Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition is filed against the judgment of the District Judge, Ernakulam in A. S. No. 78 of 1979, in his capacity as the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. That appeal was filed by the present petitioner against the order in P.W.A. No. 58 of 1976 of the Labour Court, Quilon which is the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 58 of 1976. 2. The respondent was the Secretary of the petitioner-Society. She was kept out of employment for a period from 24-11-1975 to 31-8-1976 without payment of salary. She filed P.W.A. No. 58 of 1976 under the Payment of Wages Act, claiming an amount of Rs. 2,177.50 as unpaid wages. The Authority allowed the application to the extent of Rs. 1,526.50 over-ruling the objection of the petitioner-Society on a point of jurisdiction that the dispute should have been referred to and could be decided only by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under S.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. The Authority also found that the petitioner-society bad no right to deny wages to the respondent employee. It was against that order that the petitioner filed A.S. No. 78 of 1979 under S.17(a) of the Payment of Wages Act. Narendran J., who heard the matter, felt that the question whether the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 was ousted by the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 required a decision by a Bench of this court. 3. The relevant statutory provisions on which considerable reliance was placed by the petitioner are S.69 and 100 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. 3. The relevant statutory provisions on which considerable reliance was placed by the petitioner are S.69 and 100 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. The relevant provision of S.69 reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any taw for the time being in force, if a dispute arises - (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; or such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision, and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute " A dispute is defined in S.2(1) of the Act as meaning: "any matter touching the business, constitution, establishments or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a society, whether such claim be admitted or not." Evidently, the dispute relating to payment of wages may, perhaps, be a dispute as defined in the Act. S.100 of the Act, imposes a bar of jurisdiction of courts and provides: "No civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter for which provision is made in this Act." The effect of this bar is to deprive any civil or revenue court of jurisdiction in respect of any matter for which provision is made in the Act. Obviously, a civil or revenue court will have no jurisdiction to entertain and decide a dispute as defined in the Act and which has to be referred to the Registrar under S.69 or the Act. 4. It is not seriously contended before us that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act is a civil or revenue court. If it is not one such, the bar under S.100 will not be operative. A provision similar to S.69 of the Act has been understood to deny jurisdiction only to civil courts and in respect of matters which are capable of being determined by civil courts. 5. With the enactment of the Payment of Wages Act and the constitution of Authorities thereunder, the dispute relating to unpaid or delayed wages are to be determined by the Authority under the Act and not by ordinary civil court. 5. With the enactment of the Payment of Wages Act and the constitution of Authorities thereunder, the dispute relating to unpaid or delayed wages are to be determined by the Authority under the Act and not by ordinary civil court. S.22 of the Payment of Wages Act provides that: "No Court shall entertain any suit for the recovery of wages or of any deduction from wages in so far as the sum so claimed - (a) forms the subject of an application under S.15 which has been presented by the plaintiff and which is pending before the authority appointed under that section or of an appeal under S.17; or (b) has formed the subject of a direction under S.15 in favour of the plaintiff; or (c) has been adjudged, in any proceeding under S.15. not to be owed to the plaintiff; or (d) could have been recovered by an application under S.15." It is evident, therefore, that no civil court is competent to entertain or decide a claim for recovery of wages which is subject to or could have been recovered under S.15 of the Payment of Wages Act. The bar under S 100 of the Co-operative Societies Act operates only against civil or Revenue Courts. The bar provided thereunder will not be operative to take away the jurisdiction of Authorities other than civil or revenue courts to entertain and decide claims for delayed or unpaid wages. 6. The question which is yet to be decided is whether the non-obstante clause, with which S.69 begins, shall take away the jurisdiction of an Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to decide a question relating to delayed or unpaid wages, which is also within the definition of "dispute" under S.2(i) of the Act. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and the District Court as the Appellate Authority found that the dispute relating to unpaid wages is capable of being entertained and decided by Authorities under the Payment of Wages Act as also by the Registrar under S.69 of the Co-operative Societies Act. There being no exclusion and S.100 of the Act not being operative, the authorities concurrently found that they were competent to decide the dispute. 7. There being no exclusion and S.100 of the Act not being operative, the authorities concurrently found that they were competent to decide the dispute. 7. Shri. S. Gopalakrishna Iyer, counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the non-obstante clause has the effect of denying jurisdiction to any Authority to decide a dispute falling under any of the clauses of S.69(1) of the Act. It is true that S.69 of the Act provides that disputes enumerated in clauses (a) to (h) shall be referred to the Registrar for decision notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force. The next portion of the section viz., no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute, however, makes it clear that the jurisdiction of courts alone are taken away and that the non-obstante clause is operative only in cases where the disputes are capable of being determined by courts In this state of the law, it is difficult to accept the assertion that the jurisdiction of all, other than the Registrar has been excluded by S.69 of the Co-operative Societies Act. 8. The same conclusion can be reached on the basis of precedents of this court. The earliest of the decisions in this regard and also the most eloquent was the decision rendered by M. S. Menon J., as he then was speaking for a Bench in Malabar Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v State of Kerala, 1963 KLT 705. The controversy