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1986 DIGILAW 445 (ALL)

Brahma Deo v. Board of Revenue

1986-07-18

B.L.YADAV

body1986
JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - This petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 15th December, 1978 (Annexure-5 to the petition), passed by the Board of Revenue in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction u/s 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, (for short the Act), arising out of the proceedings u/s 28 of the Act for correction of map. This petition was earlier disposed of by me by order dated 8-10-84. But thereafter a restoration application was filed alleging that Sri H.S. Joshi was the counsel for the Petitioners and as he was dead on the relevant date and nobody appeared to press the petition when the petition was listed for final hearing, and even if somebody represented him that cannot be said to be a proper representation and in the result the case of the Petitioners could not be argued effectively and they were deprived of the opportunity of hearing. Accordingly a prayer was made that the order dated 8-10-84 may be recalled and the petition may be restored to its original number and heard on merits. 2. The restoration was filed on the allegations that the case was decided against the Petitioners without hearing them. It was accordingly alleged that even though the writ petition was disposed of, the Petitioners could not be heard as they were handicapped and principles of natural justice were violated. These averments have been refuted by the contesting Respondents. But the fact remains that Sri H.S. Joshi, an Advocate of this Court represented the Petitioner and he is no more. The Petitioners allege that their arguments were not heard as he was dead on the date of hearing. Under these circumstances, it is within the judicial discretion of this Court either to allow restoration application or not. 3. The word " discretion " very often comes to be considered. It is better to have the connotation of word " discretion " as explained by Coke in Keighley's Case (1609) 10 CO Rep 13 9a, it means " a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between right and wrong, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to their wills and private affections. 4. 4. The concept of judicial discretion has been explained by Lord Mansfield " to import a duty to be fair, candid and unprejudicial ; not arbitrary, capricious or biased; much less warped by resentment, or personal dislikes " See Rooke's case (1598) 5 CO Rep 99 b. Further in other cases the judicial discretion was explained as 'according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion according to law and not humour". The discretion was to be " not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular ". See Sherp v. Wakefield (1891) AC 173 ; Ward v. James (1966) 1 QB 273 , 293. 5. In Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume 27, page 289, ' discretion ' has been defined as follows: Discretion has been variously defined as the act or the liberty of deciding according to the principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or favour, circumspection, wariness, wise conduct and management, Discretion is further defined as meaning equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances, knowledge and prudence, nice discernment and judgment directed by circumspection ". Further at page 292, ' Judicial discretion ' has been defined as follows i " Judicial discretion imports the invocation by a clear and trained mind of reason, courage, impartiality and conscience to accomplish in a calm spirit a result in conformity to law and just and equitable to all parties. 6. There is a maxim meaning " discretion is to know (discern) through law, what is just (i.e. Discretio Est Discernere Perlegem Quid Sit Justum). In my opinion judicial discretion has to be exercised in a fair and non-prejudicial way, with a view to arrive at a decision, quite consistent with law, in order to advance substantial justice between the parties. A court should be cautious in disposing of restoration applications. Whenever there is an occasion to afford a statutory right of hearing or under the maxim ' Audi Alteram Partem ' or where some order of an administrative nature has been passed affecting adversely the rights of a party, a comparatively liberal view should be taken so that the person concerned might be easily afforded an opportunity of hearing. 7. In Nirankar Nath Wahi v. The Vth Addl. 7. In Nirankar Nath Wahi v. The Vth Addl. District Judge, Moradabad 1984 AWC 659 the Supreme Court held that where the adjournment of a case was sought on the allegations that the Petitioner was handicapped and could not be heard on the date fixed as his counsel could not appear before the Court on account of unavoidable difficulties, in such situations the principle is " that justice should not only be done but ought to be shown to have been done " must be applied, and the party must be given another chance to engage another Counsel to get his case argued by another counsel in whom he reposed confidence. Under these circumstances, in the instant case the facts are that the averments have been made that the Petitioners' counsel was dead on the date of hearing. In any case the Petitioners were deprived of the opportunity of hearing. The reasonable opportunity of hearing is a must. 8. After heaving the counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that in the ends of justice and fair play the judicial discretion deserves to be exercised in favour of the Petitioners and the order dated 8-10-84 may be recalled In the result the restoration application is allowed. The earlier order dated 8-10-84 is recalled and the petition is restored to its original number. This is how the petition has come up again before me for hearing. 