M. P. ABDUL KHANDER v. VIJAYA BANK — 1986 DIGILAW 445 (KAR)

P. A. KULKARNI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision by the judgment debtor (sub-tenant of the original tenant against whom the order of eviction was passed) against the order dated December 11, 1984, passed by the Principal munsiff, Madikeri, in Execution Case No. 95 of 1982 overruling the objections of the present revision petitioner. ( 2 ) THE Vijaya Bank Ltd. Madikeri, had filed an eviction case in H. R. C. No. 12 of 1966 in the court of the Munsiff, Madikeri, under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Controal Act against the tenant, M. P. Abdul Rahman. The eviction was ordered on July 7, 1967. The tent, Abdual rahman, not being satisfied with the eviction order, approached the District Judge, Courage, in h. R. C. A. No. 10 of 1967. The learned District Judge, by his rider dated July 2, 1968, set said the order of eviction passed by the learned Munsiff and dismissed the eviction petition. The landlord, Vijaya Bank Ltd. , not being satisfied with the order passed by the learned District judge, approached this court with C. R. P. No. 1803 of 1968. This court passed an order on June 23, 1972, setting aside the order of the learned Districts Judge and restoring the order of eviction passed by the learned Munsiff. The landlord, Vijaya bank Ltd. after succeeding in this court, sued out execution in Execution Case No. 41 of 1973. In that execution, the trivision petitioner filed an implead-ing application not the ground that he had become a sub-tenant in 1966 and that he was not a party to the eviction proceedings and, therefore, the order of evictri on could not be executed against him. It was rejected by the executing court on December 6,1973. The present revision petitioner, not being satisfied with that order, approached this court with C. R. P. No. 1969 of 1973. This court, by its order dated February 21, 1974, set said the order passed by the executing court ordered that he should be impleaded. He then approached the Munsiff's Court, madikeri, with O. S. No. 70 of 1973 seeking a declaration that the order of eviction passed in h. R. C. No. 12 of 166 was not binding on hi as he was only a subtenant. That suit was dismissed on December 12, 1974. The landlord sued out execution in Execution Case No. 214 of 1974. That suit was dismissed on December 12, 1974. The landlord sued out execution in Execution Case No. 214 of 1974. The present revision petitioner, not being satisfied with the dismissal of O. C. No. 70 of 1973, approached the court of the Civil Judge, Madikeri, with R. N. No. 38 of 1974. In the said regular appeal, Execution Case No. 214 of 1974 was stayed. The said appeal was dismissed on October 31, 1975. The landlord again filed Execution Case No. 390 of 1975. The present revision petitioner, not being satisfied with the dismissal of R. N. No. 38of 1974 approached this Court with R. S. A. No. 145 of 1976. Execut wn Case No. 390 of 1975 was stayed in this appeal. The said R. S. A. was dismissed on merits on August 13, 1982. The original tenant, Abdul Rahman, died during the pendency of the R. A. S. in 1980. The landlord sued out execution in Execution case No. 95 of 1982 on December 13, 1982. The present revision petitioner filed objections in the execution contending that on account of nationalisation of banks including the Vijaya Bank ltd. , the premises became public premises within the meaning of section 2 (e) of thee Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act and that in view of section 15 of the said act, the decree had become unexecutable. The Act nationalising the banks came into force on april 15, 1980. The court below overruled the objections of the judgment debtor. Hence, the present revision. ( 3 ) THIS is a Typical example where the universal proposition that the pain of the decree-holder starts only after the decree, is quite obvious. In Babu Lal v. Hazari Kishori Lal, AIR1982 SC 818 , 1982 (1 )SCALE79 , (1982 )1 SCC525 , [1982 ]3 scr94 , 1982 (14 )UJ492 (SC ), the Supreme Court stated in para as " the present petition is a typical example of the desperate effort of the judgment-debtor to ward off the execution of the decree till the bailiff knocks at the door. " ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel, Sri Santosh Hegde, submitted that in view of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, the present premises had become public premises within the meaning of the said Act and that section 15 barred the jurisdiction of the court in ordering the eviction. " ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel, Sri Santosh Hegde, submitted that in view of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, the present premises had become public premises within the meaning of the said Act and that section 15 barred the jurisdiction of the court in ordering the eviction. The word "public premises" has been defined by section 2 (e) of the said Act. It reads as: " public premises means - (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of , the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, under the control of the secretariat of either houses of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of the secretariat: (2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or behalf of,- (i) any company as defined section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not less than fifty-one cent. of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government or nay company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first mentioned company. . . " This definition no doubt makes the premises in question public premises within the meaning of the said Act. Learned counsel, Shri Santosh Hegde, then relied on section 15 of the Act which reads: " 15. Bar of jurisdiction.