ORDER Bimal Chandra Basak, J. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order passed by the trial court dismissing the application of the petitioner-appellant for an injunction. The suit was filed by one Preeti Singha Roy stated to be the Secretary of the Calcutta Ladies Golf Club (hereinafter referred to as the said Club) against the Calcutta Tramways Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Tramways) for a declaration that the Club is entitled to retain possession of the land shown in exhibit ‘A’ and a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, its servants and/or agents from trespassing upon, damaging or digging up in any way the said land or any part thereof And for Rs. 5,000/- as damages. The plaintiff’s case as sought to be made out in the plaint is that the Calcutta Ladies Golf Club was founded in or about 1891 and had been duly registered as a Society on 17th October, 1979. The plaintiff is the Secretary of the said Club and as such entitled to sue on behalf of the of the said society. It is stated that form about 1891 the Club came into possession of the Land in the Maidan indicated in a plan prepared by the authorities o Government in about 1923 as specified in exhibit ‘A’ to the plaint of the plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the said land). The right claimed by the Club in respect of the said land, is set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the plaint which are set out herein-below:- “3. From about 1891 the Club came into possession of the land in the Maidan indicated in a plan prepared by the authorities of Government in about 1923 as specified in exhibit ‘A’ hereto 4. Subject only to such administrative control as has been exercised by the authorities of Police, the club has been in possession of the said land openly, continuously and as of right for over 90 years and had constructed a structure used as a pavilion thereon for which a fee was and is being paid to the police authorities” 2. Thereafter it is alleged that in or about December 19, 1985, some workmen or labourers of the defendant suddenly encroached upon a portion of the said land and started to dig the same without the consent or authority of the Club. The allegation is of encroachment. 3. Thereafter it is alleged that in or about December 19, 1985, some workmen or labourers of the defendant suddenly encroached upon a portion of the said land and started to dig the same without the consent or authority of the Club. The allegation is of encroachment. 3. On that basis an application fore injunction was made and the said application was dismissed by the learned trial Judge. The learned Judge dismissed the application on the ground of balance of convenience. The learned trial Judge held as follows: “While it is true that realignment of the Tramway track would definitely affect the golf course, but it would have to be seen as to whether the Law Court would be justified in the matter of granting an order of injunction in a case like this, where benefit to millions may be thwarted or be rendered nugatory in order to allow a small section of the people to enjoy and relax in the lush green area of Calcutta Maidan Crores of rupees have been spent on the Bridge to ameliorate the conditions of the traveling millions in the city of Calcutta. Tramway tracks if allowed to remain on the existing path without any realigament of the same, the experts opine, would lead to such a traffic hazard that the Bridge would be of no use to its users. Criticism has been leveled on the alteration of the alignment of the tramway tracks since 1979, but Calcutta’s problems so that in an attempt to remedy the problems, efforts are now being made so that the problems may remain at a minimal and not take a gigantic shape. In its bid to restrict the problems to he minimal, the authorities thought it fit upon expert advice to further realign the tramway track. There is no denial of fact that traffic hazard is enormous in the city of Calcutta, but in a developmental work undertaken by the appropriate authority for the benefit of the millions, balance of convenience ought to be of prime consideration in the matter of grant of Injunction. There is no denial of fact that traffic hazard is enormous in the city of Calcutta, but in a developmental work undertaken by the appropriate authority for the benefit of the millions, balance of convenience ought to be of prime consideration in the matter of grant of Injunction. This is, however, apart from the issue as regards the question of damage being an adequate remedy thought, however, I am not expressing any opinion in regard thereto……….(para 11) “In my view the balance of convenience ought to be considered as a preeminent consideration in the matter of grant of an interlocutory injunction in the facts of this case. The issue id to be looked from the point of view as to whether on refusal of the Injunction the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss or injury. Even though some affectation of right may be involved in the matter, but can it be termed to be such so as to render it an irreparable loss? Admittedly the area making of tees and fairways afresh is not an impossibility though there may be claim for damages. If other conditions being satisfied as to its entitlement, the overriding consideration is can a development project be even temporarily suspended for the convenience of a small section of people. In my view, the answer ought to be in the negative as otherwise the same would lead to catastrophe which is not only unwarranted, but wholly undesirable a swell” (para 14) 3. Being aggrieved by the same this appeal has been preferred. During the course of hearing of this appeal when we found out that though the Tramways was made the sole defendant respondent in the suit/application/appeal and though the right, title and interest to the suit land is claimed by the plaintiff in the suit by way of alleged adverse possession, and though such claim of adverse possession is obviously against the Union of India, Union of India was not represented before the Trial Court or before us. According we directed that a notice be given to the Union of India. Pursuant to the same the Union of India has appeared and with our leave filed an affidavit and in reply thereto further affidavit has been affirmed by the plaintiff appellant. 