9. The facts of the case need not detain much. The Petitioners were recorded Bhumidhar of plot No. 72/2 (corresponding new number 30) situate in village Goverdbanpur, Pargana Caswas, Tahsil and District Mirzapur. This plot was under the tenancy of one Baij Nath and after his death it was recorded in the name of his widow Smt. Janki and after her death the Petitioners succeeded. During the Consolidation operation the land in dispute being grove, was kept out of consolidation and there was no change in the shape of area or valuation of the plot in dispute. One Sakal Narain, a tenant of adjoining plot No. 30 got an incorrect map prepared during consolidation proceedings by making some encroachments over the area in the share of the Petitioners. One Sakal Narain, a tenant of adjoining plot No. 30 got an incorrect map prepared during consolidation proceedings by making some encroachments over the area in the share of the Petitioners. When the Petitioners came to learn, they filed an application u/s 33/39 of the Act and also two more applications for correction of map u/s 28 and another application was filed u/s 41 of the Act for demarcation of the plot. The application u/s 33/39 of the Act was, however, dismissed with an observation that the entries being old, could not be corrected. 10. Respondent No. 2 Sakal Narain, however, contested the Petitioners' applications u/s 28 of the Act stating that the said applications were not maintainable and the Petitioners' claim was barred by Section 49 of the UP CH Act. 11. An enquiry was made by the Sub-Divisional Officer, who recommended on the basis of a report dated 3-5-72 that the map may be corrected (vide Annexure-2). The said report was confirmed on 30-9-72 by the Collector (vide Annexure-3). Against that order the Respondent No. 2 preferred a revision before the Addl. Commissioner who dismissed the same on 1-5-73 (Annexure 4). Aggrieved by the said order Respondent No. 2 filed a revision before the Board of Revenue which was decided on 15th December, 1978 by the impugned order and the said revision was allowed (Annexure-5). It is against this order that the present petition has been filed in this Court. 12. Sri V.K.S. Chowdhry, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners urged that the order of Board of Revenue was passed in excess of jurisdiction inasmuch as u/s 219 of the Act no question of jurisdiction was involved, hence the revision ought to have been dismissed. 13. Sri Sankatha Rai, the learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents, on the other hand, urged that as the case between the parties arose u/s 28 of the Act, which was a correction of map and the proceedings u/s 28 are summary proceedings deciding no title of the parties, hence the present petition itself was not maintainable. He placed reliance on Smt Lakhmati v. Board of Revenue, 1984 AWC 928 and on Jaipal v. Board of Revenue 1956 AWR 518 . 14. He placed reliance on Smt Lakhmati v. Board of Revenue, 1984 AWC 928 and on Jaipal v. Board of Revenue 1956 AWR 518 . 14. Having heard the learned Counsel for 'the parties the first point for determination is that whether the Board of Revenue could interfere with the orders of subordinate authority in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s 219 of the Act. If so, was there any error of jurisdiction in the order of the Additional Commissioner etc. The relevant statutory provision of Section 219 of the Act can be fruitfully set out below: The Board may call for the record of a judicial nature or connected with a settlement in which no appeal lies to the Board, if the officer by whom the case was decided appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested, or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity, and may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit. 15. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that it is in pari materia with Section 115 of the CPC and the interference can be made by the . Revisional Court only when there is an error of jurisdiction in the order of the subordinate authority i. e. either the subordinate authority exercised a jurisdiction which was not vested.in 'him, or refused to exercise a jurisdiction, or acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity. 16. In Shaik Jaffar Shaik Mahmood and Others Vs. Mohd. Pasha Hakkani Saheb and Others, AIR 1975 SC 794 while innterpreting Section 26(c) of Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1956 which was in pari materia with Section 115 CPC the Supreme Court held thus i " The High Court u/s 26(c) has to see whether there is any error of jurisdiction committed by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority in passing the order, or whether there is any manifest error of procedure committed by the Courts as may effect the Ultimate decision resulting in gross injustice. 17. In Manick Chandra Nandy Vs. Debdas Nandy and Others, AIR 1986 SC 446 it was held thus i "The exercise of revisional jurisdiction of High Court is confined to questions "of jurisdiction, or the jurisdictional question of law. 17. In Manick Chandra Nandy Vs. Debdas Nandy and Others, AIR 1986 SC 446 it was held thus i "The exercise of revisional jurisdiction of High Court is confined to questions "of jurisdiction, or the jurisdictional question of law. See also Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill and Ginning Factory and Another Vs. Yograjsinha Shankarsinha Parihar and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1894 . 