated, and the order passed is a non-speaking one. If we take note of the extract of the impugned order made above, I have to sustain this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The 4th respondent has not assigned any reason for making the order of remittal. Under S. 7 of the Act the revisional Authority when exercises the power of revision must examine the record, subject matter of revision, and there must be an indication that it did examine such records and if the revisional authority chooses to pronounce any order, it must have the support of reasons therefor. The present order is a bald one, and the 4th respondent seemed to have abdicated his function as revisional authority and has, without assigning any reason, relegated the matter to the first authority, namely, the second respondent. This is not permissible in law. This feature obliges me to show the indulgence of interference in writ powers. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and the matter will stand remitted to the file of the 4th respondent for him to examine the matter afresh in the light of all the materials and record s in the case; adjudicate the questions raised by the parties in the light of such records and materials, make up his mind one way or the other, and then make his pronouncement in accordance with law. I make no order as to costs.