4. Mr. According we directed that a notice be given to the Union of India. Pursuant to the same the Union of India has appeared and with our leave filed an affidavit and in reply thereto further affidavit has been affirmed by the plaintiff appellant. 4. Mr. De appearing in support of the appellant has submitted that though the claim of the plaintiff is based on title which is based on adverse possession, it is not necessary to decide the question of title in this case as his client is in lawful possession and she is complaining about the wrong doing of a trespasser. In this connection he has relied upon the following decisions Bishan Das v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1570 , Ismail Ariff v. Mohammad Ghause 20 IA 99 (at 106), Nair Service Society v. K. C. Alexandar, AIR 1968 SC 1165 (para 16), M. Kamalam v. Dr. V. A. Syed Mohammad, AIR 1978 SC 841 (para 9) and M. K. Shetty v. Lakshmaran AIR 1972 SC 2299 (para 5). 5. Mr. Mullick appearing for the Union of India has placed the affidavits to set out the facts and he has stated that the Union of India has not been made a party and this is not a proper suit. He has also submitted that the plaintiff is the Secretary of the registered body which is representing the incorporated body, but the possession of the Club is claimed by the unincorporated body and the possession of the unit corporated body cannot become possession of the incorporated body. 6. Mr. A. P. Chatterjee appearing for the respondent Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. has referred to us to the plaint and averments therein. 7. We shall now set out the historical facts so far as the Maidan is concerned as would appear from the affidavits and records produced before us. The suit land is situated in a portion of a vast area popularly known as the “Maidan” which is part of “Fort William”. The said Act was published in the Gazette of India, on 11th March, 1881 and come into force on 1st April, 1881. By the 1881 Act it was, inter alia, provided that the Central Government may from time to time by Notification in the Official Gazette define the purpose of the 1881 Act and the limits of Fort William in Bengal. By the 1881 Act it was, inter alia, provided that the Central Government may from time to time by Notification in the Official Gazette define the purpose of the 1881 Act and the limits of Fort William in Bengal. Thereafter by a Notification dated 9th January, 1894, and published in the Calcutta Gazette dated 10th January, 1894, the description of the revised boundary of the Fort William and the Military Burial Ground which have been approved by the Government of India was specified for general information. By the said Notification the description of the boundary of the Fort William, commonly known as the Calcutta Maidan, was fully given by stone numbers, degrees minutes and direct distance in feet. The admitted position is that the land which is the subject matter of this suit is situated within this area. It appears that the said Club was allotted the land in 1891 though actual allotment letter was not available either from the plaintiff or the defendant or any one else. It further appears that the Club obtained sanction for erection of the pavilion in replacement of the tent by a later dated 1st October, 1990 from the Government of India for warded to the Government of Wes Bengal. By a Notification dated 14th August, 1909 and published in the Calcutta Gazette dated 18th August, 1909 the description of the revised boundary of the Fort Willaim as approved by the Government of India was published. Admittedly this land remained within the Fort William area in spite of such revision. A sketch map of 1909 show that this land is within the blue zone which remained with the Government of India, addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Government of Bengal, Public Works Department whereby the decision of the Government of India regarding the control and exercise of the Calcutta Maidan area by the Government of India was communicate and the same is set out herein-below. “2. Control over the area enclosed by the blue line will be delegated to the local Government subject to the conditions that the General Officer Commanding Presidency & Assam District, must be consulted regarding all proposals for the proposal objected to is sanctioned.” In this contention reference may be made to annexure ‘D’ of the affidavit of A Chawnmarial affirmed on 17th April, 1986. 9. 