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1986 DIGILAW 448 (KAR)

KARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD v. HALAPPA

1986-12-01

M.P.CHANDRAKANTARAJ

body1986
CHANDRAKANTHARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the Karnataka electricity Board (for short the 'board') it is directed against the Judgment and decree dated 3rd July 1986 in O. S. No, 19 of 1983 on the file of the Civil Judge, gadag. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT Halappa, is a transport carrier. He was carrying thirty-two docras of cotton belonging to various cotton growers from Hebbal in Shirahatti taluk to Hubli Market on 8-4-1981. His vehicle had the registration mark MYW 8383. The goods belonged to persons who were named in Annexure to the plaint at Schedule-A. While thirty-two docras of cotton lint was thus being carried on the way, at Shiggli Toll Naka in Lakshmeshwar Town a tire accident took place due to the short circuit by touching the over-head electric wirelines belonging to the Board. (First defendant is the Board ; 2nd defendant is the Chief engineer of the Board and the 3rd defendant is the Assistant Executive Engineer of the Board, Laxmeshwar, taluka Shirahatti, District Dharwad ). Plaintiff pleaded that the over-head electric wire lines were at a height of 14 to 15 feet from the ground and were not guarded with safety covers. They were stung very loosely giving room for sagness which resulted in the accident. He pleaded that the sagness, height maintained, the span loose conductors etc. ; were all contrary to the provisions of the Indian electricity Act. In the circumstances ha prayed for a decree for a sum of Rs. 52,904-35 ps as damages for thirty-two docras of Jayadhar cotton lint that was burnt and interest thereon at 12 percent per annum as it was due to the fault and negligence of the defendants. ( 3 ) THE defendants in their written statement contended that the suit of the plaintiff was not true and bona fide and was not tenable in law. They further contended that the Court had no Jurisdiction. They also further contended that the suit was barred by time not having been filed within six months from the date of accident. They denied the contention of the plaintiff that there were loose conductors touching each other while the plaintiffs' lorry was passing the said spot. They denied the other allegations in regard to the span, height of the sagging wires etc. They denied the contention of the plaintiff that there were loose conductors touching each other while the plaintiffs' lorry was passing the said spot. They denied the other allegations in regard to the span, height of the sagging wires etc. They asserted that, periodical checks for maintenance were carried at Lakshmesh- war town, which is situated in the main road where number of vehicles, buses, loaded lorries and trucks move about. They, in substance, pleaded that there was no negligence on their part. They alleged that the plaintiff was carrying cotton docras without adopting safety methods and without taking care of the said docras. They however; admitted that it was not possible to ascertain the reason for the accident. It could have been the plaintiffs mistake like throwing beedis or cigarates on the cotton docras or somebody else throwing burning cigarates etc. , ( 4 ) ON such pleadings as many as five issues were framed. They are as follows :1. Whether the plaintiff proves that on 8-4-1981, 32 Jayadhar cotton lint docras loaded in lorry were burnt causing damage of Rs. 52,904-35 due to short circuit on account of negligence in maintaining over-head electric wire lines across Shigli-Laxmesh- war road near Shigli toll naka ? 2. Whether this court has jurisdiction to try this suit. 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by time. 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim interest of Rs. 11,411-00 at the rate of 12% p. m. ? ( 5 ) WHAT amount plaintiff isentitled to recover? 5. All issues were found in favour of the plaintiff and the suit was decreed as prayed. Therefore the present appeal. ( 6 ) WE do not propose to refer to the evidence led by the parties in the suit in the trial Court. Now before us, sri C. R. V. Swamy, learned Counsel for the appellant-Board has urged only three legal contentions on which the appeal should succeed of fail. Those contentions may be stated in the form of the following propositions :- (1) The plaintiff-respondent could not maintain the suit as admittedly he was not the owner of 32 docras of jayadhar cotton lint which was burnt? (2) That a sum of Rs. Those contentions may be stated in the form of the following propositions :- (1) The plaintiff-respondent could not maintain the suit as admittedly he was not the owner of 32 docras of jayadhar cotton lint which was burnt? (2) That a sum of Rs. 52,904-35 Ps awarded as damages was unsupported by any evidence in regard to the value of the property said to have been burnt on account of the negligence of the defendant-Board ? (3) That interest from 8-4-1981 could not have been awarded on the amount claimed as damages till the date of suit ? ( 7 ) THE first-contention though strenuously urged at the beginning was later practically given up by the learned counsel for the Board having regard to the provisions made in Section 180 of the Contract Act. The defendant never disputed that the plaintiff was the carrier and as such the bailee of the cotton or docras which had been entrusted to him by the producers whose names he had disclosed in the plaint schedule. As long as that was not disputed, either the owners or the Bailee or the carrier could file the suit to recover damages on grounds of negligence. Therefore, we have hesitation to sustain the conclusion reached by the Court-below that the suit was maintainable by the plaintiff. ( 8 ) THE second contention that when there was no basis or evidence to arrive at the figure claimed by the plaintiff as damages, in our view, is also without substance. Plaintiff estimated the value of the cotton burnt at the sum he claimed by way of damages In the course of his oral evidence, he