- No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of - (a) the eviction of any person who is unauthorised occupation of any public premises. . . " ( 5 ) ACCORDING to him, the word "proceeding" used in section 15 would also include the execution proceedings. for purpose, he relied on Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, AIR1982 SC 818 , 1982 (1 )SCALE79 , (1982 )1 SCC525 , [1982 ]3 scr94 , 1982 (14 )UJ492 (SC ). He drew my attention to paragraph 17 which reads as (at pages 824): " The word `proceeding' is not defined in the Act. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines it as `carrying on of an action at law, a legal action or process; any done by authority of a court of law; any step taken in a cause by either party. He drew my attention to paragraph 17 which reads as (at pages 824): " The word `proceeding' is not defined in the Act. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines it as `carrying on of an action at law, a legal action or process; any done by authority of a court of law; any step taken in a cause by either party. The terms `proceeding ' is a very comprehensive and generally speaking means a prescribe course of action for en-forcing a legal right. It is not technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business in conducted. the word `proceeding' in section 22 includes execution proceedings also. In rameshwar Nath v. Uttar Pradesh Union Bank Ltd. AIR1956 All 586 , such a view was taken. it is terms giving the widest freedom to a court of so that it may of justice to the parties in the case. Execution is a stage in the legal proceeding It is a step in the judicial process. It marks a stage in litigation. It is a step in the ladder. In the journey of litigation, there are various stages. POne of them is execution. " ( 6 ) SECTION 22 of the Specific Relief act, 1963, reads as: " (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) any person suing for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for (a) possession, or partition and separate possession of the property, in addition to such performance ; or (b) any other relief to which he may entitled, including the refund of nay earnest or deposit paid or made by him in case his claim for specific performance is refused. (2) No relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically claimed: provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaintiff, the court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the palint on such terms as amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief. (3) The power of the court to grant relief under clause (b) of sub- section (1) shall be without prejudice to its powers to awards compensation under section 21. " ( 7 ) THE proviso to sub-section (20 makes it clear that thought the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint. Therefore, the word "proceeding" contemplated in the proviso is a proceeding which will come into existence after the proceedings relating to the plaint are over. The said proviso is added to further the meaning and the implication mentioned in sub-section (2 ). Therefore, under these peculiar circum-stances, the Supreme Court held that the word "proceeding" used in the proviso would include execution proceedings also. That cannot be taken as a universal principle laid down by the Supreme Court in all cases. Every case will have to be decided under the provision of law under which the proceeding in initiated. Therefore, the said Supreme Court decision, in my opinion, will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 8 ) AS already stated above, section 15 contemplates a proceeding in which the eviction of a person is sought. In the execution proceedings now sued out, it is not the eviction that is sought. What is sought is that the order of eviction already passed in the H. R. C. Proceedings which has become final once for all, be given effect to. Even though the eviction order is passed and has become final, the landlord cannot straightway rush to the premises and throw out the party who is in possession. The mode prescribed to obtain the fruit of the eviction order is to file execution proceedings. The court does not pass an order of eviction in the execution case, but only passes an order authorising the bailiff of the court to go to the spot and hand over possession and thereby execute the order of eviction. Therefore, the question of passing an order of eviction is to give effect to the order of eviction that has already become final. The execution is filed in order to obtain an order under Order 21, rule 35, Civil Procedure Code, and entrust the warrant to the bailiff with a direction to put the landlord in possession of the property. Therefore, the question of passing an order of eviction is to give effect to the order of eviction that has already become final. The execution is filed in order to obtain an order under Order 21, rule 35, Civil Procedure Code, and entrust the warrant to the bailiff with a direction to put the landlord in possession of the property. Therefore, section to put the landlord in possession of the property. Therefore, section 15 of the Public Premises