9. By a letter dated 12th January 1929, the Deputy Secretary of the Government of Bengal conveyed to the Commissioner of police, Calcutta, the approval of the Government regarding the conditions in modification of the existing conditions laid down in the orders dated the 1st October, 1900 and the 4th June, 1910. Thereafter by a notification dated 20th January, 1940 published in the Gazette of India Act, 1935, the Governor General in Council certified that the lands and building immediately before the commencement of Part-III of the said Act were vested in his Majesty for the purpose of the Government of India and which were formerly used and were intended to be used for the purposes which after commencement of the said Part had become purposes of the Federal Government under the said Act and have been retained by the Governor-General in the Council Maidan area which was shown as 928 86 acres of land. The club was within this area. 10. The Club licence was renewed for 1965-66 on 22nd February 1965. On 16th September 1965 permit was issued to the Club with conditions from the Deputy Commissioner of Police. On 13th February 1967 the licence fee was given by the Club. For the period 1967-68 the club licence was issued. From time to time such renewal was made. In October 1979 this club was registered under the same under the Societies Registration Act. A letter was written by the Bengal Area of the Eastern Command to the Commissioner of Police on 31st October, 1979 whereby it was stated that the club was making an unauthorized use of a place of Defence land Similar letter was written on the 7th December 1979, a copy of which was sent to the Club. By its reply dated 22nd February 1980 the club stated that it has been in possession and occupation of the land in question ever since its formation and had been using the same openly as of right ever since. It was stated that this Club had been holding inter club competitions with the Service Club. It was denied that it was in unauthorised occupation. A notice was issued to the Club under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unautorised Occupants) Act 1971, on behalf of the army for unauthorised use of a portion of the Maidan land. It was stated that this Club had been holding inter club competitions with the Service Club. It was denied that it was in unauthorised occupation. A notice was issued to the Club under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unautorised Occupants) Act 1971, on behalf of the army for unauthorised use of a portion of the Maidan land. The follow up of the notice was issued by a letter dated 29th April, 1980. 11. The dispute is regarding the shifting of stretch of the Tramway tracks running along the West of Kidderpore Road from Hastings Junction to Outram Road Junction which was required to be shifted for final completion of the approach to the second Hooghly River Bridge. One of the main approaches to the Bridge from the Central and Northern parts of the City of Calcutta is upper kidderpore Road. In order to accommodate the said Hooghly Bridge, it was felt necessary to widen the Kidderpore Road to those lands for proper, facilities. For the purpose of widening Kidderpore Road on both sides, the West side covering the existing tram tracks was to be shifted to the eastern side which would effect the area used by the Club for playing golf. From time to time there was joint conference with all departments was given by the Government for grant of lease to C T C for such shifting of tramway tracks. 12. In our opinion, apart from the question of balance of convenience, before obtaining an interim order of injunction the plaintiff petitioner must also make out a prima facie case. The prima facie case to be made out by the plaintiff is whether the plaintiff has any right to make such complaint and what title the Club has got in respect of the suit land. The question is whether the Club is in possession of the said property as it claims. The question further is whether a prima facie case of adverse possession has been made out. In our opinion, it is necessary in this case to ascertain the same prima facie, before any interim relief is granted as prayed for. However, as this is not a final hearing of the suit, we shall only have to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out for obtaining such an interim order. 13. In our opinion, it is necessary in this case to ascertain the same prima facie, before any interim relief is granted as prayed for. However, as this is not a final hearing of the suit, we shall only have to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out for obtaining such an interim order. 13. The case sought to be made out in the plaint is of adverse possession. In this context we may point out that surprisingly enough, the allegation made in paragraphs 3 and 4, which asserts such claim and which we have set out hereinabove, are verified as true to knowledge of the plaintiff. However admittedly Smt. Preeti Singha Roy, the Secretary of the Club, is a member of the Club according to her own saying from 1968 only and she is not certainly more than 50 years old. There cannot be any such personal knowledge as to what has happened since 90 years back. 14. Whether the petitioner was in possession of the land as the owner or a lessee or a licensee, a prima facie case has to be established. The case made out in the plaint is of owner and that also by adverse possession. The defendant Tramways is claiming that its action is not unauthorised because it has been permitted to do so by the Government of India who is entitled to give such permission as owner thereof. Therefore, a prima facie case has to be made out by the plaintiff. We have referred to the documents hereinabove. What is pitted against that is the bare statement of the plaintiff. On the aforesaid facts and document we are satisfied of the prima facie case has not been made out by the plaintiff. On the aforesaid facts and document we are satisfied that the plaintiff is only in permissive possession as a licensee. They have only been allowed to use the land for the purpose of playing golf. It was so allotted to them in 1891 and they are continuing as such without any change to the nature of user of their right. 