involved in that decision was whether a reference of a dispute, between the Co-operative Society audits employees relating to wages to be paid and other service conditions, was competent in the light of S.51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932. In his inimitable style M. S. Menon, C. J., observed: "Co-operative societies are creatures of statute, controlled by their contracts. Industrial disputes stem, not from the subtle refinements of contractual obligations, but from the rougher jurisprudence of social justice and readjustment. The uplands of the Industrial Tribunals are out of bounds to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies." In Kerala State Handloom Weavers' Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1964 KLJ 175, the same Division Bench held with reference to "S.60(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act, that "the arbitration proceedings contemplated by S.60(1) of the T.C Co-operative Societies Act. The uplands of the Industrial Tribunals are out of bounds to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies." In Kerala State Handloom Weavers' Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1964 KLJ 175, the same Division Bench held with reference to "S.60(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act, that "the arbitration proceedings contemplated by S.60(1) of the T.C Co-operative Societies Act. 1951 is not concerned with industrial disputes and notwithstanding the said sub-section, industrial disputes can be referred for adjudication under S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The question is not whether the dispute referred to adjudication touches the business of a co-operative society; the question really is whether that dispute comes within the category of disputes covered by S.60(1) of the T. C. Co-operative Societies Act. 1951 The purpose of Chap.13 of the T.C. Co-operative Societies Act, 1951 the Chapter in which S.60(1) occurs - is not to resolve all controversies touching the business of co-operative societies under the provisions of that Chapter; but to resolve only such controversies as can be resolved in an ordinary court of law. In other words, the arbitration provided by Chap.13 is an alternative to the normal processes of the ordinary Courts and not to the extraordinary process of adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. which has been designed to deal with controversies which by their very nature are outside the purview of ordinary litigation". 9. This trend of thought was followed by Govindan Nair, J., as he then was, in the decision reported in K. F. Service Co-op. Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1973 KLT. 523. again speaking for a Division Bench. In emphasising the distinction between the powers of the Registrar, who had to function as an alternative forum for determination of civil disputes, it was said, that the Tribunals which were constituted under special enactments can, in disregard of well-known concepts of law, readjust rights and obligations in a manner conceived to be Justin the light of socio-economic changes that are taking place. 10. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the decision reported in Rambhau v. Vinkar Co-op. Society, AIR 1966 Bombay 187, relied on the decision in Kerala State Handloom Weavers Co-op. Society v. State of Kerala. 10. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the decision reported in Rambhau v. Vinkar Co-op. Society, AIR 1966 Bombay 187, relied on the decision in Kerala State Handloom Weavers Co-op. Society v. State of Kerala. 1964 KLJ 175, and held that the dispute referred to the Registrar under S.91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, (which corresponds to S.69 of our Act) must be such as a civil court can take cognizance of and try. 11. In Sankara Wariyar v. North Malabar District Co-op. Supply & Marketing Society Ltd., 1982 KLJ 124. Bhat, J., considered the question whether the provisions of S.69 of the Co-operative Societies Act excluded the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in a matter involving dismissal of an employee of a co-operative society. It was held, following the earlier decisions referred to above, that S.69 of the Act provides only an alternative to the normal processes of ordinary courts, and if an ordinary court cannot adjudicate on the dispute, it means that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies cannot also adjudicate on it. it is true that the decisions in 1973 KLT 523 and 1982 KLJ 124 dealt with cases of dismissal and were largely influenced by the fact that the Registrar could not order reinstatement of a dismissed employee, as much as a civil court could not enforce a service contract by forcing a former employee on an unwilling employer. But the principles involved are clear to at only in respect of such disputes as can be competently decided by a civil court can the bar of jurisdiction under S.100 of the Act be operative, and only in respect of such disputes can the Registrar claim exclusive jurisdiction. We have already found that the Authorities under the Payment of Wages Act are not courts. We do so bold notwithstanding S.18 of the Payment of Wages Act which confers on authorities under that Act limited powers of a civil court in some matters and deem such authorities as Civil Courts for certain purposes. That provision is necessary only because of the fact that such authorities are not civil courts and such powers have to be conferred by express provisions. If they are not Courts, the exclusion of jurisdiction either under S.69 or S.100 of the Co-operative Societies Act will not be operative to deny jurisdiction to such authorities. 12. That provision is necessary only because of the fact that such authorities are not civil courts and such powers have to be conferred by express provisions. If they are not Courts, the exclusion of jurisdiction either under S.69 or S.100 of the Co-operative Societies Act will not be operative to deny jurisdiction to such authorities. 12. In this view, the finding of the Original and Appellate Authorities, that they have jurisdiction to decide the question of payment of wages is unassailable. We, therefore, hold that the Authorities under the Payment of Wages Act had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions contained in S.69 and 100 of the Co-operative Societies Act to decide the question as to whether an employee was entitled to claim delayed or unpaid wages by resort to proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act. 13. We do not feel that we are called upon to consider the propriety of the findings concurrently come to by the original and appellate authorities on the question of denial of wages due to the respondent We do not find any such error of law or jurisdiction or misdirection in law or perversity in the appreciation of evidence as to attract the provisions of S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revision petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. But, in the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.