Act will not apply to the facts of the present case. This is also the view taken by me in C. R. P. No. 67 of 1986 and C. R. P. No 3852 of 1985 disposed of on November 21, 1986. ( 9 ) SHRI Santosh Hegde referred me to Narasinga Rao v. Bhimppa Annappa [1972] 2 May LJ 193. It was a case where the eviction had been ordered on account of non - payment of rent under the provisions of the B. T. and A. L. Act. This court made reference to section 23 of the Karnataka land Reforms Act which reads as: " (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 22, the Tahsilder shall not order possession to bee resorted to the land lord on the ground of default in paying rent, if during the pendency of an proceedings, as decided by thee Tahsildar, within such period as may be fixed by the tahsildar. " ( 10 ) THEREFORE, section 23 prohibits the landlord being put in possession of the property irrespective of the order of eviction. That is not the situation in the present case. Therefore, the principle laid down in the said case will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel, Shri Sundaraswany, submitted that thee Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980, has become into force on April 15, 1980, while REA no. 145 of 1976 had been disposed of on August 13, 1982. According to him, the present plea raised in the execution ought to have been raised in the said RSA. Thus, he constructed an argument that thee present plea was barred by res judicate. 145 of 1976 had been disposed of on August 13, 1982. According to him, the present plea raised in the execution ought to have been raised in the said RSA. Thus, he constructed an argument that thee present plea was barred by res judicate. There is nothing in the PUBlic premises Act or any other Act to indicate that any order of eviction obtained by a bank which has become nationalised later on Becomes unexecutable in view of the provisions of the Public premises Act. this plea ought to have been taken in the RSA itself. Therefore on the principle of might and ought laid down by section 11, Civil Procedure Code, the present plea appears to be breed by res judicate. Even assuming for a movement that it is not barred by res judicate, it has been already shown above by me that section 15 of the Public Premises Act does not outset the jurisdiction of the court in the present case. ( 12 ) UNDER the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, all the rights, liabilities, etc. , of the bank had vested in the nationalised bank and the order of eviction had become final C. R. P. No. 1803 of 1968. Therefore, the right obtained under the order passed in the said C. R. P. had become vested in Vijay Bank became a successor to Vijay Bank Ltd. Therefore, whether rights has been obtained by Vijay Bank Ltd. were got by the nationalised vijay Bank as laid down by section 5 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transferred of undertakings) Act, 1980. Therefore, the right that has become rested cannot be nullified by any subsequent proceedings which has no basis at all in law. Therefore, even viewed from this angle, the lower court was justified in over ruling the objections of the present revision petitioner. ( 13 ) ONCE the order of eviction has become final, any subsequent events that might have taken place will not take away the effect of that final order of eviction, unless the law provides that such an order, though it has become final, would be unexecutable. / No such provision is to be found wither in the Bank Nationalisation Act or in the Public Premises Act. / No such provision is to be found wither in the Bank Nationalisation Act or in the Public Premises Act. ( 14 ) IT is a case where the present revision petitioner claims to have become a sub - tenant after the institution of H. R. C. No. 12 of 1986. Section 30 of the Rent Control Act clearly lays down as: "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, where the interest of the tenant in any premises is determined for any reason whatsoever and any order is made by the court under this act for the recovery of possession of such premises, the order shall, subject to the provisions of section 21, be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the premises and vacant possession thereto shall be given to the landlord by evicting such persons therefrom. " ( 15 ) HE claims to race become a sub - tenant after the institution of H. R. C. No. 12 of 1966. Therefore, he cannot claim to hace any independent status or right. He claims to have derived the position of a sub - tenant only only under the tenant agaiinst whom the eviction case was filed. Therefore, any order of eviction passed against the original tenant would be binding even on him also. All his attempts to protract the proceedings by filing objections in the execution, by filing the suit, by filing the first appeal and by filing the second appeal have proved to be abortive. Notwithstanding that, he does not want to be vanished. Therefore, this is a typical case where the stand taken by the revision petitioner is unrightous and the desperate attempt to protect proceedings to the extent possible. This court, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction, cannot and should not encourage such unrightous steps taken for protracting the proceedings (vide in this connections Siddappa v. Lakshmamma, AIR 1965 Mys 313 ). ( 16 ) IN the result, the order passed by the court below is confirmed. The revision is dismissed. No costs in the revision.