15. The position in law is also the same. The law of adverse possession is very clear. They have only been allowed to use the land for the purpose of playing golf. It was so allotted to them in 1891 and they are continuing as such without any change to the nature of user of their right. 15. The position in law is also the same. The law of adverse possession is very clear. A permissive possession cannot be converted into an adverse possession unless it is proved that the person in possession asserted an adverse title to the property to the knowledge of true owners for the relevant period. We ought to point out that the case of the plaintiff petitioner is that from the very beginning they were in adverse possession. No case has been made out that there was a permissive possession which was later converted into an adverse possession. Excepts for the year 1980 at no other point of time the expression “adverse possession” has been used. Negotiation have been going on for a long time about the shifting of tram track, to which the plaintiff was a party. At no point of time the club asserted in any such conference that it was the absolute owner in respect of the said property by virtue of any alleged adverse possession. 16. A prima facie case has been made out by the Union of India that this land at all material times stood vested in the Emperor of India. Later on it vested in Indian Federal Government and thereafter vested in the Union of India after independence. The possession of the portion of the said land was permissive in its inception and remained so throughout. From time to time licence fee was being paid and renewed. As pointed out, in 1921 the administration of the Maidan, wherein this Club is situated, was delegated to the Commissioner of Police and thereafter the Commissioner of Police, as such delegated authority of the Government of India, has been accepting payment of fees as paid by the Club. The Club has never raised the question that it is not liable to pay either to the Government of India or its delegate any fee because it was the absolute owner of the land. 17. The Club has never raised the question that it is not liable to pay either to the Government of India or its delegate any fee because it was the absolute owner of the land. 17. On the question of possession, we are prima facie of the opinion that the Club was never in possession of the land in the sense that they were not in possession either as absolute owner by way of adverse possession or otherwise, or as a lessee in exclusive possession. They were merely allowed to use the suit land for the purpose of playing golf and such use was permissive in nature. It has and is merely a permission to use the land and not to have possession of the same far less the question of absolute or excusive possession. The question of interference with the possessor right of the Club cannot and does not arise. 18. In the case of Ismail Ariff v. Mahomad Ghouse reported in 20 Indian Appeals 99 it was held as follows: “It appears to their Lordships that there is here a misapprehension of the nature of the plaintiff’s was sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant. By s.9 of the Specific Relief Act (Act I of 1877), if the plaintiff had been disposed otherwise than in due course of law, he could, by a suit instituted within six months from the date of the dispossession, have recovered possession, notwithstanding any other title that might be set up in such suit. If he could thus recover possession from a person who might be able to prove a title, it is certainly right and just that he should be able, against a person who has no title and is a mere wrongdoer, to obtain a declaration of title as owner, and an injunction to restrain the wrongdoer from interfering with the possession. The Appellate Court, in accordance with the judgment above quoted, has dismissed the suit Consequently the defendant may continue to willfully, improperly and illegally interfere with the plaintiff’s possession, as the learned Judges say he has done, and the plaintiff has no remedy. Their Lordships are of opinion that the suit should not have been dismissed; that the plaintiff was entitled in it to a declaration of his title to the land. Their Lordships are of opinion that the suit should not have been dismissed; that the plaintiff was entitled in it to a declaration of his title to the land. It was not necessary for him to negative that the land was dedicated to religious or charitable purposes, a question upon which the Original and Appellate Courts have differed, and which, as the only Defendant was not entitled to maintain the wakf namath, and other persons would not be bound by an adverse decision, their Lordships do not decide. That declaration should be omitted from the decree. Their Lordships will humbly advise. Her Majesty to reverse the decree of the Appellate Court, and order the defendant to pay the costs of the appeal to that Court, and to affirm the decree of Mr. Justice Trevelyan, substituting for the words “the sole and absolute owner”-“lawfully entitled to possession” and after the words “in this suit mentioned”, omitting “and that the same have not been dedicated for religious or charitable purposes”. The Respondent will pay the costs of this appeal.” 19. In the present case, the plaintiff is not in such possession and the question of dispossession does not arise Calcutta Tramways Corporation is not a wrongdoer. 20. In the case of Nyer Service Society v. K. C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165 , the passage relied on is at paragraph 16 “The proposition of law on the subject has been summed up by Salmond on Torts (13 Edn.) at page 172 in following words: “The mere de facto and wrongful possession of land is a valid title of right against all persons who cannot show a better title in themselves, and is therefore sufficient to support an action of trespass against such persons, Just as a legal title to land without the possession of it is insufficient for this purpose, so conversely the possession of it without legal title is enough. In other words, no defendant in an action of trespass can plead to just tertii -- the right of possession outstanding in some third person-as against the fact of possession in the plaintiff. In other words, no defendant in an action of trespass can plead to just tertii -- the right of possession outstanding in some third person-as against the fact of possession in the plaintiff. The maxim of law is Adverse extraneous vitiose possession prodesse Solet, and if the plaintiff is in possession he jus tertii does not afford a defence.” Salmond, however, goes on to say: ‘But usually the plaintiff in an action of ejectment is not in possession: he relies upon his right to possession, unaccompanied by actual possession. In such a case he must recover by the strength of his own title, without any regard to the weakness of the defendants. The results, therefore, is that in action of ejectment the jus terti is in practice a good defence. This is sometimes spoken of as the doctrine of Doe d. Carter v. Barnard (1849) 13 QB 945”. Salmoud, however, makes two exceptions to this statement and the second he states thus: ‘Probably if the defendant’s possession is wrongful as against the plaintiff, the plaintiff may succed though he cannot show a good title: Doe d Hughes v. Dyball (1829) 3C and p 610, Davision v. Gent (1857) 1 H and N 744. But possession is prima facie evidence is not displaced by proof of title. If such prima facie evidence is not displaced by proof of title in a third person the plaintiff with prior possession will recover. So in (1865) 1Q B1 where a man inclosed waste land and died without having had 20 years possession, the heir of his devisee was held entitled to recover it against a person who entered upon it without any title. This decision, although long, doubtful, may now be regarded as authoritative in consequence of its express recognition of the Judicial Committee in Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73” Mr. Nambiar strongly relied upon the above exposition of the law and upon institutional comments by Wiren. The plea of jus terii in ejectment (1925) 41 LQR 139. Hargreaves “Terminology and Title in Ejectment” (1940) 56 LQR 346 and Holdsworth’s article in (1950) 56 LQR 479.” 21. The claim of the plaintiff in the present case is not on such basis. It claims title on the basis of adverse possession. Moreover the Calcutta Tramways, through Union of India, has a better title. It also comes within the exception pointed out. 22. The claim of the plaintiff in the present case is not on such basis. It claims title on the basis of adverse possession. Moreover the Calcutta Tramways, through Union of India, has a better title. It also comes within the exception pointed out. 22. In the case of Bishan Das & ors v. State of Punjab & ors AIR 1961 SC 1570 it was held as follows: “One R, with permission of the State, on behalf of the Joint family firm built a Dharamshala, temple and shops on land belonging to the State and managed the same during his life time The Dharamshala was built for the benefit of travelling public and the members of the public offered worship in the temple. After R’s death, the petitioners, the other members of the joint family, continued the management but subsequently the petitioners were dispossessed of the properties by an executive order passed by the S.D.O. in pursuance of direction given by the Deputy Commissioner and the management of the properties was placed in charge of the Municipal Committee. The petitioners filed a writ petition under Art 32 of the Constitution challenging the action of the Government. It was held that the petitioners could not be held to be trespassers in respect of the dharamsala, temple and shops; nor could it be held that the dharamsala, temple and shops belonged to the State, irrespective of the question whether the trust created was of a public or private nature. A trustee even of a public trust can be removed only by procedure known to law. He cannot be removed by an executive fiat. A person who bona fide puts up constructions on land belonging to others with their permission would not be a trespasser, nor would the buildings so constructed vest in the owner of the land by the application of the maxim qulcquld plantatur solo, solo credit. Hence, in respect of the dharamsala, temples and shops the State had not acquired any right whatsoever merely by reason of their being on land belonging to the State. If the State thought that the constructions should be removed or that State. Hence, in respect of the dharamsala, temples and shops the State had not acquired any right