18. In the instant case it was to be seen as to whether there was any jurisdictional error in the order of the Additional Commissioner and the Collector. According to the Petitioner the incorrect order in respect of correction of area and entry in the map was obtained by the contesting Respondent in respect of the land in dispute during consolidation operation and after the close of consolidation operations and after the notification u/s 52 was issued, the Petitioner could know about the change in area and map, accordingly application for correction of map u/s 28 was filed. The case was contested by Respondent No. 2 Sakal Narain, who alleged that the map was correctly prepared during consolidation operations and the claim of the Petitioner was barred by Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The Board of Revenue in the impugned order (Annexure-5, page 41 of the petition) held as follows under para 8 of the order: The consolidation records are more authentic because they are prepared after carrying out detailed survey and measurements on the spot. The land has undergone considerable changes and the map prepared by consolidation authorities shows the latest actual position on the spot, hence it is not liable to correction. These findings lead to the inference that during consolidation operations the area and map were corrected after carrying out measurements on the spot. If Petitioners were aggrieved they should have filed objection at the proper stage. Village maps are revised u/s 7 of UP CH Act, 1953. The field book and current annual registers are revised in view of provisions u/s 8. The statement of principles is prepared u/s 8A. The notices are issued u/s 9 in respect of correction of records etc. and if somebody feels aggrieved he should file objection u/s 9(2) and 9A(2). u/s 9A(2) cases which are not disposed of and conciliation by Assistant Consolidation Officer are referred to Consolidation Officer for disposal. The statement of principles is prepared u/s 8A. The notices are issued u/s 9 in respect of correction of records etc. and if somebody feels aggrieved he should file objection u/s 9(2) and 9A(2). u/s 9A(2) cases which are not disposed of and conciliation by Assistant Consolidation Officer are referred to Consolidation Officer for disposal. The appeal against order of Consolidation Officer lies to Settlement Officer (Consolidation) u/s 11 and revision lies u/s 48. The Petitioner admittedly did not file any objection, appeal or revision during consolidation operations. The claim of Petitioners was, accordingly barred by Section 49 of UP CH Act and the revenue authorities have no jurisdiction to entertain an application u/s 28 of the Act and to allow it and pass an order Correcting entries or areas of plot as prepared by consolidation authorities. As the Sub-Divisional Officer, Collector or the Addl. Commissioner have no jurisdiction to entertain and allow the application u/s 28, on behalf of the Petitioners if they had filed no objection at the stage of Section 9 or 9A of the UP CH Act, 1953. This was an order passed in excess of jurisdiction and certainly there was an error of jurisdiction. If the Board of Revenue allowed the revision u/s 219 of the Act and set aside the orders of the subordinate authorities which was passed in excess of jurisdiction, the Board of Revenue passed the order consistent with revisional jurisdiction u/s 219 and it committed no error much less an error apparent on the face of record. There is, therefore, no merit in this submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 19. As regards the submission of the learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents that the writ petition was not maintainable as in a correction of map or papers case the rights of the parties are not decided, I am of the view that in the application arising out of correction of map filed u/s 28 of the Act if some order has been passed, that does not decide the title of any party. An order in an application u/s 28 is just in the realm of a summary proceeding and if anybody including the Petitioners feels aggrieved, they are free to seek their remedy by filing a regular suit before the appropriate court. An order in an application u/s 28 is just in the realm of a summary proceeding and if anybody including the Petitioners feels aggrieved, they are free to seek their remedy by filing a regular suit before the appropriate court. I have considered in detail the cases cited on behalf of either side in Smt. Lakhmati v. Board of Revenue (Supra), and have come to the conclusion that the proceedings either for mutation or for correction of papers etc arising under the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, are summary proceedings having nothing to do with the title of the parties. Unless some right of a party has been decided, the writ petition cannot be held to be maintainable. Similar view was taken in Jaipal v. Board of Revenue (Supra). Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue did not decide the title of the parties and hence the present petition filed by the Petitioners was not maintainable. 20. In the result, the petition lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed. Under the circumstances, ho A ever, there shall be no order as to costs.