ORDER: The opposite party was appointed as a Senior Accountant in the petitioner Company, which was a public limited company, 60% of whose share is held by a British Organisation in the U. K. and 40% of its share is held by Indian Share holders. The opposite party was appointed as the Senior Accountant with effect from 1st March, 1974 and subsequently was promoted to the post of Chief Accountant with effect from the 1st July, 1979 and till his resignation from his service on 2nd of August, 1985 he held the post of Financial Controller of the petitioner-company. When the opposite party was Financial Controller of the petitioner-Company, the company provided him with the Company’s rented flat at premises No. 310, Jodhpur Park, Calcutta 58, including one garage, one servant room on mezzanine floor at the said premises. The company also provided the opposite party with company’s Ambassador Car being No. WMB 7123, two Air Conditioners, one Refrigerator, five ceiling fans, one inverter with batteries, two geysers and also a telephone and other amenities attached to the said rented flat. The opposite party submitted his resignation from his service with the company out of his own with effect from 2nd August, 1985 and the said resignation was also accepted by the petitioner company on the same date. The opposite party also resigned from the membership of the Board of Trustees o the Company, Provident Fund, Gratuity Fund, Pension Fund, Junior Management Staff Pension Fund etc. 2. After his resignation the opposite party approached the company to permit him to stay in the said flat as well as to use the Company’s car and other amenities and facilities till 30th November, 1985 and the company allowed him to enjoy such facilities till that date on compassionate ground as is done in other cases of the officers who resigned from the service. The petitioner company by its letter dated 30th August, 1985 requested the opposite party to make over the company’s car and further intimated that if necessary, the company would arrange hired car for his use upto 30th November, 1985. The petitioner company by its letter dated 30th August, 1985 requested the opposite party to make over the company’s car and further intimated that if necessary, the company would arrange hired car for his use upto 30th November, 1985. Subsequently, however, the opposite party filed Title Suit No. 284 of 1985 in the 4th Court of the learned Munsif at Alipore against the petitioner-company inter alia, for declaration that the opposite party was and is in employment of the petitioner-company as its Financial Controller and also for cancellation of the letter of resignation dated 2nd August, 1985 and for permanent injunction. In the said suit the opposite party also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure supported by an Affidavit for temporary injunction restraining the petitioner-company, its men and agents from dispossessing the opposite party from the said flat and from removing the Ambassador car being No. WMB 7123 and other movables from the custody of the opposite party and from disconnecting and/or removing the telephone from the said flat and prayed for an ad interim order to that effect. 3. The learned Munsif by his order no 2 dated the 25th November, 1985 granted the ad interim order of maintaining status quo in respect of the possession of the said flat. Against the said ad interim order, the petitioner-company preferred and appeal being Misc Appeal No. 782 of 1985 and in the said appeal the petitioner-company subsequently raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the suit and took a plea that the suit as framed was barred under the Specific Relief Act and no relief as claimed by the opposite party in the plaint, could be granted as the nature of the pleading and the reilefs sought for in the plaint amounted to specific performance of contract of personal service, which relief cannot be granted by a Civil Court. The learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court at Alipore, 24 Parganas, however, by his judgment and order dated 16th May, 1986 dismissed the said appeal inter alia, holding that it was true that under s. 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act 196 the contract for personal service cannot be specifically enforced and the remedy of the employee is only to file a suit for damages for wrongful dismissed or for breach of contract and none disputed the said proposition of law, but the suit as framed by the opposite party was not a suit for declaration for specific performance of contract of service nor the suit was for declaration that his dismissal order was wrongful and as such the suit was prima facie maintainable as it would clearly come under s. 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Against the said order of the lower appellate court, the petitioner company moved this Court in revision and obtained the present Civil Order. 4. Dr. Mookherjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-company submitted before me that since the suit as framed by the opposite party squarely comes under s. 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1963, it is mot maintainable as the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to enforce the specific performance of the contract between “master” and “servant” and since the opposite party cannot get the reliefs as prayed for in the suit, he is also not entitled to get any ad interim relief by way of injunction in the suit in respect of such relief and both the courts below acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting ad interim injunction in favour of the opposite party Dr. Mookherjee in support of his contention relied upon a number of decisions including an upreported Division Bench Judgment of this Court delivered by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mookerjee (as His Lordship then was and the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mukul Gopal Mukherjee in F.M.A.T. No. 734 of 1984 Shalimar Paints Ltd. v. Moloy Mitter. Mr. Mitter learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party also referred to certain decisions of the Supreme Court and tried to distinguish the aforesaid unreported judgment of this Court in his own way. 5. Justice Mukul Gopal Mukherjee in F.M.A.T. No. 734 of 1984 Shalimar Paints Ltd. v. Moloy Mitter. Mr. Mitter learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party also referred to certain decisions of the Supreme Court and tried to distinguish the aforesaid unreported judgment of this Court in his own way. 5. After considering the decisions cited at the bar and also the aforesaid up-reported judgment of this Court in Shalimra Paints’ case (supra), I hold that the opposite party is not entitled to any interim relief as prayed for and both the courts below acted in excess of jurisdiction and also with material irregularity in granting ad interim relief to the opposite party as prayed for. The opposite party was an officer of the petitioner company which is described as a Company registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act. The opposite party does not hold any Civil Post under the State or under any authority which is an instrumentality of the State. The conditions of his service are not governed by any statute but prima facie by the terms of contract and therefore, no order of ad interim injunction ought to be made in respect of the dispute regarding personal service because the Civil Court might not to be in a position to enforce specific performance of such a contract of personal service. 6. presumably while making ex parte order of ad interim injuriction in the opposite party’s favour the Trial Court had no occasion to apply his mind regarding the above legal position relating to grant of injunction in respect of alleged breaches of contract of employment under the petitioner-company which is a company registered under the Companies Act. Neither that was within the scope of appeal before the lower appellate court. That question is therefore, kept open to be decided at the time of hearing of the suit but considering the facts and circumstance of the case I hold that prima face the opposite party is not entitled to get any ad interim relief by way of injunction in the suit since prima facie he is not entitled to get the permanent reliefs as sought for in the plaint and a person who presumably is not entitled to get a particular relief in the permanent form in the suit, can not get such relief in an ad interim form therein. 7. 7. The order of the lower appellate court is therefore set aside and the ex parte order granting ad interim injunction by the Trial Court is also vacated but in the interest of justice and equity however, the petitioner-company is directed to deposit in the Trial Court either in case or by way furnishing security in the shape of Fixed Deposit a sum of Rs. 25,000/- within three weeks from date and that will remain in court until further order of the Trial Court. 8. I express no opinion regarding the merits of the suit and I make it clear that the observations made in this judgment have been made only for the purpose of disposing of the present Civil Order. The Civil Order is therefore, disposed of as above. 9. There will be no order as to costs. Let the order be communicated to the Trial Court forthwith and the Deputy Registrar, Appellate Side will submit a report within a fortnight from date whether the order has been so communicated or not. Orders of the Court below set aside.