whatsoever merely by reason of their being on land belonging to the State. If the State thought that the constructions should be removed or that State. If the State thought that the constructions should be removed or that the condition as to resumption of the land should be removed or that the condition as to resumption of the land should be invoked, it was open to the State proceeded on the footing that the trust was a public trust it should have taken appropriate legal action for the removal of the trustee. It is well recognised that a suit under s. 92 Civil Procedure Code, may be brought against persons in possession of the trust property even if they claim adversely to the trust, that is, claim to be owners of the property or against person who deny the validity of the trust. The State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorizes their acts. The executive action take in this case by the State and its officers was destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. It was further held that the respondents had clearly violated the fundamental rights of the petitioners who were bona fide in possession by depriving them of the possession of the properties by executive orders and therefore the orders must be quashed and the respondents must be restrained from interfering with the petitioner in the management of those properties. 23. There is no question of executive fiat in this case. The facts of the present case are completely different. 24. In the case of M. Kallappa Setty v. M. V. Lakashminarayan Rao AIR 1972 SC 2299 , the passage relied on is set out as follows:- “So far as the question of possession is concerned, as mentioned earlier, both the trial Court and the first appellate court have accepted the plaintiff’s case that he was in possession of the suit site ever since he purchased the same in 1947. This is essentially a finding of fact. That finding is based on evidence. This is essentially a finding of fact. That finding is based on evidence. The High Court in our opinion erred in coming to the conclusion that the possession of the plaintiff after the sale deed in his favour is not a relevant circumstance. We are of the opinion that it is an extremely important circumstance. The plaintiff can on the strength of his possession resist interference from persons who have no better title than himself to the suit property. Once it is accepted, as the trial court and first appellate court have done, that the plaintiff was in possession of the property ever since 1947 then his possession has to be protected as against interference by some one who is not proved to have a better title than himself to the suit property. On the findings arrived at by the fact finding courts as regards possession, the plaintiff was entitled to the second relief asked for by him even if he had failed to prove his title satisfactorily. Therefore in our opinion the High Court was not right in interfeing with the judgment of the trail court as affirmed by the first appellate court regarding relief No. 2” (para 5) 25. There is no question of the plaintiff “on the strength of his possession” resisting interference by persons having “no better title” in the facts and circumstance of the case Calcutta. Tramways Corporation, having regard to its arrangements with Union, certainly have a better title than the plaintiff. 26. There is also merits in the contention made on behalf of the Union of India to the effect that the suit is bad for non-joinder of a necessary party. Title is claimed by way of adverse possession and this adverse possession is claimed against the Union of India, which has not been made a party to the suit. 27. On the question of balance of convenience also the learned Trial Judge was right to decide it against the plaintiff. We approve the reasons given by him. We may add that balance of convenience is a theory where generally only two parties are involved. The question involved is which of the parties will suffer more if such interim order of injunction is or is not passed. However where public interest is involved, that is of paramount consideration. We approve the reasons given by him. We may add that balance of convenience is a theory where generally only two parties are involved. The question involved is which of the parties will suffer more if such interim order of injunction is or is not passed. However where public interest is involved, that is of paramount consideration. In the present case this land is required for the purpose of shifting the tram track which is necessitated in connection with the construction of the second Hooghly River Bridge. The Second Hooghly River Bridge is being constructed for a number of years and it is not known how long it will take to completed the same. We shall take judicial notice of the fact that having a Second Bridge over the River Hooghly will benefit the members of the public not only staying in Calcutta or its neighbourhood, but having anything to do in Calcutta and its neighbourhood. This paramount public interest requires that there shall not be any injunction against proposed work of shifting by the Tramways. 28. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. All interim orders are vacated There will be no order as to costs. Prayer for continuation of interim order is made and rejected as it involves a place of land which is needed for a work which is a matter of public interest. In our opinion continuation of interim order would prejudicially affect the public interest. Sachi Kanta Hazari, J. I agree. Appeal dismissed.