asserted that that was the value of the cotton. As against that the Board in its defence in the written statement did not dispute the claim. It concentrated only on denying its liability and on denying its negligence as the cause for the accident. Therefore, the trial Court came to the conclusion that in the absence of denial of the assertion made in his oral evidence and in the absence of any denial by the board in the written statement it should be presumed to have admitted the value. If the above position is what really obtains in the records then it cannot be said that it is without any foundation. If the above position is what really obtains in the records then it cannot be said that it is without any foundation. The trial Court had no choice but to award what was claimed in the absence of any issue being joined by the defendants on the value of the goods lost in the fire accident by the negligence of the defendant-Board. Therefore, this contention is liable to be rejected and it is so rejected. ( 9 ) THE last contention is that no interest could have been awarded by the trial Court as it amounted to awarding interest by way of damages. The learned Counsel has brought to our notice a number of decisions. In the case of mahabir Prasad Rungta v Durga Datta (AIR, 1961 S. C. 990) Supreme Court held that it was well settled that interest as damages cannot be awarded. But on the facts of that case, it was further held that interest up to date of suit, was not claimable. As regards interest pendente lite until the date of realisation ; such interest was within the discretion of the court. This ruling has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in sowcar T. Thimmappa v S. L. Prasad (1977 (2) Kar. LJ. 346) and explained in the following manner:-"this concerns the award of interest prior to suit. The Court below has awarded a sum of Rs. 2,880/- as interest prior to the suit on the view that grant of such interest, in the circumstances of the case, is warranted by and permissible under the Interest Act, 1939. It was conceded before us by Sri Keshava lyengar, learned Counsel for the respondent, that the provisions of Interest Act were not extended to the then State of Mysore and that no recourse could be had to the provisions of that Statute in the present case. " ( 10 ) INTEREST for the period prior to the commencement of the suit is claimable either under an agreement, or usuage of trade or under a statutory provision or under the Interest Act. Interest is also awarded in some cases by Courts of equity. It is equally well settled that interest as damages cannot be awarded (See : Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. , ltd. v Ruttanji Ramji (AIR 1938 PC 67) and Mahabir Prasad Rungta v Durga dutta ( AIR 1961 SC 990 ) ). Interest is also awarded in some cases by Courts of equity. It is equally well settled that interest as damages cannot be awarded (See : Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. , ltd. v Ruttanji Ramji (AIR 1938 PC 67) and Mahabir Prasad Rungta v Durga dutta ( AIR 1961 SC 990 ) ). In the present case, admittedly there is no contract to pay interest ; nor is the grant of interest sought to be supported by any usage or under any statutory provision". It is true it is the consistent view taken that till the date of suit on damage awarded, no interest could be awarded by the Court as that would amount to awarding damages by way of interest. But the fact is, the Court has competence otherwise to grant interest is evident from the passage in SOWCAR T. THIMMAPPA's case. It is seen the grant of interest if supported by any satutory provision such interest may be awarded by the Court. In sowcar Thimmappa's ease Supra Interest Act was not extended to Mysore state as it was then. Under clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the act it is provided, if the proceedings do not relate to any such debt, referred to in clause (a) of that sub-section then from then date mentioned in that regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest would be claimed, the Court may award interest from the date of such notice. ( 11 ) IT is not disputed that the defendant-Board was called upon to pay the damages by a notice dated22-4-1981 issued through the Counsel of the Plaintiff. That was followed up by yet another notice in the year 1982 before filing the suit. The accident occurred on 8-4-1981. Therefore, the only mistake mads by the trial Court is in awarding interest from 8-4-1981 and not from 22-4 1981. By virtue of the provisions contained in the Interest Act, 1978, under section 3, interest could be awarded even on damages is clear to our mind. The difference of interest for a pericd of 14 days would not in our mind seriously prejudice the defendants. The sum which is in excess is under Rs. 500/ -. By virtue of the provisions contained in the Interest Act, 1978, under section 3, interest could be awarded even on damages is clear to our mind. The difference of interest for a pericd of 14 days would not in our mind seriously prejudice the defendants. The sum which is in excess is under Rs. 500/ -. We, therefore, do not propose to interfere with the judgment and decree though technically the appellants' are entitled to deduct that excess amount of interest. ( 12 ) WE are persuaded to take this view in the light of the assertion made by Sri W K. Joshi, learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, who has entered caveat for the plaintiff. He has, on the suggestion made by this Court, filed today in Court affidavits of respondent- plaintiff as well as all of the owners of the cotton bales or docras which were entrusted to the plaintiff and which got burnt as per plaint averment stating that they have been paid the value of the goods entrusted as far back as in the year 1981 itself. Though the affidavits were not called for as evidence we have taken them on record more to satisfy our conscience that no injustice would be done to the Board. ( 13 ) THEREFORE we dismiss this appeal and confirm the findings of the trial Court. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .